Home > Case Law Studies > On Deontological Dialectic: My Written Submission January 7, 2016 Kuala lumpur

On Deontological Dialectic: My Written Submission January 7, 2016 Kuala lumpur

proposition

DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA
(BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN)

RAYUAN SIVIL NO.W-01(IM)(NCVC)-247-08/ 2015

DI ANTARA

MOHAMAD IZAHAM BIN MOHAMED YATIM … PERAYU

DAN

1. NORINA BINTI ZAINOL ABIDIN
2. INSPEKTOR SITI MAZIRA BINTI ZAKARIA
3. INSPEKTOR MOHD RAZIF BIN MD ZAHID
4. MAZELAN BIN JAMALUDDIN
5. NURUL ASHIQIN BINTI ZULKIFLI
6. NUR WAHIDA BINTI MD. KHAIRUDDIN
7. TAN SRI ABDUL GANI PATAIL, PEGUAM NEGARA
8. ZAKI ASYRAF BIN ZUBIR
9. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN

[Dalam perkara Mahkamah Tinggi Sivil Kuala Lumpur
Guaman Sivil No. 21NCVC-14-03/2014]

RINGKASAN HUJAHAN PERAYU

Yang Arif-Yang Arif,

Pendahuluan

Rayuan ini adalah terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Tuan Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera yang membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden untuk membatalkan Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 pada 7 Julai 2015.

Kronologi Peristiwa Kes Rayuan:

Kronologi Peristiwa Kes Rayuan ini seperti di muka surat 1 hingga 6 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama.

Kronologi Fakta:

Kronologi Fakta Kes Rayuan ini seperti di muka surat 2 hingga 28 Kronologi Fakta yang difailkan pada 24 November 2015.
Hujahan:

1. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan mengguna pakai Pembelaan Responden-Responden yang masih tertakluk kepada suatu pembuktian yang ketat berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang belum dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Tinggi melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(a) Pembelaan Responden-Responden masih tertakluk kepada suatu pembuktian yang ketat berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang belum dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Tinggi melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(b) Walau bagaimanapun, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi mengguna pakai Pembelaan Responden-Responden tersebut apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 mengikut perenggan 2 Alasan Penghakiman (muka surat 26 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Pembelaan Responden-Responden bukanlah suatu bukti tetapi hanya suatu pernyataan bagi pembelaan Responden-Responden yang menjawab tuntutan Perayu dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan.

(d) Oleh itu, tidak memadai hanya sekadar “mengekstrak” (gleaned) fakta-fakta tertentu daripada Pernyataan Tuntutan, Pembelaan dan afidavit maka Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah dapat membuat keputusan bahawa Perayu tiada kausa tindakan terhadap Responden-Responden memandangkan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dalam perenggan 2 Alasan Penghakiman menyatakan “The brief facts, in so far as they are relevant to this claim, and as can be gleaned from the Statement of Claim, Defence and Affidavits, are as follows”.

(e) Perayu menyokong hujahan ini dengan merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Agung, Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 [TAB 25 IA/(P)]:
“[13] The principles for striking out pursuant to O 18 r 19 of the RHC 1980 are well settled. In Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, the Supreme Court ruled:
The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clard Ltd), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable’ (see AG to Duchy of Lancaster v L 7 NW Rly Co) …

[14] A striking out application is not a trial on affidavits. It is not an application where the parties have to adduce evidence to establish the merits of their case. The court should not conduct a minute examination of the documents and the facts of the case. So long as the claim on the face of it discloses some cause of action or raises some question fit to be tried it should not be struck out. The mere fact the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out.

[15] A striking out order should not be made summarily by the court if there is issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration. It should also not be made if there is issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial, (see Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565 (Federal Court)).

[16] The test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder’s case is that the claim on the face of it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’. The stress is not only on the word ‘unsustainable’ but also on the word ‘obviously’ ie the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into a lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/or fact, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at trial.”

(f) Hujahan Perayu berdasarkan kes Sivarasa Rasiah & Ors v Che Hamzah Che Ismail & Ors [2012] 1 MLJ 473 [TAB 26 IA/(P)] di perenggan 13,14, 15 dan 16 seperti yang berikut:

“[13] The principles for striking out pursuant to O 18 r 19 of the RHC 1980 are well settled. In Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, the Supreme Court ruled:
The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clard Ltd), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable’ (see AG to Duchy of Lancaster v L 7 NW Rly Co) …

[14] A striking out application is not a trial on affidavits. It is not an application where the parties have to adduce evidence to establish the merits of their case. The court should not conduct a minute examination of the documents and the facts of the case. So long as the claim on the face of it discloses some cause of action or raises some question fit to be tried it should not be struck out. The mere fact the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out.

[15] A striking out order should not be made summarily by the court if there is issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration. It should also not be made if there is issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial, (see Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565 (Federal Court)).

[16] The test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder’s case is that the claim on the face of it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’. The stress is not only on the word ‘unsustainable’ but also on the word ‘obviously’ ie the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into a lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/or fact, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at trial.”

(g) Implikasi yang jelas daripada keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur ini ialah pihak penguat kuasa boleh sewenang-wenangnya menceroboh hak individu bagi tujuan penyiasatan tanpa mengambil kira sama ada ada syak yang munasabah atau bukti-bukti yang benar-benar relevan disita atau dirampas bagi tujuan pendakwaan dan pembuktian kes di mahkamah.

(h) Selain daripada itu, hak-hak individu yang dijamin di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan tidak dihormati.

(i) Dalam hal ini, sekiranya terdapat keputusan Mahkamah seperti keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur ini maka pihak pendakwa raya boleh mendakwa mana-mana individu sewenang-wenangnya tanpa bukti yang kukuh dan tanpa berlandaskan prinsip-prinsip undang-undang keterangan yang mantap.

2. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan mengguna pakai afidavit-afidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Peguam Kanan Persekutuan yang tiada pengetahuan mengenai perbicaraan Kes Tangkap No.2-83-7119-2009 (“Kes Tangkap Tersebut’) dan mengemukakan ekshibit “ARBAD-1” iaitu izin pendakwaan yang merupakan dokumen yang dipertikaikan oleh Perayu dan Responden-Responden dan tertakluk kepada pembuktian dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(a) Responden-Responden di perenggan 28 Pembelaan menyatakan seperti yang berikut (muka surat 112 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama):
“Selanjutnya Defendan-Defendan menyatakan bahawa Defendan Keempat telah mengeluarkan izin di bawah Seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 secara sah dan berlandaskan undang-undang sebelum pendakwaan ke atas Plaintif dibuat di bawah Seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta 620.”

(b) Selain daripada itu, Responden-Responden di perenggan 29.1 Pembelaan menegaskan seperti yang berikut (muka surat 112 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama):
“Keizinan bertulis oleh Timbalan Pendakwaraya menurut Peruntukkan Seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 telah dikeluarkan oleh Defendan Keempat pada 6.11.2009.”

(c) Daripada perenggan di atas jelas sekali bahawa tiada pernyataan dalam Pembelaan Responden-Responden bahawa izin pendakwaan tersebut ada dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Majistret untuk Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

(d) Perayu dalam perenggan 68 Pernyataan Tuntutan telah menyatakan bahawa Perayu akan mengemukakan nota keterangan dan rakaman CRT Kes Tangkap Tersebut untuk menunjukkan bahawa ekshibit “P-1” Kes Tangkap Tersebut sebenarnya borang serah menyerah dan bukan keizinan bertulis (muka surat 90 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(e) Jadi, persoalan timbul bagaimana Peguam Kanan Persekutuan boleh mendeposkan dalam perenggan 10 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan-Defendan yang diikrarkan pada 24 September 2014 bahawa “Izin bertulis yang ditandatangani oleh Defendan Keempat telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah tersebut dengan sewajarnya dan ditandakan sebagai “Ekshibit-P1” (muka surat 163 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama) yang ditandakan sebagai ekshibit “ARBAD-1”.

(f) Perayu dalam perenggan-perenggan 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 dan 14 Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif No.2 yang diikrarkan pada 7 Oktober 2014 telah mempertikaikan pengemukaan ekshibit “ARBAD-1”oleh Peguam Kanan Persekutuan (muka surat 167-168 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(g) Perayu turut membantah pengemukaan ekshibit “ARBAD-1” kerana Peguam Kanan Persekutuan bukanlah Timbalan Pendakwa Raya yang mengendalikan Kes Tangkap Tersebut (muka surat 168 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(h) Di samping itu, timbul persoalan daripada mana Peguam Kanan Persekutuan memperoleh ekshibit “ARBAD-1”.

(i) Sekiranya ekshibit “ARBAD-1” benar-benar telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah Majistret untuk Kes Tangkap Tersebut (dinafikan), timbul satu lagi persoalan mengapa Responden Kelima tidak mengikrarkan afidavit bagi mengesahkan perkara tersebut.

(j) Mengikut Aturan 41 Kaedah 5 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012, afidavit hanya boleh mengandungi fakta yang boleh dibuktikan dengan pengetahuan deponen [TAB 1 IA/(P)]:
“Contents of affidavit (O. 41, r. 5)

5. (1) Subject to Order 14, rules 2(2) and 4(2), to paragraph (2) of this rule and to any order made under Order 38, rule 3, an affidavit may contain only such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove.”

(k) Peguam Kanan Persekutuan dalam mengikrarkan Afidavit Jawapan Responden-Responden dengan mengemukakan ekshibit “ARBAD-1” tidak mematuhi Aturan 41 Kaedah 5(1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

(l) Perayu berhujah bahawa Responden-Responden terikat dengan perenggan-perenggan 28 dan 29.1 Pembelaan mereka yang bercanggah dengan perenggan 10 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan-Defendan yang diikrarkan oleh Peguam Kanan Persekutuan.

(m) Perayu merujuk kepada kes State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490 [TAB 27 IA/(P)] seperti yang berikut:
“Parties are bound by their pleadings and we do not think that the appellant should on the admitted facts of this case be allowed to avoid vicarious liability merely on the bare fact that there was such an administrative circular relating to the prohibition.”

(n) Perayu juga merujuk kepada kes Chan Min Swee v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2000] 7 CLJ 1[TAB 28 IA/(P)], Abdul Malik Ishak J (pada ketika itu) menyatakan bahawa afidavit hanya boleh mendeposkan fakta yang dalam pengetahuan deponen:
“…It would certainly not be a proper course of action for the defendant to undertake by filing an affidavit to dispute the legal effect of a document since the role of an affidavit is limited to the purpose of deposing to a state of facts and not in regard to a question of law. Order 41 r. 5 of the RHC states as follows:

(1) Subject to Order 14 rules 2(2) and 4(2), to paragraph (2) of this rule and to any order made under Order 38 rule 3,an affidavit may contain only such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove.

(2) An affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in interlocutory proceedings may contain statements of information or belief with the sources and grounds thereof.
Only the facts must be deposed to in affidavits. The law, especially the construction of the letter in question, remains the domain of the court to reflect and expound.”
(o) Pernyataan di perenggan 10 Afidavit Jawapan Responden-Responden yang diikrarkan oleh Peguam Kanan Persekutuan pada 24 September 2014 bercanggah dengan Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur bertarikh 5.10.2011 yang membuat keputusan bahawa izin pendakwaan tidak dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Majistret untuk Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan prosiding Kes Tangkap Tersebut terbatal (‘nullity’) (muka surat 170-172 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(p) Dalam kes Lee Ah Chor v Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 428 [TAB 29 IA/(P)], Mahkamah Agung memutuskan bahawa apabila isu tidak dibangkitkan dalam pliding maka isu tersebut tidak boleh dihujahkan semasa rayuan seperti yang berikut:
“All these three cases deal with a similar point, ie that where a vital issue was not raised in the pleadings it could not be allowed to be argued and to succeed on appeal.”

(q) Hujahan Perayu berdasarkan kes Sivarasa Rasiah & Ors v Che Hamzah Che Ismail & Ors [2012] 1 MLJ 473 [TAB 26 IA/(P)] Mahkamah Rayuan di perenggan 13,14, 15 dan 16 memutuskan seperti yang berikut:
“[13] The principles for striking out pursuant to O 18 r 19 of the RHC 1980 are well settled. In Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, the Supreme Court ruled:
The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clard Ltd), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable’ (see AG to Duchy of Lancaster v L 7 NW Rly Co) …

[14] A striking out application is not a trial on affidavits. It is not an application where the parties have to adduce evidence to establish the merits of their case. The court should not conduct a minute examination of the documents and the facts of the case. So long as the claim on the face of it discloses some cause of action or raises some question fit to be tried it should not be struck out. The mere fact the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out.

[15] A striking out order should not be made summarily by the court if there is issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration. It should also not be made if there is issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial, (see Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565 (Federal Court)).

[16] The test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder’s case is that the claim on the face of it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’. The stress is not only on the word ‘unsustainable’ but also on the word ‘obviously’ ie the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into a lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/or fact, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at trial.”

(r) Oleh itu, terdapat percanggahan dan pertikaian fakta mengenai keizinan bertulis Kes Tangkap Tersebut yang seharusnya diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

3. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa Responden Kedua telah merampas beberapa artikel termasuk ‘thumb drive’ dan ‘sebuah ‘hard disk’ walaupun Perayu memplidkan di perenggan 14 Pernyataan Tuntutan, hanya ‘thumb drive’ yang dirampas dan pemilikan ‘hard disk’ tersebut sama ada milik Perayu tidak berjaya dibuktikan kerana Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Yang Arif Datuk Su Geok Yiam semasa rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut telah melepaskan Perayu daripada sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan mengambil kira pernyataan di perenggan 15.8 Pembelaan bahawa Responden Kedua telah merampas beberapa artikel termasuk ‘thumb drive’ dan ‘sebuah ‘hard disk’ walaupun pernyataan ini tertakluk kepada keterangan yang perlu diberikan oleh Responden Kedua dan juga keterangan dokumentar dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(b) Pernyataan mengenai artikel yang dirampas oleh Responden Kedua semasa serbuan dibuat pada 13.7.2009 bercanggah dengan perenggan 14 Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu (muka surat 76 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama) dan oleh itu, tertakluk kepada keterangan yang perlu diberikan oleh Perayu dan juga keterangan dokumentar dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(c) Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dalam membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 gagal mengambil kira fakta bahawa Yang Arif Hakim Datuk Su Geok Yiam semasa rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut telah membuat keputusan bahawa pemilikan ‘hard disk’ yang dikatakan dirampas oleh Responden Kedua sama ada milik Perayu tidak berjaya dibuktikan oleh Responden Kelima dalam perenggan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu (muka surat 93 hingga 101 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(d) Selain daripada itu, Yang Arif Datuk Su Geok Yiam telah membuat keputusan bahawa Borang Senarai Geledah yang dibuat oleh Responden Kedua dan dikemukakan kepada Responden Kelapan oleh Responden Kelima telah dipertikaikan kerana berbeza dengan Borang Senarai Geledah yang diberikan pada hari serbuan, 13.7.2009 dalam perenggan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 93 hingga 101 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(e) Oleh itu, cara penyiasatan Responden Kedua berkenaan penggeledahan pada 13.7.2009 yang berkait rapat dengan persoalan pemilikan ‘hard disk’ yang dikatakan dirampas oleh Responden Kedua sama ada milik Perayu perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

4. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa barang kes telah dikemukakan kepada Responden Ketiga di IPK Pulau Pinang walaupun dalam perenggan-perenggan 15.10 dan 19.2 Pembelaan Responden-Responden, terdapat dua kali penyerahan barang kes menyebabkan fakta ini diragui dan tertakluk kepada pembuktian dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(a) Perenggan 7 Pembelaan Responden-Responden menyatakan bahawa alamat penyampaian Responden Ketiga adalah di Jabatan Siasatan Jenayah Komersial Bukit Aman, Kompleks Kerajaan Bukit Perdana, Jalan Dato’ Onn 50502 Kuala Lumpur.

(b) Perenggan 15.10 Pembelaan Responden-Responden menyatakan seperti yang berikut:
“Kesemua barang-barang kes yang dirampas telah dihantar kepada Defendan Ketiga di Unit Siasatan Forensik Komputer, Ibu Pejabat Polis Kontinjen, Pulau Pinang, untuk penganalisaan dan pemeriksaan lanjut.”

(c) Selanjutnya di perenggan 19.2 Pembelaan Responden-Responden pula menyatakan seperti yang berikut:
“Barang-barang kes yang dirampas telah dihantar ke Makmal Unit Siasatan Forensik Komputer, Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Siber dan Multimedia, Jabatan Siasatan Jenayah untuk penganalisaan dan pemeriksaan lanjut.”

(d) Daripada ketiga-tiga perenggan tersebut amat jelas terdapat percanggahan dari segi tempat bertugas Responden Ketiga dan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dalam Alasan Penghakimannya menerima pernyataan bahawa barang-barang kes dihantar kepada Responden Ketiga di IPK Pulau Pinang walaupun Resonden Ketiga dalam perenggan 7 bertugas di Kuala Lumpur dan barang-barang kes yang dirampas dibawa ke mana selepas rampasan dan di sini Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf kerana menerima fakta-fakta ini dalam suatu permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 walaupun terdapat percanggahan antara ketiga-tiganya dan tanpa mendengar keterangan-keterangan Responden Kedua dan Ketiga melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh bagi pembuktian yang ketat dan kukuh bagi fakta-fakta ini.

(e) Oleh itu, percanggahan fakta-fakta tersebut hanya boleh diputuskan melalui keterangan Responden Ketiga yang diberikan dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh.

5. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa ‘hard disk’ yang dianalisa oleh Responden Ketiga mengandungi 106 klip video lucah termasuk klip video Perayu dan isteri Perayu dan dokumen peribadi Perayu walaupun fakta ini tidak dibuktikan semasa perbicaraan penuh Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Yang Arif Datuk Su Geok Yiam telah melepaskan Perayu daripada sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan atas alasan Responden Ketiga bukan seorang pakar, analisa yang dibuat oleh Responden Ketiga tidak mengikut standard pembuktian keterangan elektronik yang diamalkan di peringkat antarabangsa dan keterangan-keterangan dokumentar yang dikemukakan oleh Responden Kelima sebagai Timbalan Pendakwa Raya adalah tidak relevan dan tidak membuktikan Perayu memiliki klip video lucah yang didakwa sebagaimana dalam pertuduhan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelima yang tiada senarai klip video.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 menyatakan bahawa ‘hard disk’ yang dianalisa oleh Responden Ketiga mengandungi 106 klip video lucah termasuk klip video Perayu dan isteri Perayu di perenggan 5 Alasan Penghakiman.

(b) Keputusan ini tidak berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan Perayu dan Responden Ketiga walaupun fakta ini tidak dibuktikan semasa perbicaraan penuh Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Yang Arif Datuk Su Geok Yiam telah melepaskan Perayu daripada sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan atas alasan Responden Ketiga bukan seorang pakar, analisa yang dibuat oleh Responden Ketiga tidak mengikut standard pembuktian keterangan elektronik yang diamalkan di peringkat antarabangsa dan keterangan-keterangan dokumentar yang dikemukakan oleh Responden Kelima sebagai Timbalan Pendakwa Raya adalah tidak relevan dan tidak membuktikan Perayu memiliki klip video lucah yang didakwa sebagaimana dalam pertuduhan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelima yang tiada senarai klip video.

(c) Apabila tiada senarai klip video lucah sebagaimana dalam pertuduhan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelima, perkara ini sendiri bercanggah dengan seksyen 36 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang mengkehendaki suatu senarai filem yang dirampas perlu disediakan di tempat kejadian dan perkara ini perlu dan boleh dibuktikan melalui imej forensik dan “hash value” sebagai “digital signature” yang mengandungi senarai filem yang dirampas dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut. Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Datuk Su Geok Yiam memutuskan bahawa Responden Ketiga semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut tidak menggunakan pengimejan forensik (‘forensic imaging’), “hash value” sebagai “digital signature” dan penggunaan peralatan yang ada ralat pengalatan (‘instrumentation error’) dalam perenggan 71f. dan g. Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 94 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(d) Seksyen 36 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 [TAB 4IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:
“Notice of seizure

36. (1) Where any seizure is made under this Part, the Enforcement Officer or police officer making the seizure shall prepare a list of every film, film-publicity material, book, document or other thing seized and of the place in which it is found and shall sign the list.

(2) The list prepared in accordance with subsection (1) shall be delivered immediately to the occupant of the place or premises where the film, film-publicity material, book, document or other thing seized is found.

(3) Where the seizure is made in or from any place or premises which are unoccupied, the Enforcement Officer or police officer making the seizure shall whenever possible post a list of the things seized conspicuously at the place or premises.

(4) Where any film, film-publicity material, book, document or other thing is seized otherwise than in or from any place or premises, the Enforcement Officer or police officer making the seizure shall give a notice in writing of the seizure and the grounds of the seizure to the owner of the film, film-publicity material, book, document or other thing seized by delivering a copy of such notice to the owner in person or by post at his place of business or residence.

(5) A notice under subsection (4) need not be given where the seizure is made in the presence or with the knowledge of the owner.”

(e) Perayu berhujah bahawa Responden Kedua telah menyalahi tanggungjawab yang ditetapkan di bawah subseksyen 3(3) Akta Polis 1967 [Akta 344] apabila menjalankan siasatan berkenaan Perayu dan hubungan perkahwinan Perayu yang dijamin di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

(f) Subseksyen 3(3) Akta Polis 1967 [Akta 344] [TAB 17 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:
“Constitution of the Police Force
3. …
(3) The Force shall subject to this Act be employed in and throughout Malaysia (including the territorial waters thereof) for the maintenance of law and order, the preservation of security and peace in Malaysia, the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension and prosecution of offenders and the collection of security intelligence.”

(g) Perayu turut berhujah bahawa tindakan Responden Kedua dalam membuat penggeledahan pada 13.7.2009 tersebut tidak dilindungi di bawah seksyen 32 Akta 344 [TAB 18 IA/(P)] yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:
“Non-liability for act done under authority of warrant

32. (1) Where the defence to any suit instituted against a police officer, an extra police officer, volunteer reserve police officer or an auxiliary police officer is that the act complained of was done in obedience to a warrant purporting to be issued by any competent authority, the court shall, upon production of the warrant containing the signature of such authority and upon proof that the act complained of was done in obedience to such warrant, enter judgment in favour of such police officer, extra police officer, volunteer reserve police officer or auxiliary police officer.”

(h) Namun, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur mengambil jalan singkat dengan hanya mengambil kira Pembelaan tanpa melakukan analisis yang betul dan menyeluruh untuk Pernyataan Tuntutan dan Pembelaan yang bercanggah mengenai perkara ini.

(i) Oleh itu, isu-isu berbangkit berkenaan kausa tindakan terhadap Responden Kedua perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

6. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan Perayu tiada kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap Responden Pertama yang bercanggah dengan keputusan Yang Arif Datuk Su Geok Yiam yang telah melepaskan Perayu daripada sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan atas alasan bahawa laporan polis Responden Pertama adalah ‘First Information Report (“FIR”) dan Responden Kedua telah membuat penggeledahan berdasarkan laporan polis Responden Pertama tersebut dan mengikut prinsip undang-undang yang mantap, tindakan berasaskan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) perlu dibuktikan melalui perbicaraan penuh dan bukan melalui permohonan interlokutori.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur menyatakan bahawa Perayu tiada kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap Responden Pertama dalam perenggan 11 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 13 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 31 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Persoalan sama ada Perayu ada kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap Responden Pertama ialah isu utama yang perlu diputuskan melalui perbicaraan penuh.

(c) Mengikut prinsip undang-undang yang mantap, tindakan berasaskan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) perlu dibuktikan melalui perbicaraan penuh dan bukan melalui permohonan interlokutori.

(d) Hujahan Perayu bersandarkan kepada kes Rawther v Abdul Kareem [1966] 2 MLJ 201 [TAB 30 IA/(P)] seperti yang berikut:
“Any action for malicious prosecution raises questions of difficulty. On the one hand there is the need to protect the reputation of the individual against unjustified attacks and his pocket against the expense of defending himself against unjustified criminal proceedings. On the other hand the courts have always recognised the necessity of affording protection to persons who, whatever their real motives, assist in the administration of public justice. As was said by Viscount Simonds in the case of Glinski McIver [1962] AC 726 741:-

“in such cases as these the liberty of the subject is involved on the one side, and on the other the risk that the citizen in the performance of his duty may be embarrassed if a jury too readily gives a verdict in favour of a plaintiff who has been prosecuted and acquitted.”

In any such action the plaintiff must prove at least five things and unless he does so he cannot succeed. He must prove that the defendant set the criminal law in motion against him. He must prove that the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favour, that the defendant had no “reasonable and probable cause” for setting the law in motion against him and that the plaintiff was actuated by malice in the sense that he had a motive other than only to carry the law into effect. And for historical reasons (the action was originally in case) he must prove damage.”

(e) Perayu telah menghujahkan perkara ini dalam hujahan bertulis Perayu untuk pendengaran permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 di Mahkamah Tinggi (muka surat 197 hingga 200 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama) tetapi tidak diambil kira oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur.

(f) Oleh itu, Perayu hanya boleh membuktikan kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Pertama dan ada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

7. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan Perayu gagal membuktikan bahawa Responden Pertama telah membuat laporan tersebut dengan niat jahat (‘malice’) walaupun mengikut prinsip undang-undang yang mantap, tindakan berasaskan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) perlu dibuktikan melalui perbicaraan penuh dan bukan melalui permohonan interlokutori.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur menyatakan bahawa Perayu gagal membuktikan bahawa Responden Pertama telah membuat laporan polis tersebut dengan niat jahat (‘malice’) dalam perenggan 11 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 13 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 30 hingga 31 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Persoalan sama ada Responden Pertama telah membuat laporan polis tersebut dengan niat jahat (‘malice’) terhadap Perayu perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh dengan mengemukakan keterangan yang kukuh.

(c) Perayu telah membangkitkan persoalan ini sebagai salah satu isu yang perlu dibicarakan dalam penghujahan untuk permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 tetapi tidak diambil kira oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur (muka surat 228 hingga 233 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(d) Oleh itu, isu yang perlu dibicarakan yang dibangkitkan dalam perenggan-perenggan di atas tidak sesuai diputuskan melalui permohonan interlokutori dan perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

8. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa seseorang yang tidak dikenali (‘person unknown’) memuat naik gambar-gambar Responden Pertama ke laman sesawang yang dikenali sebagai http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com walaupun keputusan ini tidak dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh dan bercanggah dengan keputusan rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa seseorang yang tidak dikenali (‘person unknown’) memuat naik gambar-gambar Responden Pertama ke laman sesawang yang dikenali sebagai http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com dalam perenggan 2 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 27 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Keputusan ini tidak dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh dan bercanggah dengan keputusan rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dalam perenggan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 93 hingga 101 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Dalam hal ini, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur tidak sewajarnya menyatakan bahawa seseorang yang tidak dikenali (‘person unknown’) memuat naik gambar-gambar Responden Pertama ke laman sesawang yang dikenali sebagai http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com kerana ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa beliau membuat perbicaraan semula (‘retrial’) tanpa melalui satu perbicaraan penuh dengan membuat kesimpulan hanya daripada Pernyataan Tuntutan dan Pembelaan yang tidak mengandungi bukti-bukti bagi menjawab persoalan ini.

(d) Oleh itu, persoalan mengenai “person unknown” yang dinyatakan dalam Alasan Penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 perlu diputuskan untuk menunjukkan bahawa sama ada laporan polis Responden Pertama berasas atau tidak.

9. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu menuntut ‘vindicatory damages’ terhadap Responden Kedua, Ketiga dan Kesembilan walaupun Perayu menuntut ‘vindicatory damages’ dalam Writ bertarikh 6.3.2014 dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu bertarikh 5.3.2014 berdasarkan pernyataan-pernyataan di perenggan-perenggan 12,14,15, 71(yy) dan 72 Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 5.3.2014.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu menuntut ‘vindicatory damages’ terhadap Responden Kedua,, Ketiga dan Kesembilan walaupun Perayu menuntut ‘vindicatory damages’ dalam Writ bertarikh 6.3.2014 dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu bertarikh 5.3.2014 berdasarkan pernyataan-pernyataan di perenggan-perenggan 12,14,15, 71(yy) dan 72 Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 5.3.2014 dalam perenggan 12 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 32 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Perayu menuntut ‘vindicatory damages’ untuk kausa tindakan pendakwaan salah yang melibatkan pencerobohan hak privasi Perayu yang dijamin di bawah Artikel 11 dan Artikel 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

(c) Ia menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa tuntutan apa-apa kerugian sama ada ganti rugi am, ganti rugi teladan, ganti rugi teruk atau “vindicatory damages” perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(d) Perayu bersandarkan kepada kes Hock Huat Iron Foundry (suing as a firm) v Naga Tembaga Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 65 [TAB 31 IA(P)], Mahkamah Rayuan mengikut prinsip mengenai kerugian perlu dibuktikan oleh pihak yang membawa tindakan undang-undang yang telah diputuskan dalam kes Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Ltd 64 TLR 177 and Popular Industries Ltd v Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 360 seperti yang berikut:

“As to the question whether the defendant has proved its loss, the learned trial judge said that the law is clear that the burden of proving both the facts and the amount of damages lies on the person seeking damages before he can recover them, citing Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Ltd 64 TLR 177 and Popular Industries Ltd v Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 360.” (penekanan dibuat).

(e) Apabila Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur memutuskan untuk membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012, keputusan ini telah bercanggah dengan prinsip undang-undang bahawa tuntutan kerugian perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.
10. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu ada menyatakan bahawa ‘thumb drive’ dan ‘hard disk’ milik isteri Perayu walaupun tiada dinyatakan sedemikian dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 5.3.2014 dan Responden Kelima tidak berjaya membuktikan bahawa Perayu memiliki hard disk tersebut berdasarkan keputusan Yang Arif Datuk Su Geok Yiam yang telah melepaskan Perayu daripada sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan atas alasan tersebut.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dalam membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 menyatakan bahawa ‘thumb drive’ dan ‘hard disk’ milik isteri Perayu dalam perenggan 13 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 13 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 32 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Fakta yang dinyatakan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur bahawa ‘thumb drive’ dan ‘hard disk’ milik isteri Perayu merupakan fakta yang tiada dinyatakan sedemikian dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 5.3.2014 dan juga Pembelaan Responden-Responden bertarikh 7.4.2014.

(c) Oleh itu, perkara berbangkit di sini bagaimana Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur boleh menyatakan fakta tersebut tanpa apa-apa bukti melalui keterangan saksi dan keterangan dokumentar.

(d) Selain daripada itu, fakta ini tertakluk kepada keterangan yang perlu diberikan oleh Perayu dan saksi dan juga keterangan dokumentar dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh.

11. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa penggeledahan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kedua adalah teratur berdasarkan Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593] yang bercanggah dengan perenggan 15.4 Pembelaan Responden-Responden di mana siasatan Responden Kedua di bawah seksyen 233 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 di mana peruntukan-peruntukan berkenaan penggeledahan di bawah Kanun Tatacara Jenayah tidak terpakai memandangkan Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 telah mempunyai peruntukan-peruntukan khusus mengenai tatacara penggeledahan.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa penggeledahan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kedua adalah teratur berdasarkan Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593] mengikut perenggan 13 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 32 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Keputusan bercanggah dengan perenggan 15.4 Pembelaan Responden-Responden yang menyatakan bahawa siasatan Responden Kedua di bawah seksyen 233 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 [Akta 588].

(c) Selanjutnya, peruntukan-peruntukan berkenaan penggeledahan di bawah Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593] tidak terpakai memandangkan Akta 588 telah mempunyai peruntukan-peruntukan khusus mengenai tatacara penggeledahan di bawah seksyen 247, 248 dan 250 Akta 588.

(d) Seksyen 247 Akta 588 [TAB 19 IA/(P)] ] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

Search by warrant

247.(1) If it appears to a Magistrate, upon written information on oath and after such inquiry as he considers necessary, that there is reasonable cause to believe that an offence under this Act or its subsidiary legislation is being or has been committed on any premises, or that any evidence or thing which is necessary to the conduct of an investigation into an offence may be found in any premises, the Magistrate may issue a warrant authorizing any police officer not below the rank of Inspector, or any authorized officer named in it, to enter the premises at any reasonable time by day or by night, with or without assistance and if need be by force, and there to search for and seize any such evidence or thing.

(2)Without affecting the generality of subsection (1), the warrant issued by the Magistrate may authorize the search and seizure of—

(a)copies of any books, accounts or other documents, including computerized data, which contain or are reasonably suspected to contain information as to any offence so suspected to have been committed;

(b)any signboard, card, letter, pamphlet, leaflet or notice representing or implying that the person has a licence granted or assignment issued under this Act; or

(c)any other document, facility, apparatus, equipment, device or matter that is reasonably believed to furnish evidence of the commission of the offence.

(3)A police officer or an authorized officer conducting a search under subsection (1) may, for the purpose of investigating into the offence, search any person who is in or on the premises.

(4)A police officer or an authorized officer making a search of a person under subsection (3) may seize, or take possession of, and place in safe custody all things, other than the necessary clothing, found upon the person, and any other things, for which there is reason to believe that they are the instruments or other evidence of the crime, and they may be detained until the discharge or acquittal of the person.

(5)Whenever it is necessary to cause a woman to be searched, the search shall be made by another woman with strict regard to decency.

(6)If, by reason of its nature, size or amount, it is not practicable to remove any book, accounts, document, computerized data, signboard, card, letter, pamphlet, leaflet, notice, facility, apparatus, equipment, device, thing or matter seized under this section, the seizing officer shall, by any means, seal such book, accounts, document, computerized data, signboard, card, letter, pamphlet, leaflet, notice, facility, apparatus, equipment, device, thing or matter in the premises or container in which it is found.

(7)A person who, without lawful authority, breaks, tampers with or damages the seal referred to in subsection (6) or removes any book, accounts, document, computerized data, signboard, card, letter, pamphlet, leaflet, notice, facility, apparatus, equipment, device, thing or matter under seal or attempts to do so commits an offence.

(8)If a search under this section indicates that there is any interference-causing equipment, radio apparatus or radio-sensitive equipment, the authorized officer may direct that necessary steps be taken to ensure an interference-free environment.

(e) Seksyen 248 Akta 588 [TAB 20 IA/(P)] pula memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

Search and seizure without warrant

248. If a police officer not below the rank of Inspector in any of the circumstances referred to in section 247 has reasonable cause to believe that by reason of delay in obtaining a search warrant under that section the investigation would be adversely affected or evidence of the commission of an offence is likely to be tampered with, removed, damaged or destroyed, the officer may enter the premises and exercise in, upon and in respect of the premises all the powers referred to in section 247 in as full and ample a manner as if he were authorized to do so by a warrant issued under that section.

(f) Seksyen 250 Akta 588 [TAB 21 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

List of things seized

250.(1)Except as provided in subsection (2), where any book, accounts, document, computerized data, signboard, card, letter, pamphlet, leaflet, notice, facility, apparatus, equipment, device,thing or matter is seized under section 247 or 248, the seizing officer shall prepare a list of the things seized and immediately deliver a copy of the list signed by him to the occupier of the premises which have been searched, or to his agent or servant, at those premises.

(2)If the premises are unoccupied, the seizing officer shall whenever possible post a list of the things seized conspicuously on the premises.

(g) Oleh itu, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur seharusnya mengambil kira peruntukan-peruntukan mengenai penggeledahan di bawah Akta 588 sebelum membuat keputusan bahawa penggeledahan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kedua teratur di bawah Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593].

(h) Tambahan lagi, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur perlu mengetahui bahawa tujuan suatu undang-undang digubal dan sebab suatu peruntukan undang-undang khusus dimasukkan dalam undang-undang tertentu yang diluluskan oleh Parlimen sebagai kuasa tertinggi meluluskan undang-undang sebagaimana yang diputuskan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Chu Beow Hin [1982] 1 MLJ 135 [TAB 32 IA/(P)]:

“The first task of the court is to find out the intention of Parliament and the words of a statute speak the intention of Parliament. ‘And in so doing it must bear in mind that its function is jus dicere, not jus dare: the words of a statute must not be overruled by the judges, but reform of the law must be left in the hands of Parliament’ ( Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Ed. pp. 1, 2).”

(i) Oleh itu, keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur berlawanan dengan kehendak Parlimen dalam meluluskan Akta 588.

12. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira prinsip undang-undang dalam maxim undang-undang “generalia specialibus non derogant” terpakai dalam tatacara penggeledahan di bawah Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 mengatasi Kanun Tatacara Jenayah.

(a) Mengikut perenggan 13 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 32 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama), Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa penggeledahan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kedua adalah teratur berdasarkan Kanun Tatacara Jenayah[Akta 593].

(b) Perayu berhujah bahawa peruntukan-peruntukan berkenaan penggeledahan di bawah Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593] oleh Responden Kedua untuk siasatan Kes Tangkap Tersebut tidak terpakai memandangkan Akta 588 telah mempunyai peruntukan-peruntukan khusus mengenai tatacara penggeledahan.

(c) Perayu turut berhujah bahawa prinsip undang-undang dalam maxim undang-undang “generalia specialibus non derogant” terpakai dalam tatacara penggeledahan di bawah Akta 588 mengatasi Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593].

(d) Oleh itu, persoalan mengenai cara penggeledahan Responden Kedua yang tidak mengikut Akta 588 walaupun siasatan di bawah seksyen 233 Akta 588 perlu dibuktikan melalui keterangan Responden Kedua melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

13. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa tiada aduan dibuat oleh Perayu terhadap penggeledahan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kedua walaupun terdapat laporan polis yang dibuat oleh Perayu mengikut perenggan 19 Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 5.3.2014 dan rampasan “thumb drive” adalah tidak munasabah kerana siasatan Responden Kedua di bawah seksyen 233 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 adalah berkenaan penggunaan tidak wajar kemudahan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan rangkaian dan lain-lain di mana tiada rangkaian internet ditemui, tiada “IP address” dan tiada “MAC Address” ditemui di tempat kejadian.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa tiada aduan dibuat oleh Perayu terhadap penggeledahan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kedua dalam perenggan 13 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 33 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Walau bagaimanapun, Perayu ada menyatakan dalam perenggan 19 Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 5 Mac 2014 bahawa Perayu ada membuat laporan polis berkenaan serbuan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kedua pada 13.7.2009 dan sebab-sebab kenapa penyitaan yang dilakukan oleh Responden Kedua tidak munasabah dalam perenggan 15,16 dan 17 Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 77 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Ini menunjukkan bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur tidak menganalisis fakta dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu dengan teliti dalam membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

(d) Oleh itu, percanggahan antara pernyataan dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan dan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur hanya boleh diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

14. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan menggunakan “breached his and his wife’s privacy” di perenggan 15 Alasan Penghakiman sedangkan mengikut prinsip undang-undang yang mantap yang diktiraf oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia adalah pencerobohan privasi (‘invasion of privacy’) Perayu yang dijamin di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan menggunakan “breached his and his wife’s privacy’” di perenggan 15 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 34 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Perayu menyatakan bahawa hak privasi Perayu telah diceroboh dalam perenggan 72, 74 dan 76 Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 101 hingga 102 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Perayu berhujah bahawa “breach” (pelanggaran) berbeza dengan “invasion” (pencerobohan) berdasarkan kes-kes pencerobohan privasi yang diputuskan oleh mahkamah-mahkamah di Malaysia.

(d) Perayu berhujah bahawa hak-hak Perayu di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang berikut [TAB 8, 9,10,11 IA/(P)] telah diceroboh:
“Federal Constitution: Liberty of the person

5. (1) No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.

(2) Where complaint is made to a High Court or any judge thereof that a person is being unlawfully detained the court shall inquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order him to be produced before the court and release him.

(3) Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.

(4) Where a person is arrested and not released he shall without unreasonable delay, and in any case within twenty-four hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey) be produced before a magistrate and shall not be further detained in custody without the magistrate’s authority:

Provided that this Clause shall not apply to the arrest or detention of any person under the existing law relating to restricted residence, and all the provisions of this Clause shall be deemed to have been an integral part of this Article as from Merdeka Day:

Provided further that in its application to a person, other than a citizen, who is arrested or detained under the law relating to immigration, this Clause shall be read as if there were substituted for the words “without unreasonable delay, and in any case within twenty-four hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey)” the words “within fourteen days”:

And provided further that in the case of an arrest for an offence which is triable by a Syariah court, references in this Clause to a magistrate shall be construed as including references to a judge of a Syariah court.

(5) Clauses (3) and (4) do not apply to an enemy alien.

Federal Constitution: Freedom of religion

11. (1) Every person has the right to profess and practise his religion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it.

(2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other than his own.

(3) Every religious group has the right—

(a) to manage its own religious affairs;

(b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and

(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law.

(4) State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.

(5) This Article does not authorize any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health or morality.

Federal Constitution: Prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement

9. (1) No citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Federation.

(2) Subject to Clause (3) and to any law relating to the security of the Federation or any part thereof, public order, public health, or the punishment of offenders, every citizen has the right to move freely throughout the Federation and to reside in any part thereof.

(3) So long as under this Constitution any other State is in a special position as compared with the States of Malaya, Parliament may by law impose restrictions, as between that State and other States, on the rights conferred by Clause (2) in respect of movement and residence.

Federal Constitution: Freedom of religion

11. (1) Every person has the right to profess and practise his religion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it.

(2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other than his own.

(3) Every religious group has the right—

(a) to manage its own religious affairs;

(b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and

(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law.

(4) State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.

(5) This Article does not authorize any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health or morality.
Federal Constitution: Rights to Property

13. (1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law.

(2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate compensation.
(e) Hujahan Perayu bersandarkan kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan yang telah mengiktiraf pencerobohan privasi dalam kes Maslinda Ishak v. Mohd Tahir Osman & Ors [2009] 6 CLJ 653 [TAB 33 IA/(P)] yang telah diikuti oleh kes Mahkamah Tinggi, Lee Ewe Poh v. Dr Lim Teik Man & Anor [2011] 4 CL 397 [TAB 34 A/(P)] seperti yang berikut:
“1st Issue: Whether Plaintiff’s Cause Of Action For Violation Or Invasion Of Her Privacy Rights Is Actionable Under The Law Of Tort

[4] There is no dispute that the plaintiff and the 1st defendant had a doctor-patient relationship. Indeed, the duty of care owned by a doctor arises out of his relationship with his patient. Without the doctor and patient relationship, there is no duty on the part of the doctor to diagnose, advise and treat his patient; see Foo Fio Na v. Dr Soo Fook Mun & Anor [2007] 1 CLJ 229. 1st defendant contended that invasion of privacy rights is not a recognized breach in tort under the English common law and hence it is also not an actionable tort in Malaysia pursuant to s. 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956. Learned counsel for the 1st defendant refers to Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 18th edn, 2000 p. 19 para 1-34 which says that “privacy remains an interest unprotected by the English law of torts. However gross the invasion of the claimant’s privacy, that violation of privacy is not itself a tort… It would not be overlooked that violation of privacy can amount to violation of some other interest protected in tort. This may range from trespass to land to injury to health resulting repeated incursions of privacy or breach of confidence…” Therefore learned counsel for the 1st defendant submitted that plaintiff must establish that there was a breach of confidence or trust by the 1st defendant resulting in the invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy rights. To be able to succeed in such claim, three requirements must be satisfied ie, the information must have the necessary quality of confidence about it, the information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence and there must be an unauthorized use or disclosure of that information. He cited in support Clerk & Lindshall on Torts at p. 1518 para 27 – 03 and Murray v. Yorkshire Fund Managers Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 951. It was also submitted that so long as the confider’s identity is protected, the confidence is not breached referring to Regina v. Department of Health Ex-parte Source informatics Ltd [2001] QB 424 at 440 and Medical Negligence by Michael A Jones 2003 p. 173 at para 2-169. Since there is no evidence that the 1st defendant had disseminated the two paragraphs to any third parties or that he had made unauthorized use of the said photographs, learned counsel for the 1st defendant submitted that the 1st defendant was not in breach of any confidence or trust. It was further submitted that the 1st defendant being the treating doctor who had already seen the plaintiff’s private part whilst undertaking the procedure cannot be said to have violated the plaintiff’s privacy and that the moment the plaintiff had submitted herself to the 1st defendant to conduct the procedure, there is no longer any right of privacy available to the plaintiff.

[5] Learned counsel for the 2nd defendant similarly submitted that a claim on an infringement, invasion or violation of privacy is not a recognized tort or a course of action in Malaysia citing the case of Ultra Dimension Sdn Bhd v. Kook Wei Kuan [2004] 5 CLJ 285 and Lew Cher Phow @ Lew Cha Paw & Ors lwn. Pua Yong Yong & Satu Lagi [2009] 1 LNS 1256 Johor Bahru High Court Civil Suit No. MT 4-22-510-2007. It was contended that the photographs taken were taken in a clinical environment and intended for the plaintiff’s medical record; there was no publication. Plaintiff’s identity was also not known in these paragraphs.

[6] Plaintiff’s counsel submitted on the other hand that the old school of thought does not recognize the invasion of privacy as an actionable tort. He relied however on our Court of Appeal’s case of Maslinda Ishak v. Mohd Tahir Osman & Ors [2009] 6 CLJ 653 to contend that our Court of Appeal has recognized and affirmed invasion of privacy as a cause of action.

[7] In Maslinda Ishak’s case, His Lordship Suriyadi Halim Omar JCA, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal has said at p. 657 as follows:

[4] It was pleaded that at about 11.30pm on 21 March 2003 the appellant was arrested at the Kelab De Vegas at Jalan Imbi, Kuala Lumpur in a joint operation by officers of the 2nd and 3rd respondents. The appellant together with some other persons arrested, were then put into a truck and driven off to Taman Maluri, Cheras. Enroute the appellant had requested from officers of the 2nd and 3rd respondents permission to use the toilet facilities but was disallowed. Instead she was scolded and told to urinate in the truck. As she was in quite a state, she asked her friends to shield her by encircling her with a shawl, in order to ease herself. At that particular moment, the 1st defendant suddenly opened the door of the truck, rushed in, pulled down the shawl and proceeded to take numerous photos of the appellant in a squatting position urinating. As a result, the appellant was thoroughly humiliated with the whole incident, which was within the view of everyone in the truck.

[5] There was abundance of evidence as regards this invasion of privacy, amongst others, his subsequent prosecution for a charge under s. 509 of the Penal Code under arrest case C83-494-2003. He pleaded guilty and was convicted of it. He was accordingly sentenced to four months jail vide, with the sentence confirmed by the High Court vide a revision. In fact, this issue of the invasion of privacy was never under challenge.
[6] To return to the pleadings, the appellant pleaded that her privacy had been invaded, resulting in her humiliation, trauma and serious mental anguish. She wanted general, aggravated and exemplary damages in the sum of RM5,000,000.00 interest and costs from the first defendant and the respondents. She pleaded that the officers of the 2nd and 3rd respondents at the material time, had negligently failed to protect her well-being, by allowing the first defendant to snap those photographs. To reiterate, at the end of the trial, the learned judge found for the appellant only as regards the first defendant, but not the rest of the respondents. Neither did the first defendant nor the respondents appeal against that decision.

[8] The learned trial judge found for Maslinda Ishak against the 1st defendant but not against the other respondents for whom she appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal and held the respondents to be jointly and severally liable for the wrongful act of their agent as well as vicariously liable. Although Maslinda Ishak ‘s case is not directly on point, the fact remains that the High Court in so finding has departed from the old English law that invasion of privacy is not an actionable tort and our Court of Appeal indirectly, though this issue was not canvassed, seems to endorse such cause of action when the pleadings were specifically referred to and CA did not overrule invasion of privacy as a cause of action on ground that it is not one in line with the English law. Since such a cause of action has been accepted as a cause of action under our common law, it is thus permissible for a plaintiff to found his/her action on it. Drawing an analogy of this Court of Appeal case, I am inclined to hold the view that since our courts especially the Court of Appeal have accepted such an act to be a cause of action, it is thus actionable. The privacy right of a female in relation to her modesty, decency and dignity in the context of the high moral value existing in our society is her fundamental right in sustaining that high morality that is demanded of her and it ought to be entrenched. Hence, it is just right that our law should be sensitive to such rights. In the circumstances, plaintiff in the instant case ought to be allowed to maintain such claim.”

(f) Perayu turut merujuk kepada Faiza Thamby Chik J (beliau pada ketika itu) dalam kes Ultra Dimension Sdn Bhd dan Kook Wei Kuan [2004] 5 CLJ 285 [TAB 35 IA/(P)] yang menyatakan pemerhatian beliau seperti yang berikut:
“In Bathurst City Council v. Saban, Young J identified an exception to the general rule in situations where the photographs in question were offensive. He thought it would be as much open to an Australian as an American court to give relief to a plaintiff who complained that someone had taken a photograph of him in a shockingly wounded condition after a road accident or that she had been standing innocently over the air vent in a fun house and someone had photographed her with her skirt blown up. The exception perhaps was limited to photographs of a person in an embarrassing pose which were surreptitiously taken and published. It would cover, for example, the taking of secret photographs of a person engaged in sexual activity or arranging large mirrors so as to observe all that passed in the operating room of a nearby dentist. Young J’s views are noteworthy for his acceptance that intrusive photographs may in principle be actionable, although it may be that his particular examples would not all give rise to a remedy, even in the United States.
Further, at p. 184 in the book of “Torts in the Nineties – Nicholas J Mullany” it is stated as follows:
Bound up with the question whether a matter is private is the fourth element to liability, whereby the disclosure must be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. The especially sensitive who complain about publicity being given to harmless or neutral facts have no redress.
Therefore the above extracts show that the invasion of privacy rights does not give rise to a cause of action and is not actionable. A cause of action may only arise if the photographs are highly offensive in nature and show a person in an embarrassing position or pose. On the facts of the instant appeal, I think the said photograph is not offensive in nature at all because it is merely a photograph of a group of kindergarten pupils in cheerful mood taken at an open area outside the kindergarten, and there was no publication of any information relating to the respondent in the said advertisement. The said photograph was used for a decent purpose which was for an advertisement for Bonus link card. The said photograph did not picture the respondent in “dalam keadaan memalukan”, and the said photograph does not intrude into the private rights of the respondent. Furthermore, the said photograph was taken at a public place which was an open area outside the kindergarten which anyone present would be free to see and take photographs of the children there. I am of the view that the taking of photographs at public places where there are many passersby and the publication of such photographs in newspapers, brochures and other reading materials does not give rise to a cause of action. Privacy rights has been defined in “Torts in the Nineties – Nicholas J Mullany” p. 176 to mean the right to be left alone and live free from all intrusions by others. It states:
NATURE OF PRIVACY
Giving a comprehensive definition of privacy is fraught with difficulty and only the broadest of proposition can be safely ventured. It may be said that a person’s interest in privacy is invaded where, without the person’s consent, others see or hear or read about what he or she does or says, or what others say or do comes unwillingly to his or her attention. So understood any “right” to privacy amounts to no more that the right of a person to be left alone; yet no-one, or virtually no-one, can live so as to be free from all intrusions by others. Perhaps the hermit who retires to a remote and unpopulated place may attain such a state but most of us are required, unwillingly or otherwise to rub shoulders with our fellow human beings. Contact with others is the price of existence as a social being.” [penekanan dibuat]

(g) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dalam perenggan 16 hingga 24 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 menyatakan bahawa kedudukan undang-undang berkenaan kausa tindakan untuk pencerobohan privasi tidak jelas dan tidak diktiraf di Malaysia kerana kedudukan undang-undang tidak tetap dan mantap (muka surat 34 hingga 42 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(h) Perayu berhujah bahawa kedudukan undang-undang berkenaan kausa tindakan untuk pencerobohan privasi diputuskan oleh Mahkamah di Malaysia berasaskan “case by case basis” sekiranya dikaji daripada kes-kes berkenaan pencerobohan privasi yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah di Malaysia dan tidak boleh dikatakan bahawa secara amnya, kausa tindakan undang-undang berkenaan kausa tindakan untuk pencerobohan privasi tidak diiktiraf di Malaysia.

(i) Dalam hal ini, Perayu tidak diberi peluang untuk mengemukakan bukti yang terdiri daripada empat belas keping (14) keping gambar anak dan isteri Perayu untuk menunjukkan bahawa gambar-gambar tersebut melibatkan kesopanan (‘modesty’) yang tidak seharusnya dijadikan dokumen awam kerana dikemukakan dalam perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

(j) Oleh itu, keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur bahawa kausa tindakan untuk pencerobohan privasi tidak diiktiraf di Malaysia secara umum tidak boleh diambil kira kerana persoalan ini perlu dibicarakan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

15. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa Perayu tidak boleh menuntut pencerobohan hak privasi walaupun tuntutan Perayu adalah berdasarkan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) yang turut melibatkan pencerobohan privasi Perayu yang dijamin di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan semasa penggeledahan pada 13.7.2009 dan juga semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut di mana gambar-gambar anak dan isteri Perayu dikemukakan kepada Responden Kelapan dan bercanggah dengan keputusan Yang Arif Datuk Su Geok Yiam yang telah melepaskan Perayu daripada sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan atas alasan bahawa gambar-gambar anak dan isteri Perayu tidak relevan untuk pembuktian pemilikan hard disk oleh Perayu, tidak termasuk dalam tafsiran “filem” di bawah seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002.
(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa Perayu tidak boleh menuntut pencerobohan hak privasi dalam perenggan 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 dan 24 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 34 hingga 42 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur gagal mengambil kira bahawa tuntutan Perayu berdasarkan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) yang turut melibatkan pencerobohan privasi Perayu yang dijamin di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan semasa penggeledahan pada 13.7.2009 dan juga semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut, gambar-gambar anak dan isteri Perayu dikemukakan kepada Responden Kelapan dan bercanggah dengan keputusan Yang Arif Datuk Su Geok Yiam yang telah melepaskan Perayu daripada sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan atas alasan bahawa gambar-gambar anak dan isteri Perayu tidak relevan untuk pembuktian pemilikan hard disk oleh Perayu, tidak termasuk dalam tafsiran “filem” di bawah seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002.

(c) Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 [TAB 3 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

“Interpretation
3. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—

“film” includes the original or duplicate of the whole or any part of—

(a) a cinematograph film; and

(b) a videotape, diskette, laser disc, compact disc, hard disc and other record, of a sequence of visual images, being a record capable of being used as a means of showing that sequence as a moving picture, whether or not accompanied by sound;”

(d) Gambar-gambar anak dan isteri Perayu tidak relevan untuk pembuktian pemilikan hard disk oleh Perayu dan tidak termasuk dalam tafsiran “filem” di bawah seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 kerana bukan gambar yang bergerak (“moving picture”) sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Yang Arif Hakim Datuk Su Geok Yiam dalam rayuan terhadap sabitan bagi Kes Tangkap Tersebut dalam perenggan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 93 hingga 101 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(e) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur membuat keputusan tanpa memberi peluang kepada Perayu untuk mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah gambar-gambar anak dan isteri Perayu yang dikemukakan kepada Responden Kelapan untuk menunjukkan bahawa gambar-gambar tersebut melibatkan kehormatan (“modesty”).

(f) Oleh itu, persoalan mengenai gambar-gambar anak dan isteri Perayu yang melibatkan kehormatan (“modesty”) dan sama ada gambar-gambar tersebut patut dikemukakan oleh Responden Kelima perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

16. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa tiada undang-undang privasi di Malaysia walaupun Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia telah mengiktiraf prinsip pencerobohan privasi.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa tiada undang-undang privasi di Malaysia dalam perenggan 16,17,18,19,20, 21,22 dan 23 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 34 hingga 42 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur membuat keputusan tanpa melihat bukti-bukti yang akan dikemukakan oleh Perayu terutama 14 keping salinan gambar isteri and anak-anak Perayu yang bersifat peribadi dan melibatkan “private morality and modesty” yang telah dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut oleh Responden Kelima.

(c) Tambahan pula, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Yang Arif Su Geok Yiam telah membuat keputusan semasa rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut bahawa Perayu dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan atas alasan bahawa gambar-gambar anak dan isteri Perayu tidak relevan untuk pembuktian pemilikan hard disk oleh Perayu dan tidak termasuk dalam tafsiran “filem” di bawah seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dalam perenggan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 93 hingga 101 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(g) Oleh itu, persoalan mengenai gambar-gambar anak dan isteri Perayu yang melibatkan kehormatan (“modesty”) dan sama ada gambar-gambar tersebut patut dikemukakan oleh Responden Kelima perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

17. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa Responden Ketiga telah membuat analisa yang dijadikan asas bagi pertuduhan ke atas Perayu untuk Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan Perayu tiada kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap Responden Ketiga yang bercanggah dengan keputusan semasa rayuan diputuskan bahawa Responden Ketiga bukan pakar kerana tiada sijil kepakaran dikemukakan, peralatan yang digunakan Responden Ketiga untuk menganalisa barang bukti ada ralat (“error”), makmal untuk analisa bahan bukti forensik tiada sijil ISO, laporan analisa tidak menjadi ekshibit semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut, tiada pengetahuan mengenai kaedah analisis forensik bahan bukti berbentuk elektronik (“electronic evidence”) melibatkan “hash algorithm”, “hash function”, “hash value” (“digital signature”) dan imej forensic (“forensic imaging”). Tiada keterangan saintifik dan tiada keterangan yang membawa kebenaran “scientific cognition a priori” mahupun kebenaran “a posteriori” yang dikemukakan oleh Responden Ketiga semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa Responden Ketiga telah membuat analisa yang dijadikan asas bagi pertuduhan ke atas Perayu untuk Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan Perayu tiada kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap Responden Ketiga dalam perenggan 5, 7, 14, 26, 32, 39 dan 47 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 28, 29, 33, 43, 47 dan 51 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Keputusan ini bercanggah dengan keputusan semasa rayuan diputuskan bahawa Responden Ketiga bukan seorang pakar kerana tiada sijil kepakaran dikemukakan, peralatan yang digunakan Responden Ketiga untuk menganalisa barang bukti ada ralat (“error”), makmal untuk analisa bahan bukti forensik tiada sijil ISO, laporan analisa tidak menjadi ekshibit semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut, tiada pengetahuan mengenai kaedah analisis forensik bahan bukti berbentuk elektronik (“electronic evidence”) melibatkan “hash algorithm”, “hash function”, “hash value” dan imej forensic (“forensic imaging”) dalam perenggan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 93 hingga 101 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Perayu merujuk kepada kes Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.509 U.S. 579 (1993) [TAB 36 IA/(P)] berkenaan penilaian sama ada seseorang itu seorang pakar atua sebaliknya yang diterima di peringkat antarabangsa:
“Daubert Test for Reliability
Witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:
-The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data
-The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods
-The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case
The key for the Court in determining whether an expert may testify before a jury is therefore primarily one of “reliability of method”. The court will not look at the actual opinion held by an expert, but merely examines his or her methodology to determine whether the procedures used or his methodology is not reliable, then his entire opinion is likewise unreliable and should be excluded from the jury.
Daubert Factors
The U.S Supreme Court set out several specific factors that should be used by the courts in evaluating any proposed expert testimony. These factors are not exclusive and some or all may not apply in any given case, but they are always the place to start the reliability analysis. The factors are as follows:

1. Whether the theory or technique has been scientifically tested.

2. Whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review or publication.

3. The (expected) error rate of the technique used.
4. Acceptance of the theory or technique in the relevant scientific community.

Are the underlying premises upon which a technique or method empirically validated?
Is there a professional literature that describes the purposes to be achieved and the methods whereby the aims of the field can be reliably realized?
Are there professional associations or societies offering contuining education to which members with established credentials are eligible to belong?
Does there exist a rigorous training program whereby one can achieve basic proficiency in the discipline under the supervision of persons with established credential who can impart knowledge and experience to trainees seeking to qualify as examiners?

Is there a meaningful certification program that attests to the competence and proficiency of workers in the discipline?
Has an examination protocol been developed whereby investigations can be reliably carried out and which will yield reasonably consistent results when followed by properly credentialed examiners [18]?”

(d) Oleh itu, isu yang dibangkitkan berkenaan kausa tindakan terhadap Responden Ketiga perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.
18. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira bahawa tiada senarai klip video yang dirampas sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 36(1) dan (2) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan penyitaan tidak munasabah mengikut seksyen 42 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 [Akta 620].
(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan dalam perenggan 39 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 bahawa terdapat alasan munasabah untuk pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 5 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 [Akta 620] dibuat terhadap Perayu (muka surat 51 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Sekali lagi di sini, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur tidak meneliti fakta-fakta Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu kerana tidak mengambil kira fakta yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan 31 dan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan bahawa tiada senarai klip video yang dirampas sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 36(1) dan (2) Akta 620 dan penyitaan tidak munasabah mengikut seksyen 42 Akta 620.

(c) Subseksyen 36(1) dan (2) Akta 620 [TAB 4 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

“Notice of seizure

36. (1) Where any seizure is made under this Part, the Enforcement Officer or police officer making the seizure shall prepare a list of every film, film-publicity material, book, document or other thing seized and of the place in which it is found and shall sign the list.

(2) The list prepared in accordance with subsection (1) shall be delivered immediately to the occupant of the place or premises where the film, film-publicity material, book, document or other thing seized is found.

(3) Where the seizure is made in or from any place or premises which are unoccupied, the Enforcement Officer or police officer making the seizure shall whenever possible post a list of the things seized conspicuously at the place or premises.

(4) Where any film, film-publicity material, book, document or other thing is seized otherwise than in or from any place or premises, the Enforcement Officer or police officer making the seizure shall give a notice in writing of the seizure and the grounds of the seizure to the owner of the film, film-publicity material, book, document or other thing seized by delivering a copy of such notice to the owner in person or by post at his place of business or residence.

(5) A notice under subsection (4) need not be given where the seizure is made in the presence or with the knowledge of the owner.”
(d) Selanjutnya, seksyen 42 Akta 620 [TAB 5 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

No costs or damages arising from seizure can be recovered

42. No person shall, in any proceedings before any court in respect of the seizure of any film, film-publicity material, book, document or other thing seized in the exercise or the purported exercise of any powers conferred under this Act, be entitled to the costs of such proceedings or to any damages or other relief unless such seizure was made without reasonable cause.”

(e) Hujahan Perayu berkenaan subseksyen 36(1) dan (2) dan seksyen 42 Akta 620 telah diterima oleh yang Arif Hakim Datuk Su Geok Yiam semasa rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut sebagaimana dalam perenggan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 93 hingga 101 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(f) Oleh itu, persoalan yang berbangkit daripada cara penggeledahan yang dilakukan oleh Responden Kedua dan sama ada subskesyen 36(1) dan (2) dan seksyen 42 Akta 620 telah dipatuhi untuk pendakwaan terhadap Perayu perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.
19. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Keempat kerana tiada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”).

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Keempat kerana tiada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) dalam perenggan 47 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 57 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Dalam hal ini, Perayu perlu menunjukkan bahawa Responden Keempat telah mengeluarkan keizinan bertulis tanpa alasan yang kukuh dengan pertimbangan akal antara buruk dan baik dari kedua-duanya (“full consideration is required for consent since “consent” an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side”).

(c) Oleh itu, Perayu hanya boleh membuktikan kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Keempat dan ada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

20. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa suatu keizinan pendakwaan yang diberikan untuk kes jenayah adalah suatu perbuatan yang mempunyai alasan yang kukuh dengan pertimbangan akal antara buruk dan baik dari kedua-duanya (“full consideration is required for consent since “consent” an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side”).

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 bahawa keizinan bertulis telah dikeluarkan oleh Responden Keempat dalam perenggan 32, 33, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44,45, 46 dan 47 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 47 hingga 57 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Ia prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa suatu keizinan pendakwaan yang diberikan untuk kes jenayah adalah suatu perbuatan yang mempunyai alasan yang kukuh dengan pertimbangan akal antara buruk dan baik dari kedua-duanya (“full consideration is required for consent since “consent” an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side”).

(c) Perayu bersandarkan kepada kes Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 ML 45 [TAB 37 IA/(P)]:
“The question is whether the court has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial on the amended charge without a fresh consent by the Public Prosecutor. As the matter is res integra I proceeded with the trial to save the public expense, the witnesses and jury being present in court. It will be observed that although the original and amended charges are two distinct offences, they are both created by the same section of the law viz. section 39B(1) and both carry the same penalty. Both require the consent of the Public Prosecutor under section 39B(3). The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor argued that the amendment was technical and as the Public Prosecutor had given his consent on the original charge he was at liberty to amend the charges in the manner he did. I do not think so. It was held in Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 231 that a consent to prosecute “is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side”. The Public Prosecutor has clearly exercised his mind in respect of the original charge when he gave his consent to prosecute some four months after the alleged offence. It was incumbent on him however to exercise the same degree of deliberation in respect of the amended charge. He has not done so. In Lim Seo v Regina [1962] MLJ 304 counsel was given sanction to prosecute under section 379 of the Penal Code but he proceeded under section 381 of the Penal Code instead. It was held that counsel cannot depart from the specific authorisation of the Public Prosecutor. It seems to me that the same principles apply here. The facts of the case were fully before the Public Prosecutor at the time of giving his consent and he could have elected to proceed on the amended charge then. He did not do so. It would appear therefore that the Public Prosecutor has not given his consent to prosecute under the amended charge. That being so, the trial is a nullity on the authority of Lyn Hong Yap v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 226.”

(d) Perayu mengulangi hujahan Perayu sebagaimana dalam perenggan 19 Ringkasan Hujahan ini.

(e) Oleh itu, persoalan mengenai keizinan bertulis untuk Kes Tangkap Tersebut yang dipertikaikan oleh Perayu dan telah diputuskan dalam rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut perlu dikemukakan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.
21. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira bahawa keizinan pendakwaan bertulis tidak dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut boleh dibuktikan dengan Nota Keterangan dan rakaman CRT Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa keizinan pendakwaan bertulis telah dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dalam perenggan 51 dan 52 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 58 hingga 60 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Perayu telah menyatakan dalam perenggan 31 Pernyataan Tuntutan senarai ekshibit yang dikemukakan oleh Responden Kelima semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut (muka surat 80 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Selanjutnya, Yang Arif Hakim Datuk Su Geok Yiam juga telah membuat keputusan bahawa tiada keizinan bertulis dikemukakan oleh Responden Kelima semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dalam rayuan Kes Tangkat Tersbeut dan Perayu dilepaskan dan dibebaskan atas alasan tersebut dalam perenggan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 93 hingga 101 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(d) Oleh itu, jelas sekali Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpru telah terkhilaf dalam meneliti dan menganalisis fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan yang masih tertakluk kepada pembuktian dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh.

22. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Kelima kerana tiada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”).

(a)Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Kelima kerana tiada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) dalam perenggan 47 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 57 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(d) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur gagal mengambil kira keputusan Yang Arif Datuk Su Geok Yiam dalam perenggan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan bahawa Responden Kelima mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dengan tidak mengikut peruntukan undang-undang keterangan apabila tiada satu pun klip video lucah yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan Kes Tangkap Tersebut ditanda sebagai ekshibit oleh Responden Kelapan (muka surat 93 hingga 101 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(e) Oleh itu, Perayu hanya boleh membuktikan kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Kelima dan ada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

23. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Keenam kerana tiada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”).

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Keenam kerana tiada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) dalam perenggan 47 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 57 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Seksyen 377 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593] [TAB 14 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:
“Act 593 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE

Conduct of prosecutions in Court

377. Every criminal prosecution before any court and every inquiry before a Magistrate shall, subject to the following sections, be conducted—

(a) by the Public Prosecutor, a Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor, a Deputy Public Prosecutor or an Assistant Public Prosecutor;

(b) subject to the control and direction of the Public Prosecutor,

by the following persons who are authorized in writing by the Public Prosecutor:

(1) an advocate;

(2) a police officer not below the rank of Inspector;

(3) an officer of any Government department;

(4) an officer of any local authority;

(5) an officer of any statutory authority or body; or

(6) any person employed or retained by any local authority or any statutory authority or body: provided that in any district in which it may be impracticable, without an unreasonable amount of delay or expense, that such prosecutions or inquiries should be so conducted it shall be lawful for the Public Prosecutor from time to time, by notification in the Gazette, to direct that prosecutions may be conducted in that district by a police officer below the rank of Inspector.”

(c) Oleh itu, Perayu hanya boleh membuktikan bahawa Perayu ada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Keenam dan ada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

24. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Responden Keenam boleh mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Timbalan Pendakwa Raya untuk permohonan supaya Responden Kelapan menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap Tersebut yang difailkan oleh Perayu walaupun Responden Keenam hanya seorang Pembantu Undang-Undang yang tidak mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut, tiada pengetahuan mengenai perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan tidak diwartakan sebagai Timbalan Pendakwa Raya mengikut seksyen 377 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Keenam kerana tiada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) dalam perenggan 35, 36, 37 dan 47, Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 49, 50 dan 57 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi gagal mengambil kira fakta bahawa Responden Keenam hanya seorang Pembantu Undang-Undang yang tidak mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut, tiada pengetahuan mengenai perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan tidak diwartakan sebagai Timbalan Pendakwa Raya mengikut seksyen 377 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593].

(c) Dalam hal ini, Perayu mengulangi hujahan-hujahan yang diutarakan dalam perenggan 23 Ringkasan Hujahan ini berkenaan kausa tindakan terhadap Responden Keenam.

(d) Oleh itu, persoalan sama ada terdapat kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap Responden Keenam perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

25. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu tidak pernah membangkitkan bantahan mengenai Responden Keenam mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Timbalan Pendakwa Raya semasa pendengaran permohonan supaya Responden Kelapan menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap Tersebut walaupun perkara berkenaan bantahan tersebut telah dinyatakan di perenggan 71(gg) Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Perayu tidak pernah membangkitkan bantahan mengenai Responden Keenam mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Timbalan Pendakwa Raya semasa pendengaran permohonan supaya Responden Kelapan menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap Tersebut dalam perenggan 37 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 49 dan 50 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Bantahan mengenai Responden Keenam mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Timbalan Pendakwa Raya semasa pendengaran permohonan supaya Responden Kelapan menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap Tersebut telah dinyatakan di perenggan 71(gg) Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu.

(c) Bantahan ini dibangkitkan sekali lagi semasa pendengaran rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Datuk Su Geok Yiam telah membuat keputusan membenarkan rayuan Perayu yang meliputi isu bantahan terhadap afidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Responden Keenam.

(d) Oleh itu, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah terkhilaf dalam meneliti fakta-fakta berkaitan rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan bukti-bukti mengenai rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut perlu dikemukakan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.
26. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa tiada keperluan dalam undang-undang afidavit untuk permohonan kes jenayah diikrarkan oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya yang mengendalikan perbicaraan kes jenayah tersebut.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa tiada keperluan dalam undang-undang bagi afidavit untuk permohonan kes jenayah diikrarkan oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya yang mengendalikan perbicaraan kes jenayah dalam perenggan 37 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 49 dan 50 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Keputusan ini bercanggah dengan keputusan Yang Arif Datuk Su Geok Yiam apabila melepaskan dan membebaskan Perayu bagi rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut yang membuat keputusan bahawa afidavit Responden Keenam untuk permohonan Perayu supaya Responden Kelapan menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap Tersebut tidak boleh diterima kerana dia tiada pengetahuan mengenai Kes Tangkap Tersebut kerana tidak mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

(c) Oleh itu, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah terkhilaf dalam meneliti fakta-fakta berkaitan rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan bukti-bukti mengenai rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut perlu dikemukakan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

27. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira bahawa prinsip undang-undang berdasarkan maxim undang-undang “delegate potestas non potest delegari” (‘no delegated powers can be further delegated’) terpakai ke atas Responden Keenam untuk membuktikan bahawa Responden Keenam diberi kuasa untuk mengiikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Responden Kelima.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Responden Keenam boleh dari segi undang-undang mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Timbalan Pendakwa Raya semasa pendengaran permohonan supaya Responden Kelapan menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap Tersebut dalam perenggan 37 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 49 dan 50 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur gagal mengambil kira fakta bahawa apabila Responden Keenam mengikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Timbalan Pendakwa Raya semasa pendengaran permohonan supaya Responden Kelapan menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap Tersebut, tiada penurunan kuasa daripada Responden Ketujuh kepada Responden Keenam atau pewartaan Responden Keenam sebagai Timbalan Pendakwa Raya dikemukakan sebagai ekshibit dalam afidavit tersebut sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah subseksyen 376(3) dan seksyen 377 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593].

(c) Subseksyen 376(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [TAB 13 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:
“The Public Prosecutor may appoint fit and proper persons to be Deputy Public Prosecutors who shall be under the general control and direction of the Public Prosecutor and may exercise all or any of the rights and powers vested in or exercisable by the Public Prosecutor by or under this Code or any other written law except any rights or powers expressed to be exercisable by the Public Prosecutor personally and he may designate any of such Deputy Public Prosecutor as Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor.”

(d) Seksyen 377 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [TAB 14 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

“Act 593 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE

Conduct of prosecutions in Court

377. Every criminal prosecution before any court and every inquiry before a Magistrate shall, subject to the following sections, be conducted—

(a) by the Public Prosecutor, a Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor, a Deputy Public Prosecutor or an Assistant Public Prosecutor;

(b) subject to the control and direction of the Public Prosecutor,

by the following persons who are authorized in writing by the Public Prosecutor:

(1) an advocate;

(2) a police officer not below the rank of Inspector;

(3) an officer of any Government department;

(4) an officer of any local authority;

(5) an officer of any statutory authority or body; or

(6) any person employed or retained by any local authority or any statutory authority or body: provided that in any district in which it may be impracticable, without an unreasonable amount of delay or expense, that such prosecutions or inquiries should be so conducted it shall be lawful for the Public Prosecutor from time to time, by notification in the Gazette, to direct that prosecutions may be conducted in that district by a police officer below the rank of Inspector.”

(e) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur juga gagal mengambil kira Artikel 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan [TAB 12 IA/(P)] yang memperuntukkan kuasa Pendakwa Raya seperti yang berikut:
“Federal Constitution: Attorney General
145. (3) The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Syariah court, a native court or a court-martial.”

(f) Perayu telah memplidkan mengenai prinsip undang-undang berdasarkan maxim undang-undang “delegate potestas non potest delegari” (“no delegated powers can be further delegated”) terpakai ke atas Responden Keenam untuk membuktikan bahawa Responden Keenam diberi kuasa untuk mengiikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Responden Kelima dalam perenggan 27 Jawapan kepada Pembelaan (muka surat 129 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(g) Oleh kerana tiada bukti penurunan kuasa daripada Responden Ketujuh kepada Responden Keenam maka persoalan sama ada prinsip undang-undang berdasarkan maxim undang-undang “delegate potestas non potest delegari” (‘no delegated powers can be further delegated’) terpakai ke atas Responden Keenam untuk membuktikan bahawa Responden Keenam diberi kuasa untuk mengiikrarkan afidavit bagi pihak Responden Kelima perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

28. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Ketujuh kerana tiada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”).

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Ketujuh kerana tiada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) dalam perenggan 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 dan 38 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 43-47 dan 50-51 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Perayu berhujah bahawa kuasa Responden Ketujuh diperuntukkan di bawah Artikel 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan [TAB 12 IA/(P)] seperti yang berikut:

“Federal Constitution: Attorney General
145. (3) The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Syariah court, a native court or a court-martial.”

(c) Kuasa ini hanya boleh diturunkan oleh Responden Ketujuh kepada Responden Kelima dan kuasa yang diturunkan Responden Kelima tidak boleh diturunkan kepada Responden Keenam.

(d) Perayu juga bersandarkan kepada kes Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris [1976] 2 MLJ 116 [TAB 38 IA/(P)], Mahkamah Agung memutuskan bahawa kuasa pendakwaan ialah kuasa Pendakwa Raya dan tiada kaitan dengan bidang kuasa Mahkamah jenayah dan pendakwaan dibuat oleh Pendakwa Raya setelah mengkaji dan meneliti sedalam-dalamnya segala perkara yang berkaitan dengan suatu kesalahan berdasarkan bukti-bukti yang kukuh dan melampaui keraguan yang munasabah:
“4. Powers of the Public Prosecutor in criminal prosecutions.
Article 145(3) of the Constitution reads:
“The Attorney-General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence ….”
Section 376(i) of the Code provides:
“The Attorney-General shall be the Public Prosecutor and shall have the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this Code.”
This section must certainly be circumscribed by and read subject to and in the light of the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution which in effect only restate and are declaratory of the existing powers and duties of the Attorney-General in relation to criminal prosecutions and proceedings at the date the Constitution was promulgated.
The Solicitor-General lays considerable stress on the wide powers of the Attorney-General in England in their historical context, stating he is a master to himself, and submits the same applies to the Attorney-General of Malaysia. It must be remembered however that the constitutional rights, powers and duties of our Attorney-General are specifically spelt out in Article 145 of the Constitution and in particular in clauses (2) and (3) thereof, and it is clause (3) of that Article which is relevant and material to the issue before me and which circumscribes and specifies the limits of his functions and powers in relation to criminal proceedings. It would be dangerous therefore to go beyond this specific constitutional provision and rely on the position in England by historical analogy to justify any action of the Attorney-General in our country which does not come within the ambit of that provision.
It would now be necessary to consider the connotation of the words ‘institute’ and ‘conduct’ in Article 145(3).
‘Institute’ in Article 145(3) cannot cover the subject-matter of section 418A of the Code, as the Solicitor-General contends. It must necessarily refer to the commencement of criminal proceedings and prosecutions and not to such as have already been instituted and are pending or to criminal procedure as such. It may well be, as the Solicitor-General submits, that the Public Prosecutor has power, apart from the application of the provisions of sections 417 and 418A of the Code to direct any case triable in the Magistrate’s or Sessions Court to be tried in the High Court after a preliminary inquiry. This power to so direct would, if exercised, fall squarely within his discretion to institute and conduct criminal prosecutions and proceedings. The position under section 418A of the Code is wholly different as it has no relation to the institution and for that matter the conduct of criminal proceedings but instead clearly and expressly concerns and relates to criminal cases already commenced and pending in the subordinate courts.
‘Conduct’ in Article 145(3) cannot but refer to the conduct of prosecutions in court, as it indeed appears ipsissimis verbis in section 377 of the Code. And ‘control and direction’ in section 376(i) of the Code is in respect of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings, and not of criminal procedure or the jurisdiction of the courts.
‘Conduct’ of criminal prosecutions and proceedings in Article 145(3) cannot connote the regulation of criminal procedure or of the jurisdiction of the courts or the power or discretion to do so. Any contrary contention would in effect in my view be tantamount to the suggestion of the Public Prosecutor arrogating to himself the legislative powers vested in Parliament under Item 4 and in particular paragraph (b) thereof in List I (Federal List) in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, with perhaps also the not inconceptible resultant intrusion or at least a more than peripheral incursion into the sphere of Article 121(1) of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the Federation is vested in two High Courts and in such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law – namely, the Subordinate Courts Act, 1948 which specifies the subordinate courts and their respective civil and criminal jurisdiction.
Pursuing its signification, ‘to conduct’ means ‘to lead, guide, manage’ (In re Bhupalli Malliah AIR 1959 And Pra 477;Pride of Derby v British Celanese Ltd [1953] 1 Ch 149 167 at p. 167 per Lord Evershed, M.R.). It conveys the idea of leading and guiding, that is to say, the person who conducts the prosecution determines all important questions of policy involved in the course of the trial and the attitude to be adopted by the prosecution towards material objections raised or demands made by the accused with respect to the evidence.
The effect of Article 145(3) of the Constitution and section 376(i) of the Code was considered by the Federal Court in Long bin Samat & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1974] 2 MLJ 152. That was a case involving a charge under section 324 of the Penal Code for voluntarily causing hurt but the evidence adduced before the Magistrate disclosed an offence under section 326 of the Penal Code for voluntarily causing grevious hurt. The appellant was convicted under section 324 and appealed on the ground that the trial was a nullity since the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the case as the evidence disclosed an offence under section 326. The Federal Court held on a reference that it was well within the wide discretion vested in the Public Prosecutor to prefer a charge for a less serious offence than what the evidence in fact disclosed. This was clearly in my view a perfectly proper application of the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution and section 376(i) of the Code as the Public Prosecutor is not open to question by anyone if in the exercise of his discretion to institute and conduct prosecutions he chooses to prefer a charge for a lesser offence in the particular circumstances of a case.
The examples of discretion vested in the Public Prosecutor the Solicitor-General refers to in relation to the issue and refusal of sanctions for prosecution and the withdrawal of charges pertain to the institution and conduct of prosecutions and not to the regulation of criminal procedure.
If indeed the Attorney-General who by virtue of the provisions of section 376(i) of the Code is the Public Prosecutor is as omnipotent as the Solicitor-General contends by virtue of his discretionary powers under Article 145(3) and section 376(i) of the Code, then in my view there would be no point or purpose in including the Public Prosecutor in the provisions of section 417 of the Code in the matter of applying to the High Court for a transfer or other order thereunder, let alone enacting separately special powers exercisable by him under section 418A of the Code, as the Public Prosecutor would on the contention advanced be in a position by virtue of the very provisions of the Constitution to virtually dictate the venue of trial and trial court itself when initially applying for a summons or warrant, and the logical extension or rather perhaps the reductio ad absurdum of any such argument would be that the Public Prosecutor could indeed even specify any particular Magistrate, President or Judge for that matter to hear any particular case – a situation which I would consider to be absolutely inconceivable even to the most ardent advocates of any such contention.
In this context, the provisions of section 197 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code (on which the Code is based but which has since been repealed and re-enacted in 1973) provide an interesting contrast. That section provides for the trial of Judges, Magistrates and certain public officials only with the previous sanction of the Central or State Government as the case may be, and subsection (2) thereof provides that the Central or State Government may determine the person by whom and the manner in which the prosecution is to be conducted and also specify the court of trial. The validity of this section which was challenged in relation to Article 14 of the Constitution of India (which equates with our Article 8(1)) was upheld by the Supreme Court of India in Matajog Dobey v HC Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44 as the discrimination was based upon a rational classification for the protection of public servants from harassment in the discharge of official duties.
In any event, in the exercise of his discretionary powers, the Public Prosecutor cannot discriminate at will and infringe the provisions of Article 8(1) as judicially determined in the matter of classification, differentia and nexus. If he can indeed do so, there would be no reason why in the exercise of his powers he cannot even infringe the specific provisions of Article 8(2). It is significant, in my view, that, unlike Article 8(2), Article 8(1) is not prefaced by the clause “Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution”. And equally significant is the fact that neither is there a non obstante clause in Article, 145(3) to eliminate the application of Article 8(1) to its provisions. I would add that I respectfully associate myself with what Chandrachud J., held in Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2292 and so declare that the equality provision in Article 8(1) is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and a basic feature thereof. In that case two of the other Judges of the Indian Supreme Court did not deal with that question, one was equivocal and only Mathew J., held otherwise.
The Solicitor-General submits that if the Constitution allows discrimination, any such discrimination made must be upheld. That in fact is the position under Article 8(5) which expressly and specifically except provisions in respect of the five matters specified therein from being invalidated or prohibited by Article 8. Article 145(3) does not however in terms make any classification whatsoever or allow discrimination but only endows the Attorney-General with discretionary powers in relation to the matters therein stipulated and is in my view subject to and must necessarily harmonise with the provisions of Article 8(1). The Solicitor-General in support of his proposition that any discrimination allowed by the Constitution must be upheld refers to two Indian cases, but there it was not discretionary discrimination at will that was allowed but classification that was made by the Constitution. A classification made by the Constitution itself cannot of course be struck down as violating Article 8(1). Accordingly in Moti Ram v Union of India AIR 1966 HP 25 3132 (at p. 31, 32), the distinction made between the State and Union Territories by section 54 of the Union Territories Act, 1963 was held to be valid as this classification appears in the Indian Constitution itself. There is no and cannot indeed be any provision in our or the Indian Constitution which provides for or allows discretionary discrimination at will and pleasure without any reasonable classification.
The Constitution is not to be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense (James v Commonwealth of Australia [1936] AC 578 614 at p. 614 per Lord Wright) but it is equally true that this does not mean that the court is at liberty to stretch or pervert the language of the Constitution in the interests of any legal or constitutional theory of omnipotence of the Attorney-General in matters relating to criminal procedure and the jurisdiction of the courts.
Article 145(3) cannot therefore in my view on any reasonable and acceptable interpretation provide, as the Solicitor-General contends, any form of licence to override the provisions of Article 8(1) which is a fundamental liberty under Part II of the Constitution, and perhaps even also those of Article 121(1), and at the very least, in any event, applying the principle of harmonious construction of the Constitution – an accepted canon of constitutional interpretation, effect should be given to all these provisions as far as possible, and on that basis alone any exercise of discretionary powers by the Attorney-General must necessarily relate to reasonable classification and not arbitrary selection.
No resort can be had to Article 145(3) of the Constitution to ascertain the policy or guidance for the exercise of discretionary powers by the Attorney-General even if there were any. In Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1895 1901, the Supreme Court of India reiterated (at p. 1901) that a liberal construction of an impugned statute should not be carried by the courts to the extent of always trying to discover a dormant or latent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary power conferred on executive authorities, and that it is the duty of the court to strike down without any hesitation any arbitrary power conferred on the executive by the legislature. The Supreme Court in that case in considering the provisions of a section of a statute conferring uncontrolled power on the provincial Government to levy a turnover tax at such rates as the Government might direct without any guidance or policy laid down in that respect in the statute itself, held that such a policy could not be gathered from the constitutional provisions as this would destroy the doctrine of excessive delegation and would also sanction conferment of power by the legislature on the executive without laying down any guidelines in the statute (ibid, at p. 1901).

(e) Kuasa yang diperuntukkan kepada Responden Ketujuh ada hadnya mengikut Artikel 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan subseksyen 376(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593] dan hanya kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya yang diperturunkan kuasa untuk mendakwa tersebut sahaja.

(f) Perayu turut bersandarkan kepada kes Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 135 [TAB 39 IA/(P)], Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan bahawa seharusnya ada had kepada kuasa yang diperuntukkan di bawah undang-undang:

“Every legal power must have legal limits, otherwise there is dictatorship. In particular, it is a stringent requirement that a discretion should be exercised for a proper purpose, and that it should not be exercised unreasonably. In other words, every discretion cannot be free from legal restraint; where it is wrongly exercised, it becomes the duty of the courts to intervene. The courts are the only defence of the liberty of the subject against departmental aggression. In these days when government departments and public authorities have such great powers and influence, this is a most important safeguard for the ordinary citizen: so that the courts can see that these great powers and influence are exercised in accordance with law. I would once again emphasize what has often been said before, that “public bodies must be compelled to observe the law and it is essential that bureaucracy should be kept in its place”, (per Danckwerts L.J. in Bradbury v London Borough of Enfield [1967] 3 All ER 434 442.)”

(g) Dalam kes Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 50 [TAB 40 IA/(P)], Privy Council telah memutuskan budi bicara pendakwaan boleh dipersoalkan apabila ia digunakan secara tidak sah (“unlawful”) atau berasaskan pertimbangan yang tidak relevan. Lord Diplock menyatakan seperti yang berikut:
“Under the common law system of administration of criminal justice a prosecuting authority has a discretion whether to institute proceedings at all and, if so, with what offence to charge the accused. Such a discretion is conferred upon the Attorney General of Malaysia by Article 145(3) of the Constitution, viz:
“The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Muslim court, a native court or a court-martial.”
There are many factors which a prosecuting authority may properly take into account in exercising its discretion as to whether to charge a person at all, or, where the information available to it discloses the ingredients of a greater as well as a lesser offence, as to whether to charge the accused with the greater or the lesser. The existence of those factors to which the prosecuting authority may properly have regard and the relative weight to be attached to each of them may vary enormously between one case and another. All that equality before the law requires, is that the cases of all potential defendants to criminal charges shall be given unbiased consideration by the prosecuting authority and that decisions whether or not to prosecute in a particular case for a particular offence should not be dictated by some irrelevant consideration.
If indeed the Attorney General was possessed of a discretion to choose between prosecuting the appellant for an offence against section 57(1) of the Internal Security Act, 1964, or for an offence under the Arms Act, 1960, and the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act, 1971, there is no material on which to found an argument that in the instant case he exercised it unlawfully.”

(h) Perayu merujuk kepada kes Savrimuthu Sinnapan v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 CLJ 368 [TAB 41 IA/(P)] Salleh Abas LP, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti yang berikut:
“.. public interest, reason, and sense of justice demand that any statutory power must be exercised reasonably and with due consideration.”

(i) Oleh itu, Perayu hanya boleh membuktikan kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Ketujuh dan ada kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) bagi tuntutan pendakwaan salah (“malicious prosecution”) melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

29. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa terdapat kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) dalam pendakwaan terhadap Perayu dalam Kes Tangkap Tersebut kerana terdapat hubungan (‘nexus’) antara Perayu dan kandungan “hard disk” yang dirampas oleh Responden Kedua tanpa melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa terdapat kemunasabahan dan kemungkinan kausa (“reasonable and probable cause”) dalam pendakwaan terhadap Perayu dalam Kes Tangkap Tersebut kerana terdapat hubungan (‘nexus’) antara Perayu dan kandungan “hard disk” yang dirampas oleh Responden Kedua dalam perenggan 39 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 51 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Fakta mengenai terdapat hubungan (‘nexus’) antara Perayu dan kandungan “hard disk” yang dirampas oleh Responden Kedua merupakan fakta yang dipertikaikan dan perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(c) Oleh itu, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur terkhilaf dalam memutuskan terdapat hubungan (‘nexus’) antara Perayu dan kandungan “hard disk” yang dirampas oleh Responden Kedua walaupun ia ialah salah satu fakta yang dipertikaikan.

30. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Kelapan dan Responden Kelapan mempunyai bidang kuasa membicarakan Kes Tangkap Tersebut walaupun keputusan tersebut bercanggah dengan keputusan Hakim Datuk Su Geok Yiam yang memutuskan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut adalah prosiding yang batal (“nullity’) kerana tiada izin pendakwaan dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Majistret jenayah tersebut.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Kelapan dan Responden Kelapan mempunyai bidang kuasa membicarakan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dalam perenggan 50 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 58 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur juga menyatakan bahawa bidang kuasa Responden Kelapan diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 44 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 [Akta 620].

(c) Seksyen 44 Akta 620 [TAB 7 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any written law to the contrary, a court of a First Class Magistrate shall have the jurisdiction to try any offence under this Act and to award the full punishment for any such offence.”
(d) Dalam hal ini, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur gagal memahami bahawa sebelum diperuntukkan bidang kuasa Mahkamah di bawah seksyen 44 Akta 620, seksyen 43 Akta 620 memperuntukkan bahawa pendakwaan hendaklah dibuat melalui keizinan bertulis.

(e) Seksyen 44 Akta 620 perlu dibaca bersama dengan seksyen 43 Akta 620 untuk menunjukkan proses pendakwaan bagi kes-kes yang disyaki memiliki bahan lucah boleh dituduh di bawah seksyen 5 Akta 620.

(f) Perayu bersandarkan kepada kes Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116 [TAB 38 IA/(P)]:
“…4. Powers of the Public Prosecutor in criminal prosecutions.
Article 145(3) of the Constitution reads:
“The Attorney-General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence ….”
Section 376(i) of the Code provides:
“The Attorney-General shall be the Public Prosecutor and shall have the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this Code.”
This section must certainly be circumscribed by and read subject to and in the light of the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution which in effect only restate and are declaratory of the existing powers and duties of the Attorney-General in relation to criminal prosecutions and proceedings at the date the Constitution was promulgated.
The Solicitor-General lays considerable stress on the wide powers of the Attorney-General in England in their historical context, stating he is a master to himself, and submits the same applies to the Attorney-General of Malaysia. It must be remembered however that the constitutional rights, powers and duties of our Attorney-General are specifically spelt out in Article 145 of the Constitution and in particular in clauses (2) and (3) thereof, and it is clause (3) of that Article which is relevant and material to the issue before me and which circumscribes and specifies the limits of his functions and powers in relation to criminal proceedings. It would be dangerous therefore to go beyond this specific constitutional provision and rely on the position in England by historical analogy to justify any action of the Attorney-General in our country which does not come within the ambit of that provision.
It would now be necessary to consider the connotation of the words ‘institute’ and ‘conduct’ in Article 145(3).
‘Institute’ in Article 145(3) cannot cover the subject-matter of section 418A of the Code, as the Solicitor-General contends. It must necessarily refer to the commencement of criminal proceedings and prosecutions and not to such as have already been instituted and are pending or to criminal procedure as such. It may well be, as the Solicitor-General submits, that the Public Prosecutor has power, apart from the application of the provisions of sections 417 and 418A of the Code to direct any case triable in the Magistrate’s or Sessions Court to be tried in the High Court after a preliminary inquiry. This power to so direct would, if exercised, fall squarely within his discretion to institute and conduct criminal prosecutions and proceedings. The position under section 418A of the Code is wholly different as it has no relation to the institution and for that matter the conduct of criminal proceedings but instead clearly and expressly concerns and relates to criminal cases already commenced and pending in the subordinate courts.
‘Conduct’ in Article 145(3) cannot but refer to the conduct of prosecutions in court, as it indeed appears ipsissimis verbis in section 377 of the Code. And ‘control and direction’ in section 376(i) of the Code is in respect of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings, and not of criminal procedure or the jurisdiction of the courts.
‘Conduct’ of criminal prosecutions and proceedings in Article 145(3) cannot connote the regulation of criminal procedure or of the jurisdiction of the courts or the power or discretion to do so. Any contrary contention would in effect in my view be tantamount to the suggestion of the Public Prosecutor arrogating to himself the legislative powers vested in Parliament under Item 4 and in particular paragraph (b) thereof in List I (Federal List) in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, with perhaps also the not inconceptible resultant intrusion or at least a more than peripheral incursion into the sphere of Article 121(1) of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the Federation is vested in two High Courts and in such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law – namely, the Subordinate Courts Act, 1948 which specifies the subordinate courts and their respective civil and criminal jurisdiction.
Pursuing its signification, ‘to conduct’ means ‘to lead, guide, manage’ (In re Bhupalli Malliah AIR 1959 And Pra 477;Pride of Derby v British Celanese Ltd [1953] 1 Ch 149 167 at p. 167 per Lord Evershed, M.R.). It conveys the idea of leading and guiding, that is to say, the person who conducts the prosecution determines all important questions of policy involved in the course of the trial and the attitude to be adopted by the prosecution towards material objections raised or demands made by the accused with respect to the evidence.
The effect of Article 145(3) of the Constitution and section 376(i) of the Code was considered by the Federal Court in Long bin Samat & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1974] 2 MLJ 152. That was a case involving a charge under section 324 of the Penal Code for voluntarily causing hurt but the evidence adduced before the Magistrate disclosed an offence under section 326 of the Penal Code for voluntarily causing grevious hurt. The appellant was convicted under section 324 and appealed on the ground that the trial was a nullity since the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the case as the evidence disclosed an offence under section 326. The Federal Court held on a reference that it was well within the wide discretion vested inthe Public Prosecutor to prefer a charge for a less serious offence than what the evidence in fact disclosed. This was clearly in my view a perfectly proper application of the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution and section 376(i) of the Code as the Public Prosecutor is not open to question by anyone if in the exercise of his discretion to institute and conduct prosecutions he chooses to prefer a charge for a lesser offence in the particular circumstances of a case.
The examples of discretion vested in the Public Prosecutor the Solicitor-General refers to in relation to the issue and refusal of sanctions for prosecution and the withdrawal of charges pertain to the institution and conduct of prosecutions and not to the regulation of criminal procedure.
If indeed the Attorney-General who by virtue of the provisions of section 376(i) of the Code is the Public Prosecutor is as omnipotent as the Solicitor-General contends by virtue of his discretionary powers under Article 145(3) and section 376(i) of the Code, then in my view there would be no point or purpose in including the Public Prosecutor in the provisions of section 417 of the Code in the matter of applying to the High Court for a transfer or other order thereunder, let alone enacting separately special powers exercisable by him under section 418A of the Code, as the Public Prosecutor would on the contention advanced be in a position by virtue of the very provisions of the Constitution to virtually dictate the venue of trial and trial court itself when initially applying for a summons or warrant, and the logical extension or rather perhaps the reductio ad absurdum of any such argument would be that the Public Prosecutor could indeed even specify any particular Magistrate, President or Judge for that matter to hear any particular case – a situation which I would consider to be absolutely inconceivable even to the most ardent advocates of any such contention.
In this context, the provisions of section 197 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code (on which the Code is based but which has since been repealed and re-enacted in 1973) provide an interesting contrast. That section provides for the trial of Judges, Magistrates and certain public officials only with the previous sanction of the Central or State Government as the case may be, and subsection (2) thereof provides that the Central or State Government may determine the person by whom and the manner in which the prosecution is to be conducted and also specify the court of trial. The validity of this section which was challenged in relation to Article 14 of the Constitution of India (which equates with our Article 8(1)) was upheld by the Supreme Court of India in Matajog Dobey v HC Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44 as the discrimination was based upon a rational classification for the protection of public servants from harassment in the discharge of official duties.
In any event, in the exercise of his discretionary powers, the Public Prosecutor cannot discriminate at will and infringe the provisions of Article 8(1) as judicially determined in the matter of classification, differentia and nexus. If he can indeed do so, there would be no reason why in the exercise of his powers he cannot even infringe the specific provisions of Article 8(2). It is significant, in my view, that, unlike Article 8(2), Article 8(1) is not prefaced by the clause “Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution”. And equally significant is the fact that neither is there a non obstante clause in Article, 145(3) to eliminate the application of Article 8(1) to its provisions. I would add that I respectfully associate myself with what Chandrachud J., held in Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2292 and so declare that the equality provision in Article 8(1) is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and a basic feature thereof. In that case two of the other Judges of the Indian Supreme Court did not deal with that question, one was equivocal and only Mathew J., held otherwise.
The Solicitor-General submits that if the Constitution allows discrimination, any such discrimination made must be upheld. That in fact is the position under Article 8(5) which expressly and specifically excepts provisions in respect of the five matters specified therein from being invalidated or prohibited by Article 8. Article 145(3) does not however in terms make any classification whatsoever or allow discrimination but only endows the Attorney-General with discretionary powers in relation to the matters therein stipulated and is in my view subject to and must necessarily harmonise with the provisions of Article 8(1). The Solicitor-General in support of his proposition that any discrimination allowed by the Constitution must be upheld refers to two Indian cases, but there it was not discretionary discrimination at will that was allowed but classification that was made by the Constitution. A classification made by the Constitution itself cannot of course be struck down as violating Article 8(1). Accordingly in Moti Ram v Union of India AIR 1966 HP 25 3132 (at p. 31, 32), the distinction made between the State and Union Territories by section 54 of the Union Territories Act, 1963 was held to be valid as this classification appears in the Indian Constitution itself. There is no and cannot indeed be any provision in our or the Indian Constitution which provides for or allows discretionary discrimination at will and pleasure without any reasonable classification.
The Constitution is not to be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense (James v Commonwealth of Australia [1936] AC 578 614 at p. 614 per Lord Wright) but it is equally true that this does not mean that the court is at liberty to stretch or pervert the language of the Constitution in the interests of any legal or constitutional theory of omnipotence of the Attorney-General in matters relating to criminal procedure and the jurisdiction of the courts.
Article 145(3) cannot therefore in my view on any reasonable and acceptable interpretation provide, as the Solicitor-General contends, any form of licence to override the provisions of Article 8(1) which is a fundamental liberty under Part II of the Constitution, and perhaps even also those of Article 121(1), and at the very least, in any event, applying the principle of harmonious construction of the Constitution – an accepted canon of constitutional interpretation, effect should be given to all these provisions as far as possible, and on that basis alone any exercise of discretionary powers by the Attorney-General must necessarily relate to reasonable classification and not arbitrary selection.
No resort can be had to Article 145(3) of the Constitution to ascertain the policy or guidance for the exercise of discretionary powers by the Attorney-General even if there were any. In Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1895 1901, the Supreme Court of India reiterated (at p. 1901) that a liberal construction of an impugned statute should not be carried by the courts to the extent of always trying to discover a dormant or latent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary power conferred on executive authorities, and that it is the duty of the court to strike down without any hesitation any arbitrary power conferred on the executive by the legislature. The Supreme Court in that case in considering the provisions of a section of a statute conferring uncontrolled power on the provincial Government to levy a turnover tax at such rates as the Government might direct without any guidance or policy laid down in that respect in the statute itself, held that such a policy could not be gathered from the constitutional provisions as this would destroy the doctrine of excessive delegation and would also sanction conferment of power by the legislature on the executive without laying down any guidelines in the statute (ibid, at p. 1901).

(g) Dalam kes Bradley v Fisher, 13, wall 335, 20 L.Ed [TAB 42 IA/(P)] memutuskan seperti yang berikut:

“Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.” Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed.”

(h) Oleh itu, persoalan mengenai Perayu tiada kausa tindakan munasabah terhadap Responden Kelapan dan sama ada Responden Kelapan mempunyai bidang kuasa membicarakan Kes Tangkap Tersebut perlu diputuskan melalui pengemukaan bukti-bukti dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh.

31. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira fakta bahawa sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan tanpa bukti-bukti yang kukuh dan Perayu menjalani hukuman penjara atas sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan dalam rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut Perayu telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan dengan merit.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa Responden Kelapan ada mempunyai bidang kuasa mendengar dan membicarakan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dalam perenggan 48, 49 dan 50 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 58 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur gagal mengambil kira fakta bahawa sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan tanpa bukti-bukti yang kukuh dan Perayu menjalani hukuman penjara atas sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan dalam rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut Perayu telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan dengan merit walaupun telah dinyatakan di perenggan 26 hingga 68 Pernyataan Tuntutan (muka surat 78 hingga 90 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Pihak Responden-Responden telah mempertikaikan fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan 26 hingga 68 Pernyataan Tuntutan dalam perenggan 28 hingga 59 Pembelaan(muka surat 112 hingga 117 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(d) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur juga gagal mengambil kira Jawapan kepada Pembelaan yang difailkan oleh Perayu untuk menjawab Pembelaan Responden-Responden mengenai pertikaian fakta tersebut dalam perenggan 20 hingga 45 Jawapan kepada Pembelaan (muka surat 126 hingga 137 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(e) Daripada semua yang dinyatakan di atas, jelas terdapat pertikaian fakta dan persoalan undang-undang yang boleh diketahui kebenarannya melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh dan bukan melalui permohonan interlokutori di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

32. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa izin pendakwaan (“consent”) telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah tersebut semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut walaupun tiada dinyatakan dalam Pembelaan Repsonden-Respondendan bercanggah dengan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Datuk Su Geok Yiam untuk rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa izin pendakwaan (“consent”) telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah tersebut semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dalam perenggan 51, 52, 53, 54 dan 55 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015.

(b) Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur ini bercanggah dengan Pembelaan kerana tiada dinyatakan sedemikian dalam Pembelaan dan dalam keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Datuk Su Geok Yiam untuk rayuan Perayu terhadap sabitan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan untuk Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

(c) Perayu juga berhujah bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur tidak boleh mengguna pakai subseksyen 376(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah untuk mengesahkan bahawa pengemukaan keizinan bertulis oleh Responden Kelima teratur dan sah di sisi undang-undang kerana bercanggah dengan prinsip undang-undang yang mantap dalam maxim undang-undang “generalia specialibus non derogant” terpakai di bawah seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 sebagai undang-undang yang spesifik yang mengkehendaki keizinan bertulis dikemukakan mengatasi subseksyen 376(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah.

(d) Subseksyen 376(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [TAB 13 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:
“The Public Prosecutor may appoint fit and proper persons to be Deputy Public Prosecutors who shall be under the general control and direction of the Public Prosecutor and may exercise all or any of the rights and powers vested in or exercisable by the Public Prosecutor by or under this Code or any other written law except any rights or powers expressed to be exercisable by the Public Prosecutor personally and he may designate any of such Deputy Public Prosecutor as Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor.”
(e) Perayu juga mengulangi hujahan-hujahan Perayu dalam perenggan 30 Ringkasan Hujahan ini.

(f) Oleh itu, persoalan mengenai keizinan bertulis yang menjadi persoalan utama bagi Kes Tangkap Tersebut perlu dibuktikan melalui pengemukaan bukti-bukti dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh.
33. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa izin pendakwaan adalah ekshibit bertanda “P-1” berlawanan dengan Nota Keterangan dan rakaman CRT Kes Tangkap Tersebut yang menyatakan bahawa ekshibit “P-1” adalah Borang Serah Menyerah.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa izin pendakwaan adalah ekshibit bertanda “P-1” dalam perenggan 51 dan 52 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 58 dan 59 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Perayu telah menyatakan dalam perenggan 31 Pernyataan Tuntutan berkenaan ekshibit yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan ekshibit “P-1” adalah Borang Serah Menyerah (muka surat 80 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Responden-Responden mengakui Responden Kelima telah mengemukakan barang-barang kes dan dokumen-dokumen berkaitan kes dan ditandakan sebagai ekshibit di Mahkamah dan pernyataan-pernyataan lain di perenggan 31 Pernyataan Tuntutan dinafikan dalam perenggan 32 Pembelaan (muka surat 112 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(d) Perayu turut menyatakan dalam perenggan 22 Jawapan kepada Pembelaan (muka surat 127 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama) bahawa Perayu akan mengemukakan Rekod Rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut bagi membuktikan pernyataan di perenggan 31 Pernyataan Tuntutan.

(e) Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur ini berlawanan dengan Nota Keterangan dan rakaman CRT Kes Tangkap Tersebut yang menyatakan bahawa ekshibit “P-1” adalah Borang Serah Menyerah yang akan dikemukakan oleh Perayu dalam perbicaraan penuh.

(f) Oleh itu, jelas sekali Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah terkhilaf dalam membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden melalui permohonan interlokutori di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

34. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira prinsip undang-undang dalam maxim undang-undang “generalia specialibus non derogant” terpakai bagi seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 sebagai undang-undang yang spesifik yang mengkehendaki keizinan bertulis dikemukakan mengatasi seksyen 376(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa keizinan bertulis telah dikemukakan secara teratur oleh Responden Kelima mengikut seksyen 376(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah.

(b) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah gagal mengambil kira prinsip undang-undang dalam maxim undang-undang “generalia specialibus non derogant” terpakai bagi seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 sebagai undang-undang yang spesifik yang mengkehendaki keizinan bertulis dikemukakan mengatasi seksyen 376(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah [Akta 593].

(c) Perayu merujuk kepada kes Public Prosecutor v Chew Siew Luan [1982] 2 MLJ 119 [TAB 43 IA/(P)], Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengaplikasi maxim undang-undang “generalibus specialia derogant” dalam menafsirkan suatu undang-undang:
“Generalibus specialia derogant is a cardinal principle of interpretation. It means that where a special provision is made in a special statute, that special provision excludes the operation of a general provision in the general law.”

(d) Dalam hal ini, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur terikat dengan prinsip-prinsip undang-undang yang diputuskan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Chew Siew Luan [1982] 2 MLJ 119 [TAB 43 IA/(P)].

(e) Oleh itu, isu berbangkit mengenai pemakaian maxim undang-undang “generalibus specialia derogant” dalam menafsirkan suatu undang-undang perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

35. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira prinsip undang-undang dalam maxim undang-undang “generalia specialibus non derogant” terpakai bagi seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 sebagai undang-undang yang spesifik yang mengkehendaki keizinan bertulis dikemukakan secara jelas bertulis (“explicit’) mengatasi prinsip umum undang-undang mengenai pengemukaan izin pendakwaan secara tersirat (“implicit”).

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa keizinan bertulis telah dikemukakan sebagaimana ekshibit “ARBAD-1” mengikut seksyen 376(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dalam perenggan 51 hingga 55 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 58 hingga 62 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur gagal mengambil kira prinsip undang-undang dalam maxim undang-undang “generalia specialibus non derogant” terpakai dalam menentukan bagimana izin pendakwaan di bawah seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 sebagai undang-undang yang spesifik yang mengkehendaki keizinan bertulis dikemukakan secara jelas bertulis (“explicit’) mengatasi prinsip umum undang-undang mengenai pengemukaan izin pendakwaan secara tersirat (“implicit”) mengikut seksyen 376(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dan dengan pendakwaan dilakukan oleh Pendakwa Raya atau timbalannya dengan hadir sendiri.

(c) Perayu merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan, Public Prosecutor v Chu Beow Hin [1982] 1 MLJ 135 [TAB 32 IA/(P)] yang terpakai bagi tafsiran undang-undang bertulis seperti yang berikut:
“The first task of the court is to find out the intention of Parliament and the words of a statute speak the intention of Parliament. ‘And in so doing it must bear in mind that its function is jus dicere, not jus dare: the words of a statute must not be overruled by the judges, but reform of the law must be left in the hands of Parliament’ ( Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Ed. pp. 1, 2).”

(d) Perayu juga turut bersandarkan kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan, Public Prosecutor v Chew Siew Luan[1982] 2 MLJ 119 [TAB 43 IA/(P)] berkenaan prinsip “generalia specialibus non derogant” seperti yang berikut:

“Generalibus specialia derogant is a cardinal principle of interpretation. It means that where a special provision is made in a special statute, that special provision excludes the operation of a general provision in the general law.”

(e) Prinsip-prinsip undang-undang dalam kes-kes Mahkamah Persekutuan, Public Prosecutor v Chu Beow Hin [1982] 1 MLJ 135 [TAB 32 IA/(P)] dan Public Prosecutor v Chew Siew Luan[1982] 2 MLJ 119 [TAB 43 IA/(P)] terpakai dan mengatasi kes-kes PP v Oie Hee Koi & Associated Appeals [1968] 1 MLJ 148 (PC) dan PP v Mohamed Halipah [1982] 1 MLJ 155 (HC) yang dirujuk oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dalam perenggan 53 dan 54 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 60 dan 61 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(f) Oleh itu, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur terikat dengan prinsip-prinsip yang diputuskan dalam kes-kes Mahkamah Persekutuan, Public Prosecutor v Chu Beow Hin [1982] 1 MLJ 135 [TAB 32 IA/(P)] dan Public Prosecutor v Chew Siew Luan[1982] 2 MLJ 119 [TAB 43 IA/(P)] mengenai undang-undang yang spesifik yang mengkehendaki keizinan bertulis dikemukakan secara jelas bertulis (“explicit’) mengatasi prinsip umum undang-undang mengenai pengemukaan izin pendakwaan secara tersirat (“implicit”).

36. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal memgambil kira persoalan bagaimana Peguam Kanan Persekutuan boleh mengemukakan keizinan bertulis yang tidak pernah dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 tanpa mengambil kira persoalan bagaimana Peguam Kanan Persekutuan boleh mengemukakan keizinan bertulis yang tidak pernah dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dalam perenggan 51dan 52 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 58 dan 59 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Perayu telah mempertikaikan pengemukaan keizinan bertulis tersebut dalam perenggan 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 dan 14 Afidavit Jawapan No.2 Perayu (muka surat 167, 168 dan 169 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Tambahan lagi, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur gagal mengambil kira Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(2) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 bahawa Responden-Responden tidak seharusnya mengemukakan bukti pada peringkat permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1)(a),(b), (c) dan (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

(d) Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(2) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 [TAB 1 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:
“19. Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O.18 r.19)

(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that—

(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;

(2) No evidence shall be admissible on an application under subparagraph (1)(a).

(e) Oleh itu, persoalan berkenaan keizinan bertulis dalam tuntutan Perayu perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

37. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira bahawa Responden-Responden menggunakan sebahagian nota keterangan Responden Kelapan dalam perenggan 36 Pembelaan Responden-Responden walaupun Responden-Responden sendiri mempertikaikan kandungan Nota Keterangan Responden Kelapan.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan tidak memutuskan berkenaan Responden-Responden menggunakan sebahagian nota keterangan Responden Kelapan dalam perenggan 36 Pembelaan Responden-Responden walaupun Responden-Responden sendiri mempertikaikan kandungan Nota Keterangan Responden Kelapan.

(b) Fakta bahawa Responden-Responden menggunakan sebahagian nota keterangan Responden Kelapan dalam perenggan 36 Pembelaan Responden-Responden walaupun Responden-Responden sendiri mempertikaikan kandungan Nota Keterangan Responden Kelapan boleh diteliti daripada ekshibit “MIMY-1” Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif No. 2 untuk menjawab afidavit yang diikrarkan untuk permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (muka surat 165 hingga 169 dan 175 dan 176 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Di sini, timbul persoalan bagaimana Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur boleh menerima Pembelaan Responden-Responden untuk permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 sekiranya Responden-Responden hanya mengguna pakai sebahagian Nota Keterangan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan dan mempertikaikan sebahagian besar Nota Keterangan tersebut.

(d) Oleh itu, Nota Keterangan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kelapan perlu dikemukakan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh untuk diteliti oleh Mahkamah.

38. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana tidak membuat keputusan berkenaan Responden Kelapan tiada bidang kuasa dalam membicarakan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dengan menyatakan dalam Alasan Penghakimannya “absence of jurisdiction” (whatever that may mean)” dan perkara ini perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan tidak membuat keputusan berkenaan Responden Kelapan tiada bidang kuasa dalam membicarakan Kes Tangkap Tersebut apabila menyatakan dalam Alasaln Penghakimannya “absence of jurisdiction” (whatever that may mean)” dalam perenggan 48 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 57 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Persoalan sama ada Responden Kelapan mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar dan membicarakan Kes Tangkap Tersebut perlu ditunjukkan berdasarkan bukti-bukti yang perlu dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah.

(c) Apabila Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan “(whatever that may mean)”, ini menunjukkan beliau tidak benar-benar memahami proses pendakwaan kes jenayah di Mahkamah yang tidak berdasarkan kuasa Mahkamah tetapi ia adalah kuasa Pendakwa Raya yang telah ditetapkan di bawah Artikel 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

(d) Oleh itu, persoalan ini perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.
39. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira bahawa kelakuan Responden Kelapan yang menunjukkan tidak mendengar perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dengan niat suci (“in good faith”) hendaklah dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa pliding dan afidavit Perayu tidak menunjukkan bagaimana Responden Kelapan mendengar perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut dengan niat jahat (“in bad faith”) dalam perenggan 56 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 62 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Perayu berhujah bahawa bagaimana untuk menunjukkan kelakuan Responden Kelapan tidak mendengar perbicaraan dan membuat keputusan untuk Kes Tangkap Tersebut dengan niat suci (“in good faith”) perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh dan bukan melalui afidavit.

(c) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur tidak memahami prinsip undang-undang yang mantap berkaitan pembuktian bagi kes pendakwaan salah perlu melalui perbicaraan penuh supaya Mahkamah dapat menilai kelakuan Responden Kelapan dan memberi peluang kepada Perayu untuk membuktikan kelakuan Responden Kelapan yang mendengar, membicarakan dan membuat keputusan Kes Tangkap Tersebut tanpa suci hati kerana membuat sabitan tanpa bukti-bukti yang melampau keraguan yang munasabah.

40. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana membuat keputusan bahawa Responden Kelapan mempunyai kekebalan kehakiman (“judicial immunity”) untuk perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut mengikut seksyen 14 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1965 yang hanya terpakai kepada Hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan, Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan dan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi.
(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa kekebalan kehakiman Responden Kelapan di bawah seksyen 14 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1948 [Akta 91] dalam perenggan 57 dan 58 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 63, 64 dan 65 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Seksyen 14 Akta 91 [TAB 24 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

Protection of Judges and other judicial officers
“14. No Judge or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction, nor shall any order for costs be made against him, provided that he at the time in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do so or order the act compained of.”
(c) Walau bagaimanapun, Perayu dengan rendah diri berhujah bahawa Majistret tidak termasuk dalam tafsiran “Hakim” di bawah seksyen 3 Akta 91 [TAB 22 IA/(P)] seperti yang berikut:

“Interpretation

3. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—

“Judge” means a Judge of the Federal Court, of the Court of Appeal or of the High Court, and includes the Chief Justice, the President and a Chief Judge;”
(d) Di samping itu, Majistret tidak termasuk dalam kumpulan “other person acting judicially” kerana di bawah seksyen 10 telah diperuntukkan orang lain yang bertindak mengikut kuasa kehakiman adalah Pendaftar. Seksyen 10 Akta 91 [TAB 23 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

“Registrars

10. (1) Subject to subsection (4), the Chief Registrar, Deputy Registrars, Senior Assistant Registrars and Assistant Registrars of the Federal Court and the Registrars, Deputy Registrars, Senior Assistant Registrars and Assistant Registrars of the Court of Appeal and of the High Courts shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the recommendation of the Chief Justice.

(2) Subject to any directions that the Chief Justice may issue, the Registrars, Deputy Registrars, Senior Assistant Registrars and Assistant Registrars of the High Court may exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Chief Registrar or Registrar, Deputy Registrars, Senior Assistant Registrars and Assistant Registrars respectively of the Federal Court or the Court of Appeal.

(3) The Chief Registrar, Registrars, Deputy Registrars, Senior Assistant Registrars and Assistant Registrars appointed under this Act shall subject to this Act or any other written law have the same jurisdiction, powers and duties as the Masters of the Supreme Court, Clerks of Criminal Courts, Registrars and like officers in the Supreme Court of Judicature in England and, in addition, such further jurisdiction, powers and duties as may be prescribed by rules of court.

(4) The Magistrates the local limits of whose jurisdiction extend to the towns in which registries of the High Court are situate shall be ex-officio Senior Assistant Registrars of the High Court for all purposes.”
(e) Kekebalan kehakiman di bawah seksyen 14 Akta 91 hanya terpakai kepada Majistret yang menjalankan kuasa kehakiman sebagai Penolong Kanan Pendaftar ex-officio di bandar-bandar yang mempunyai pejabat pendaftaran Mahkamah Tinggi.

(f) Responden Kelapan semasa mendengar dan membicarakan Kes Tangkap Tersebut tidak menggunakan kuasa kehakiman di bawah subseksyen 10(4) Akta 91.

(g) Oleh itu, daripada peruntukan-peruntukan undang-undang di atas amat jelas bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah terkhilaf apabila membuat keputusan bahawa kekebalan Responden Kelapan di bawah seksyen 14 Akta kerana Akta 91 tidak terpakai kepada Responden Kelapan.

(h) Perayu dengan rendah diri turut berhujah bahawa kes Indah Desa Saujana Corp Sdn Bhd & Ors lawan James Foong Cheng Yuen & Anor [2006] 1 MLJ 464 yang disandarkan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur untuk kekebalan kehakiman tidak terpakai kerana Responden Kelapan bukan hakim di bawah tafsiran hakim di bawah seksyen 3 Akta 91.

(i) Oeh itu, persoalan mengenai kekebalan kehakiman Responden Kelapan perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

41. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira peruntukan berkenaan kekebalan seseorang Majistret adalah di bawah seksyen 107 Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa kekebalan kehakiman Responden Kelapan di bawah seksyen 14 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1948 dalam perenggan 57 dan 58 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 63, 64 dan 65 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 tanpa mengambil kira peruntukan berkenaan kekebalan seseorang Majistret adalah di bawah subseksyen 107(1) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948.

(c) Perayu mengulangi hujahan Perayu pada perenggan 44 Ringkasan Hujahan ini mengenai isu kekebalan kehakiman Responden Kelapan.

(d) Oleh itu, persoalan undang-undang sama ada Responden Kelapan mempunyai kekebalan kehakiman dalam mendengar dan membicarakan Kes Tangkap Tersebut seharusnya diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

42. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira prinsip undang-undang dalam maxim undang-undang “generalia specialibus non derogant” terpakai bagi seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 sebagai undang-undang yang spesifik mengatasi seksyen 107 Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 dalam membuat keputusan bahawa Responden Kelapan mempunyai kekebalan kehakiman (“judicial immunity”).

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan gagal mengambil kira prinsip undang-undang dalam maxim undang-undang “generalia specialibus non derogant” terpakai bagi seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 sebagai undang-undang yang spesifik mengatasi seksyen 107 Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 dalam membuat keputusan bahawa Responden Kelapan mempunyai kekebalan kehakiman (“judicial immunity”) dalam perenggan 50, 51, 52, 53 dan 54 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 58 hingga 61 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Persoalan sama ada Responden Kelapan mempunyai bidang kuasa mendengar Kes Tangkap Tersebut dan seterusnya mempunyai kekebalan kehakiman berkait rapat dengan persoalan sama ada keizinan bertulis ada dikemukakan oleh Responden Kelima untuk Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

(c) Perayu bersandarkan kepada kes Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116 [TAB 38 IA/(P)] yang memutuskan bahawa kuasa mendakwa ialah kuasa Pendakwa Raya dan perkataan “conduct” dalam Artikel 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan tidak meliputi prosiding kes jenayah dan bidang kuasa Mahkamah:
“…4. Powers of the Public Prosecutor in criminal prosecutions.
Article 145(3) of the Constitution reads:
“The Attorney-General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence ….”
Section 376(i) of the Code provides:
“The Attorney-General shall be the Public Prosecutor and shall have the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this Code.”
This section must certainly be circumscribed by and read subject to and in the light of the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution which in effect only restate and are declaratory of the existing powers and duties of the Attorney-General in relation to criminal prosecutions and proceedings at the date the Constitution was promulgated.
The Solicitor-General lays considerable stress on the wide powers of the Attorney-General in England in their historical context, stating he is a master to himself, and submits the same applies to the Attorney-General of Malaysia. It must be remembered however that the constitutional rights, powers and duties of our Attorney-General are specifically spelt out in Article 145 of the Constitution and in particular in clauses (2) and (3) thereof, and it is clause (3) of that Article which is relevant and material to the issue before me and which circumscribes and specifies the limits of his functions and powers in relation to criminal proceedings. It would be dangerous therefore to go beyond this specific constitutional provision and rely on the position in England by historical analogy to justify any action of the Attorney-General in our country which does not come within the ambit of that provision.
It would now be necessary to consider the connotation of the words ‘institute’ and ‘conduct’ in Article 145(3).
‘Institute’ in Article 145(3) cannot cover the subject-matter of section 418A of the Code, as the Solicitor-General contends. It must necessarily refer to the commencement of criminal proceedings and prosecutions and not to such as have already been instituted and are pending or to criminal procedure as such. It may well be, as the Solicitor-General submits, that the Public Prosecutor has power, apart from the application of the provisions of sections 417 and 418A of the Code to direct any case triable in the Magistrate’s or Sessions Court to be tried in the High Court after a preliminary inquiry. This power to so direct would, if exercised, fall squarely within his discretion to institute and conduct criminal prosecutions and proceedings. The position under section 418A of the Code is wholly different as it has no relation to the institution and for that matter the conduct of criminal proceedings but instead clearly and expressly concerns and relates to criminal cases already commenced and pending in the subordinate courts.
‘Conduct’ in Article 145(3) cannot but refer to the conduct of prosecutions in court, as it indeed appears ipsissimis verbis in section 377 of the Code. And ‘control and direction’ in section 376(i) of the Code is in respect of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings, and not of criminal procedure or the jurisdiction of the courts.
‘Conduct’ of criminal prosecutions and proceedings in Article 145(3) cannot connote the regulation of criminal procedure or of the jurisdiction of the courts or the power or discretion to do so. Any contrary contention would in effect in my view be tantamount to the suggestion of the Public Prosecutor arrogating to himself the legislative powers vested in Parliament under Item 4 and in particular paragraph (b) thereof in List I (Federal List) in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, with perhaps also the not inconceptible resultant intrusion or at least a more than peripheral incursion into the sphere of Article 121(1) of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the Federation is vested in two High Courts and in such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law – namely, the Subordinate Courts Act, 1948 which specifies the subordinate courts and their respective civil and criminal jurisdiction.
Pursuing its signification, ‘to conduct’ means ‘to lead, guide, manage’ (In re Bhupalli Malliah AIR 1959 And Pra 477;Pride of Derby v British Celanese Ltd [1953] 1 Ch 149 167 at p. 167 per Lord Evershed, M.R.). It conveys the idea of leading and guiding, that is to say, the person who conducts the prosecution determines all important questions of policy involved in the course of the trial and the attitude to be adopted by the prosecution towards material objections raised or demands made by the accused with respect to the evidence.
The effect of Article 145(3) of the Constitution and section 376(i) of the Code was considered by the Federal Court in Long bin Samat & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1974] 2 MLJ 152. That was a case involving a charge under section 324 of the Penal Code for voluntarily causing hurt but the evidence adduced before the Magistrate disclosed an offence under section 326 of the Penal Code for voluntarily causing grevious hurt. The appellant was convicted under section 324 and appealed on the ground that the trial was a nullity since the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the case as the evidence disclosed an offence under section 326. The Federal Court held on a reference that it was well within the wide discretion vested inthe Public Prosecutor to prefer a charge for a less serious offence than what the evidence in fact disclosed. This was clearly in my view a perfectly proper application of the provisions of Article 145(3) of the Constitution and section 376(i) of the Code as the Public Prosecutor is not open to question by anyone if in the exercise of his discretion to institute and conduct prosecutions he chooses to prefer a charge for a lesser offence in the particular circumstances of a case.
The examples of discretion vested in the Public Prosecutor the Solicitor-General refers to in relation to the issue and refusal of sanctions for prosecution and the withdrawal of charges pertain to the institution and conduct of prosecutions and not to the regulation of criminal procedure.
If indeed the Attorney-General who by virtue of the provisions of section 376(i) of the Code is the Public Prosecutor is as omnipotent as the Solicitor-General contends by virtue of his discretionary powers under Article 145(3) and section 376(i) of the Code, then in my view there would be no point or purpose in including the Public Prosecutor in the provisions of section 417 of the Code in the matter of applying to the High Court for a transfer or other order thereunder, let alone enacting separately special powers exercisable by him under section 418A of the Code, as the Public Prosecutor would on the contention advanced be in a position by virtue of the very provisions of the Constitution to virtually dictate the venue of trial and trial court itself when initially applying for a summons or warrant, and the logical extension or rather perhaps the reductio ad absurdum of any such argument would be that the Public Prosecutor could indeed even specify any particular Magistrate, President or Judge for that matter to hear any particular case – a situation which I would consider to be absolutely inconceivable even to the most ardent advocates of any such contention.
In this context, the provisions of section 197 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code (on which the Code is based but which has since been repealed and re-enacted in 1973) provide an interesting contrast. That section provides for the trial of Judges, Magistrates and certain public officials only with the previous sanction of the Central or State Government as the case may be, and subsection (2) thereof provides that the Central or State Government may determine the person by whom and the manner in which the prosecution is to be conducted and also specify the court of trial. The validity of this section which was challenged in relation to Article 14 of the Constitution of India (which equates with our Article 8(1)) was upheld by the Supreme Court of India in Matajog Dobey v HC Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44 as the discrimination was based upon a rational classification for the protection of public servants from harassment in the discharge of official duties.
In any event, in the exercise of his discretionary powers, the Public Prosecutor cannot discriminate at will and infringe the provisions of Article 8(1) as judicially determined in the matter of classification, differentia and nexus. If he can indeed do so, there would be no reason why in the exercise of his powers he cannot even infringe the specific provisions of Article 8(2). It is significant, in my view, that, unlike Article 8(2), Article 8(1) is not prefaced by the clause “Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution”. And equally significant is the fact that neither is there a non obstante clause in Article, 145(3) to eliminate the application of Article 8(1) to its provisions. I would add that I respectfully associate myself with what Chandrachud J., held in Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2292 and so declare that the equality provision in Article 8(1) is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and a basic feature thereof. In that case two of the other Judges of the Indian Supreme Court did not deal with that question, one was equivocal and only Mathew J., held otherwise.
The Solicitor-General submits that if the Constitution allows discrimination, any such discrimination made must be upheld. That in fact is the position under Article 8(5) which expressly and specifically excepts provisions in respect of the five matters specified therein from being invalidated or prohibited by Article 8. Article 145(3) does not however in terms make any classification whatsoever or allow discrimination but only endows the Attorney-General with discretionary powers in relation to the matters therein stipulated and is in my view subject to and must necessarily harmonise with the provisions of Article 8(1). The Solicitor-General in support of his proposition that any discrimination allowed by the Constitution must be upheld refers to two Indian cases, but there it was not discretionary discrimination at will that was allowed but classification that was made by the Constitution. A classification made by the Constitution itself cannot of course be struck down as violating Article 8(1). Accordingly in Moti Ram v Union of India AIR 1966 HP 25 3132 (at p. 31, 32), the distinction made between the State and Union Territories by section 54 of the Union Territories Act, 1963 was held to be valid as this classification appears in the Indian Constitution itself. There is no and cannot indeed be any provision in our or the Indian Constitution which provides for or allows discretionary discrimination at will and pleasure without any reasonable classification.
The Constitution is not to be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense (James v Commonwealth of Australia [1936] AC 578 614 at p. 614 per Lord Wright) but it is equally true that this does not mean that the court is at liberty to stretch or pervert the language of the Constitution in the interests of any legal or constitutional theory of omnipotence of the Attorney-General in matters relating to criminal procedure and the jurisdiction of the courts.
Article 145(3) cannot therefore in my view on any reasonable and acceptable interpretation provide, as the Solicitor-General contends, any form of licence to override the provisions of Article 8(1) which is a fundamental liberty under Part II of the Constitution, and perhaps even also those of Article 121(1), and at the very least, in any event, applying the principle of harmonious construction of the Constitution – an accepted canon of constitutional interpretation, effect should be given to all these provisions as far as possible, and on that basis alone any exercise of discretionary powers by the Attorney-General must necessarily relate to reasonable classification and not arbitrary selection.
No resort can be had to Article 145(3) of the Constitution to ascertain the policy or guidance for the exercise of discretionary powers by the Attorney-General even if there were any. In Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1895 1901, the Supreme Court of India reiterated (at p. 1901) that a liberal construction of an impugned statute should not be carried by the courts to the extent of always trying to discover a dormant or latent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary power conferred on executive authorities, and that it is the duty of the court to strike down without any hesitation any arbitrary power conferred on the executive by the legislature. The Supreme Court in that case in considering the provisions of a section of a statute conferring uncontrolled power on the provincial Government to levy a turnover tax at such rates as the Government might direct without any guidance or policy laid down in that respect in the statute itself, held that such a policy could not be gathered from the constitutional provisions as this would destroy the doctrine of excessive delegation and would also sanction conferment of power by the legislature on the executive without laying down any guidelines in the statute (ibid, at p. 1901).

(d) Sekali lagi Perayu merujuk kepada kes Bradley v Fisher, 13, wall 335, 20 L.Ed [TAB 42 IA/(P)] yang memutuskan bahawa apabila tiada bidang kuasa maka tiada budi bicara, di mana budi bicara merupakan insiden kepada bidang kuasa, seperti yang berikut:

“Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.” Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed.”

(e) Oleh itu, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira prinsip undang-undang dalam maxim undang-undang “generalia specialibus non derogant” terpakai bagi seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 sebagai undang-undang yang spesifik mengatasi seksyen 107 Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 dalam membuat keputusan bahawa Responden Kelapan mempunyai kekebalan kehakiman (“judicial immunity”).

43. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira bahawa tiada kekebalan kehakiman mutlak di bawah seksyen 107 Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan menyatakan bahawa kekebalan kehakiman Responden Kelapan di bawah seksyen 14 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1948 dalam perenggan 57 dan 58 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 63, 64 dan 65 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Subseksyen 107(1) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 [TAB 15 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:
“Protection of judicial officers
107.(1) No Sessions Court Judge, Magistrate or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction, nor shall any order for costs be made against him, provided that he at the time in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of.”

(c) Daripada peruntukan tersebut, amat jelas bahawa tiada kekebalan kehakiman mutlak di bawah seksyen 107 Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 dan tindakan undang-undang boleh diambil terhadap seseorang Hakim Sesyen atau Majistret sekiranya Hakim Sesyen atau Majistret tersebut tiada bidang kuasa untuk mendengar suatu kes atau Hakim Sesyen atau Majistret tidak secara suci hati percaya bahawa dia mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar atau membuat apa-apa perintah.

44. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat perbicaraan penuh melalui Pernyataan Tuntutan, Pembelaan dan afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan di bawah permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat perbicaraan penuh melalui Pernyataan Tuntutan, Pembelaan dan afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan di bawah permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 melalui penelitian dan analisis Perayu ke atas Alasan Penghakiman.

(b) Perayu berhujah bahawa Pernyataan Tuntutan, Pembelaan dan afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan di bawah permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 mengandungi fakta-fakta yang dipertikaikan oleh kedua-dua pihak dan apabila terdapat pertikaian fakta maka pertikaian fakta tersebut hendaklah diputuskan melalui perbicaraan penuh.

(c) Kaedah yang digunakan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur tidak seharusnya digunakan untuk kes tuntutan atas pendakwaan salah dan kerugian akibat daripada pendakwaan salah tersebut.

(d) Hujahan Perayu berdasarkan kes Sivarasa Rasiah & Ors v Che Hamzah Che Ismail & Ors [2012] 1 MLJ 473 [TAB 26 IA/(P)] di perenggan 13,14, 15 dan 16 seperti yang berikut:
“[13] The principles for striking out pursuant to O 18 r 19 of the RHC 1980 are well settled. In Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, the Supreme Court ruled:
The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clard Ltd), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable’ (see AG to Duchy of Lancaster v L 7 NW Rly Co) …

[14] A striking out application is not a trial on affidavits. It is not an application where the parties have to adduce evidence to establish the merits of their case. The court should not conduct a minute examination of the documents and the facts of the case. So long as the claim on the face of it discloses some cause of action or raises some question fit to be tried it should not be struck out. The mere fact the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out.
[15] A striking out order should not be made summarily by the court if there is issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration. It should also not be made if there is issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial, (see Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565 (Federal Court)).

[16] The test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder’s case is that the claim on the face of it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’. The stress is not only on the word ‘unsustainable’ but also on the word ‘obviously’ ie the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into a lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/or fact, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at trial.”

(e) Oleh itu, pertikaian fakta-fakta dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu dan Pembelaan Responden-Responden hendaklah diputuskan melalui perbicaraan penuh.

45. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira bahawa Responden-Responden mempertikaikan Rekod Rayuan yang akan digunakan untuk perbicaraan penuh dan Responden-Responden perlu mengemukakan bukti-bukti mereka sendiri melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 tanpa mengambil kira bahawa Responden-Responden mempertikaikan Rekod Rayuan yang akan digunakan untuk perbicaraan penuh dan Responden-Responden perlu mengemukakan bukti-bukti mereka sendiri melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh kerana tiada dinyatakan dalam Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015.

(b) Perayu telah menyatakan dalam perenggan 71 Pernyataan Tuntutan bahawa Perayu akan mengemukakan Rekod Rayuan dan Hujahan Bertulis Rayuan Kes Tangkap Tersebut (muka surat 101 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Rekod Rayuan yang merupakan bukti kepada pendakwaan salah terhadap Perayu hanya boleh dikemukakan melalui perbicaraan penuh dan bukan melalui permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana bercanggah dengan Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(2) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 yang memperuntukkan bahawa tiada bukti dikemukakan bagi permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1)(a) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

(d) Oleh itu, tuntutan Perayu berasaskan pendakwaan salah perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh dengan keterangan saksi-saksi, pengemukaan Rekod Rayuan dan keterangan dokumentar lain.

46. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan yang telah dibangkitkan oleh Perayu dalam penghujahan untuk permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan gagal mengambil kira isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan yang telah dibangkitkan oleh Perayu dalam penghujahan untuk permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana tiada dinyatakan dalam Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015.

(b) Perayu telah membangkitkan isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan dalam hujahan bertulis Perayu semasa pendengaran permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (muka surat 264 hingga 269 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Apabila terdapat isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan maka permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 tidak seharusnya dibenarkan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur mengikut prinsip-prinsip yang diputuskan dalam kes Bandar Builder v United Malaysian Banking Corporation Berhad [1993] 3 MLJ 36 [TAB 25 IA/(P)].

47. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira bahawa tuntutan Perayu adalah berasaskan pendakwaan salah (‘malicious prosecution’) yang perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan memutuskan elemen-elemen pendakwaan salah (‘malicious prosecution’) dalam tuntutan Perayu bukan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh dalam perenggan 27, 28, 29, 30 dan 31 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 43 hingga 47 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Perayu berhujah bahawa kaedah pendengaran Writ yang digunakan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur tidak seharusnya digunakan untuk kes tuntutan atas pendakwaan salah dan kerugian akibat daripada pendakwaan salah tersebut.

(c) Perayu berhujah bahawa tuntutan perayu perlu dibezakan dengan kes Rosli bin Dahlan v Tan Sri Abdul Gani binPatail & Ors [2014] 11 MLJ 481 yang diputuskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur kerana dalam kes tersebut, pihak Defendan-Defendan tidak memfailkan Pembelaan dan oleh itu, permohonan Defendan-Defendan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 telah ditolak oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur.

(d) Perayu turut berhujah bahawa kes-kes luar negara yang dirujuk oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur di perenggan 29, 31, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45 dan 46 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 44 hingga 56 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama) tidak terpakai dalam tuntutan Perayu kerana Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur terikat dengan kes-kes Sivarasa Rasiah & Ors v Che Hamzah Che Ismail & Ors [2012] 1 MLJ 473 [TAB 26 IA/(P) ], Bandar Builder v United Malaysian Banking Corporation Berhad [1993] 3 MLJ 36 [TAB 25 IA/(P)] dan Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116 [TAB 38 IA/(P)].
(e) Ini kerana terdapat prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa tuntutan berasaskan pendakwaan salah hendaklah melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

(f) Dalam kes Sivarasa Rasiah & Ors v Che Hamzah Che Ismail & Ors [2012] 1 MLJ 473 [TAB 26 IA/(P) ] Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa tuntutan berasaskan pendakwaan salah perlu diputuskan melalui pengemukaan bukti-bukti dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh dalam perenggan 26, 27 dan 28 seperti yang berikut:
“[26] On reading the grounds of judgment by the learned JC, it is clear that the learned JC had failed to consider the malicious prosecution claim by the appellants in the same suit. It is another cause of action by the appellants as appears in the statement of claim, where if the appellants succeed, damages would ensue. It is a question for trial on evidence whether the appellants are able to prove their case or not.

[27] Paragraph 23, of the statement of claim at pp 44–46 of the appeal records sets out the lengthy particulars of the malicious prosecution claim. The first respondent, whom the appellants claimed to be the main tortfeasor in the malicious prosecution claim, has been named as a party. The appellants contended that it was the first respondent who had initiated the prosecution of the appellants which led to the criminal case against them at the Sessions Court Kuala Lumpur. From the pleadings and submissions of counsel, it is clear that both questions of fact and law arise that cannot be resolved without a trial. Only at trial the appellants may be able to prove that:

(a) the respondents initiated the process of prosecution against the appellants which led to the criminal case in the Sessions Court Kuala Lumpur;

(b) the prosecution terminated in favour of the appellants (ie they were acquitted in the criminal case);

(c) the respondents initiated the prosecution maliciously;

(d) there was no reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution; and

(e) the appellants have suffered damages.
(see Alkin’s Encyclopedia of Court Forms in Civil Proceedings, (2nd Ed), Vol 25, 1998 Issue, p 400, para 2).
[28] On this issue the court is in agreement with Clement Skinner J (now JCA) in his decision in Wui Kuang Liang v Government of Malaysia & Anor [2006] 4 MLJ 369, where the plaintiff’s claim in that case was for malicious prosecution. The learned judge held:
Here, the appellant’s cause of action is for malicious prosecution, the success or failure of which action will depend on whether or not it can be shown that the second respondent instituted or earned on the proceedings maliciously or whether there was an absence of reasonable and probable cause for the proceedings, which are questions that give rise to issues of mixed fact and law which are dependent for their resolution on all the circumstances and evidence that are disclosed at a trial. Such questions are not suitable to be decided on disputed facts in the affidavits of the parties, and certainly cannot be decided by merely looking at the pleadings only on an application under the first limb of O 14 r 21(1)(a) of the SCR.”

(g) Perayu berhujah bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur terikat dengan prinsip-prinsip yang diputuskan dalam kes Sivarasa dan sewajarnya memutuskan bahawa tuntutan Perayu yang berdasarkan pendakwaan salah diputuskan melalui perbicaraan penuh.

48. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira pembelaan Responden-Responden di bawah seksyen 2(a) Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa 1948.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 tanpa mengambil kira pembelaan Responden-Responden di bawah seksyen 2(a) Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa 1948 kerana tiada dinyatakan langsung dalam Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015.

(b) Pembelaan Responden-Responden bahawa tuntutan Perayu telah disekat oleh had masa di bawah seksyen (2)(a) Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa 1948 dalam perenggan 68 Pembelaan (muka surat 118 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(c) Seksyen 2(a) of Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa Awam 1948 [Akta 198] [TAB 16 IA/(P)] memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:
“Protection of persons acting in execution of statutory or other public duty”

2. Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provisions shall have effect:

(a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof;”

(d) Jika Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur benar-benar mengambil kira Pembelaan Responden-Responden dalam membuat keputusan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 maka seharusnya perkara berbangkit mengenai tuntutan Perayu disekat oleh had masa ini diputuskan melalui perbicaraan penuh dan tidak hanya memilih untuk membuat keputusan bagi pernyataan-pernyataan tertentu dalam Pembelaan Responden-Responden.

(e) Oleh itu, isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Responden-Responden berkenaan tuntutan Perayu disekat oleh had masa perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.

49. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana gagal mengambil kira pembelaan Responden-Responden di bawah seksyen 2(a) Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa Awam 1948 tidak terpakai kepada kausa tindakan Perayu bagi pendakwaan salah sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam penghujahan bertulis Responden-Responden.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 tanpa mengambil kira pembelaan Responden-Responden di bawah seksyen 2(a) Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa 1948 kerana tiada dinyatakan langsung dalam Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015.

(b) Sebagaimana dihujahkan dalam perenggan 45(b) Ringkasan Hujahan ini, pembelaan Responden-Responden bahawa tuntutan Perayu telah disekat oleh had masa di bawah seksyen (2)(a) Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa 1948 dalam perenggan 68 Pembelaan.

(c) Perayu telah menjawab isu undang-undang ini dalam perenggan 52 Jawapan kepada Pembelaan (muka surat 140 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(d) Perayu juga turut menghujahkan mengenai pembelaan Responden-Responden bahawa tuntutan Perayu disekat oleh had masa ini dalam perenggan 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 dan 71 Penghujahan Bertulis Perayu untuk permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (muka surat 192 hingga 198 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(e) Dalam hal ini, apabila Perayu mengemukakan Jawapan kepada Pembelaan dan seterusnya mengemukakan otoriti dalam penghujahan bertulis semasa pendengaran permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 maka pembelaan Responden-Responden ini dipertikaikan dan isu perlu diputuskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi.

(f) Perayu bersandarkan kepada kes Ibrahim Bin Mohideen Kutty v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2003] 5 MLJ 294 [TAB 44 IA/(P)], Low Hop Bing J (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan isu had masa di bawah seksyen 2(a) Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa Awam 1948 [Akta 198] terdapat dalam dua keadaan seperti yang berikut:
“The limitation period under s 2(a) as alluded to above has been specified in two separate limbs.
The first limb disallows the commencement of, eg, any suit or action in the Federation against any person for any act done in pursuance of any execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority unless it is commenced within 36 months next after the act, neglect or default complained of.
In my considered view, ‘the act, neglect or default complained of contained in the first limb of s 2(a) is confined to a single act, neglect or default which does not involve an element of continuance thereof and the single act per se is capable of constituting a complete cause of action, ie ‘where there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued and when all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed’, per Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ (Malaya) in Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MU 409 (SC).
In the case of a continuance of injury or damage, in the form of or by way of deprivation of fundamental liberty brought about by a detention order in the instant case which was stated to be for a duration of two years, ie from 8 July 1998 to 8 July 2000, the second limb of s 2(a) would apply, so that for the purposes of imposing the period of limitation, time begins to run when the injury or damage ceases when the detention order expired on 8 July 2000 or more specifically in the instant case when the plaintiff was released on 3 January 2000.
In my judgment, the first limb of s 2(a) has no application to the facts of the instant case as the detention order was far from being a single act per se but, as alluded to above, was stated to be for a duration of two years. It is open to the plaintiff to seek reliance on the second limb of s 2(a) which is couched in such a manner as to provide for the continuance of injury or damage by way of natural progression or effluxion of time, so that the remedy, if any, for any alleged injury or damage would be available and reckonable from the date of the cessation thereof.
In the circumstances, I hold that the limitation period of 36 months under the second limb of s 2(a) began to run from the date the injury or damage ceased, ie the date on which the plaintiff was released on 3 January 2000 and he is at liberty to file his suit or action against the first defendant within 36 months thereof, ie on or before 3 January 2003.”

(g) Oleh itu, isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Responden-Responden berkenaan Writ Perayu disekat oleh had masa perlu diputuskan melalui perbicaraan penuh.

50. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa tuntutan Perayu terhadap Responden-Responden adalah tidak jelas dan mapan (“unsustainable”).

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa tuntutan Perayu terhadap Responden-Responden adalah tidak jelas dan mapan (“unsustainable”) dalam perenggan 59 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 65 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Persoalan sama ada tuntutan Perayu terhadap Responden-Responden adalah tidak jelas dan mapan (“unsustainable”) perlu diputuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh kerana bukti-bukti perlu dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah supaya Mahkamah boleh memutuskan setiap persoalan fakta dan undang-undang yang dipertikaikan dengan seadil-adilnya.

(c) Persoalan sama ada tuntutan Perayu terhadap Responden-Responden adalah tidak jelas dan mapan (“unsustainable”) tidak boleh diputuskan melalui permohonan interlokutori di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana Perayu telah membangkitkan isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan dalam hujahan bertulis Perayu semasa pendengaran permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (muka surat 264 hingga 269 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(d) Hujahan Perayu bersandarkan kepada kes Bandar Builder v. United Malaysian Banking Corporation Berhad [1993] 3 MLJ 36 [TAB 25 IA/(P)], Mahkamah Agung memutuskan seperti yang berikut:
“The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd 7, and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it’s obviously unsustainable’ (see AG of Duchy of Lancaster v L & NW Rly Co 8). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (see Wenlock v Moloney & Ors 9). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O 33 r 3 (which is in pari materia with our O 33 r 2 of the RHC) (see Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd 7). The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.”

(e) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur terikat dengan prinsip-prinsip yang telah diputuskan dalam kes Bandar Builder di atas dan seharusnya membuat keputusan bahawa Writ yang difailkan oleh Perayu diputuskan melalui perbicaraan penuh.

51. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa tuntutan Perayu terhadap Responden-Responden adalah remeh-temeh dan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah.

(a) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah membuat keputusan membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dengan membuat keputusan bahawa tuntutan Perayu terhadap Responden-Responden adalah remeh-temeh dan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah dalam perenggan 59 dan 60 Alasan Penghakiman bertarikh 15 Ogos 2015 (muka surat 65 dan 66 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama).

(b) Walau bagaimanapun, daripada kesemua hujahan Perayu di atas, Perayu telah dapat menunjukkan bahawa terdapat isu-isu serius yang perlu dibicarakan, tuntutan Perayu terhadap Responden-Responden bukan tindakan yang remeh-temeh dan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah dan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah terkhilaf dalam keputusannya membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

Kesimpulan
Secara kesimpulannya, Perayu dengan rendah diri memohon agar rayuan Perayu dibenarkan dengan kos berdasarkan hujahan-hujahan yang telah dikemukakan di atas kerana kes Perayu ialah kes pendakwaan salah yang perlu dibuktikan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh.
Bertarikh pada 7 haribulan Januari, 2016.

…………………………….
Perayu

RINGKASAN HUJAHAN ini difailkan oleh Perayu yang beralamat penyampaian di **************************************,
No. Tel: 019-2787830

Categories: Case Law Studies
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