Breach of Natural Justice | Anti Cyber Forensics - The Art of Counter-Cyber Forensics

My Civil Suit Against The Malicious Magistrate and Prosecutions: To Be Represented By Prominent Lawyers – Limitation of Immunity for Lower Courts if Found Malicious and Mala Fide

February 11, 2011 The Mathematical Theory of Nothing 369 comments

My Written Submission at the Close of Defence Case On 7th of February 2011: The First Magistrate in Malaya Courts Had Been Proved To Be “The Greatest Liar of All Times”, and Of Course The Malicious Deputy Public Prosecutor

February 7, 2011 The Mathematical Theory of Nothing 1,263 comments

Serious Malicious at:

15. Pihak Pembelaan menyediakan hujahan bertulis ini tanpa memprejudiskan hak pihak Pembelaan untuk membangkitkan isu bahawa tiada Nota-nota Keterangan untuk prosiding pada 19.10.2010, 13.12.2010, 23.12.2010, 6.1.2011 dan 18.1.2011 dibekalkan oleh Mahkamah dan ini jelas tidak mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 265,268, 272 dan 433 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah (Akta 593).

24. Adalah dihujahkan juga bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan premis tempat kejadian kerana tiada gambar-gambar tempat kejadian dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan. Di samping itu, tiada rajah kasar disediakan oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7). Walaupun pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil SP3 untuk memberi keterangan tetapi gagal memberi lokasi tempat kejadian yang tepat dan tempat kejadian tidak dikenalpasti (mukasurat 40 Nota Keterangan). Selain itu premis tempat kejadian adalah rumah sewa yang turut berada di dalam kawalan SP3 yang sudah tentu mempunyai akses kepada premis tersebut. Oleh yang demikian bukan Tertuduh sahaja ada akses kepada premis tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh). Oleh yang demikian tempat kejadian tidak dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan.

and etc.

Below is The Most Seriousness of Malicious Acts and Material Evidence by a Malicious Magistrate Kuala Lumpur:

68. Tiada senarai klip video yang disediakan oleh Saksi Pendakwaan ke-7 (SP7) selaku Pegawai Penyiasat dan setiap satu daripada 106 klip video yang berlainan tajuk dan menjadi asas pertuduhan tidak ditanda sebagai ekshibit. Ini dapat dibuktikan dengan tiada keterangan direkodkan di dalam Nota-nota Keterangan sehingga 6.1.2011.

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DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR

DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA

KES TANGKAP NO: 2-83-7119-2009

ANTARA

PENDAKWA RAYA

DAN

MOHAMAD IZAHAM BIN MOHAMED YATIM

HUJAHAN BERTULIS PIHAK PEMBELAAN

Dengan izin Majistret,

1. Ini adalah hujahan bertulis pihak pembelaan di akhir kes pembelaan.

LATARBELAKANG KES:

2. Tertuduh dihadapkan dengan pertuduhan seperti berikut:

“Bahawa kamu pada 13/07/09 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat *** **** *** *** ** **********, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah didapati memiliki sebanyak 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK yang di bawah milikan kamu. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 5(2) akta yang sama”.

3. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil 7 orang saksi untuk membuktikan kes pendakwaan iaitu:

3.1 SP-1 iaitu Insp. Mohd Razif b. Mohd Zaid I/16542

3.2 SP-2 iaitu Zanariah binti Ibrahim

3.3 SP-3 iaitu Mohanaraj Naidi Subbiah

3.4 SP-4 iaitu Mohamad Zamri bin Roslan

3.5 SP-5 iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah I/17525

3.6 SP-6 iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus

3.7 SP-7 iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira binti Zakaria

4. Ekshibit-ekshibit yang telah ditanda adalah seperti berikut:-

4.1 P-1 – Borang Serah Menyerah (Borang D6)

4.2 P2(a), (b), (c), (d) – (n) – 7 DVC, 3 VCD, 2 Cd, 1 thumb drive dan hard disc

4.3 P3(a – m) – 13 keping DVD

4.4 P9 – Copy SP2

4.5 P11 – Quotation Baru

4.6 P12 – Surat Lawyer 1 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

4.7 P13 – Surat Lawyer 3 mohon hak penjagaan anak

4.8 P14 – Surat Lawyer 7

4.9 P15 – Surat Lawyer 7A2 contoh isteri derhaka yang nyata

4.10 P16-(dalam softcopy)Surat lawyer 7A2 dokumen

4.11 P17-(softcopy) surat lawyer 8 dokumen

4.12 P18 – Surat Lawyer 8 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

4.13 P19 – yearfocal – terdapat nama Saliza binti Ramli

4.14 P20 – S6301428.jpg

4.15 P21-S6301429.jpg

4.16 P22-S6301430.jpg

4.17 P23-S6301431.jpg

4.18 P24-S6301432.jpg

4.19 P25-S6301433.jpg

4.20 P26-S6301434.jpg

4.21 P27-S6301435.jpg

4.22 P28-S6301436.jpg

4.23 P29-S6301437.jpg

4.24 P30-S6301438.jpg

4.25 P31- S6301439.jpg

4.26 P32- S6301440.jpg

4.27 P33- S6301441.jpg

4.28 P34 – Dang Wangi Report D29694/2009

4.29 P35 – Laporan Analisa

4.30 P36 – Copy SP2

4.31 P37-Borang Senarai Geledah

5. Pihak Pembelaan telah memohon untuk memanggil 3 orang saksi untuk membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah tetapi telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah sebanyak 2 kali dan hanya Tertuduh memberi keterangan secara bersumpah.

6. Pihak Pembelaan juga telah turut mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen berikut untuk membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan iaitu:

6.1 Salinan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report No.5070/09

6.2 Salinan Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan

Kes Mal No. 07004-014.199/03

Mahkamah Rendah Syariah Balik Pulau,

Pulau Pinang

6.3 Salinan Sijil Kelahiran Abu Muhammad Abdullah No. AN 95545

6.4 Salinan Laporan Polis Bayan Lepas Report:3010/03

6.5 Salinan Wakalah Peguam Syarie bertarikh 19.5.03;

6.6 Penyata Tuntutan Kes Mal No. 07004-055-0036/04;

6.7 Surat daripada Mahkamah Rendah Syariah Balik Pulau bertarikh 11.1.2005 beserta Nota Prosiding bertarikh 8.3.2004;

6.8 Perintah Perceraian bertarikh 9.3.2004;

6.9 Surat Perakuan Perceraian bertarikh 23.9.2004.

6.10 Surat Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Negeri Pulau Pinang bertarikh 16.4.2004;

6.11 Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Pulau Pinang bertarikh 31.3.2004;

6.12 Certificate of Incorporation of Code Genius Limited bertarikh 7.12.2001;

6.13 Laporan Analisa bertarikh 27.7.2009 ditanda sebagai “ID-D1”; dan

6.14 Salinan karbon Senarai Geledah (tiada catatan masa) bertarikh 13.7.2009.

7. Salinan dokumen-dokumen dikemukakan tanpa memprejudiskan hak Tertuduh yang telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11” hingga “P-19” yang telah dibuat semasa kes pendakwaan.

8. Pada 13.12.2010 apabila Tertuduh membuat permohonan agar kes ditangguhkan dengan mengemukakan otoriti bahawa rayuan ini perlu didengar terlebih dahulu, permohonan telah ditolak tanpa mengambilkira kes yang telah diputuskan dan dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Majistret yang mengikat Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

9. Pihak Pembelaan telah mengemukakan kes Mahkamah Rayuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) kes Rowstead Systems Sdn Bhd v. Bumicrystal Technology (M) Sdn Bhd [2005] 2 CLJ 471 (di mukasurat 471 Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa penangguhan prosiding perlu dibenarkan apabila terdapat rayuan berkenaan keputusan Hakim yang menolak permohonan daripada menarik diri daripada mendengar kes tersebut.

Di muka surat 471, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“As mentioned above, this case comes under the category of non-automatic disqualification. Hence the need to prove whether the element of bias exists. It has to be objectively decided, based on all the facts and circumstances of the case. But more important question to be asked is whether it is proper for such decision to be made by presiding judge against whom bias has been alleged? In other words, when a party alleges that a presiding judge is biased, and if the presiding judge himself decides he is not, would such decision not infringe the rule of natural justice in that “one should not be a judge in one’s own cause”. This, we think, is the crux of the instant case, even more so when the learned JC would have to decide the degree of bias that would be sufficient to affect his impartiality. In our judgment, this situation would come within the meaning of special circumstances.

We have taken into consideration the fact that in the event that a stay a proceedings was not granted and the learned JC be allowed to proceed with the hearing of this case, it would result in a waste of time and effort by all persons involved since if the Court of Appeal allows the appeal the whole proceedings conducted by the learned JC would have to be completely expunged. In the circumstances it would be more expedient to allow a stay of the proceedings until the hearing of the appeal has been completed.”

10. Pada 13.12.2010 Tertuduh di dalam akuan bersumpah telah memberi keterangan-keterangan seperti berikut:

10.1 Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Tertuduh berada di Johor Bahru, Johor.

10.2 Tertuduh tidak menandatangani Senarai Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009. Salinan Senarai Geledah tersebut tiada catatan masa.

10.3 Pada 4.11.2009 Tertuduh telah dipanggil oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7) untuk hadir memberi keterangan di Balai Polis Ampang, Selangor.

10.4 Tiada ekshibit ditunjukkan oleh SP7. Tertuduh dipaksa menandatangani kertas kosong.

10.5 Hard disk (“P-2”) bukan kepunyaan Tertuduh. Tertuduh tidak pernah membeli cakera keras (“hard disk”) di Malaysia.

10.6 Tertuduh tidak tahu apa yang dirampas oleh SP7 pada 13.7.2009.

10.7 Tertuduh mempertikaikan analisa dan Laporan Analisa yang disediakan oleh Saksi Pendakwaan pertama (SP1) kerana analisa tidak betul dan tidak mengikut piawaian antarabangsa yang diiktiraf oleh mahkamah-mahkamah lain di dunia. SP1 juga menyatakan beliau tidak buat analisis. Tiada imej forensik (‘forensic image’) dibuat oleh SP1. Integriti fail yang diekstrak oleh SP1 amat diragui. ‘Time stamp’ yang penting untuk pengesahan tarikh kewujudan fail tidak mengikut hukum alam. Masa tidak boleh berpatah balik.

10.8 Tertuduh tidak dipanggil untuk melihat kandungan P2.

10.9 DVD (ekshibit “P3a-P3m”) telah dibawa oleh Tertuduh ke Balai Polis Kepong dan seorang anggota polis bernama Kopral Azmi telah mengira klip video yang berada di dalam ekshibit ” P3a-P3m” hanya berjumlah 82 klip video sahaja.

10.10 Cara penyimpanan ekshbit “P-2” tidak mengikut prosedur untuk (dengan izin) ‘electronic evidence’. Tiada (dengan izin) ‘casing’ disediakan oleh SP1.

10.11 Perkara yang menjadi perbincangan di antara Tertuduh dan SP2 mengenai ‘property’ berbeza dengan ekshibit “P-9”

10.12 Tertuduh hanya penah bertemu dengan SP3 pada tahun 2007.

10.13 Tertuduh turut mempertikaikan setiap salinan dokumen cetakan komputer yang dikemukakan iaitu ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11” hingga “P-19” (ditender di Mahkamah dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’) dengan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan di perenggan 6.2 hingga 6.11 Hujahan Bertulis Pihak Pembelaan.

10.14 Tiada gambar tempat kejadian dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah.

10.15 Laporan Forensik yang diterima hanya bertarikh 27.7.2009 dan bukan seperti Ekshibit “P-35” bertarikh 28.7.2009.

10.16 Pengadu asal bagi salinan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report No. 5070/09 dikenali oleh Saksi Pendakwaan ke-enam (SP6) dan laporan polis dibuat untuk menganiaya SP6.

11. Semasa pemeriksaan balas Tertuduh telah menafikan kesemua isu yang telah dibangkitkan oleh Pendakwaraya. Semasa pemeriksaan semula Tertuduh mengulangi fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan semasa pemeriksaan utama.

12 Pada 24.12.2010 apabila kes ditetapkan untuk sambung bicara bagi kes Pembelaan dan sepina kepada saksi turut dicatitkan tarikh yang sama, waran tangkap dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah kerana dikatakan tarikh sambung bicara sebenarnya pada 23.12.2010.

13. Pada 6.1.2011 tarikh yang ditetapkan untuk Sebutan waran tangkap, waran tangkap telah dibatalkan dan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menolak permohonan pihak Pembelaan untuk memanggil 2 orang saksi pembelaan dan menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 18.1.2011.

14. Pada 17.1.2011 Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 1 telah menolak rayuan Tertuduh dan kes ditetapkan untuk sebutan di hadapan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 untuk Tertuduh melantik peguambela dan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 7.2.2011.

HUJAHAN PIHAK PEMBELAAN

16. Di dalam kes ini pihak Pendakwaan perlu membuktikan setiap intipati (‘ingredients’) pertuduhan berkaitan seksyen 5(1) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh iaitu; (1) bahawa Tertuduh mempunyai milikan ekslusif pada setiap masa yang material iaitu pada 13-7-2009 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat 7-3-5 Jalan 2/38B, Taman SPPK Segambut, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK; dan (2) 106 klip video tersebut adalah lucah.

17. Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 bahawa (di mukasurat 504 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

“I am of the view that the submission of the learned DPP in respect of the 1st ground comprising the 1st to the 3rd points is without merit. The charge preferred against the accused under s. 5(1) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 (“the Act”) requires proof of two essential ingredients:

(a) the accused was in exclusive possession at the material time, ie, 3p.m. on 18 November 2002 of the 18 obscene film’s in the form of VCD; and

(b) that the 18 film’s are of obscene material.”

Pihak Pembelaan juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 bahawa (di mukasurat 324 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

“[5] Bagi membuktikan satu kes prima facie dibawah s. 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah membuktikan bahawa:

(a) Responden mempunyai milikan terhadap VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas;

(b) tiada sebarang keraguan tentang identiti barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah; dan

(c) kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”).”

Pihak Pembelaan juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon [2010] 5 CLJ 77 bahawa (di mukasurat 79 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

“The Charge

[8] The charge preferred against the respondent under s. 5(1) of the 2002 Act requires proof of two main ingredients ie, that:

(i) the respondent at the material time was in possession of the 65 obscene films in the form of DVD; and

(ii) that the 65 films (DVDs) are obscene.”

Isu Milikan Eksklusif Pada Setiap Masa Yang Material

18. Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 bahawa (di mukasurat 504 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

(a) the accused was in exclusive possession at the material time, ie, 3p.m. on 18 November 2002 of the 18 obscene film’s in the form of VCD; and

(b) that the 18 film’s are of obscene material.”

“[5] Bagi membuktikan satu kes prima facie dibawah s. 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah membuktikan bahawa:

(a) Responden mempunyai milikan terhadap VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas;

(b) tiada sebarang keraguan tentang identiti barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah; dan

(c) kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”).”

“The Charge

[8] The charge preferred against the respondent under s. 5(1) of the 2002 Act requires proof of two main ingredients ie, that:

(i) the respondent at the material time was in possession of the 65 obscene films in the form of DVD; and

(ii) that the 65 films (DVDs) are obscene.”

19. Apa yang boleh difahamkan daripada kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, hanya si tertuduh berada di gerai haram tersebut sepanjang masa dan si tertuduh kelihatan melayan pelanggan dan ketika serbuan dibuat sewaktu si tertuduh berada di gerai haram tersebut, terdapat VCD dan DVD yang dikatakan lucah di gerai haram tersebut. Di peringkat pendakwaan ini, untuk membuktikan intipati ini, pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan dan pemunyaan sebenar premis tersebut dan DVD tersebut, cukup sekadar membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif. Pemilikan eksklusif tidak sama dengan pemilikan sebenar atau pemilikan fizikal.

20. Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material telah dibuktikan dengan cara berikut, iaitu:

“[9] Having read the appeal record and the written submission of the appellant and having heard both parties, I am in agreement with the learned deputy public prosecutor that the element of possession has been proved through the prosecution witnesses SP1, 2 and 3 who were members of the raiding party.

[10] The 65 DVDs alleged to be obscene were found under the counter of the premises and at the material time of the raid, the respondent was alone in the premises manning the counter. He attempted to flee when SP1 identified himself as a police officer.

[11] The facts of this case are similar to Mohamed Ibrahim v. PP [1962] 1 LNS 100 HC wherein the appellant was found to be in possession of 65 copies of the book “Tropic of Cancer”. The impugned books were found under the counter of his shop. The appellant in Mohamed Ibrahim (supra) was employed to manage the sale of books and though an attempt was made to absolve himself of knowledge as he could not read English, nevertheless the court held that the inference was irresistible that the 65 copies found in the shop for the purpose of being sold and that the appellant was the person in charge of selling of the books in the shop was in possession of them and in possession of them for purposes of sale. He also failed in his argument that knowledge was negated by his ignorance of the English language as the court held that he could have obtained the services of an English – speaking clerk in ordering the books.

[12] In this case, there was the uncontroverted evidence of SP1 and SP3 that the 65 DVDs were found under the counter and the respondent was found at the time of raid, behind this counter. Knowledge can also be inferred from the fact that he attempted flight when SP1 identified himself as a public officer. Therefore, viewed in its totality the prosecution had proved the element of possession.

[13] There is no cause for the adverse inference to be invoked as it is trite that the calling of witnesses is at the discretion of the prosecution and the burden is on the prosecution throughout to prove its case. I find no gap here, neither can it be said that there was any suppression of evidence.

[14] Therefore the learned magistrate had erred in holding that the element of possession was not proved and in invoking the adverse presumption.”

21. Apa yang boleh difahamkan dari kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, ketika serbuan dibuat, si tertuduh berada keseorangan dan sedang menjaga kaunter di dalam premis yang diserbu tersebut, dan DVD yang dikatakan lucah tersebut dijumpai di bawah kaunter tersebut. Di peringkat pendakwaan ini, untuk membuktikan intipati ini, pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan dan pemunyaan sebenar premis tersebut dan DVD tersebut, cukup sekadar membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif. Pemilikan eksklusif tidak sama dengan pemilikan sebenar atau pemilikan fizikal.

22. Pihak Pembelaan telah Berjaya mewujudkan satu keraguan yang munasabah daripada keterangan saksi-saksi pihak pendakwaan sendiri iaitu Saksi Pendakwaan 5 dan Saksi Pendakwaan 7 (Pegawai Penyiasat) kerana mengikut kedua-dua saksi, Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009.

23. SP5 iaitu pegawai yang terlibat semasa geledah dan SP7 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat sendiri mengesahkan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Oleh yang demikian milikan secara fizikal tidak dibuktikan langsung (rakaman video prosiding perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).

SP3 di dalam pemeriksaan balas hanya memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

C : How many unit?

J : I’m not sure.

25. Sekali lagi pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada kes Pendakwa Raya v. Goh Hoe Cheong [2006] MLJU 0468 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 0471 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana K N Segara J memutuskan bahawa apabila tiada gambar dan pelan kasar tempat tertuduh ditahan di ‘baggage assembly area” maka terdapat keraguan di dalam kes pendakwaan.

26. Di dalam kes kita pada hari ini, jika dilihat pada Borang Senarai Geledah yang mesti diisi di tempat dan masa pemeriksaan, ianya merujuk kepada No. Repot 5070/09 Balai Jalan Patani, tempat/bangunan yang diperiksa ialah 7-3-5, Jalan 2/38B, Taman Segambut, SPPK, 50200 Kuala Lumpur (Premis tersebut), nama penghuni atau sesiapa yang hadir iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus (Penghuni tersebut), nama pegawai polis yang hadir semasa pemeriksaan iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal, Insp Siti Mazira bt Zakaria dan D/Kpl Nora (Pegawai Polis tersebut), pada tarikh 13-7-2009 dan masa yang tidak disebut (Tarikh dan Masa tersebut), barang yang dijumpai adalah seperti yang tertera di dalam Borang Senarai Geledah tersebut. Ini adalah terkandung di dalam Borang Geledah yang diberikan kepada penama pada 13.7.2009. Walaubagaimanapun Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010 adalah berbeza kerana ada masa dicatatkan. Pihak Pembelaan telah membangkitkan bantahan berkenaan perbezaan di antara Borang Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009 dan Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010.

27. Di antara ketiga-tiga Pegawai Polis tersebut yang hadir untuk pemeriksaan di Bangunan tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut, Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah telah dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai SP5 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai penggeledahan tersebut.

28. SP5 ketika pemeriksaan utama telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 46 – 47 Nota Keterangan) bahawa:

“Pada 13-7-2009, saya terima arahan daripada ketua bahagian saya iaitu ASP Kamarudin untuk beri bantuan kepada pegawai penyiasat dari Pulau Pinang iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira untuk membuat rampasan dan pemeriksaan. Saya dan Insp. Mazira telah sampai di alamat 7-3-5, Jalan 2/38B, Taman Segambut SPPK, Kuala Lumpur. Saya dan Insp. Mazira telah sampai di alamat tersebut dan Insp. Mazira telah ketuk pintu rumah beberapa kali dan keluar seorang wanita. Insp. Mazira telah perkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai kanan polis dengan menunjukkan kad kuasa kepada wanita tersebut. Wanita tersebut dikenali sebagai Aini Suhailah binti Yunus. Kemudian kami masuk ke dalam rumah untuk buat pemeriksaan setelah menerangkan tujuan kehadiran kami bersama saya Insp. Siti Mazira dan seorang anggota perempuan iaitu Kopral Nora. Saya lihat ada 2 orang kanak-kanak. Dan saya lihat sebelah kiri ada 2 bilik satu bilik tidur dan satu bilik bacaan. Pemeriksaan dilakukan dalam bilik bacaan tersebut, saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah merampas satu unit hard disc di rak buku iaitu Hitachi Deskstar. No. Siri R32559XK, satu unit thumbdrive Data Traveller, juga di rak buku, 2 unit CD, 3 unit VCD dan 7 unit DVD dalam bilik tersebut. Dalam bilik tersebut juga saya lihat satu CPU dan monitor yang mana CPU tersebut dalam keadaan tidak bertutup dengan casing dan tiada sambungan wayar ke monitor atau power. Saya anggap ia tidak berfungsi. Lepas membuat pemeriksaan saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah buat rampasan ke atas barang-barang yang saya sebut tadi dan telah disenaraikan dalam senarai bongkah. Senarai bongkah dibuat oleh pegawai penyiasat dan lihat ia ditandatangani pemilik rumah iaitu Aini Suhailah. Satu salinan diberi kepada penama. Kemudian rampasan telah diambil oleh pegawai penyiasat. Saya nampak barang itu dirampas oleh Insp. Mazira sebab saya ada di belakang beliau. Suasana cerah kerana rampasan dibuat waktu siang. Barang kes sentiasa dalam kawalan Insp. Siti Mazira. Saya masih boleh camkan hard disk P2a dan P2b itu berdasarkan nombor siri. (Saksi dirujuk hard disc dan thumbdrive P2a dan P2b – dicamkan SP5). Hanya satu jenis hard disc sahaja yang ditemui. Pemeriksaan dilakukan hanya dalam bilik bacaan sahaja dan tiada apa-apa yang berlaku.”

29. SP5 ketika pemeriksaan balas telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 47 – 49 Nota Keterangan) bahawa, antaranya:

“Saya diminta bantuan daripada Insp. Mazira yang menyiasat bersabit laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/09.”

“Saya hanya dimaklumkan untuk bantuan tentang bersabit kes itu.”

“Saya diminta untuk beri bantuan pemeriksaan dan rampasan oleh Insp. Kamarudin kepada Insp. Siti Mazira bersabit Patani Report.”

“Pada 13-7-2009 masuk jam 6.30 petang.”

“Tak nampak si tertuduh masa itu di kawasan itu.”

“Semasa masuk buat pemeriksaan Insp. Mazira telah perkenalkan diri dengan tunjukkan kad kuasa polis, waran tiada.”

“Masa masuk dalam rumah, nampak satu wanita dan 2 orang kanak-kanak.”

“Saya membantu Insp. Mazira untuk membuat pemeriksaan rumah.”

30. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa melalui Borang Senarai Geledah dan keterangan SP5, dapat disimpulkan bahawa Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tiada di dalam Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut pada jam 6.30 petang.

31. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa merujuk kepada dokumen di perenggan 6.14 tiada catatan mengenai masa di dalam Borang Senarai Geledah tidak dimasukkan. Ini berlainan dengan Ekshibit “P-37” dan ini menunjukkan bahawa Borang Geledah telah diubahsuai.

32. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa masa di dalam kertas pertuduhan dan di dalam keterangan SP5 tidak sama. Tiada penerangan mengenainya daripada SP5. Begitu juga tiada penerangan mengenainya daripada SP7.

33. SP6 telah dipanggil untuk pemeriksaan utama hanya disuruh membaca sehelai kertas yang didakwa sebagai borang geledah oleh pihak pendakwaan. Tiada pengecaman yang dibuat dengan SP6 berkenaan ketiga-tiga anggota polis yang datang ke premis tersebut pada 13.7.2009.

34. Borang Senarai Geledah yang disediakan oleh SP7 telah gagal mematuhi kehendak peruntukan Seksyen 36(1) dan (2) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 kerana tiada senarai lengkap klip video yang dirampas.

Akta Penapisan Filem

Notis penyitaan

36. (1) Jika apa-apa penyitaan dibuat di bawah Bahagian ini, Pegawai Penguat Kuasa atau pegawai polis yang membuat penyitaan itu hendaklah menyediakan suatu senarai tiap-tiap filem, bahan publisiti filem, buku, dokumen atau benda lain yang disita dan tempat filem, bahan publisiti filem, buku, dokumen atau benda lain itu telah dijumpai dan hendaklah menandatangani senarai itu.

(2) Senarai yang disediakan mengikut subseksyen (1) hendaklah diserahkan dengan serta-merta kepada penghuni tempat atau premis di mana filem, bahan publisiti filem, buku, dokumen atau benda lain yang disita itu dijumpai.

Pihak Pembelaan ingin merujuk kepada kes Kalidasan A/L Manikam lawan Pendakwaraya Rayuan Jenayah No. 41-44A-2009 (yang Mengikat Mahkamah ini) (Mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) di mana Yang Arif Hakim Yaacob bin Haji Md. Sam telah memutuskan bahawa timbul keraguan apakah sebenarnya judul-judul filem yang perayu dipertuduhkan sebagai memilikinya apabila identiti VCD dan DVD yang dirampas gagal dibuktikan tanpa keraguan oleh pihak pendakwaan.

35. SP7 telah dipanggil untuk pemeriksaan utama oleh Timbalan Pendakwaraya menyatakan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian.

36. Ada anggota polis lain yang memasuki premis tersebut pada masa material tetapi tidak dipanggil kerana berdasarkan keterangan SP5 semasa pemeriksaan utama:

“Kemudian kami masuk ke dalam rumah untuk buat pemeriksaan setelah menerangkan tujuan kehadiran kami bersama saya Insp. Siti Mazira dan seorang anggota perempuan iaitu Koperal Nora. Pihak Pembelaan memohon Mahkamah menggunapakai Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 di mana saksi ini sekiranya dipanggil akan memudaratkan kes pendakwaan walaupun beliau perlu dipanggil untuk pengesahan perbezaan Borang Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009 dan Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010.

37. Bagi membuktikan elemen milikan, pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi-saksi SP1, SP2, SP4 dan SP6.

38. Di dalam kes ini Tertuduh masih lagi membangkitkan bantahan terhadap setiap dokumen lain yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1 dan dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’ (Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21”, “P-22, “ P-23”, “P-24” P-25”, “P-26”, “P-27”, “P-28”, “P-29”, “P-30”, “P-31”, “P-32” dan “P-33” mukasurat 16,17 Nota Keterangan) yang tiada kaitan langsung dengan pertuduhan dan tidak termasuk di dalam lingkungan definisi “filem” sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002.

39. Di dalam kes ini juga pihak Pembelaan telah berjaya mengemukakan dokumen untuk membuktikan bahawa ekshibit “P-9” yang ditender melalui SP2 tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan (Ekshibit “P-9” mukasurat 34 dan 35 Nota Keterangan). Pihak Pembelaan telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap pengemukaan salinan dokumen tersebut kerana tiada kaitan dengan pertuduhan dan mengikut keterangan SP2 semasa pemeriksaan balas, dokumen asal telah dimusnahkan kerana polisi syarikat.

40. Tiada definisi untuk ‘milikan’ di dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC di dalam kes Pendakwaraya lawan Sim, Odita, Muhammad Architects Sdn Bhd [2008] 3 CLJ 623 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah perlu merujuk kepada definisi untuk milikan di dalam kes-kes yang telah diputuskan. Di dalam kes ini responden telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan milikan secara fizikal perisian yang melanggar hakcipta oleh responden.

Di dalam kes tersebut Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC memutuskan seperti berikut:

“The word “possession’ is not defined in the Copyrights Act 1987 and therefore it is pertinent to refer to judicial decisions involving criminal charges to guide us to define the word “possession’. Thus, it was the contention of the defence that prosecution has to establish physical possession of the alleged infringing programs by the accused. The prosecution failed to prove actual physical possession of the alleged infringing copies of computer programs, as evidence was before the court that the premises of the accused was not for the sole usage of the accused company but also shared among the other companies mentioned above. This by itself, in my view, is sufficient to sustain the order of acquittal.

41. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah lanjut mengenai isu ini di mana daripada Nota Keterangan tersebut, amat jelas saksi awam SP4 mengesahkan tiada surat-surat yang ditunjuk oleh pihak pendakwaan diterima oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Pulau Pinang (Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18, P19 dan muka surat 42, 43, 44 dan 45 Nota Keterangan) untuk membuktikan surat-surat yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1.

42. Fakta ini seterusnya telah disahkan oleh saksi pendakwaan ketujuh iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat bahawa Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18 dan P19 (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010) tiada di dalam rekod Mahkamah Syariah. Oleh yang demikian Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18 dan P19 tidak seharusnya diterima sebagai ekshibit kerana tiada fakta mengesahkan kewujudan ekshibit-ekshibit tersebut.

43. Tertuduh semasa memberi keterangan semasa pemeriksaan utama kes pembelaan telah mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen daripada Mahkamah Syari’ah untuk menunjukkan percanggahan yang wujud bagi ekshibit “P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14”, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18” dan “P-19” tetapi Mahkamah tidak menanda setiap satu dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Tertuduh sebagai ekshibit sebagaimana mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 173(j)(iii) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

44. Pihak Pembelaan ingin berhujah bahawa pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” amat jelas telah mencabul hak (dengan izin) ‘privacy’ dan (dengan izin) ‘privillege’ Tertuduh dan keluarga sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Artikel 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” adalah tanpa sebarang kebenaran daripada pembuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut dan tidak relevan kepada pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh.

45. Pihak Pendakwaan turut memanggil SP6 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” yang kononnya mengikut pihak Pendakwaan diekstrak dari cakera keras tersebut. Walaubagaimanapun SP6 menggunapakai peruntukan undang-undang Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 kerana beliau mempunyai ‘privilege’ ke atas gambar-gambar berbentuk perlakuan tersebut yang merupakan satu bentuk komunikasi di antara Tertuduh dan SP6. Mahkamah sendiri telah turut memutuskan bahawa ekshibit “P-20” hingga “P-33” adalah dokumen-dokumen yang dilindungi di bawah privilege di bawah Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan oleh yang demikian tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti di Mahkamah (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010). Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

S122. “No person who is or has been married shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has been married; nor shall he be permitted to disclose anu such communication unless the person who made it or his representative in interest consents, except in suits between married persons or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.”

46. Pihak Pembelaan bersandarkan satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Mustapha Hussain J di dalam Palldas a/l Arumugam v Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 CLJ 661, 665 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) menyatakan bahawa perlakuan juga satu bentuk komunikasi di antara isteri dan Tertuduh.

“From the record of appeal, the appellant’s wife Gudi Kaur (PW3) had, in examination-in-chief, given quite a lengthy evidence of all communications between herself and her husband. Though some of the evidence relates between purely to acts, as distinct from words spoken, ie, what she saw appellant was doing, it is so inextricably interwoven with what appellant had said to her, that to separate each act from words spoken by the appellant to her would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Even if extricable and rejecting the words spoken, one would have their prejudicial effect still lingering.

Even though objection was not taken by the defence, this silence cannot convert what the law says is inadmissible evidence to be admissible. One would expect the wife’s evidence to be led in such a way as to confine such evidence to what she saw the appellant doing. The wife should have been stopped the moment she started uttering what her husband said to her. From the record it would seem that nobody ever bothered about this section 122.

47. Di dalam kes Public Prosecutor lawan Abdul Majid [1994] 3 MLJ 457 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 6 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) James Foong J telah memutuskan bahawa isteri tertuduh boleh dipaksa memberi keterangan kecuali komunikasi yang dibuat oleh tertuduh kepada beliau melainkan jika keizinan tertuduh diperolehi seperti yang diperlukan di bawah S122 Akta itu.

48. Di samping itu Pemohon ingin menyatakan bahawa pengemukaan “P21” hingga “P33” tersebut telah mencabul hak ‘privacy’ Pemohon dan keluarga Pemohon sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Artikel 10 dan 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

49. Tertuduh berhujah bahawa milikan tidak boleh dibuktikan melalui keterangan persekitaran (‘circumstantial evidence’) iaitu dengan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, “P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21” hingga “P33” yang merupakan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan hanya kerana dokumen-dokumen tersebut didakwa terdapat di dalam cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh).

50. Di antara ketiga-tiga Pegawai Polis tersebut yang hadir untuk pemeriksaan di Bangunan tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut, Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah telah dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai SP5 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai penggeledahan tersebut.

51. SP5 ketika pemeriksaan utama telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 46 – 47 Nota Keterangan) bahawa:

Isu Kaedah Analisis Forensik Komputer (SP1)

52. Saksi pakar SP1 dipertikaikan oleh pihak Pembelaan berdasarkan sebab-sebab berikut:

a. Pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh telah dibuat berdasarkan laporan polis SP1 Dang Wangi Report No. 029694/09 (Ekshibit “P-34” mukasurat 18 Nota Keterangan) apabila SP1 membuat pemeriksaan analisa pada 23.7.2009. Walaubagaimanapun di dalam salinan laporan polis tersebut ada jelas tercatit bahawa laporan polis tersebut tidak boleh digunakan untuk tuntutan atau perbicaraan di Mahkamah dan hanya untuk kegunaan dalaman PDRM sahaja. Oleh yang demikian pertuduhan di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah cacat, defektif dan tidak sah di sisi undang-undang kerana berasaskan laporan polis yang tidak boleh digunakan untuk pendakwaan dan perbicaraan di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. Walaubagaimanapun di akhir kes pendakwaan pada 19.10.2010, Mahkamah ada menyatakan bahawa laporan polis SP1 sekarang adalah ‘First Information Report’ (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).

b. Di dalam kes ini terdapat konflik kepentingan (‘conflict of interest’) dan melanggar etika seorang pakar (‘Breach of Expert Duties’) di pihak SP1 yang bertindak sebagai pakar dan pengadu pada masa yang sama dan telah memprejudiskan secara material pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh dan ini sangat bertentangan dengan kod etika dan amalan saksi pakar yang diterimapakai oleh mahkamah-mahkamah di seluruh dunia. Setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan-perbicaraan yang dijalankan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 29.7.2010, memang ketara bahawa terdapat konflik kepentingan (‘conflict of interest’) dan “Breach of Expert Duties” di mana saksi pendakwaan pertama (SP1) bukan hanya bertindak sebagai pengadu dan pakar tetapi juga sebagai pegawai penyiasat pada masa yang sama kerana semua barang kes diterima melalui beliau dan catatan di atas Ekshibit “P-20” hingga Eksihbit “P-33” ditanda oleh beliau mengikut keterangan SP7(rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010). Keterangan SP1 bersifat keterangan dengar cakap (‘hearsay’) dan tidak dapat diterima pakai.

Di dalam kes Alcontara A/L Ambross v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 MLJ 209 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 211 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“(5) Although no objection had been raised to the admission of one of the statement made by ASP Abdul Wahab which was clearly based on hearsay and therefore inadmissible, the judge was nevertheless under an automatic duty to stop it from being adduced, for inadmissible evidence does not become admissible by reason of failure to object.”.

c. Adalah menjadi hujah Pihak Pembelaan bahawa saksi pendakwaan SP1 hanya merupakan saksi pakar dan adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas bahawa keterangan seorang saksi pakar hanya bersifat sokongan (‘corroborative’), boleh diambilkira tetapi tidak semestinya perlu diterima dan Mahkamah sendiri yang perlu menentukan isu kebolehterimaan sesuatu bukti.

Pihak Pembelaan ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah kepada kes Public Prosecutor v. Lin Lian Chen [1992] 2 MLJ 561 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 317 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Agung telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bila memanggil keterangan pakar, pihak pendakwaan mesti mendirikan kepakaran saksi tersebut.

d. Selain daripada itu, Pihak Pembelaan turut berhujah bahawa kaedah yang betul perlu digunapakai apabila melibatkan saksi pakar sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Hashim J di dalam kes Wong Chop Saow v. Public Prosecutor [1965] 1 MLJ 247 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) seperti berikut:

“To avoid confusion the expert witness should give his evidence as follows: He should first state his qualifications as an expert. He should then state that he has given evidence as an expert in such cases and that his evidence has been accepted by the courts.”

e. Daripada Nota Keterangan tersebut, tiada keterangan daripada SP1 yang menunjukkan kelayakan beliau dan samada beliau pernah memberi keterangan di mahkamah dan mahkamah menerima keterangan beliau.

f. Setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan tersebut, banyak tokok tambah, percanggahan keterangan yang direkodkan dan juga fakta-fakta penting tidak direkodkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur. Di antara percanggahan keterangan tersebut SP1 telah menyatakan bahawa beliau tiada sijil ENCase tetapi mengikut Nota Keterangan tersebut SP1 menyatakan bahawa beliau ada sijil dari satu syarikat dan identiti syarikat tersebut tidak dinyatakan (mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan tersebut). Seperti yang dijelaskan di dalam buku “Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations” 3^rd Edition muka surat 81, Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillps, Frank Enfiger, and Christopher Steuart:

EnCase Certified Examiner (EnCE) Certification

Guidance Software, the creator of EnCase, sponsors the EnCE certification program. EnCE certification is open to the public and private sectors and is specific to the use and mastery of EnCase computer forensics analysis. Requirements for taking the EnCE certification exam don’t depend on taking the Guidance Software EnCase training courses. Candidates for this certificate are required to have a licensed copy of EnCase.

Tertuduh ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia ini kepada kes Foo Fio Na v. Hospital Assunta & Anor [1999] 6 MLJ 738 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 758 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) yang merujuk kepada kes Whitehouse v Jordan & Anor [1981] 1 All ER pada mukasurat 276:

“While some degree of consultation between experts and legal advisers is entirely proper, it is necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to be the independent product of the expert, uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation. To the extent that it is not, the evidence is likely to be not only incorrect but self defeating.”

Tertuduh ingin juga merujuk kepada kes R v Harris [2006] 1 Cr App Rep 55 (di mukasurat 65 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan)seperti berikut:

“[271] It may be helpful for judges, practitioners and experts to be reminded of the obligations of an expert witness summarised by Cresswell J in National Justice Cia Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd, The Ikarian Reefer [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 at 81. Cresswell J pointed out amongst other factors the following,which we summarise as follows:

(1) Expert evidence presented to the court should be and seen to be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation.

(2) An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of advocate.

(3) An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions on which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which detract from his concluded opinions.

(4) An expert should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise.

(5) If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers that insufficient data is available then this must be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one.

(6) If after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on material matters, such change of view should be communicated to the other side without delay and when appropriate to the court.”

g. Saksi SP1 tidak memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini kelulusan akademik berkaitan dengan kepakaran di dalam bidang komputer dan tidak pernah menduduki peperiksaan (EnCE) yang diiktiraf oleh syarikat EnCase Software bagi melayakkan beliau mengendalikan perisian Encase dengan betul dan tepat berdasarkan piawaian persijilan ISO kawalan mutu forensik komputer antarabangsa. Ini amat memudaratkan kes Pendakwaan kerana kelayakan dan kepakaran SP1 tidak dibuktikan.

h. Mengikut keterangan Tertuduh semasa dipanggil membela diri, ianya di luar kemampuan SP1 untuk mempunyai satu lesen Encase di atas nama sendiri dan apabila SP1 gagal mengemukakan sebarang sijil kelayakan pengendalian Encase, adalah diragui analisis yang dijalankan oleh SP1 menggunakan perisian Encase yang tulen.

SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

C : “Qualified untuk handle Encase?

: Saya berkursus untuk belajar Encase dan jalankan analisa, tak ingat nama company tapi ada sijil”

(mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan)

Ini disokong dengan satu kes Pendakwaraya lawan Kit Chee Wan [1999] 1 MLJ 16 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 6 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa saksi pakar mesti membuktikan latarbelakang kelayakan akademik dan keupayaan kepakaran beliau.

h. Analisis terhadap barang rampasan yang dijalankan oleh SP1 tidak mengikut piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa. SP1 di dalam keterangannya semasa pemeriksaan balas mengaku bahawa beliau tidak melakukan analisa forensik yang ditetapkan oleh piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa malah SP1 juga mengaku tidak melakukan proses ‘acquisition’, ‘forensic imaging’, dan pengesahan kesahihan kandungan hard disk tersebut (mukasurat 2, 3, 4, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).

Bagi isu ini pihak Pembelaan memohon agar Mahkamah yang Mulia ini menggunapakai peruntukan Seksyen 5 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan dibaca bersama Seksyen 56 dan Seksyen 57 Akta Keterangan 1950 untuk mengambilkira kes-kes yang telah diputuskan mengikut Common Law atau undang-undang yang berkuatkuasa di England mengenai kaedah pembuktian forensik komputer memandangkan terdapat ‘lacunae’ di dalam undang-undang Malaysia dan tiada kes berkaitan pembuktian cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang diputuskan dengan piawaian forensik antarabangsa di Malaysia pada masa ini.

Piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa untuk penggunaan perisian Encase, peralatan pengimejan forensik ImagerSolo III, dan beberapa perisian yang lain yang diiktiraf oleh piawaian forensik antarabangsa dan persijilan ISO kawalan mutu forensik komputer antarabangsa, kaedah ‘acquisition’ yang betul dan tepat di samping kaedah pengimejan menggunakan format pengimejan forensik komputer yang diterima oleh piawaian forensik antarabangsa tetapi tidak ditunjukkan dan dilakukan oleh SP1. Kaedah pengiraan ‘hash value’ bagi setiap klip video dengan menggunakan proses ‘one-way hash functions’ yang akan menghasilkan ‘digital fingerprint’ (‘hash value’) yang unik bagi setiap maklumat yang diproses dengan algorithma ‘digital signature’ atau ‘DNA signature’ tertentu yang peka terhadap Kesan Avalanche (Avalanche Effect) (di mukasurat 1-2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan). Kaedah ‘forensic imaging’ yang betul dan tepat juga memainkan peranan yang sangat penting untuk mengawal rapi ketepatan dan bahan bukti di dalam bentuk yang asal dan tidak tercemar atau ‘tampered’. Penggunaan dan pemilihan algorithma-algorithma yang betul dan tepat amat bersesuaian untuk tujuan pengesahan, kesahihan, integriti dan kebolehterimaan kandungan cakera keras (‘harddisk’) untuk perbicaraan di mahkamah di mana kaedah pengekstrakan bahan bukti secara imej-imej forensik yang disalin dari cakera keras satu persatu bit (bit per bit) dan kesemua proses tersebut tidak dilakukan oleh SP1 (mukasurat 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).

i. SP1 juga tidak tahu apa itu yang dimaksudkan sebagai ‘hash value‘, ‘hash functions’ dan ‘algorithm‘ yang digunakan untuk tujuan pengesahan, integriti, kebolehterimaan dan kebolehpercayaan data di dalam harddisk tersebut. Malah SP1 juga telah memberi keterangan bahawa dia tidak tahu kegunaan ‘hash functions’, ‘hash value’, ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘forensic tools’ yang sepatutnya digunakan semasa melakukan analisa forensik terhadap ‘harddisk’ seperti yang telah dibangkitkan oleh Tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan balas (mukasurat 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).

Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada kes R v. Trapp [2009] S.J. No. 64; 2009 SKPC 109; 2009SK.C. LEXIS 686 (di mukasurat 2-10 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana pakar telah menunjukkan kepada mahkamah penggunaan ‘hash function’ atau ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘hash value’ merupakan proses yang sangat kritikal dan penting di samping pengimejan forensik dilakukan sebelumnya. Di dalam kes tersebut, pakar telah menggunakan SHA-1 sebagai ‘hash function’, ‘hash value’ pengiraan ‘hash value’ ditunjukkan dan dibandingkan dengan salinan imej forensik semasa perbicaraan. Berdasarkan keterangan saksi SP1, telah jelas bahawa saksi SP1 tidak melakukan analisa yang betul dan tepat untuk memenuhi piawaian forensik antarabangsa yang ditetapkan berdasarkan Piawaian Daubert, di dalam kes Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993)(mukasurat 13 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan), yang merupakan satu piawaian yang diterimapakai oleh semua badan forensik di seluruh dunia, seperti di bawah:

Daubert Test for Reliability

Witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:

-The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data

-The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods

-The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case

The key for the Court in determining whether an expert may testify before a jury is therefore primarily one of “reliability of method”. The court will not look at the actual opinion held by an expert, but merely examines his or her methodology to determine whether the procedures used or his methodology is not reliable, then his entire opinion is likewise unreliable and should be excluded from the jury.

Daubert Factors

The U.S Supreme Court set out several specific factors that should be used by the courts in evaluating any proposed expert testimony. These factors are not exclusive and some or all may not apply in any given case, but they are always the place to start the reliability analysis. The factors are as follows:

1. Whether the theory or technique has been scientifically tested.

2. Whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review or publication.

3. The (expected) error rate of the technique used.

4. Acceptance of the theory or technique in the relevant scientific community.

SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas menyatakan bahawa beliau tidak membuat pengimejan bahan bukti di dalam bentuk salinan imej-imej forensik bagi keseluruhan kandungan cakera keras (‘harddisk’) (mukasurat 26 Nota Keterangan) seperti yang ditetapkan oleh piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa (Piawaian Daubert). Fakta ini telah ditegaskan oleh Tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan utama bagi kes pembelaan. Oleh yang demikian SP1 tidak mengikut kaedah yang diiktiraf oleh piawaian komputer forensik antarabangsa dan bahan bukti tidak disahkan kesahihan dan integritinya. Tertuduh juga telah menerima 13 keping DVD salinan klip video yang disalin dengan menggunakan format DVD yang bukan mengikuti piawaian format pengimejan forensik antarabangsa yang ditetapkan di mana apabila diperiksa oleh Tertuduh telah mendapati metadata setiap fail klip video tidak sama dengan metadata yang diterangkan oleh SP1 dan bilangan klip video juga berbeza bilangan yang diberi dengan keterangan SP1 semasa perbicaraan. Terdapat juga kandungan yang sama dikira berulang-ulang semasa perbicaraan.

Fakta ini dinyatakan semasa pemeriksaan utama SP1:

“Selepas analisa/kenalpasti video2 lucah yang terkandung tindakan seterusnya adalah masukan video2 ini ke dalam DVD. Tidak ingat berapa keping. Saya masih boleh cam.”

(Rujuk DVD dalam sampul putih-di dalam ada 13 keping tanda X1-X13. Dicamkan SP1. Ditanda sebagai P3a-m) (mukasurat 13 Nota Keterangan).

Di dalam kertas penyelidikan yang dibentangkan oleh Renico Koen dari ICSA, University of Pretoria, South Africa dan Martin S. Oliver, ICSA, University of Pretoria, South Africa yang bertajuk “The Use of File Timestamps in Digital Forensics” menyatakan:

“Event data is generated when a significant digital event occurs. Although the generated event data is of little value when viewed independently, collectively event data can produce information that can help investigators to deduce relationships between events to produce abstract views of the evidence at hand.”

Dan mereka juga telah membuat kesimpulan bahawa:

“A principle was introduced based on the concept of synergy claiming that insignificant pieces of event datum may collectively be of significant forensic importance.”

Diikuti juga di dalam kertas penyelidikan oleh Svein Yngvar Willassen yang bertajuk “Hypothesis Based Investigation of Digital Timestamps” dengan jelas menerangkan di dalam abstract bahawa:

“Timestamps stored on digital media play an important role in digital investigations. Unfortunately, timestamps may be manipulated, and also refer to a clock that can be erroneous, failing or maladjusted. This reduces the evidentiary value of timestamps. This paper takes the approach that historical adjustments to a clock can be hypothesized in a clock hypothesis. Clock hypotheses can then be tested for consistency with stored timestamps. A formalism for the definition and testing of a clock hypothesis is developed, and test methods for clock hypothesis consistency are demonstrated. With the number of timestamps found in typical digital investigations, the methods presented in this paper can justify clock hypotheses without having to rely on timestamps from external sources. This increases the evidentiary value of timestamps, even when the originating clock has been erroneous, failing or maladjusted.”

Di dalam kes Regina v. Shipman (Harold Frederick) (1999, unreported) terdapat persoalan modifikasi dan manipulasi ‘timestamps’ di mana semasa perbicaraan didapati bahawa ‘timestamp’ boleh diubah yang boleh membawa kepada penipuan metadata yang akan memberi impak besar dan nilai signifikan yang tinggi kepada analisis forensik terhadap kebolehterimaan probative evidence, kebolehpercayaan di dalam perbicaraan mahkamah.

j. Persijilan ISO – Analisis SP1 gagal mengikut piawaian kawalan kualiti dan standard forensik komputer antarabangsa bagi ‘error’ dan ralat saintifik yang berkaitan dengan perisian dan peralatan untuk tujuan penganalisa forensik kerana SP1 telah memberi keterangan semasa pemeriksaan balas bahawa makmal beliau tidak dipersijilkan dengan standard ISO 9000 (Quality Management System in Production Environment), ISO 9001 (Quality Management), ISO 9069 (Software Quality Model), ISO 9241 (Ergonomic requirements for office work with visual display), ISO 17025 (General requirements for competence of test and calibration laboratories), ISO 27001 (Information technology-Security Techniques-Information Security Management Systems) dan ISO 15489/1:2001 (mukasurat 26 Nota Keterangan) untuk pengurusan kualiti untuk prosedur, proses, perisian, peralatan forensik computer yang digunakan dan yang berkaitan dengannya. Ini merupakan satu syarat yang sangat kritikal dan penting bagi sesuatu analisis forensik komputer dapat dijalankan dengan betul dan tepat.

Semasa pemeriksaan balas SP1 telah mengesahkan ada ‘error’ semasa ujitayang dibuat dengan menggunakan ‘software Encase’. (Mukasurat 20 Nota Keterangan).

Pihak Pembelaan ingin bersandarkan kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan New Zealand, di dalam kes Holt lawan Auckland City Council [1980] 2 NZLR 124; 1980 NZLR LEXIS 568, (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa sesiapa yang menggunakan peralatan perlu memastikan ketepatan data yang dihasilkan:

“The presumption serves the important purpose of saving the time and expense of proving the obvious. At the same time, until it can be considered that the functioning and trustworthiness of a newly developed device is a matter of common knowledge, those who rely on the equipment must carry the responsibility of establishing its accuracy.”

k. Pihak Pembelaan mempertikaikan tentang catatn masa yang berlawanan daripada hukum alam kerana masa yang direkodkan di dalam senarai klip video yang disediakan oleh SP1 adalah terkebelakang. Tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan utama kes pembelaan telah menunjukkan bahawa setiap catatan masa pada Laporan Forensik bertarikh 27.7.2009 tidak seiring dengan hukum alam dan jelas menunjukkan berlaku perubahan atau fabrikasi pada cakera keras tersebut.

Pihak Pembelaan ingin merujuk kepada kes Director of Public Prosecutions lawan Mc Keown dan Director of Public Prosecutions lawan Jones [1997] All ER 737 [1997] 1 WLR 295, [1997] RTR 162, 161 JP 356, [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 155, [1997] Crim LR 522 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) yang membuat pemerhatian tentang masa seperti berikut:

“I have considered the matter on the assumption that the error in the clock display showed that the computer was not operating properly. I should say, however, that I am not satisfied that this conclusion should have been drawn. Computer clocks, like any others, have to be set to the correct time and the most obvious explanation for the 15-minute discrepancy was that someone had made a mistake when he last set the clock.”

Pihak Pembelaan juga turut merujuk kepada kes Castle v Cross
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION [1985] 1 All ER 87, [1984] 1 WLR 1372, [1984] Crim LR 682, [1985] RTR 62 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) di mana Queen’s Bench Division membuat kesimpulan mengenai penggunaan peralatan komputer bergantung kepada kawalan seseorang adalah seperti berikut:

“Of course, where a computer is used in respect of its memory function, it is possible to envisage where it might fall foul of the rule against hearsay.”

“[Counsel for the appellant] submitted that there was a difference in kind between the measuring device (even a sophisticated one) and this computer. He also suggested that there was a difference in kind between a mathematician who used a slide rule and one who used a calculating computer. We do not agree. This computer was rightly described as a tool. It did not contribute its own knowledge. It merely did a sophisticated calculation which could have been done manually by the chemist and was in fact done by the chemists using the computer programmed by Mr. Kellie whom the Crown called as a witness. The fact that the efficiency of a device is dependent on more than one person does not make any difference in kind. Virtually every device will involve the persons who made it, the persons who calibrated, programmed or set it up (for example with a clock the person who set it to the right time in the first place) and the person who uses or observes the device. In each particular case how many of these people it is appropriate to call must depend on the facts of, and the issues raised and concessions made in that case.”

l. Tertuduh telah mengemukakan bantahan terhadap Laporan Forensik SP1 yang mana Laporan Forensik yang cuba ditender di Mahkamah bertarikh 28.7.2009 yang amat ketara berlainan dengan Laporan Forensik bertarikh 27.7.2009 yang diberikan oleh pihak pendakwaan di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 51A Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Pihak Tertuduh terpaksa membangkitkan bantahan apabila pihak pendakwaan sendiri tidak mematuhi prosedur-prosedur di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 51A dan Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah di mana apabila pihak Pendakwaan gagal memberikan salinan di dalam tempoh waktu yang ditetapkan dan penerimaan Laporan Forensik tersebut sebagai ekshibit adalah bertentangan dengan kes-kes yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah di mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal mematuhi tempoh penyerahan laporan yang ditetapkan di bawah Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, ianya ‘fatal’ kepada kes pendakwaan dan laporan forensik tersebut tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti.

Tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan utama kes pembelaan telah menunjukkan bahawa setiap catatan masa pada Laporan Forensik bertarikh 27.7.2009 (“ID-D1”) tidak seiring dengan hukum alam dan jelas menunjukkan berlaku perubahan atau fabrikasi.

Berkenaan isu ini, pihak Tertuduh ingin merujuk kepada satu kes Ooi Lean Chai v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 1 MLJ 337 (Rep) (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Agung telah memutuskan bahawa Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah bukan hanya bersifat prosedural tetapi mengandungi peraturan untuk kebolehterimaan laporan pakar sebagai bukti di mana sekiranya ‘proviso’ kepada Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah tidak dipatuhi, laporan pakar tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti.

53. SP1 juga gagal memberi sebarang keterangan bagaimana beliau menjaga ‘hard disk’ tersebut selepas menerimanya dari Pegawai Penyiasat dari tarikh 13.7.2009 ke 26.7.2009 dan dari tarikh analisa ke tarikh pertama sebutan kes. Adalah dihujahkan di sini bahawa rantaian kawalan dan rantaian bukti telah terputus (“break in the chain of custody and break in the chain of evidence’). SP1 di dalam pemeriksaan semula hanya memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

“J : Ianya ada dalam kawalan saya. Disimpan dalam makmal forensic disimpan dalam peti khas untuk hard disc yang mana kunci dipegang oleh saya sendiri.”

54. Tertuduh semasa dipanggil membela diri mempertikaikan cara penyimpanan barang kes oleh SP1 kerana tiada ‘casing’ khusus untuk mengelakkan berlakunya ‘anti static’ dan fabrikasi semasa pemindahan dari tempat kejadian ke makmal tempat analisa SP1.

Kes ini perlu dibezakan dengan kes-kes Mahkamah yang telah diputuskan berkenaan ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD) kerana cakera keras mempunyai kapasiti penyimpanan data yang lebih besar dan dibandingkan dengan ‘compact disc‘, malah tiada material yang boleh dimasukkan semula ke dalam ‘compact disc’ melainkan hanya berlaku pada cakera keras – (data yang terdahulu akan terbatal (dengan izin ‘fast overwrite‘)).

55. Apabila cakera keras tersebut dimainkan dengan set komputer yang bukan dirampas dari tempat kejadian, ianya tidak terdiri daripada satu sistem yang lengkap dan sekiranya ianya dimainkan dengan bukan sistem komputer yang asal dan komputer yang lain cakera keras tersebut telah dicemari (‘tampering with evidence‘) dan ini tidak seharusnya dibenarkan berlaku oleh Mahkamah. Dirujuk kepada buku bertajuk “Cyber Forensics – A Field Manual for Collecting, Examining, and Preserving Evidence of Computer Crimes”, 2^nd Edition oleh Albert J. Marcella, Jr. dan Doug Menendez ms 288, 289, 276-281 menyatakan keperluan buku log bagi merekod setiap aktiviti siasatan dan analisis forensik wajib dinyatakan semasa perbicaraan di mahkamah.

56. Tertuduh berhujah bahawa milikan tidak boleh dibuktikan melalui keterangan persekitaran (‘circumstantial evidence‘) iaitu dengan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Ekshibit-ekshibit “P11”, “P12”, “P13”, “P14, “P15”, “P16”, “P17”, “P18”, “P19”, “P20”, “P21” hingga “P33” yang merupakan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan hanya kerana dokumen-dokumen tersebut didakwa terdapat di dalam cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh).

Pihak Pembelaan ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh VT Singham J di dalam kes Ah Poon & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 CLJ 521 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 10-11 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana VT Sigham J menyatakan seperti berikut:

“Irrelevant and Prejudicial Facts Or Evidence

[17] As for the police report which contains serious allegation that the accuseds are suspected to be involved in the activity of prostitution, it cannot be denied that this is highly prejudical, inadmissible or is otherwise objectionable and the accuseds have every right to know and understand the contents and they should be given the opportunity of raising any objection to the contents of the police report which is against them. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to show whether the contents of the police report which has been marked as exh. P 3 was read and explained to the accuseds and what was their reponse.

[18] It is paramount importance that all documentary evidence which are tendered as evidence by the prosecution and marked as exhibits in proceedings where the accused has pleaded guilty to a charge if possible should be shown, read and explained to the accuseds and understood by him or her so that in the event the contents of the documents which contains some incriminating facts which implicates the accuseds are disputed or not admitted, the document will have to be rejected without having it marked as an exhibit…..Be that as it may, a document or an exhibit is not to be admitted unless it is relevant to the charge.”

57. Oleh itu, laporan Forensik SP1 (Ekshibit “P35”) tidak komprehensif dan konklusif.

58. Oleh yang demikian, kesimpulan yang tidak dapat dielakkan ialah Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tidak mempunyai pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material, bahan yang dikatakan lucah tersebut.

Isu 106 Klip Video Tersebut Mestilah Lucah di Sisi Undang-undang

59. Di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“2nd Ground

Under the 2nd ground the prosecution submitted that the learned Magistrate had erred in law and in fact when he came to his finding that the prosecution has failed to prove that all of exh. P1, ie, the remaining 14 VCD (video cakera padat) seized are obscene films and disregarded PW5′s evidence that the result of a screen test conducted on the seized items has shown that all these items are obscene films.

Under the 2nd ground, in my view, it would be unsafe for the court to solely rely on PW5′s evidence that he had conducted a screen test on all the 18 VCD’s and that they were all obscene films because I find that exh. P5 which was prepared by him in respect of the 18 VCDs handed to him lacked evidential value and besides there was a material contradiction as from whom he received the 18 VCDs (discussed earlier).

Therefore, the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCDs is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films becomes critical. Here as per the finding of the learned Magistrate not only were only four VCDs screened but unfortunately the titles of the four VCDs were not even identified. Hence, there is no evidence before the court of which of the four VCDs out of the 18 VCDs exh. P1 (A-R) were of obscene material and neither was there proof whether the remaining 14 VCDs were of obscene material or otherwise.

I agree with the defence that the learned Magistrate should not be faulted just because he had allowed the prosecution’s application to conduct random screening. In my opinion the permission granted by the learned Magistrate is not tantamount to a waiver of the burden emplaced on the prosecution to prove each and every essential ingredient of the charge for purposes of establishing a prima facie case. It is the duty of the prosecution throughout to establish a prima facie case and it is not for the learned Magistrate, as pointed out by the defence, to tell them as to the correct procedure to be adopted.”

60. Di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“Intipati (b)

[9] Berdasarkan keterangan, SP1 ada membuat rampasan terhadap barang-barang kes. Namun begitu, adalah didapati tiada sebarang penandaan dibuat pada mana-mana bahagian pada VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas. Setelah barang-barang kes diserahkan kepada SP3 (C/Insp. Saifulnizam bin Mohamed Jais), SP3 juga tidak membuat apa – apa tanda pada barang-barang kes yang diterima dan menyimpan barang-barang kes tersebut di bilik stor barang kes. Penjaga stor pula tidak dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan di mahkamah. Kemungkinan bahawa barang-barang kes ini telah bercampur-aduk dengan barang kes untuk kes yang lain tidak dapat diketepikan.

[10] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan keputusan Majistret apabila beliau mendapati senarai bongkar (eks. P3) yang merujuk kepada senarai VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas adalah tidak lengkap. Terdapat sepuluh keping VCD dan DVD lucah dalam bahasa Cina tidak dinyatakan tajuk (“title”) dan begitu juga dengan empat keping DVD dalam bahasa Cina yang tidak dinyatakan tajuk. Dalam eksh. P3 cuma dinyatakan seperti berikut: “pelbagai tajuk VCD/DVD lucah dalam bahasa Cina”. Dalam perkara ini, saya bersetuju dengan penghakiman dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501, di mana Hakim Lau Bee Lan memutuskan:

… the principle to be gleaned is the effect of non-compliance of the provision governing a search list merely cast doubt on the bona fides of the parties conducting the search and then becomes incumbent on the trial judge to scrutinize the evidence further whether a prima facie has made out.

In the context of the present case, the identity of the 18 VCDs is central to proving that the accused had possession of them and the absence of the listing of each of the titles of the 18 VCDs greatly weakens the case for the prosecution.

Intipati (c)

[11] Timbalan pendakwa raya terpelajar menghujahkan bahawa kesemua VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas telah dibuktikan mengandungi adegan lucah. Dengan hormat, mahkamah ini tidak bersetuju. Walaupun pihak pendakwaan telah mendapat kebenaran dari mahkamah Majistret untuk menjalankan uji tayang secara rawak terhadap barang-barang kes, namun begitu, adalah menjadi tugas pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan kes mereka sepanjang perbicaraan. Hanya sepuluh keping dari VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas dibuat uji tayang di mahkamah Majistret dan sepuluh keping VCD/DVD yang dibuat uji tayang itu juga tidak dinyatakan tajuk-tajuknya. Tidak terdapat mana-mana peruntukan dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang menyatakan bahawa penayangan sejumlah VCD/DVD yang dirampas yang dipercayai mengandungi adegan lucah akan dianggap sebagai telah membuktikan bahawa keseluruhan VCD/DVD tersebut mengandungi adegan lucah. Oleh yang demikian, setiap satu VCD/DVD yang dirampas itu perlu dibuat uji tayang. Keadaan ini adalah berbeza, misalnya, dengan peruntukan yang jelas dibawah s. 37(j) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang menyatakan bahawa adalah mencukupi jika sampel dadah diambil tidak kurang dari 10% bekas (receptacles) yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya (lihat kes-kes Gunalan Ramachandran & Ors v. PP[2004] 4 CLJ 551; Chu Tak Fai v. PP [2006] 4 CLJ 931 dan PP v. Seow Wei Hoong[2008] 4 CLJ 453).

[12] Dalam perkara ini, saya juga bersetuju dengan penghakiman dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Chung Wan Li (supra) apabila hakim dipetik berkata:

Therefore, the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCDs is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films becomes critical. Here as per the finding of the learned magistrate not only were only four VCDs screened but unfortunately the titles of the four VCDs were not even identified. Hence, there is no evidence before the court of which the four VCDs out of the 18 VCDs Exh P1 (A-R) were of obscene material and neither was there proof whether the remaining 14 VCDs were of obscene material or otherwise.

I agree with the defence that the learned magistrate should not be faulted just because he had allowed the prosecution’s application to conduct random screening. In my opinion, the permission granted by the learned magistrate is not tantamount to a waiver of the burden emplaced on the prosecution to prove each and every essential ingredient of the charge for purposes of establishing a prima facie case. It is the duty of the prosecution throughout to establish a prima facie case and it is not for the learned magistrate, as pointed out by the defence, to tell them as to the correct procedure to be adopted.

[13] Keputusan bahawa terdapat keraguan yang munasabah sama ada barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian adalah sama dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah dan sama ada kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas itu mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”) adalah penemuan fakta yang dibuat oleh Puan Majistret berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan beliau di mana beliau mempunyai kelebihan untuk melihat dan mendengar saksi-saksi berkenaan. Penemuan fakta adalah merupakan fungsi eksklusif mahkamah bicara (lihat PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457). Perkara ini telah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap. Dalam kes Herchun Singh & Ors v. PP [1969] 1 LNS 52, Ong Hock Thye, KH berkata:

An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding on fact arrived at by the judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding: see Sheo Swarup v. King- Emperor AIR [1934] PC 227.

[14] Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa tidak terdapat apa-apa alasan untuk memutuskan bahawa Puan Majistret telah “mishandling the fact” dalam kes ini. Keputusan selainnya oleh Puan Majistret akan bertentangan dengan keberatan keterangan (“weight of evidence”) yang ada di hadapan mahkamah.

[15] Kesan terkumpul undang-undang terhadap keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan dalam kes ini telah menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pihak pendakwaan. Terdapat jurang yang tidak dipenuhi oleh pihak pendakwaan terutama yang berhubung dengan identiti ekshibit dan adegan lucah. Perkara ini memudaratkan kes pihak pendakwaan. Dalam kes Mohan Singh Lachman Singh v. PP [2002] 3 CLJ 293, Mahkamah Rayuan membuat pemerhatian:

The burden of proving its case at every stage lies on the prosecution. The only task of the accused is to raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecution’s case. If there are gaps in the case for the prosecution, these cannot be filled by resorting to a purported failure on the part of the defence to put specific questions relevant to its case. Such gaps must be filled by the prosecution itself: Abdullah Zawawi v. PP [1985] CLJ 19 (Rep); [1985] 2 CLJ 2; [1985] 2 MLJ 16. That has always been the law. It is still the law.

[16] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan di atas, mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa rayuan timbalan pendakwa raya tidak mempunyai merit. Dengan itu, rayuan ditolak dan keputusan Puan Majistret yang melepas dan membebaskan responden di akhir kes pendakwaan bagi pertuduhan kedua dikekalkan.”

61. Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah di sisi undang-undang, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“Screen Testing For Obscenity

[15] However, I find that the second vital ingredient in this case, ie, that the 65 DVDs are obscene was not proved.

15.1. There is no evidence at all that the 65 DVDs were subject to a screen test (uji tayang) for the court to make a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene.

15.2. SP1 merely testified that he was satisfied that the 65 DVDs were obscene by looking at the covers of the DVDs.

15.3. SP4, the I.O. of the case, said he had screen tested them at random in his office and found them to be obscene.

15.4. Although at one point of the proceedings the learned APP applied to reserve screen-testing of the DVDs, the learned defence counsel had responded that there was no need for screen-testing (p. 29 of Appeal Record). Unfortunately the court appeared to have agreed with learned defence counsel because nowhere in the notes of evidence does it appear that screen testing was done.

[16] In the case of PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 HC, the learned High Court judge held that “the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCD’s is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films”. In Chung’s case (supra), the learned High Court judge did not approve of the random testing that was conducted during the trial.

[17] His Lordship Mohd. Zawawi Salleh, JC, concurred with the learned High Court judge in the case of PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 HC. His Lordship held in Lee Swee Sing’s case that there is no provision in the Film Censorship Act 2002 which allows for random testing. A comparison was drawn with the provision of s. 37(j) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which allowed for a 10% of the sample of the drugs to be tested.

[18] In this case, there was no screen testing at all carried out during the trial. How then can the court arrive at a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene? It is patently clear that the prosecution had failed to prove that the 65 DVDs were obscene and the learned magistrate should have so found.

[19] For the reasons as adumbrated above the acquittal and discharge of the respondent is hereby affirmed as the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case against the respondent as per the charge.

[20] The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

62. Apa yang boleh difahamkan daripada ketiga-tiga kes di atas, kesemua jumlah bahan yang tercatat di dalam kertas pertuduhan mestilah dibuktikan lucah di sisi undang-undang. Sekiranya satu bahan tidak lucah, maka si tertuduh mestilah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan tersebut kerana tidak terdapat mana-mana peruntukan dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang menyatakan bahawa penayangan sejumlah VCD/DVD yang dirampas yang dipercayai mengandungi adegan lucah akan dianggap sebagai telah membuktikan bahawa keseluruhan VCD/DVD tersebut mengandungi adegan lucah.

63. Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil SP1 untuk memberi keterangan bahawa 106 klip video tersebut adalah lucah. SP1 telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 4 – 11 Nota Keterangan) bahawa: “Ada 150 video. Dalam senarai, ada 106 yang lucah. Saya ada list saya buat dalam list laporan forensic saya.” SP1 seterusnya telah diberi keterangan bahawa di antara klip video tersebut adalah lucah, tidak lucah, tidak dapat dimainkan, ada gambar lucah, tiada video lucah, tiada bahan lucah, tidak boleh dimainkan, mohon delete temporary file.

64. Oleh itu, melalui keterangan SP1 dan Ekshibit P35 (Laporan Analisa), jumlah klip video yang dikatakan lucah tidak sampai 106. Maka, pihak Pendakwaan tidak berjaya membuktikan intipati ini menurut undang-undang.

65. Bilangan klip video lucah sebanyak 106 klip tersebut sebenarnya tidak dapat dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan kerana terdapat klip video yang berulang-ulang dan mempunyai kandungan yang sama tetapi nama fail yang berbeza (mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan). Terdapat klip-klip video yang tidak dapat dimainkan seperti dancewater.avi, dcmonument.avi dan moonrise.avi, ROSEBLOOM.avi, video001.avi, V10raw.mpg dan V137raw.mpg (mukasurat 5, 6 dan 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip-klip video yang tidak keluar (mukasurat 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada yang tiada kandungan lucah (mukasurat 5,6,7 dan 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip yang tidak dapat dibaca seperti V10.raw.mpg (mukasurat 7 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip video yang tidak lucah tetapi ditandakan sebagai bahan lucah seperti Sato1.mpg dan sato2.mpg (mukasurat 6 Nota Keterangan). Di samping itu terdapat 2 klip video yang tidak boleh dikira sebagai lucah apabila melibatkan perlakuan di antara suami dan isteri (beast1.Mpg dan dollah2.mpg – mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan) yang pada asalnya berada di tempat persendirian tetapi telah didedahkan oleh SP7 apabila ekshibit “P2” diambil.

66. Tertuduh di dalam pemeriksaan utama Kes Pembelaan telah member keterangan bahawa DVD (ekshibit “P3a-P3m”) telah dibawa oleh Tertuduh ke Balai Polis Kepong dan seorang anggota polis bernama Kopral Azmi telah mengira klip video yang berada di dalam ekshibit P3 hanya berjumlah 82 klip video sahaja.

67. Pegawai Penyiasat juga tidak menyediakan senarai klip video lucah tersebut kerana tiada senarai diberikan mengikut Seksyen 51A Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Sekiranya pihak Pendakwaan mendakwa senarai klip video yang dilampirkan bersama Laporan Forensik (ekshibit “P35”) maka senarai tersebut tidak boleh diambilkira kerana Laporan Forensik tersebut telah dicabar kesahihannya dengan jumlah uji tayang yang dibuat di Mahkamah dan penerimaan Laporan Forensik tersebut sebagai ekshibit tidak mengikut lunas undang-undang.

69. Bagi intipati kedua pertuduhan, Pihak Tertuduh berhujah bahawa tiada definisi yang khusus bagi ‘lucah’ di dalam undang-undang.

70. SP7 selaku Pegawai Penyiasat juga gagal memberikan definisi yang tepat mengenai lucah di sisi perundangan. Beliau di dalam pemeriksaan balas turut menyatakan bahawa apa yang berlaku di dalam rumah di antara pasangan tidak boleh diambilkira sebagai lucah dan ini sangat bertentangan dengan apa yang beliau lakukan dengan menghadapkan Tertuduh dengan pertuduhan terhadap klip video beast1.Mpg dan dollah2.mpg (mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan) di mana kedua-dua klip video tersebut merupakan klip antara Tertuduh dengan bekas isteri yang diambil semasa masih lagi suami isteri. Ini merupakan pencabulan hak asasi manusia dan bertentangan dengan Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Pihak Pembelaan ingin merujuk kepada kes Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan):

[ Footnote 7 ] The Supreme Court of Ohio considered the issue in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N. E. 2d 387 (1960). Four of the seven judges of that court felt that criminal prosecution for mere private possession of obscene materials was prohibited by the Constitution. However, Ohio law required the concurrence of “all but one of the judges” to declare a state law unconstitutional. The view of the “dissenting” judges was expressed by Judge Herbert:

“I cannot agree that mere private possession of . . . [obscene] literature by an adult should constitute a crime. The right of the individual to read, to believe or disbelieve, and to think without governmental supervision is one of our basic liberties, but to dictate to the mature adult what books he may have in his own private library seems to the writer to be a clear infringement of his constitutional rights as an individual.” 170 Ohio St., at 437, 166 N. E. 2d, at 393.

71. Tiada definisi bagi perkataan ‘lucah’ berdasarkan perundangan yang boleh digunapakai di dalam rumah samada di dalam Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967, Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan Kanun Kesiksaan.

72. Mengikut Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Volume 1, 24^th Edition di muka surat 1115 dengan jelas menerangkan bahawa:

“The word “obscene” has not been defined in the Code.”

73. Definisi Lucah (‘Obscene’) atau Kelucahan (‘Obscenity’) bergantung kepada keadaan, tempat dan konteks semasa ianya berlaku. Apabila seseorang tanpa seurat benang di tubuh berada di rumahnya tanpa kehadiran orang luar tiada sesiapa boleh mengatakan bahawa beliau berkelakuan lucah. Keadaan yang sama juga jika sesuatu rakaman dibuat di dalam rumah dengan diri sendiri tanpa kehadiran orang lain atau dengan kehadiran pasangan yang sah di sisi undang-undang sahaja berada di rumah di mana di dalam konteks tersebut perlakuan tidak dikira bersifat lucah. Kesopanan awam hanya meliputi luar premis persendirian dan lucah tidak didefinisikan secara khusus di dalam perundangan.

Akta Penapisan Filem

Filem lucah

5. (1) Tiada seorang pun boleh—

(a) ada atau menyebabkan dirinya ada dalam milikan, jagaan, kawalan atau pemunyaannya; atau

(b) menyebarkan, menayangkan, mengedarkan, mempamerkan, membuat, mengeluarkan, menjual atau menyewakan, apa-apa filem atau bahan publisiti filem yang lucah atau yang selainnya bertentangan dengan kesopanan awam.

(2) Mana-mana orang yang melanggar subseksyen (1) melakukan suatu kesalahan dan apabila disabitkan boleh didenda tidak kurang daripada sepuluh ribu ringgit dan tidak lebih daripada lima puluh ribu ringgit atau dipenjarakan

74. Di dalam kes-kes ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD), ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD) tersebut diedar, dijual dan disebarkan untuk orang awam yang sudah tentu akan memberi kesan kepada orang awam terutamanya golongan muda yang memilikinya. Ini berbeza dengan kes ini di mana pihak polis telah memasuki premis tanpa waran geledah yang sah di sisi undang-undang dan rampasan harta peribadi dibuat yang jelas bukan untuk tatapan umum.

75. Mengikut Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Volume 1, 24^th Edition di mukasurat 1122, faktor yang perlu diambilkira di dalam menentukan sesuatu material itu lucah adalah material berunsur lucah tersebut jatuh ke tangan siapa. Di dalam kes ini Pegawai Penyiasat telah memasuki tempat kejadian dan material tersebut berada di tangan beliau. Hanya beliau membuat kesimpulan bahawa material itu lucah.

76. Oleh yang demikian, kesimpulan yang tidak dapat dielakkan ialah Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tidak mempunyai kandungan lucah di sisi undang-undang pada setiap masa yang material, bahan yang dikatakan lucah tersebut.

77. Pihak Pembelaan menyatakan bahawa memandangkan kedua-dua intipati penting di peringkat pendakwaan ini bagi membuktikan kes melampaui keraguna yang munasabah terhadap Tertuduh tidak dapat dibuktikan menurut undang-undang, kesimpulan yang tidak boleh dielakkan ialah Tertuduh dilepaskan dan dibebaskan serta merta daripada pertuduhan tersebut.

78. Pihak Pembelaan menyatakan bahawa pihak Pendakwaan masih gagal untuk membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan yang munasabah terhadap Tertuduh dengan butir-butirannya seperti di perenggan di bawah.

79. Menurut Nota Keterangan, terdapat ruang (‘gap’) di antara ekshibit-ekshibit di mahkamah yang menyebabkan pihak Pembelaan tidak dapat berhujah sepenuhnya dan ini telah memprejudiskan Tertuduh. Pihak Pembelaan ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah bahawa di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 17.8.2010 tiada keterangan mengenai ekshibit-ekshibit “P4” “P5”, “P6”, ”P7, “P8’ dan “P10”. Oleh yang demikian pihak Pembelaan tidak dapat mengutarakan hujah berkenaan ekshibit “P4”, “P5”, “P6”, “P7”, “P8” dan “P10”. Walaubagaimanapun sekiranya ekshibit “P4”, “P5”, “P6”, “P7, “P8’ dan P10” adalah salinan dokumen-dokumen yang diesktrak oleh SP1, pihak Pembelaan membangkitkan bantahan mengenai penerimaan salinan dokumen-dokumen tersebut kerana pihak Pendakwaan gagal mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950.

80. Kertas pertuduhan adalah bersangkut dengan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009. Ini menggambarkan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani adalah ‘First Information Report’. Dokumen ini telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah Majistret tetapi tidak ditanda sebagai ekshibit kerana Mahkamah Majistret telah menolak permohonan Tertuduh untuk memanggil Pengadu asala sebagai saksi kedua pembelaan yang menyebabkan pihak Pembelaan tiada peluang untuk membuktikan fakta-fakta berkenaan aduan pengadu.

81. SP5 telah memberi keterangan bahawa pemeriksaan dan penggeledahan yang dibuat di Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 (mukasurat 47 Nota Keterangan). Keterangan SP5 ini menunjukkan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 ialah ‘First Information Report’ yang membolehkan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan di Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut. Barang-barang yang dirampas adalah untuk laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 bukannya report polis lain. Mana-mana ‘First Information Report’ lain yang menggunakan barang-barang geledah menurut Borang Senarai Geledah pada Tarikh tersebut di Premis tersebut telah mencabuli hak setiap rakyat Malaysia yang telah dijamin dan termaktub di dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia.

82. Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Chong Chieng Jen lawan Mohd Irwan Hafiz bin Md Radzi & Anor [2009] 8 MLJ 364 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana komputer riba pemohon telah dirampas apabila satu waran geledah dikeluarkan oleh Majistret apabila pemohon disyaki menyimpan bahan berunsur hasutan. Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk mengetepikan waran geledah dan memerintahkan komputer riba dikembalikan kepada Pemohon. Di dalam kes ini Rhodzariah Bujang JC menyatakan seperti berikut:

“The requirement for ‘information’ and ‘reason to believe’ is mandatory because the execution of the warrant willl definitely result in the invasion of the privacy and property of the owner of the premises so named and may even result in the consfication of his property. A person’s privacy and the right to his property are very basic rights of a man and that to his property is even enshrined under Article 13(1) of the Federal Constitution.”

83. Apalagi di dalam kes ini jika tiada waran geledah diperolehi dari mana-mana Mahkamah dan ini sudah tentu mengganggu hak ‘privacy’ Tertuduh sebagaimana yang termaktub di bawah Artikel 10 dan 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

84. Adalah mustahil sesuatu tempat itu digeledah terlebih dahulu sebelum adanya ‘First Information Report’ atau sesuatu tempat itu digeledah mendahului ‘First Information Report’. Tambahan lagi Laporan Analisa oleh SP1 adalah berkenaan dengan Dang Wang Rpt 29694/09 bersabit Jalan Patani Rpt 5070/2009.

85. Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 sebagai ‘First Information Report’ adalah amat penting di dalam kes ini memandangkan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani tersebut. Tertuduh semasa memberi keterangan di dalam pemeriksaan utama telah memohon agar Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report No. 5070/09 tersebut ditanda sebagai “ID” tetapi disebabkan Pengadu Norina Zainol Abidin tidak dapat dipanggil kerana ditolak oleh Mahkamah, salinan laporan polis tersebut ditender mengikut Seksyen 173(j)(iii) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

86. SP-5 memberi keterangan bahawa tiada waran untuk melakukan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan tersebut. Bagi situasi ini, pihak Pendakwaan mestilah mematuhi S.62 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan segala intipati S.62 mestilah dipenuhi terlebih dahulu sebelum membuat pemeriksaan atau penggeledahan tanpa waran. Tiada apa-apa keterangan mengenai situasi ini maka penggeledahan atau pemeriksaan pada Tarikh tersebut di Bangunan tersebut adalah tidak sah di sisi undang-undang.

87. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi pendakwaan pertama (SP1) sebagai saksi pakar. Pengadu asal tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi. Maklumat pertama (“First Information Report’) adalah dari seorang bernama Norina Zainol Abidin yang tidak dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai saksi pertama kerana berdasarkan laporan beliau, polis telah datang ke premis tersebut pada 13.7.2009 tanpa waran geledah dan alasan yang munasabah untuk memasuki premis tersebut. Laman web yang dikatakan lucah http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com merupakan laman blog yang kosong oleh itu tidak wujud isu kelucahan atau isu yang melanggar kesopanan awam pada laman blog tersebut. Amat ketara bahawa laporan pertama tersebut tidak benar dan merupakan laporan yang palsu yang sengaja direka-reka oleh Pengadu asal untuk menceroboh hak persendirian Tertuduh. Oleh yang demikian cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang ditender sebagai ekshibit tidak sepatutnya dirampas pada hakikat sebenarnya kerana tiada peralatan atau peranti atau modem atau talian rangkaian yang dilanggani pada tarikh 13hb. Julai, 2009 yang dijumpai di tempat kejadian mengikut seksyen 248 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998.

88. Tiada sebarang keterangan daripada SP1 dan SP7 yang menerangkan bagaimana laman web tersebut dikesan daripada ‘internet protocol’ dari ‘service provider’ kepada internet yang terdapat dari premis tempat kejadian. SP5 dan SP7 mengesahkan di dalam keterangan masing-masing bahawa tiada modem atau peranti dijumpai. Apa yang boleh digarapkan daripada keterangan-keterangan ini bahawa tiada bukti kukuh mengaitkan tempat kejadian dengan laporan pengadu “First Information Report”. SP5 memberi keterangan bahawa set komputer tidak disambung ke sumber kuasa dan tidak berfungsi. Beliau menyatakan bahawa komputer di tempat kejadian rosak. Oleh yang demikian bagaimana cakera keras (‘hard disk’) boleh dirampas sedangkan untuk akses kepada internet memerlukan peranti modem, talian internet yang pada masa material membawa satu internet protocol (IP) yang unik yang boleh dikesan dan dikaitkan dengan “MAC address” (Networking Card) pada komputer yang disyaki tersebut. Tiada keterangan mengenai analisis forensik rangkaian dan analisis forensik Facebook yang dibuat oleh SP1 untuk membuktikan bahawa Tertuduh boleh dikaitkan dengan laman web yang dinyatakan sebelum ini. Nama Domain (‘domain name’) http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com tidak dibuktikan siapa tuanpunya atau pemiliknya atau siapa yang mendaftar ‘domain name’ tersebut.

89. Di samping itu tiada keterangan daripada SP1 dan SP7 bahawa Tertuduh adalah ‘friend’ yang diterima oleh Pengadu asal untuk akaun ‘Facebook’ Pengadu asal. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang menunjukkan bahawa Tertuduh ada akses kepada maklumat akaun ‘Facebook’ Pengadu asal.

Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi berkaitan internet dan ‘domain name’ (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) Petroliam Nasional Bhd v. Khoo Nee Kiong [2003] 4 MLJ 216 (mukasurat 230-231 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan):

“[35] I also reproduce below the following excerpt from the judgment of Aldous LJ in British Telecommunications plc and another v One In A Million Ltd and others and other actions [1998] 4 All ER 476 at p480-481 which explains in very simple terms what is internet and which also adopts the explanation by the learned trial judge, Jonathan Sumption QC sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court on what is domain name:

At its simplest the internet is a collection of computers which are connected through the telephone network to communicate with each other.

As explained by the judge [1998] FSR 265 at p 267:

The internet is increasingly used by commercial organizations to promote themselves and their products and in some cases to buy and sell. For these purposes they need a domain name identifying the computer which they are using. A domain name comprises groups of alphanumeric characters separated by dots. A first group commonly comprises the name of the enterprise or a brand name or trading name associated with it, followed by a ‘top level’ name identifying the nature and sometimes the location of the organization….

Members of the public would not ordinarily have a domain name. They would subscribe to a service provider and have an e-mail address. That enables a subscriber to send a message to another computer through the service provider, which forwards the message requested to the appropriate computer. The subscriber can also browse around the world wide web and seek web pages associated with a particular domain name. Thus if he transmits a domain name and the web pages sought and provide the information obtained.”

Pihak Pembelaan bersandarkan kepada satu kes Frangione v. Vandadongen [2010] O. J. No. 2337 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Agung Ontario memutuskan seperti berikut:

[33] Counsel have referred to several cases in Ontario that have dealt with the relatively new issue of production of the contents of Facebook sites given the proliferation of social networking sites. Our courts have observed and accepted that “Facebook” is a social networking sites used by members to communicate information about one’s personal life to other members of the Facebook community. When a person registers with Facebook, at http://www.facebook.com website, he creates his own profile and privacy settings. Profile information is displayed to people in the networks specified by the user in his privacy settings e.g a user may choose to make his private profile information available to others within his school, geographic area, employment network, or to “friends” of “friends”. A user can set privacy options that limit access to his profile only to those to whom he grants permission the so called “friends” of the user (Murphy v. Perger, [2007] O.J. No. 5511 (S.C.J.); Leduc, supra[19] Wicev. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co.[2009] O.J. No. 2946 (S.C.J.); Kourtesis v. Joris [2007] O.J. No. 5539 (S.C.J).

90. Adalah amat jelas bahawa penyitaan barang kes pada 13.7.2009 dibuat tanpa sebab yang munasabah dan berlawanan dengan kehendak Seksyen 42 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan juga prinsip yang telah diputuskan di dalam kes Chong Chieng Jen lawan Mohd Irwan Hafiz bin Md Radzi & Anor [2009] 8 MLJ 364 dan Tertuduh berhak kepada gantirugi kerana penyitaan tanpa sebab yang munasabah.

91. Pada 17.1.2011 Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 1 telah membuat perintah untuk Kes Tangkap tersebut ditetapkan untuk sebutan di hadapan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 untuk Tertuduh melantik peguambela dan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 7.2.2011 tanpa member peluang dan masa untuk mencukupi untuk Tertuduh melantik peguambela yang nyata tidak mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 255 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

Tertuduh ingin bersandarkan kepada kes Mahkamah Agung (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Liaw Kwai Wah & Anor v. PP [1987] 2 MLJ 69 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Agung menyatakan bahawa hak Tertuduh untuk diwakili seorang peguambela adalah termaktub di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Di dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Awaluddin bin Suratman & Ors lawan Pendakwaraya [1992] 1 MLJ 416 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) Mohtar Abdullah J membuat pemerhatian seperti berikut:

“Although the court should be strict in dealing with application for the postponement, the court owes a duty to an accused person to ensure that he has the benefit of counsel who would be properly able to act on his behalf. Since counsel had just been retained for the first accused, a short adjournment would further the interest of justice as counsel needed the notes of evindece to be properly prepared to safeguard the accused’s interest”.

92. Pihak Pembelaan turut berhujah bahawa prosiding ‘hostile witness’ yang dilakukan terhadap Saksi Pendakwaan ke-enam (SP6) spade 19.10.2010 semasa kes pendakwaan telah tidak mengikut prosedur ‘hostile witness’ yang sewajarnya mengikut kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan kerana, inter alia, SP6 tidak ditunjukkan dengan bahagian pernyataan yang berlawanan dan tidak diberi peluang untuk memberi penjelasan bagi kenyataan yang berlawanan.

Salleh Abas FJ di dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Krishnan v. PP [1981] 2 MLJ 121, 123 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) telah mengesahkan prosedur ‘hostile witness’ di dalam kes Muthusamy v. PP [1948] MLJ 57 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan)adalah prosedur yang diterima dan digunapakai secara konsisten oleh mahkamah-mahkamah di Malaysia:

“This procedure has been accepted and consistently followed by courts in this country and we see no reason to depart from it.”

Taylor J in Muthusamy v. PP:

“The proper way to apply the section is this. On the request of either side, the court reads the former statement. If there is no serious discrepancy the court so rules and no time is wasted. The first necessity is to read it with confident expextation that it will be different form the evidence but looking judicially to see whether the difference really so serious as to suggest that the witness is unreliable.

Differences may be divided into four classes:

(a) Minor differences, not amounting to discrepancies;

(b) Apparent discrepancies;

(c) Serious discrepancies;

(d) Material contradictions.

Minor differences are attributable mainly to differences in interpretation and the way in which the statement was taken and sometimes to differences in recollection. A perfectly truthful witness may mention a detail on one occasion and not remember it on another. A mere omission is hardly ever a discrepancy. The police statement is usually much briefer than the evidence. Both the statement and the evidence are usually narratives reduced from question and answer. The witness is not responsible for the actual expressions used in either, and all the less wehre he does not speak English.

If the police statement gives an outline of substantially the same story, there being no apparent irreconcilable conflict between the two on any point material to the issue, the Magistrate should say at once “The difference is not such as to affect his credit” and hand the statement back.

If, however, the difference is so material as probably to amount to a discrepancy affecting the credit of the witness, the court may permit the witness to eb asked whether he made the alleged statement. If he denies having made it, then either the matter must be dropped or the document must eb formally proved, by calling the writer or, if he is not available, by proving in some other way that the witness did make the statement.

If the witness admits making the former statement, or is proved to have made it, then the two conflicting versions must be carefully explained to him, preferably by the Court, and he must have a fair and full opportunity to explain the difference. If he can, then his credit is saved, though there may still be doubt as to the accuracy of his memory. This procedure is cumbersome and slow and therefore should not be used unless the apparent discrepancy is material to the issue.”

93. Mahkamah Majistret sewajarnya mengendalikan penilaian maksimum ke atas keterangan semua saksi dan kegagalan untuk mengendalikan penilaian maksimum ke atas keterangan saksi-saksi mengakibatkan salah laksana keadilan.

Di dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Lee Kwan Woh v Public Prosecutor [2009] 5 MLJ 301, (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“[27] It is plain from what we have said when discussing the evidence that a reasonable tribunal properly directing itself on the applicable law and judicially appreciating the evidence would have acquitted the appellant at the close of prosecution case. The failure of the learned judge to undertake a maximum or positive evaluation of the evidence of PW3, PW4 and PW8 has in the present case resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice.”

94. Kesimpulannya berdasarkan hujahan-hujahan yang dikemukakan di atas, terdapat kecacatan yang material dan amat memudaratkan kes pihak Pendakwaan. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan setiap satu intipati pertuduhan dan pihak Pembelaan telah berjaya membuktikan terdapat keraguan yang munasabah di dalam kes pendakwaan. Oleh yang demikian Tertuduh pohon dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan di atas.

……………………………..

Mohamad Izaham bin Mohamed Yatim

Tertuduh

First in the History of Malaysian Judiciary: Malicious Prosecution by Malaysian Deputy Public Prosecution and Misconduct (Tort) of a Malicious Magistrate Been Proved During Court Proceedings (The SuperSly of Malaysian Deputy Public Prosecutor and The First Magistrate To Be Called The Greatest Liar of All Time) – My Written Submission Against the Malicious Magistrate

January 2, 2011 The Mathematical Theory of Nothing 397 comments

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR

DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: 41-147-2010

(Dalam perkara Mahkamah Majistret di Kuala Lumpur

Permohonan Jenayah No: 89-206-2010 pada 21.9.2010)

ANTARA

MOHAMAD IZAHAM BIN MOHAMED YATIM …PERAYU

DAN

PENDAKWA RAYA …RESPONDEN

[berkenaan perkara Mahkamah Majistret di Kuala Lumpur

Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009]

HUJAHAN BERTULIS PIHAK PERAYU

Dengan izin Yang Arif Hakim,

1. Ini adalah hujahan bertulis pihak Perayu untuk rayuan terhadap keputusan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur yang menolak permohonan Perayu pada 21.9.2010 agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009.

LATARBELAKANG KES:

2. Perayu dihadapkan dengan pertuduhan seperti berikut:

“Bahawa kamu pada 13/07/09 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat 7-3-5 Jalan 2/38B, Taman SPPK Segambut, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah didapati memiliki sebanyak 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK yang di bawah milikan kamu. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 5(2) akta yang sama”.

3. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil 7 orang saksi untuk membuktikan kes pendakwaan iaitu:

3.1 SP-1 iaitu Insp. Mohd Razif b. Mohd Zaid I/16542

3.2 SP-2 iaitu Zanariah binti Ibrahim

3.3 SP-3 iaitu Mohanaraj Naidi Subbiah

3.4 SP-4 iaitu Mohamad Zamri bin Roslan

3.5 SP-5 iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah I/17525

3.6 SP-6 iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus

3.7 SP-7 iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira binti Zakaria

4. Ekshibit-ekshibit yang telah ditanda adalah seperti berikut:-

4.1 P-1 – Borang Serah Menyerah (Borang D6)

4.2 P2(a), (b), (c), (d) – (n) – 7 DVC, 3 VCD, 2 Cd, 1 thumb drive dan hard disc

4.3 P3(a – m) – 13 keping DVD

4.4 P9 – Copy SP2

4.5 P11 – Quotation Baru

4.6 P12 – Surat Lawyer 1 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

4.7 P13 – Surat Lawyer 3 mohon hak penjagaan anak

4.8 P14 – Surat Lawyer 7

4.9 P15 – Surat Lawyer 7A2 contoh isteri derhaka yang nyata

4.10 P16-(dalam softcopy)Surat lawyer 7A2 dokumen

4.11 P17-(softcopy) surat lawyer 8 dokumen

4.12 P18 – Surat Lawyer 8 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

4.13 P19 – yearfocal – terdapat nama Saliza binti Ramli

4.14 P20 – S6301428.jpg

4.15 P21-S6301429.jpg

4.16 P22-S6301430.jpg

4.17 P23-S6301431.jpg

4.18 P24-S6301432.jpg

4.19 P25-S6301433.jpg

4.20 P26-S6301434.jpg

4.21 P27-S6301435.jpg

4.22 P28-S6301436.jpg

4.23 P29-S6301437.jpg

4.24 P30-S6301438.jpg

4.25 P31- S6301439.jpg

4.26 P32- S6301440.jpg

4.27 P33- S6301441.jpg

4.28 P34 – Dang Wangi Report D29694/2009

4.29 P35 – Laporan Analisa

4.30 P36 – Copy SP2

4.31 P37-Borang Senarai Geledah

5. Pihak Pembelaan telah memohon untuk memanggil 3 orang saksi untuk membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah dan telah dibenarkan pada 24.11.2010. Perayu telah memberi keterangan secara bersumpah pada 13.12.2010. Pada 6.1.2011, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menolak permohonan Perayu untuk memanggil 2 orang saksi lagi dan menetapkan tarikh untuk Hujahan pada 18.1.2011.

6. Pihak Perayu juga pada tarikh Sambung Bicara 13.12.2010 semasa kes Pembelaan telah mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen untuk menunjukkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap ekshibit-ekshibit “P-12” hingga “P-19” kerana pembuat tidak dipanggil dan terdapat keterangan bercanggah di antara satu sama lain tetapi Mahkamah enggan menerima dan menanda dokumen-dokumen tersebut sebagai keterangan pihak pembelaan.

7. Bagi permohonan Perayu agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009, afidavit-afidavit berikut telah difailkan dan Perayu memohon kepada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini agar afidavit-afidavit tersebut dirujuk bagi pendengaran rayuan ini:

6.1 Afidavit Sokongan Perayu yang diikrarkan pada 14.9.2010(kemudian daripada ini dirujuk sebagai “Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut”); dan

6.2 Afidavit Jawapan Nurwahida Binti Mat Khairuddin yang diikrarkan pada 21.9.2010(kemudian daripada ini dirujuk sebagai “Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut”).

8. Perayu ingin menyatakan pada peringkat rayuan ini bahawa pada hari pendengaran permohonan agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009 pada 21.9.2010, Majistret telah menetapkan hujahan lisan pada jam 2.30 petang tetapi apabila prosiding dimulakan pada jam 2.30 petang pada hari yang sama, Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur terus membuat keputusan menolak permohonan Perayu agar beliau menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap tersebut.

9. Oleh yang demikian Perayu tidak berpeluang untuk membangkitkan bantahan terhadap Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut. Bantahan yang ingin dibangkitkan oleh Perayu terhadap Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut adalah deponen yang mengikrarkan afidavit adalah bukan Timbalan Pendakwaraya yang mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009.

10. Di samping itu Perayu tidak berpeluang untuk membuat hujahan mengenai alasan-alasan yang telah dibangkitkan dan mengutarakan kes-kes yang menjadi asas bagi permohonan Perayu.

HUJAHAN PIHAK PERAYU

11. Pihak Perayu dengan sesungguhnya ingin menyatakan di sini bahawa hanya pada 29.11.2010 Alasan Penghakiman bagi keputusan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menolak permohonan Perayu agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 menarik diri daripada mendengar perbicaraan kes ini pada 21.9.2010 diperolehi dan oleh yang demikian Perayu berhujah bahawa Perayu telah diprejudiskan oleh kelewatan tersebut sehingga Mahkamah yang Mulia ini terpaksa menangguhkan rayuan ini ke tarikh pendengaran pada 12.1.2011.

12. Perayu ingin merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Tinggi Voon Chin Fatt v. Public Prosecutor ACRJ(KL) Criminal Appeal No 3 1949 (di Tab A mukasurat 4Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Spenser Wilkinson J memutuskan bahawa kelewatan menyediakan Alasan Penghakiman yang menyebabkan pendengaran rayuan ditangguhkan adalah tidak boleh diterima:

“The delay in bringing the appellant to trial was regrettable. But the delay since the trial in the hearing of this appeal, which was due solely to the inability of the appellant to obtain the grounds of judgment of the learned District Judge was, in my opinion inexcusable.”

In view of the confusion between admissible and inadmissible evidence; of the fatc that admissible evidence does not appear to have been as unassailable as the learned District Judge appeared to have thought; and of the possibility of prejudice to the appellant through the long delay in writing the grounds of decision, it is impossible for this conviction to stand.”

13. Walaubagaimanapun pihak Perayu turut berhujah mengenai alasan-alasan pihak Perayu di dalam permohonan agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar perbicaraan Kes Tangkap No: 2-83-7119-2009 seperti di perenggan 3 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut.

14. Alasan di perenggan 3.4 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut telah didengar dan keputusan telah dibuat pada 11.10.2010 oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dan tidak lagi relevan kepada rayuan ini. Rayuan telah dibuat terhadap keputusan tersebut di Mahkamah Rayuan.

15. Bagi alasan di perenggan 3.5 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut, Nota-nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan kes tangkap tersebut pada tarikh-tarikh 7.6.2010, 8.6.2010, 29.7.2010, 30.7.2010, 4.8.2010, 17.8.2010, 6.9.2010,20.9.2010, 21.9.2010 dan 30.9.2010 telah dibekalkan pada 5.10.2010 dan video rakaman perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010 yang dibekalkan TIDAK sepenuhnya dan terdapat percanggahan di dalam Nota-nota Keterangan tersebut sebagaimana yang telah dibangkitkan pada pendengaran permohonan di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini sebelum ini pada 11.10.2010.

16. Terlebih dahulu Perayu ingin menyatakan bahawa Perayu membangkitkan bantahan terhadap Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut kerana deponen yang mengikrarkan afidavit adalah bukan Timbalan Pendakwaraya yang mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009.

17. Mengikut perenggan pertama Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut, deponen adalah Pembantu Undang-Undang yang lebih rendah grednya daripada Timbalan Pendakwaraya dan tidak mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap tersebut kerana mengikut Nota-nota Keterangan, Timbalan Pendakwaraya adalah Nurul Ashiqin dan Siti Hajar.

18. Oleh yang demikian Perayu berhujah bahawa Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut tidak boleh digunapakai untuk pendengaran permohonan agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar perbicaraan Kes Tangkap No: 2-83-7119-2009 kerana deponen tiada pengetahuan tentang prosiding perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

19. Pihak Perayu ingin merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Agung (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Wee Choo Keong v MBf Holdings Berhad & Anor And Another Appeal [1995] 3 MLJ 549 (Tab B di mukasurat 26 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah dan Sarawak) memutuskan bahawa afidavit tidak boleh digunakan apabila tidak dapat membuktikan fakta-fakta yang diikrarkan di dalam afidavit tersebut:

“It is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only that Wee at the material time on 10 February 1993 at about 4.25pm was in his office, but also that the alleged acts and/or omissions by Ivan Wong were done on the instructions of Wee and were sufficient to constitute evasion of service of the court order on the part of Wee. After careful deliberation of submissions by counsel for both sides and detailed examination and analysis of all relevant evidence adduced in the form of affidavits and exhibits, I was of the view that the evidence, taken in totality, was insufficient to prove or fell short of proving to the criminal standard, ie beyond reasonable doubt the charge of contempt by evasion of service of the court order dated 9 February 1993 as alleged.”

20. Pihak Perayu juga turut merujuk kepada kes Zamrud Properties Sdn Bhd v Pang Mooi Gaid & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 180 (Tab C di mukasurat 12 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) Faiza Thamby Chik J telah memutuskan bahawa afidavit yang diikrarkan oleh deponen yang tiada pengetahuan tentang fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit berkenaan maka afidavit berkenaan tidak boleh digunapakai:

“The deponent in encl 2 has clearly stated that he was informed by his counsel of the happenings at the full trial in the sessions court. The deponent clearly has no personal knowledge of the happenings or the course of the trial at the sessions court and therefore is unable on his own to prove the facts as alleged in his affidavit. This is clearly hearsay evidence.”

21. Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang apabila dinyatakan di perenggan 1 bahawa alasan Perayu di perenggan 3.1 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut adalah satu alasan yang tidak munasabah.

22. Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa pertuduhan di bawah Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 berada di bawah bidangkuasa Mahkamah Majistret. Walaubagaimanapun tiada sebarang kes berkenaan ‘hard disk’ yang telah diputuskan oleh mana-mana mahkamah di Malaysia disandarkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

23. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Perayu ingin sesungguhnya menegaskan alasan di perenggan 3.1 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut amat perlu diambilkira kerana pertuduhan yang dihadapkan terhadap Perayu mengenai cakera keras (‘hard disk’) memang merupakan kes pertama seumpamanya di Malaysia.

24. Perayu berhujah dengan lebih lanjut bahawa apabila pertuduhan terhadap Perayu merupakan kes pertama seumpamanya di Malaysia dan tiada kes-kes yang pernah diputuskan oleh mana-mana Mahkamah di Malaysia maka adalah lebih wajar Majistret yang lebih kanan dan berpengalaman mendengar kes ini kerana melibatkan isu-isu teknikal dan undang-undang yang lebih kompleks dan mencabar.

25. Setakat ini kes yang telah diputuskan di mahkamah Negara-negara Komanwel yang melibatkan pertuduhan mengenai cakera keras (‘hard disk’) adalah kes R v. Trapp [2009] S.J. No. 64; 2009 SKPC 109; 2009SK.C. LEXIS 686 (Tab D di mukasurat 1-13 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana pakar telah menunjukkan kepada mahkamah penggunaan ‘hash function’ atau ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘hash value’ merupakan proses yang sangat kritikal dan penting di samping pengimejan forensik cakera keras dilakukan sebelumnya. Di dalam kes tersebut, pakar forensik komputer telah menggunakan SHA-1 sebagai ‘hash function’, ‘hash value’ pengiraan ‘hash value’ ditunjukkan dan dibandingkan dengan salinan imej forensik bagi cakera keras semasa perbicaraan.

26. Oleh itu jelas terdapat ‘lacunae’di dalam undang-undang di Malaysia berkenaan pembuktian kes melibatkan cakera keras dan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 seharusnya menggunapakai peruntukan Seksyen 5 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah di mana undang-undang di England digunapakai untuk prosedur pembuktian kes melibatkan cakera keras.

27. Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 di dalam Alasan Penghakimannya di perenggan 2 ada menyatakan bahawa kes telah selesai di peringkat pendakwaan dan sudah ditetapkan untuk keputusan. Keputusan telah diberikan pada 4.12.2010 di mana terdapat kes prima facie dan Perayu dipanggil membela diri walaupun hujahan pihak Pendakwaan bersandarkan kepada keterangan Saksi Pendakwaan keenam yang diisytihar sebagai (dengan izin) ‘hostile witness’ oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 dan otoriti-otoriti yang dikemukakan di dalam hujahan bertulis pihak Pendakwaan tidak lengkap dan konklusif mengenai terdapat satu kes prima facie yang memprejudiskan Perayu.

28. Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia ini bahawa Perayu telah memohon Alasan Penghakiman bahawa terdapat satu kes prima facie terhadap Perayu agar Perayu dapat menyediakan kes pembelaan dan juga memanggil saksi-saksi bagi pembelaan. Walaubagaimanapun sehingga ke hari ini Alasan Penghakiman tersebut tidak diperolehi.

29. Pada 13.12.2010 apabila Perayu membuat permohonan agar kes ditangguhkan dengan mengemukakan otoriti bahawa rayuan ini perlu didengar terlebih dahulu, permohonan telah ditolak tanpa mengambilkira kes yang telah diputuskan dan dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Majistret yang mengikat Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

30. Perayu telah mengemukakan kes Mahkamah Rayuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) kes Rowstead Systems Sdn Bhd v. Bumicrystal Technology (M) Sdn Bhd [2005] 2 CLJ 471 (Tab E di mukasurat 471 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa penangguhan prosiding perlu dibenarkan apabila terdapat rayuan berkenaan keputusan Hakim yang menolak permohonan daripada menarik diri daripada mendengar kes tersebut.

Di muka surat 471, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

31. Pada 24.12.2010 apabila kes ditetapkan untuk sambung bicara bagi kes Pembelaan dan sepina kepada saksi turut dicatitkan tarikh yang sama, waran tangkap dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah kerana dikatakan tarikh sambung bicara sebenarnya pada 23.12.2010.

32. Pada 6.1.2011 tarikh yang ditetapkan untuk Sebutan waran tangkap, waran tangkap telah dibatalkan dan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menolak permohonan pihak Pembelaan untuk memanggil 2 orang saksi pembelaan dan menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 18.1.2011.

33. Selanjutnya, Perayu berhujah bahawa Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang apabila mendapati bahawa tiada sebab-sebab yang kukuh yang dapat membuktikan bahawa akan ada ketidakadilan ataupun keputusan yang berat sebelah dibuat oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 seperti di perenggan 3 Alasan penghakiman bertarikh 11.11.2010.

34. Bagi membalas alasan ini Perayu dengan sesungguhnya memohon agar Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dapat melihat sendiri rakaman video sepanjang perbicaraan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 6.11.2011 supaya Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dapat menilai sendiri samada Perayu telah dibenarkan mengemukakan soalan-soalan dengan sepenuhnya semasa pemeriksaan balas.

35. Bagi menjawab alasan di perenggan 3 Alasan Penghakiman tersebut, Perayu bersandarkan alasan di perenggan 3.2 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut, di mana pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa cara Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 mendengar dan menjalankan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap tersebut tidak mengikut kaedah dan prosedur di bawah undang-undang. Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 seharusnya membuat arahan yang jelas.

36. Pada 29.7.2010 sehingga 19.10.2010 Perayu tidak dapat mengutarakan soalan-soalan dengan sepenuhnya terhadap semua saksi-saksi pendakwaan semasa pemeriksaan balas kerana dihalang oleh Mahkamah.

37. Selanjutnya, bagi alasan di perenggan 3.3 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut,

pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa hak Perayu telah dinafikan untuk melantik peguambela dan mendapat satu perbicaraan yang adil dan telus menurut Artikel 5 Perlembagaan Persekutuan (Tab F di mukasurat 1 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu).

38. Artikel 5 Perlembagaan Persekutuan memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

5. Liberty of the person.

(1) No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.

(2) Where complaint is made to a High Court or any judge thereof that a person is being unlawfully detained the court shall inquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order him to be produced before the court and release him.

(3) Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult by a legal practitioner of his choice.

39. Tiada direkodkan di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi sambung perbicaraan pada 29.7.2010 mengenai permohonan penangguhan untuk melantik peguambela.

40. Oleh itu hak Perayu untuk mendapat satu perbicaraan yang adil mengikut prinsip , dengan izin, ‘natural justice’ yang merangkumi ‘right to a fair hearing’ telah dikompromi.

41. Bagi menyokong alasan ini pihak Perayu bersandarkan kepada satu kes

Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) di dalam kes Jaginder Singh & Ors v. Attorney-General [1983] 1 MLJ 71 (Tab G di mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Raja Azlan Shah AG LP, Abdul Hamid FJ dan AbdoolCader J membenarkan rayuan perayu di dalam kes tersebut dan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“What also vitiated the committal for contempt of court in this case was the learned judge’s failure to make plain to the appellants the specific nature of the charges and the opportunity to give them a fair hearing.”

42. Pihak Perayu juga turut merujuk kepada kes Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] AC 322, PC, (Tab H di mukasurat 14 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) Lord Denning telah memutuskan bahawa:

“… The rule against bias is one thing. The right to be heard is another. Those two rules are the essential characteristics of what is called natural justice. They are the twin pillars supporting it. The Romans put them in the two maxims: Nemo judex in causa sua, and Audi alteram partem. They have recently been put in the two words, Impartiality and Fairness. But they are separate concepts and are governed by separate considerations. In the present case inspector Kanda complained of a breach of the second. He said that his constitutional right had been infringed. He had been dismissed without being given a reasonable hearing”.

43. Adalah dihujahkan oleh Perayu bahawa hak untuk mendapat perbicaraan yang adil bukan setakat Mahkamah menyediakan pen dan notepad untuk catat nota prosiding (mukasurat 12 Nota Keterangan) tetapi hak untuk mendapat satu perbicaraan yang adil merupakan salah satu prinsip asas (dengan izin) ‘natural justice’.

44. Menurut Nota Keterangan, terdapat ruang (‘gap’) di antara ekshibit-ekshibit yang dikemukakan di mahkamah yang menyebabkan pihak Perayu tidak dapat berhujah sepenuhnya dan ini telah memprejudiskan Tertuduh. Pihak Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia bahawa di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 17.8.2010 tiada keterangan mengenai ekshibit-ekshibit “P4” “P5”, “P6”, ”P7, “P8’ dan “P10”. Di sini pihak Perayu telah menunjukkan bahawa Nota-nota Keterangan yang dibekalkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur adalah tidak sempurna dan ini boleh memprejudiskan Kes Tangkap tersebut.

45. Tiada senarai klip video yang disediakan oleh Saksi Pendakwaan ke-7 (SP7) selaku Pegawai Penyiasat dan setiap satu daripada 106 klip video yang menjadi asas pertuduhan tidak ditanda sebagai ekshibit. Ini dapat dibuktikan dengan tiada keterangan direkodkan di dalam Nota-nota Keterangan sehingga 6.1.2011.

46. Selain daripada itu, setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan tersebut, banyak tokok tambah, percanggahan keterangan yang direkodkan dan juga fakta-fakta penting tidak direkodkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur. Di antara percanggahan keterangan tersebut SP1 telah menyatakan bahawa beliau tiada sijil ENCase tetapi mengikut Nota Keterangan tersebut SP1 menyatakan bahawa beliau ada sijil dari satu syarikat dan identiti syarikat tersebut tidak dinyatakan (mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan tersebut).

47. Pihak Perayu juga berhujah bahawa terdapat tokok tambah di dalam Nota Keterangan pada 20.9.2010 apabila Kes Tangkap tersebut ditetapkan untuk Sebutan waran tangkap kerana Perayu tiada memaklumkan kepada Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur bahawa Perayu dilepaskan pada waktu pagi 6.9.2010 tetapi ianya direkodkan di dalam Nota Keterangan (mukasurat 58 Nota Keterangan). Ini amat memprejudiskan Perayu kerana lain alasan diberikan lain yang direkodkan oleh Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

48. Perayu juga turut menyatakan bahawa Perayu tidak berpeluang untuk mengemukakan laporan polis Pengadu asal semasa pemeriksaan balas saksi pendakwaan kelima dan semasa Perayu memberi keterangan (rakaman video perbicaraan pada tarikh 13.12.2010) kerana Mahkamah sendiri tidak membenarkannya walaupun laporan polis Pengadu asal amat material di dalam Kes Tangkap tersebut (mukasurat 47 dan 48 Nota Keterangan).

49. Tambahan lagi di dalam Kes Tangkap tersebut, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur telah menerima sebagai bukti setiap dokumen lain yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1 dan dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’ (Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21”, “P-22, “ P-23”, “P-24” P-25”, “P-26”, “P-27”, “P-28”, “P-29”, “P-30”, “P-31”, “P-32” dan “P-33” mukasurat 16,17 Nota Keterangan) yang tiada kaitan langsung dengan pertuduhan dan tidak termasuk di dalam lingkungan definisi “filem” sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002. Walaubagaimanapun bantahan telah dibangkitkan oleh Perayu.

50. Pihak Perayu juga ingin menyatakan bahawa pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” adalah tanpa sebarang kebenaran daripada pembuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut, memprejudiskan Perayu dan tidak relevan kepada pertuduhan terhadap Perayu.

51. Pihak Pendakwaan turut memanggil SP6 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” yang kononnya mengikut pihak Pendakwaan diekstrak dari cakera keras tersebut. Walaubagaimanapun SP6 menggunapakai peruntukan undang-undang Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 kerana beliau mempunyai ‘privilege’ ke atas gambar-gambar berbentuk perlakuan tersebut yang merupakan satu bentuk komunikasi di antara Perayu dan SP6. Mahkamah sendiri telah turut memutuskan bahawa ekshibit “P-20” hingga “P-33” adalah dokumen-dokumen yang dilindungi di bawah privilege di bawah Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan juga telah membuat keputusan bahawa SP6 adalah (dengan izin) ‘hostile witness’.

52. Pihak Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh VT Singham J di dalam kes Ah Poon & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 CLJ 521 (Tab I di mukasurat 10 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana VT Sigham J menyatakan seperti berikut:

“Irrelevant and Prejudicial Facts Or Evidence

[17] As for the police report which contains serious allegation that the accuseds are suspected to be involved in the activity of prostitution, it cannot be denied that this is highly prejudicial, inadmissible or is otherwise objectionable and the accuseds have every right to know and understand the contents and they should be given the opportunity of raising any objection to the contents of the police report which is against them. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to show whether the contents of the police report which has been marked as exh. P 3 was read and explained to the accuseds and what was their response.

53. Adalah dihujahkan bahawa Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur seharusnya memastikan Mahkamah berlaku adil kepada Perayu tambahan pula Perayu tidak diwakili peguam dan perlu mengemukakan soalan-soalan semasa pemeriksaan balas setiap saksi pendakwaan sendiri.

54. Perayu ingin merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Rayuan Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Bhd v Yong Liuk Thin & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 213 (Tab J di mukasurat 17 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“To disqualify a judge, there must be circumstances or facts which have
been shown to exist which would lead a reasonable and fair-minded
onlooker or which would have given reasonable ground for him to suspect that the case would not be decided according to the evidence.”

55. Perayu berhujah bahawa Perayu telah berjaya menunjukkan fakta-fakta dari Nota Keterangan dan rakaman video perbicaraan Kes Tangkap tersebut yang boleh menjurus kepada keadaan yang munasabah bahawa Kes Tangkap tersebut diputuskan berdasarkan bukti-bukti yang tidak kukuh.

56. SP5 iaitu pegawai yang terlibat semasa geledah dan SP7 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat sendiri mengesahkan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Oleh yang demikian milikan secara fizikal tidak dibuktikan langsung (rakaman video prosiding perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).

57. Pihak Perayu seterusnya berhujah bahawa prinsip undang-undang yang digunapakai oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 adalah bukan prinsip undang-undang yang terpakai untuk penentuan samada permohonan untuk seseorang Hakim menarik diri daripada mendengar kes di hadapan beliau.

58. Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 merujuk kepada kes Mohamed Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v Inspector General of Police [2001] 2 MLJ 481 (Tab K di mukasurat 21 dan 22 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Augustine Paul J memutuskan seperti berikut:

“Any attempt made to hold a judgment against the decider whether directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly or even dressed and fashioned as a perception will strike at the very core of the administration of justice and lead to the destruction of the independence of the judiciary. A criticism can be said to be fair, even when wrong, if it is based on a legal analysis of the issues decided in a case. A criticism cannot be fair when it is built upon facts which are not truly stated and also when it is based mostly on surmises or unauthorized versions furnished by interested parties. On
the facts, the application made to recuse the judge was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court. Just as it is
improper for a judge to hear a case when there may be a reasonable perception of bias if he hears the case, it is equally wrong for him to disqualify himself from hearing a case when there are no grounds to do so”

59. Oleh yang demikian otoriti yang digunapakai untuk Alasan Penghakiman

bertarikh 11.11.2010 adalah tidak relevan.

60. Adalah dihujahkan bahawa prinsip undang-undang yang terpakai bagi menentukan isu seseorang Hakim perlu menarik diri daripada mendengar kes di hadapan beliau adalah undang-undang yang mantap seperti mana prinsip undang-undang yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) di dalam kes Mohamed Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 1 MLJ 321 (Tab L di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“The test to be applied in the present case was the ‘real danger of bias’
test. Hence, the question here was whether having regard to the facts
and circumstances, was there a real danger of bias on the part of the
learned trial judge when he heard the habeas corpus application“

Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes tersebut merujuk kepada undang-undang yang diputuskan di England berkaitan ‘bias’ seperti di dalam kes R v Gough [1993] AC 646 seperti berikut:

“[7] In England, the courts applied the ‘real danger’ of bias test in a criminal case. In R v Gough [1993] AC 646, the House of Lords rejected the reasonable suspicion test. Lord Goff, after examining the authorities in detail, reformulated the real danger test as follows (at p 670):

[Having] ascertained the relevant circumstances, the court should ask
itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a
real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the
tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or
have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party
to the issue under consideration (Emphasis added.)

[8] His Lordship also made it clear that this was the test to apply in all cases of apparent bias, whether concerned with justices or other members of inferior tribunals, or with jurors (like Webb) or with arbitrators.”

61. Perayu berhujah bahawa berdasarkan kes Mahkamah Persekutuan tersebut, (dengan izin) ‘the real danger of bias’ boleh dibuktikan daripada Nota Keterangan dan rakaman video perbicaraan Kes Tangkap tersebut seperti mana hujahan-hujahan lanjut di perenggan-perenggan 26 hinga 49 di atas.

62. Di dalam kes Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577 (Tab M di mukasurat 8 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) Lord Denning memutuskan bahawa Mahkamah perlu mengelak unsur-unsur ‘bias’ seperti berikut:

“A man may be disqualified from sitting in a judicial capacity on one of two grounds. First, a “direct pecuniary interest” in the subject-matter. Second, “bias” in favour of one side or against the other.

So far as “percuniary interest” is concerned, I agree with the Divisional Court that there is no evidence that Mr John Lannon had any direct pecuniary interest in the suit.

So far as bias is concerned, it was acknowledged that there was no actual bias on the part of Mr Lannon, and no want of good faith. But it was said that there was, albeit unconscious, a real likelihood of bias. This is a matter on which the law is not altogether clear: but 1 start with the oft-repeated saying of Lord Hewart CJ in R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256: “It is not merely of some importance, but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”

In R v Barnsley Licensing Justices, ex parte Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers’ Association [1960] 2 QB 167, Devlin] appears to have limited that principle considerably, but I would stand by it. It brings home this point: in considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. Tt does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand: Nevertheless there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not enough. There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The court will not inquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: “The judge was biased.”

63. Pihak Perayu turut berhujah bahawa adalah menjadi tanggungjawab Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur pada setiap masa untuk bersifat adil, ‘impartial’ dan membantu Perayu di dalam perbicaraan Kes Tangkap tersebut yang tidak diwakili peguambela sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

64. Perayu ingin mengemukakan pandangan berkenaan ‘impartiality of judges’ di mana NH Chan di dalam bukunya “How To Judge The Judges” di mukasurat 17 (Tab N mukasurat 17 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) merujuk kepada David Pannick, di dalam buku Judges, pada mukasurat 39-40, yang mencatatkan seperti berikut:

“Few judges could hope to emulate the impartiality of Chief Justice Mansfield: he presided, fairly, at the trial of Lord George Gordon in 1781 for alleged treason despite the fact that his own house had been burnt down in the riots provoked by Gordon. The trial resulted in Gordon’s acquittal (see Lord Campbell, The Lives of the Chief Justices of England, 3^rd edn, 1874, Vol 3, pp 128-129). But all judges would now decline to sit in judgment on a case where their personal feelings or interests made it impossible for them to act in an impartial manner.

For an account of what caused the Gordon Riots, see Lord Denning What Next in the Law, pp 23, 24:

The greatest tragedy that befell Lord Mansfield was in the Gordon Riots of 1780.

One of the subjects on which he had always shown his enlightened views was that of religious toleration…. But he was in advance of his time. On one occasion the City of London elected a man as sheriff. They knew he was a dissenter and would not serve. They imposed a fine on him for not serving. Lord Mansfield held that the fine was invalid. It was a piece of persecution. He said:

“Temporal punishment ought not to be inflicted for mere opinions with respect to particular modes of worship.”

The City was so upset that many regarded Lord Mansfield as “little better than an infidel”.

On another occasion a Roman Catholic priest had said mass contrary to the law of the land. He was tried before Lord Mansfield and a jury. He was undoubtedly guilty as the law then stood. But Lord Mansfield summed up for an acquittal. His final words to the jury were:

“Take notice, if you bring him in guilty the punishment is very severe; a dreadful punishment indeed! Nothing less than perpetual imprisonment!”

The jury found a verdict of “Not Guilty”: but many zealous Protestants were candalized. Rumours were spread abroad that the Lord Chief Justice was not only a Jacobite but a Papist, and some even asserted that he was a Jesuit in disguise.

Lord George Gordon then led the cry of “No Popery” and stirred up the people to violence. The great object of vengeance was Lord Mansfield. The mob marched on his house in Bloomsbury Square. The magistrates wished him to call in the soldiers to defend him. But he refused. The multitude came on, carrying torches and combustibles. They began to batter his front door. He then escaped with his wife through the back door. They burnt his house and all that was in it. His precious library went up in flames.

At p 25:

The insurrection was quelled. Lord George Gordon was tried for high treason. Lord Mansfield presided at the trial with a jury. Nowadays we should have considered it undesirable, lest he be thought to be prejudiced against Gordon. But Lord Mansfield tried the case with perfect propriety. Erskine defended Gordon. The defence was that Gordon himself had no hand in the violence. It was the “lawless herd, with fury blind” who did it. The jury acquitted Gordon. It was the best thing that could happen.

According to Lord Bingham (see The Sultan Azlan Shah Law Lectures, Lord Bingham: The Law as the Handmaid of Commerce, p 367):

… although Mansfield has left a generally golden reputation behind him, he was in his day the subject of sustained personal vilification perhaps never suffered by any other judge in any place at any time. I refer to the anonymous Letters ofjunius, some of which were addressed to him personally and attacked in the strongest terms his partial and pro-government approach in particular to libel trials. During the Gordon riots of June 1780 his carriage windows were smashed by the mob, he was hustled as he left the House of Lords, his house in Bloomsbury Square was burned and his library destroyed. In comparison with penalties such as these the strictures of the press to which the modern judge is exposed may seem a somewhat moderate affliction.

He served as Chief Justice for 32 years.”

65. Daripada keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan sebagaimana yang direkodkan di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi Kes Tangkap tersebut, amat jelas terdapat unsur-unsur pendakwaan bersifat mala fide (“Malicious Prosecution”) di dalam Kes Tangkap tersebut dan faktor ini perlu diambilkira oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini.

66. Kesimpulannya berdasarkan hujahan-hujahan yang dikemukakan di atas, Perayu memohon agar rayuan ini dibenarkan kerana pihak Perayu telah berjaya menunjukkan terdapat ‘real danger of bias’ di pihak Majistret di dalam mendengar dan membuat keputusan bagi Kes Tangkap tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, Perayu dengan sesungguhnya memohon agar satu perintah penggantungan prosiding dibuat berdasarkan kes Rowstead Systems Sdn Bhd v. Bumicrystal Technology (M) Sdn Bhd [2005] 2 CLJ 465 yang mengikat Mahkamah ini di mana sekiranya satu pengantungan prosiding tidak dibenarkan akan membuang masa dan merugikan usaha setiap pihak sekiranya rayuan ini dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah ini. Oleh itu, Perayu memohon agar perintah dibuat agar kes terhadap Perayu didengar oleh Majistret lain demi keadilan bagi Perayu di dalam kes ini.

……………………………..

Mohamad Izaham bin Mohamed Yatim

Perayu

12hb Januari 2011

Limitation of Immunity For Lower Court: [1895] 1 QB 668 ANDERSON v GORRIE AND OTHERS [COURT OF APPEAL] [1895] 1 QB 668 HEARING-DATES: 7 August 1894 7 August 1894

December 1, 2010 The Mathematical Theory of Nothing 618 comments

“No one can doubt that if any judge exercises his jurisdiction from malicious motives he has been guilty of a gross dereliction of duty; but the question that arises is what is to be done in such a case. In this country a judge can be removed from his office on an address by both Houses of Parliament to the Crown. In a colony such an address is not necessary. The governor of the colony represents the Sovereign, and over him is the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who represents Her Majesty, and can direct the removal of the judge.”

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[1895] 1 QB 668

ANDERSON v GORRIE AND OTHERS
[COURT OF APPEAL]
[1895] 1 QB 668
HEARING-DATES: 7 August 1894
7 August 1894

CATCHWORDS:
Judge – Court of Record of Colony – Act done in exercise of Judicial Office – Malicious Motive – Immunity from Action.

HEADNOTE:
No action lies against a judge of the Supreme Court of a colony in respect of any act done by him in his judicial capacity, even though he acted oppressively and maliciously, to the prejudice of the plaintiff and to the perversion of justice.

INTRODUCTION:
APPEAL from a judgment of Lord Coleridge C.J. in favour of the defendant Cook, at the trial with a jury.

The action was brought against three defendants, who were judges of the Supreme Court of Trinidad and Tobago, to recover damages for certain acts done by the defendants in the course of certain judicial proceedings, which acts were alleged to have been done maliciously and without jurisdiction and with knowledge of the absence of jurisdiction.

One of the acts complained of was that a rule was issued against the plaintiff calling upon him to shew cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt of Court in petitioning Her Majesty with regard to certain actions in the island of Tobago in which he had been defendant, and as to which he considered that he had a grievance. The rule was not applied for by any person, but was issued by the Supreme Court in Trinidad. The defendant appeared to shew cause, and after several adjournments the rule was discharged.

Another of the acts complained of was that the plaintiff attended before the defendant Cook to be examined as to his means of satisfying certain judgments. The examination was adjourned, and the plaintiff, under certain rules of Court enacted by the local Judicature Ordinance of 1879, was ordered to find bail, which was fixed at the sum of 500l., with one surety for the like amount. In default of finding bail the plaintiff was committed to prison, and an application for a habeas corpus to determine the validity of the committal was refused by the defendant Cook.

The first defendant named in the action died before the hearing.

The jury found, as to another of the defendants, a verdict in his favour, and judgment was entered accordingly.

As to the defendant Cook, the jury found that he had over-strained his judicial powers, and had acted in the administration of justice oppressively and maliciously, to the prejudice of the plaintiff and to the perversion of justice, and they assessed the damages at 500l.

The learned judge directed judgment to be entered for the defendant Cook, on the ground that no action will lie against a judge of a Court of Record in respect of acts done by him in his judicial capacity.

The plaintiff appealed.

COUNSEL:
The plaintiff in person. The immunity of a judge is confined to judicial acts – namely, acts done by him as a judge under his authority from the Crown and within his jurisdiction: Houlden v. Smith n(1) ; Ex parte Fernandez n(2) ; Kemp v. Neville. n(3) If he acts maliciously he is liable to an action: Kendillon v. Maltby n(4) ; and per Cockburn C.J. in Thomas v. Churton n(5) and Dawkins v. Paulet. n(6) The defendant’s acts complained of were ministerial and not judicial, and he is not entitled to the immunity claimed.

[He also referred to Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, bk. 2, c. 1, ss. 1, 3, 9, 17; Floyd v. Barker n(7) ; Ashby v. White n(8) ; Calder v. Halket n(9) ; Taaffe v. Downes. n(10) ]

Adam Walker, (Harold Hodge, with him), for the defendant. The acts complained of were judicial acts, and a long series of cases have established the immunity of a judge in such a cases, and that the question of motive is immaterial. [He cited Haggard v. Pelicier Fr res n(11) ; Scott v. Stansfield n(12) ; Fray v. Blackburn n(13) ; Dicas v. Lord Brougham. n(14) ]

[He was stopped.]

The plaintiff, in reply.

n(1) 14 Q. B. 841.

n(2) 10 C. B. (N.S.) 3.

n(3) 10 C. B. (N.S.) 523.

n(4) Car. & M. 402.

n(5) 2 B. & S. 475, 479.

n(6) Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 94; 9 B. & S. 768.

n(7) 12 Rep. 23.

n(8) 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. p. 268, at p. 274.

n(9) 3 Moo. P. C. 28.

n(10) 3 Moo. P. C. 36, n.

n(11) [1892] A. C. 61.

n(12) Law Rep. 3 Ex. 220.

n(13) 3 B. & S. 576.

n(14) 6 C. & P. 249.

PANEL: LORD ESHER M.R., KAY and A. L. SMITH L.JJ

JUDGMENTBY-1: LORD ESHER M.R

JUDGMENT-1:
LORD ESHER M.R: In this case an action was brought by the plaintiff against several judges of the Supreme Court of a colony for damages for wrongful acts done by them in commiting him for contempt of Court, and in holding him to excessive bail.

The defendants were judges of a Supreme Court in a colony, and the first question is whether these matters were matters with which they had jurisdiction to deal. As to the contempt of Court, it cannot be denied that they had jurisdiction to inquire whether a contempt had been committed, and, further, it cannot be denied that they had power to hold a person to bail in the cases provided for by the colonial statute which expressly gives that power. These two matters were obviously within the jurisdiction of the Court. No one can doubt that if any judge exercises his jurisdiction from malicious motives he has been guilty of a gross dereliction of duty; but the question that arises is what is to be done in such a case. In this country a judge can be removed from his office on an address by both Houses of Parliament to the Crown. In a colony such an address is not necessary. The governor of the colony represents the Sovereign, and over him is the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who represents Her Majesty, and can direct the removal of the judge. But the existence of a remedy would not in either of these cases of itself prevent an action by a private person; so that the question arises whether there can be an action against a judge of a Court of Record for doing something within his jurisdiction, but doing it maliciously and contrary to good faith. By the common law of England it is the law that no such action will lie. The ground alleged from the earliest times as that on which this rule rests is that if such an action would lie the judges would lose their independence, and that the absolute freedom and independence of the judges is necessary for the administration of justice. That is the ground stated in Miller v. Hope n(1) , in the year 1824, by Lord Gifford in his judgment in the House of Lords; and in 1892, in Haggard v. Pelicier Fr res n(2) , Lord Watson says: “It is due to the appellant to state that the respondents in their pleadings make no imputation of dishonesty, although their Lordships do not mean to

n(1) 2 Shaw Sc. App. Cas. 125.

n(2) [1892] A. C. 61, at p. 68.

suggest that such an imputation, if it had been made and proved, would have deprived him of the immunity which the law accords to a judge in his position.” Crompton J. in Fray v. Blackburn n(1) , said: “It is a principle of our law that no action will lie against a judge of one of the superior Courts for a judicial act, though it be alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly. … The public are deeply interested in this rule, which indeed exists for their benefit, and was established in order to secure the independence of the judges, and prevent their being harassed by vexatious actions.”

The reasons for the rule were more fully stated by Kelly C.B. in Scott v. Stansfield n(2) , and the only difficulty that has ever been raised on the point was that raised by Cockburn C.J. in Thomas v. Churton. n(3) In that case the Chief Justice said: “I am reluctant to decide, and will not do so until the question comes before me, that if a judge abuses his judicial office, by using slanderous words maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, he is not to be liable to an action.” All I can say is, that I am convinced that had the question come before that learned judge he must and would, after considering the previous authorities, have decided that the action would not lie. That case was decided in 1862, and there are subsequent cases that confirm the principle which I have stated to be derived from the common law. The case of General Picton, Reg. v. Picton n(4) , has been cited to us; but it cannot be alleged that General Picton was acting as a judge, and therefore that case has no bearing on the matter before us. To my mind there is no doubt that the proposition is true to its fullest extent, that no action lies for acts done or words spoken by a judge in the exercise of his judicial office, although his motive is malicious and the acts or words are not done or spoken in the honest exercise of his office. If a judge goes beyond his jurisdiction a different set of considerations arise. The only difference between judges of the Superior Courts and other judges consists in the extent of their respective jurisdiction. It follows from what I have said that, taking the findings of the jury to be true to the

n(1) 3 B. & S. 576, at p. 578.

n(2) Law Rep. 3 Ex. 220.

n(3) 2 B. & S. 475, at p. 479.

n(4) 30 How. St. Tr. 225.

fullest extent, the action will not lie against the defendant, and the appeal must be dismissed.

JUDGMENTBY-2: KAY L.J

JUDGMENT-2:
KAY L.J: I am of the same opinion. I take the law to be clear that for an act done by a judge in his capacity of judge he cannot be made liable in an action, even though he acted maliciously and for the purpose of gratifying private spleen. It cannot be denied that all the acts complained of were done by the defendant in his capacity of judge, and whether he acted rightly or wrongly cannot be questioned in this action. Agreeing entirely with what the Master of the Rolls has said, and with the judgment of Kelly C.B. in Scott v. Stansfield n(1) , I come to the conclusion that this action will not lie.

JUDGMENTBY-3: A. L. SMITH L.J

JUDGMENT-3:
A. L. SMITH L.J: I concur. I believe it to be settled law that if a judge of a Court of Record in the course of his office does an act, even though he does it maliciously, an action will not lie against him at the suit of the person aggrieved. The plaintiff tried to get outside that rule by saying that the acts done by the defendant were not done in the course of his office; but that contention is not well founded. It is contrary to the allegations of the statement of claim, and has been negatived by the jury by their finding that the defendant overstrained his judicial powers. The appeal must be dismissed.

DISPOSITION:
Appeal dismissed.

SOLICITORS:
The plaintiff in person.

Solicitor for the defendant: W. G. Hooper.

n(1) Law Rep. 3 Ex. 220.

A. M.

Categories: Abuse of Process of Court, Art of Counter-CyberForensics, Breach of Natural Justice, Breach of Prosecution's Duties, Case Law Studies, Conspiracy Theory, Criminal Behavioral Studies, Criminal Justice, Criminology, Law of Tort, Limitation of Immunity of Judge in Lower Court, Limitations to The Immunity Rule, Malicious Prosecution, Natural Justice, Prosecution, True Definition of Natural Justice, Vicarious Liability

The True and Finest Definition of Financial Speculation / Speculative in Legal: HIGH ACHIEVERS SDN BHD v DAR AL HANDASAH CONSULTANTS (SHAIR & PARTNERS) and NABIL NASSAR

November 29, 2010 The Mathematical Theory of Nothing 336 comments

The True and Finest Definition of Financial Speculation / Speculative in Legal

“The Plaintiff’s losses of the shares value were on a speculative basis upon a financial action that does not promise safety of the initial investment along with the return of the principal sum. The speculation is, however, an incomplete information of the projectile path that conjectures on the fluctuation of booming and depression epochs. The phenomenon is, therefore, hypothetical, in which the observable processes are rather stochastic than deterministic.”

“SP1 in his evidence states that if the JV company was able to take off, the share value could go up to RM5.00 per share. Again, this Court is bound by the decision of the learned Judge that the alleged loss of share worth is merely speculative in nature. Further, the evidence given by SP1 is really speculative as SP1 was not a stock trading expert and the Plaintiff also did not call a stock analyst to corroborate on how the futures share markets fluctuate with respect to the price-earnings ratio (P/E) and supply/demand equilibrium to be valued for the JV company which operated for only 6 months. Therefore, the data accumulated to forecast stock value fluctuation and trajectory movement is incomplete and weak.”

AINY SUHAILAH BINTI YUNUS

Senior Assistant Registrar

The Commercial Division 3

May 25, 2010

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR

(BAHAGIAN DAGANG)

GUAMAN SIVIL NO : D4 – 22 -320 TAHUN 2001

HIGH ACHIEVERS SDN BHD … PLAINTIFF

AND

1.DAR AL HANDASAH CONSULTANTS

(SHAIR & PARTNERS)

2.NABIL NASSAR … DEFENDANTS

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

The Plaintiff’s action herein filed on 2^nd March 2001 for breach of contract of joint venture agreement dated 5^th April 1996 entered between the Plaintiff, Defendants and one company called Master Engineers Malaysia Sdn Bhd (“JV Agreement”) to form a Joint Venture Company which was known as Modar (“JV Company”) when the 1^st Defendant failed or refused to pay RM500,000.00 as capital injection to the JV Company.

On 15.4.2008 Justice Dato’ Rohana Yusuf, the trial Judge, allowed the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1^st Defendant and ordered that the 1^st Defendant pay the Plaintiff damages to be assessed together with interests and costs.

In respect of the assessment of damages, the Plaintiff tendered:

(i) One witness, SP1, Sheikh Dato’ Seri Mohamad Toufic Al Ozeir and the Witness Statement marked as Enclosure 21; and

(iii) One Common Bundle of Document (“CBD”).

The Defendant has decided not to call any witness for the assessment of damages.

On 25.5.2010 the Senior Assistant Registrar had awarded a nominal damages in the sum of RM1,000.00.

On 31.5.2010 the Plaintiff filed an appeal against the decision of the Senior Assistant Registrar.

The Law

Damages for breach of contract is to place the party who suffers by the breach in the position it would have been if the contract was performed.

The measure of damages following a breach of contract is governed by Section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950 which reads as follows:

“74. (1) When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by the breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damages caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it.”

In the case of Akitek Tenggara Sdn Bhd v Mid Valley City Sdn Bhd [2007] 5 MLJ 697, the Federal Court stated the law for breach of contract as follows:

“…The measure of damages following a breach of contract is governed by s 74 of the Contracts Act 1950 which reads as follows:

(1) When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by the breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damages caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it.”

In Toeh Kee Keong v Tambun Mining Co Ltd [1968] 1 MLJ 39 it was held that s 74 is the statutory enunciation of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Exch 341. The principle underlying the award of damages is that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, as far as money can do it, to be placed in the same position with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed. In Houweling Nurseries v Governor and Company of Adventures of England Trading Into Hudson’s Bay [1984] 13 DLR (4^th) (BCCA) it was observed that in some cases the exercise wll be analogous to that of assessing damages for future losses arising from a tortuous act…”

In Birendra Nath Dhar v Food Corporation of India AIR 1978 Cal 362 there was a breach of a contract for a specified period for the provisions of services. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for the unexpired period. …”

Whenever there is a breach of contract by the defendant but the plaintiff suffers no actual loss or fails to sufficiently prove such loss, the plaintiff is generally entitled to nominal damages. This stems from the principle that the violation of a right at common law entitles the plaintiff to damages without proof of special loss.

Nominal damages thus protects a plaintiff’s legal right and recognizes that it has been infringed. In The Owners of The Steamship “Mediana” v The Owners, Master And Crew of The Lightship “Comet”[1900] AC 113 Lord Halsbury LC stated:

“Essentially, nominal damages affirm that there has been an infraction of a legal right…though it gives you no right to any real damages at all, yet [it] gives you a right to the verdict or judgment because your right has been infringed.”

Nominal damages usually consists of a small sum. In the case of Hilbourne v Tan Tiang Quee [1972] 2 MLJ 94, the defendant-solicitor breached his duty to the plaintiff-claimant when he failed to inform the latter of the completion date for the purchase of a piece of land. The Plaintiff sued the defendant for the loss of opportunity to purchase the land. On the facts, the Court of Appeal recognized that there was a breach of contract. However, as the plaintiff did not suffer any pecuniary loss, the court only awarded nominal damages of $10.

In the other decided case of Bee Wah Plastic Factory Sdn Bhd v Francis Soh Kai Shuen (b/s Shatin Marketing & General Agencies) [1997] 4 MLJ 545, although the respondent had proved the appellant’s failure to supply the plastic gum bottles, there was insufficient proof regarding the loss profits. Thus, the High Court reduced the magistrate court’s award of RM20,982.00 to RM2,000.00 as fair and reasonable nominal damages.

In Letrik Bandar Hup Heng Sdn Bhd v Wong Sai Hong [2002] 5 MLJ 247, the Sessions Court’s award of RM27,217.86 was set aside and nominal damages of RM10 was awarded.

From these cases, it is also seen that there is no standard monetary figure for nominal damages although it is usual to find RM10 nominal damages award.

The Grounds of the Judgment

The Plaintiff’s claims for damages which appears from the Witness Statement of SP1 Sheikh Dato’ Seri Mohamad Toufic Al Ozeir are the following:-

a) Loss in share value RM200,000.00

b) Losses in prospective gains RM1,000,000.00.

c) Budget for setting up the office

of JV Company for the first 6 months

i) Budgeted for office Furniture

and equipment including

telephone line RM6,000.00

ii) Budgeted for operation

including secretary, driver,

telecommunications, faxes,

electricity etc RM27,000.00

RM33,000.00

d) Administrative budget for first

6 months RM50,000.00

e) Petty cash for 6 months at

RM5,000.00 per month RM30,000.00

f) Legal cost and costs to collect

money from 1^st Defendant through

a third party RM500,000.00

Total RM1,813,000.00

The items of claims of the Plaintiff:

a) Loss of share value

In paragraph 13 of the Statement of Claim the Plaintiff had pleaded that the Plaintiff had suffered damages in losses in the value of its shares in JV company, but had not claimed under this item in the prayers under paragraph 15 of the Statement of Claim.

SP1 has given evidence that it has been agreed by the parties who entered into the JV Agreement that the Plaintiff was entitled to 200,000 units of shares which were at the value of RM1.00 each so the 1^st Defendant has to pay RM200,000.00 for the damages of losses of share value (At page 17 and 18 of the Enclosure 21).

The Learned Judge Justice Dato’ Rohana Yusuf had made a finding of fact that the Defendant has clearly in breach of the joint Venture Agreement by not making payment for the intial capital which resulted in the JV Company’s objectives fail due to lack of fund (At page 39 of the CBD).

The Learned Judge also found as a fact that the Plaintiff did suffer losses and expenses in setting up of the JV Company but the alleged loss of share worth is merely speculative in nature. The learned Judge further reiterated that the Plaintiff has to prove actual damages suffered as a result of the failure of the breach of the Defendants.

This Court, in assessing the damages, is bound by the decision of the learned Judge which reiterated that the Plaintiff has to prove actual damages suffered as a result of the failure of the breach of the Defendants.

The Plaintiff’s losses of the shares value were on a speculative basis upon a financial action that does not promise safety of the initial investment along with the return of the principal sum. The speculation is, however, an incomplete information of the projectile path that conjectures on the fluctuation of booming and depression epochs. The phenomenon is, therefore, hypothetical, in which the observable processes are rather stochastic than deterministic.

As such this claim is not allowed since it is neither pleaded in the prayers in the Statement of Claim nor it is proved by the Plaintiff.

b) Losses in prospective gains

The Plaintiff had pleaded that the Plaintiff had suffered losses in profits in paragraph 14 of the Statement of Claim and in paragraph 15(b) of the same had prayed for general damages for loss of profits in the sum of RM1 million.

In order to prove this type of losses, SP1 has stated that the losses of prospective gains comprised of profits from the share value if the JV company is in operation and make profits and also the profits from the future construction and construction management contracts with the Government of Malaysia by tendering the following documents:

i) Letter dated 21.5.1996 addressed to Menteri Besar of Pahang for an offer to develop the water resources of the state and a letter dated 19.6.1996 from Unit Perancang Ekonomi Negeri Pahang which stated that the proposed provatisation of water resources is still under consideration (Page 43, 44, 46 and 47 of CBD).

ii) Letter dated 14.7.1996 to Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister Department soliciting for work (Page 60 CBD).

iii) Letter dated 16.7.1996 to a company known as Perspec Prime (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd offers for cooperation with them in all fields and discipline of engineering and construction management (Page 61-66 CBD).

iv) Letter dated 22.7.1996 to a company known as Perspec Prime Magma Sdn Bhd offering co-operation with them in the South Kelang, Valley Expressway (SKVE) Project. Perspec replied by their letter dated 12.8.1996 stating that they have commissioned Rankill Bersekutu for engineering design (Page 67-69 CBD).

SP1 in his evidence states that if the JV company was able to take off, the share value could go up to RM5.00 per share. Again, this Court is bound by the decision of the learned Judge that the alleged loss of share worth is merely speculative in nature. Further, the evidence given by SP1 is really speculative as SP1 was not a stock trading expert and the Plaintiff also did not call a stock analyst to corroborate on how the futures share markets fluctuate with respect to the price-earnings ratio (P/E) and supply/demand equilibrium to be valued for the JV company which operated for only 6 months. Therefore, the data accumulated to forecast stock value fluctuation and trajectory movement is incomplete and weak.

For the losses of making profits from the future contract, the Plaintiff has failed to prove that it, in fact, was successful in obtaining any job or contract for the JV company.

Hence this claim should not be allowed for the above reasons.

c) Budget for office furniture, equipment and telephone and Budget for operations

According to Concise Oxford English Dictionary Eleventh Edition, Revised 2006, the word budget is defined as an estimate of income and expenditure for a set period of time or the amount of money needed or available for a purpose.

The sum of RM6,000.00 was budgeted for office furniture, equipment and telephone. Further, the sum of RM27,000.00 was for operations budget which includes claim for secretary, driver, telecommunications, faxes, electricity etc.

The Plaintiff states that it was entitled to the claim since the 1^st Defendant has agreed for the budget in the meeting (Page 49 of CBD).

However it is doubtful on whether the money have been spent for purchasing the office furniture, equipment and telephone as no invoices, bills and receipts whatsoever produced by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff also did not produce any documentary evidences in order to show that the secretary and the driver were employed. The same goes for the telephone/fax bills and electricity bills. No company accounts books or ledgers produced.

The other reasons are these claims were not pleaded by the Plaintiff in the Statement of Claim and that the items of these claims are special damages which should be specifically proven.

This is best supported with the case of Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 1 CLJ 1113 where the Supreme Court held that the trial of a suit shouldbe confined to the pleas on which the parties are at variance. As the High Court had made decision on an issue which was not raised by the parties in their pleadings the appeal in this case has been allowed and the order of the learned judge dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim was set aside.

The Court is of the view that these claims should not be allowed.

d) Administrative Budget for first six months

The Plaintiff claimed for the administrative budget for the sum of RM50,000.00 which according to SP1 has been incurred by him. The Plaintiff only produced a copy of fax dated 5.2.1997 in regards to this claim (Page 105 CBD).

If the JV company is really operated for six months at very least it should have kept the accounting records, books, ledger cards etc for the companys’ expenses. However none of these were produced.

Further, this claim is special damages which according to the principles of law, it should be specifically proven.

The claim is not allowed as it has not been proven.

e) Petty cash for 6 months

The Plaintiff claimed for the sum of RM5,000.00 per month and for the six months the petty cash claimed was for RM30,000.00.

SP1 has said that this claim should be allowed since it was agreed by the 1^st Defendant in the meeting conducted on 26^th June 1996 (Page 54-55 CBD).

Mere agreement by 1^st Defendant which according to the Plaintiff constituted as consent could not be regarded as the Plaintiff’s entitlement for the petty cash. The Plaintiff still need to prove that the sum of RM5,000.00 was the amount needed and spent for the daily management of the JV company.

The Courtis in the opinion that this claim is one of the special damages or quatified claim.

Thus, the Plaintiff has failed to prove the actual damages for this claim, therefore the claim is not allowed.

f) Legal costs and costs to collect the money from the 1^st Defendant

The claim for legal costs and costs to collect the money from the 1^st Defendant is in the sum of RM500,000.00. SP1 has stated that the Plaintiff has to obtain the services of a third party for the collection of money from the 1^st Defendant which is located at overseas.

The Court is in the opinion that the legal costs should be determined by way of taxation. Further, no sum should be allowed for collection of money through a third party because this not damages incurred by the Plaintiff which is virtually impossible to be assessed if no evidence adduced. This is also a future claim which yet to be proven.

In this case, the Plaintiff would have mitigated its losses if it has taken steps to terminate the JV Agreement upon the failure of the 1^st Defendant to make payment in the sum of RM500,000.00 for the intial capital for the JV company.

For the completeness of this judgment, I have to put down that the Court has not considered the submissions put forward by the Defendants’ counsels about the issue that the JV company was not registered under the Registration of Engineers Act 1967 since this issue has been dealt at length and dismissed by the learned trial Judge.

Applying the above principles of law, the Court decided that the Plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages in the sum of RM1,000.00 because the Plaintiff has proved that the 1^st Defendant has breached the JV Agreement by failure to pay RM500,000.00 as initial capital for the JV company.

AINY SUHAILAH BINTI YUNUS

Senior Assistant Registrar

The Commercial Division 3

May 25, 2010

Categories: Case Law Studies, Cyber Forensics & Investigations, Art of Counter-CyberForensics, Expert Witness, Chain of Custody, Chain of Evidence, Intellectual Properties & Copyrights, Expert Evidence, Credibility of Expert Witness, Gazetted Expert Witness, Natural Justice, Breach of Natural Justice, True Definition of Natural Justice, Law of Tort, Damages, Scientific Evidence and Law, FOREX THEORY, Gaussian and Non-Gaussian, Measures of Central Tendency, Measures of Dispersion, Measures of Determinism, Measures of Stochasticity, Qualitative Analysis, Quantitative Analysis, Chaos Theory, Fluid Dynamics, Turbulence, Number Theory, Data Analyses, Neural Fuzzy, Fuzzy Sets, Mathematical Theory of Nothing, Null Set Theory, Fractal Market Analysis, Failure of Gaussian Hypothesis, Fractal Time Series, Fractal Market Hypothesis, The Hurst Processes, Noisy Chaos vs R/S Analysis, Forensics Standards, The Frye Test, The Williams Departure, The Jacobetz Refinement, The Kelly-Frye Test, The Daubert Test, The Dyas Test, The Post-Daubert Decisions, The Kumho Gloss, The Non-linear Algorithms, Game Theory, Mathematical Chess Strategies, Lyapunov Exponent, Measures of Fuzziness, Laminar Flow, Measures of Nothingness

My Written Submission On 4th November, 2010 (At the close of prosecution case for prima facie) – KES TANGKAP NO: 2-83-7119-2009: PP v MOHAMAD IZAHAM BIN MOHAMED YATIM

November 9, 2010 The Mathematical Theory of Nothing 392 comments

DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR

DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA

KES TANGKAP NO: 2-83-7119-2009

ANTARA

PENDAKWA RAYA

DAN

MOHAMAD IZAHAM BIN MOHAMED YATIM

HUJAHAN BERTULIS PIHAK PEMBELAAN

Dengan izin Tuan Majistret,

1. Ini adalah hujahan bertulis pihak pembelaan di akhir kes pendakwaan.

LATARBELAKANG KES:

2. Tertuduh dihadapkan dengan pertuduhan seperti berikut:

“Bahawa kamu pada 13/07/09 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat ******************************, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah didapati memiliki sebanyak 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK yang di bawah milikan kamu. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 5(2) akta yang sama”.

3. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil 7 orang saksi untuk membuktikan kes pendakwaan iaitu:

3.1 SP-1 iaitu Insp. Mohd Razif b. Mohd Zaid I/16542

3.2 SP-2 iaitu Zanariah binti Ibrahim

3.3 SP-3 iaitu Mohanaraj Naidi Subbiah

3.4 SP-4 iaitu Mohamad Zamri bin Roslan

3.5 SP-5 iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah I/17525

3.6 SP-6 iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus

3.7 SP-7 iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira binti Zakaria

4. Ekshibit-ekshibit yang telah ditanda adalah seperti berikut:-

4.1 P-1 – Borang Serah Menyerah (Borang D6)

4.2 P2(a), (b), (c), (d) – (n) – 7 DVC, 3 VCD, 2 Cd, 1 thumb drive dan hard disc

4.3 P3(a – m) – 13 keping DVD

4.4 P9 – Copy SP2

4.5 P11 – Quotation Baru

4.6 P12 – Surat Lawyer 1 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

4.7 P13 – Surat Lawyer 3 mohon hak penjagaan anak

4.8 P14 – Surat Lawyer 7

4.9 P15 – Surat Lawyer 7A2 contoh isteri derhaka yang nyata

4.10 P16-(dalam softcopy)Surat lawyer 7A2 dokumen

4.11 P17-(softcopy) surat lawyer 8 dokumen

4.12 P18 – Surat Lawyer 8 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

4.13 P19 – yearfocal – terdapat nama Saliza binti Ramli

4.14 P20 – S6301428.jpg

4.15 P21-S6301429.jpg

4.16 P22-S6301430.jpg

4.17 P23-S6301431.jpg

4.18 P24-S6301432.jpg

4.19 P25-S6301433.jpg

4.20 P26-S6301434.jpg

4.21 P27-S6301435.jpg

4.22 P28-S6301436.jpg

4.23 P29-S6301437.jpg

4.24 P30-S6301438.jpg

4.25 P31- S6301439.jpg

4.26 P32- S6301440.jpg

4.27 P33- S6301441.jpg

4.28 P34 – Dang Wangi Report D29694/2009

4.29 P35 – Laporan Analisa

4.30 P36 – Copy SP2

4.31 P37-Borang Senarai Geledah

HUJAHAN PIHAK PEMBELAAN

5. Di dalam kes ini pihak Pendakwaan perlu membuktikan setiap intipati (‘ingredients’) pertuduhan berkaitan seksyen 5(1) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh iaitu; (1) bahawa Tertuduh mempunyai milikan ekslusif pada setiap masa yang material iaitu pada 13-7-2009 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat 7-3-5 Jalan 2/38B, Taman SPPK Segambut, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK; dan (2) 106 klip video tersebut adalah lucah.

Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 bahawa (di mukasurat 504 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

(a) the accused was in exclusive possession at the material time, ie, 3p.m. on 18 November 2002 of the 18 obscene film’s in the form of VCD; and

(b) that the 18 film’s are of obscene material.”

“[5] Bagi membuktikan satu kes prima facie dibawah s. 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah membuktikan bahawa:

(a) Responden mempunyai milikan terhadap VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas;

(b) tiada sebarang keraguan tentang identiti barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah; dan

(c) kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”).”

“The Charge

[8] The charge preferred against the respondent under s. 5(1) of the 2002 Act requires proof of two main ingredients ie, that:

(i) the respondent at the material time was in possession of the 65 obscene films in the form of DVD; and

(ii) that the 65 films (DVDs) are obscene.”

Isu Milikan Eksklusif Pada Setiap Masa Yang Material

6. Di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material telah dibuktikan dengan cara berikut, iaitu:

“Intipati (a)

[6] Dihadapan Majistret, pihak pembelaan berhujah bahawa gerai menjual VCD dan DVD lucah tersebut berada di tempat laluan orang awam dan ada kemungkinan bahawa barang-barang kes berkenaan dimiliki oleh orang lain. Tiada siasatan dibuat oleh pihak pendakwaan terhadap pendaftaran perniagaan gerai tersebut bagi menyiasat siapa pemilik gerai dan pihak pembelaan juga berhujah bahawa tiada seorang pelanggan pun ditangkap semasa serbuan.

[7] Berdasarkan keterangan dari pemerhatian yang dibuat oleh anggota-anggota serbuan selama lebih kurang sepuluh minit, didapati hanya responden sahaja yang berada di gerai tersebut dan beliau sendiri melayan pelanggan. Pemerhatian dibuat dengan jarak lebih kurang 30 meter dari gerai tersebut yang terletak betul-betul di hadapan restoran. Walaupun VCD dan DVD tersebut tidak berada dalam milikan fizikal responden, tetapi jelas dari keterangan saksi-saksi, OKT berada di gerai tersebut sepanjang masa pemerhatian dan beliau jugalah yang melayan pelanggan.

[8] Puan Majistret adalah betul apabila beliau memutuskan bahawa memandangkan gerai menjual VCD dan DVD itu adalah gerai di kaki lima (“gerai haram”), tentulah ia tidak didaftarkan. Sekiranya pihak pendakwaan membuat carian perniagaan sekalipun, usaha mereka akan menjadi sia-sia. Tentang isu ketiadaan seorang pelanggan pun ditangkap ataupun dipanggil untuk siasatan, ia adalah tidak perlu memandangkan tuduhan ke atas responden ialah terhadap kesalahan memiliki VCD dan DVD lucah, dan bukannya kesalahan menjual VCD dan DVD lucah. Oleh itu, pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa responden mempunyai milikan terhadap VCD-VCD dan DVD-DVD lucah berkenaan.”

7. Apa yang boleh difahamkan daripada kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, hanya si tertuduh berada di gerai haram tersebut sepanjang masa dan si tertuduh kelihatan melayan pelanggan dan ketika serbuan dibuat sewaktu si tertuduh berada di gerai haram tersebut, terdapat VCD dan DVD yang dikatakan lucah di gerai haram tersebut. Di peringkat pendakwaan ini, untuk membuktikan intipati ini, pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan dan pemunyaan sebenar premis tersebut dan DVD tersebut, cukup sekadar membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif. Pemilikan eksklusif tidak sama dengan pemilikan sebenar atau pemilikan fizikal.

8. Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material telah dibuktikan dengan cara berikut, iaitu:

[14] Therefore the learned magistrate had erred in holding that the element of possession was not proved and in invoking the adverse presumption.”

9. Apa yang boleh difahamkan dari kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, ketika serbuan dibuat, si tertuduh berada keseorangan dan sedang menjaga kaunter di dalam premis yang diserbu tersebut, dan DVD yang dikatakan lucah tersebut dijumpai di bawah kaunter tersebut. Di peringkat pendakwaan ini, untuk membuktikan intipati ini, pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan dan pemunyaan sebenar premis tersebut dan DVD tersebut, cukup sekadar membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif. Pemilikan eksklusif tidak sama dengan pemilikan sebenar atau pemilikan fizikal.

10. Menggunapakai ketiga-tiga kes di atas di dalam kes kita pada hari ini, untuk membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material, Tertuduh mestilah berada pada 13-7-2009 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di 7-3-5, Jalan 2/38B, Taman Segambut, SPPK, 50200 Kuala Lumpur, yang dikatakan terdapat bahan yang dikatakan lucah di sisi undang-undang tersebut.

11. Di dalam kes kita pada hari ini, jika dilihat pada Borang Senarai Geledah yang mesti diisi di tempat dan masa pemeriksaan, ianya merujuk kepada No. Repot 5070/09 Balai Jalan Patani, tempat/bangunan yang diperiksa ialah 7-3-5, Jalan 2/38B, Taman Segambut, SPPK, 50200 Kuala Lumpur (Premis tersebut), nama penghuni atau sesiapa yang hadir iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus (Penghuni tersebut), nama pegawai polis yang hadir semasa pemeriksaan iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal, Insp Siti Mazira bt Zakaria dan D/Kpl Nora (Pegawai Polis tersebut), pada tarikh 13-7-2009 dan masa yang tidak disebut (Tarikh dan Masa tersebut), barang yang dijumpai adalah seperti yang tertera di dalam Borang Senarai Geledah tersebut. Ini adalah terkandung di dalam Borang Geledah yang diberikan kepada penama pada 13.7.2009. Walaubagaimanapun Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010 adalah berbeza kerana ada masa dicatatkan. Pihak Pembelaan telah membangkitkan bantahan berkenaan perbezaan di antara Borang Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009 dan Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010.

12. Bagi membuktikan elemen milikan, pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi-saksi SP1, SP2, SP4 dan SP6.

13. Di dalam kes ini Tertuduh telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap setiap dokumen lain yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1 dan dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’ (Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21”, “P-22, “ P-23”, “P-24” P-25”, “P-26”, “P-27”, “P-28”, “P-29”, “P-30”, “P-31”, “P-32” dan “P-33” mukasurat 16,17 Nota Keterangan) yang tiada kaitan langsung dengan pertuduhan dan tidak termasuk di dalam lingkungan definisi “filem” sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002.

14. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil semula SP1 untuk membuktikan fakta bahawa komputer yang digunakan oleh SP1 untuk mencetak salinan dokumen-dokumen cetakan komputer adalah di dalam kawalan dan jagaan beliau. Walaubagaimanapun, ianya tetap memudaratkan kes pendakwaan kerana semasa pemeriksaan balas SP1 memberi keterangan bahawa tiada buku log (buku daftar akitiviti seliaan peralatan computer forensic) dan tiada sijil mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 dikemukakan untuk menunjukkan aktiviti-aktiviti yang dilakukan oleh SP1 melalui penggunaan komputer di pejabat beliau. Ini menyebabkan terputusnya rantaian bukti dan rantaian kawalan barang bukti.

15. Pihak Pembelaan bersandarkan kepada kes Pendakwa Raya v. Goh Hoe Cheong [2006] MLJU 0468 kes Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 0474 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana K N Segara J membuat keputusan seperti berikut:

“There was no witness from MAS and/or the authority managing KLIA called by the prosecution to prove the aspect of physical checking-in of the bags of passengers on flight MH020, particularly, the purported check-in of bags P6 and P23 by the 1^st and 2^nd accused, as well as the bag of Seok Hann(SP10). Therefore, the computer generated documents, namely, the baggage tags P6A, P23A and the respective baggage claim tags P16A and P31A, cannot be admitted in evidence unless S 90A Evidence Act, 1950 is complied with by the prosecution. No certificate was tendered to the Court signed by a person who either before or after the production of the documents by the computer was responsible for the management of the operation of that computer, or for the conduct of the activities for which that computer was used. In the circumstances I hold that P6A, P23A, P16A and P31A are inadmissible in evidence.”

16. Di dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 6 MLJ 678, kes Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 694,695 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan), Vincent Ng J telah memutuskan bahawa sijil diperlukan untuk pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer.

17. Di dalam kes ini pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil SP2 yang mengemukakan satu salinan dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan (Ekshibit “P-9” mukasurat 34 dan 35 Nota Keterangan). Pihak Pembelaan telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap pengemukaan salinan dokumen tersebut kerana tiada kaitan dengan pertuduhan dan mengikut keterangan SP2 semasa pemeriksaan balas, dokumen asal telah dimusnahkan kerana polisi syarikat. Mustahil jika arahan ketua syarikat tersebut untuk melupuskan semua dokumen dan salinan yang berkaitan tetapi masih terdapat satu salinan yang tersimpan yang boleh digunakan untuk perbicaraan ini. Pihak Timbalan Pendakwaraya hanya bergantung kepada Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 sebagai peruntukan untuk penerimaan keterangan sekunder sebagai bukti tanpa membuktikan elemen-elemen kritikal yang dengan berkaitan pemusnahan dokumen asal dan tidak memanggil ketua SP2 yang mempunyai kuasa mengeluarkan arahan pemusnahan untuk memusnahkan dokumen asal dan tiada keterangan mengenai kaedah yang digunakan untuk memusnahkan dokumen asal tersebut. Saksi-saksi yang berkaitan dengan proses pemusnahan juga tidak dipanggil berserta dengan mesin yang digunakan untuk memusnahkan dokumen tersebut tidak dibawa ke mahkamah. Di samping itu SP2 tidak mempunyai kepakaran tulisan tangan dan tandatangan yang digazzettekan oleh kerajaan dan sudah pastinya bukan seorang pakar tandatangan untuk mengenalpasti tandatangan yang terdapat di atas salinan dokumen tersebut. Sekiranya perbandingan dibuat dengan dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan di Mahkamah melalui SP1 terdapat perbezaan yang ketara di mana dokumen yang ditender di Mahkamah tiada tandatangan mana-mana pihak dan kandungan juga berbeza. SP2 juga mendakwa salinan yang dikemukakan juga merupakan dokumen asal yang dikemukan oleh Tertuduh.

18. Di dalam kes Kum Wah Sdn Bhd v. RHB Bank Bhd [2009] 9 MLJ 490 kes Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 498 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan), di mana Azian J memutuskan bahawa keterangan seorang pakar tandatangan yang tidak digazettekan mengikut undang-undang tidak boleh diterima:

“Based on their qualifications and experiences, I am more inclined to accept that PW4 is more qualified to give evidence in respect of whether the signatures on Exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and ‘D6’ are forgery. DW6 may have been the director general of the Malaysian Chemistry Department but he was never gazette as a document examiner in the government service. He said ‘I am not a document examiner. I have never produced a technical report. Yes, a technical report can only be produced by a gazetted document examiner. As such I am of the considered opinion that PW4 is more qualified and experienced to give testimony in respect of signatures on the three documents mentioned.”

19. Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 perlu dibaca bersama dengan Seksyen 45 untuk keterangan pakar diambil untuk pengesahan tandatangan di atas dokumen tersebut.

20. Dengan ini adalah dihujahkan bahawa salinan Ekshibit “P-9” yang ditender melalui SP2 tidak boleh diterima masuk sebagai dokumen ekshibit pendakwaan kerana tidak dibawa masuk melalui pembuatnya.

21. Ini jelas bertentangan dengan Seksyen 90 dibaca bersama Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memperuntukkan bahawa apabila pembuat dokumen tidak dipanggil, satu sijil pengesahan perlu dikeluarkan dan tiada sebarang tindakan diambil oleh pihak pendakwaan untuk mematuhi kehendak-kehendak peruntukan-peruntukan undang-undang di atas.

22. Untuk kes-kes jenayah, undang-undang keterangan terbaik (‘the best evidence rule’) adalah keterangan primer dan tiada Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 digunapakai bagi kes-kes jenayah. Oleh sebab itu Tertuduh ingin menyokong hujahan dengan prinsip yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Wong Choon Mei & Anor V. Dr. Kuldeep Singh & Anor [1985] 2 MLJ 373 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 376 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan sekiranya Seksyen 65 (1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 hendak digunapakai oleh mana-mana pihak, pihak tersebut telah mengambil semua langkah untuk mencari dokumen asal dan sekiranya dokumen asal telah musnah atau hilang, orang yang bertanggungjawab menjaga dokumen asal tersebut perlu mengesahkan fakta mengenai kemusnahan atau kehilangan dokumen asal tersebut.

Seah SCJ memutuskan seperti berikut:

“In short, before secondary evidence could be received the condition laid down in section 65(1)(c) viz. the original (the 4 X-rays) has been destroyed or lost, must be satisfactorily proved by admissible evidence, like calling the officer in charge of the X-ray Record Office. If the officer was not available then his absence should eb properly accounted for. In my opinion, it is highly undesirable to allow the 1st respondent, who was being sued by the appellant and who might be regarded as an interested party, to give hearsay, evidence that the 4 X-Rays had been lost or misplaced. His testimony might be treated as tainted. A fortitori, it might even be rejected on the ground of hearsay. This strict rule was reiterated by Lord Tenterden in Vincent v Cole 173 ER 1151:

“I have always acted (perhaps more so than other judges) most strictly on the rule; that what is in writing shall only be proved by the writing itself. My experience has taught me the extreme danger of relying on the recollection of witnesses, however, honest, as to the contents of a written instrument; they may be so easily mistaken that I think the purposes of justice require the strict enforcement of the rule”.

23. Ekshibit “P-9” yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan melalui SP2 hanya salinan fotostat, bukan cetakan komputer dan SP2 bukan pembuat dokumen tersebut yang begitu diragui kebolehterimaannya sebagai ekshibit. Walaubagaimanapun salinan Ekshibit “P-9” tersebut diterima sebagai eksibit oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

24. Salinan Ekshibit “P-9” yang dikemukakan oleh SP2 tidak boleh diterima sebagai keterangan dokumentar oleh Mahkamah berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang tersebut di atas.

25. SP5 telah mengesahkan bahawa beliau dan anggota polis yang dua lagi memasuki tempat kejadian tanpa satu waran yang sah di sisi undang-undang yang sudah tentu menimbulkan kacau ganggu terhadap penghuni premis tersebut (muka surat 48 Nota Keterangan).

26. Saksi pendakwaan SP5 memberi keterangan bahawa Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada tarikh rampasan barang kes dibuat iaitu pada 13.7.2009(muksurat 48 Nota Keterangan). SP5 menyatakan beliau hanya nampak seorang wanita dan dua orang kanak-kanak. Wanita yang dikatakan oleh SP5 tidak dicamkan di Mahkamah (mukasurat 46 dan 47 Nota Keterangan). SP5 semasa pemeriksaan balas turut menyatakan bahawa cakera keras (‘hard disc’) dipegang oleh Pegawai Penyiasat dari rak buku dan ada banyak buku. SP5 tidak tahu warna rak buku tersebut, di mana kedudukan rak buku, di mana kedudukan ‘hard disc’ pada rak buku tersebut dan bilangan rak pada rak buku tersebut (mukasurat 49 Nota Keterangan). Tiada gambar diambil dan ditunjuk kepada SP5 bagi membuktikan tempat barang rampasan ditemui (dinafikan oleh pembelaan). SP5 juga mengesahkan semasa pemeriksaan utama bahawa cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tidak berada di dalam milikan, jagaan dan kawalan Tertuduh pada masa rampasan dibuat kerana Tertuduh tidak berada di tempat kejadian.

27. Di dalam kes ini Tertuduh tidak pernah melihat cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang didakwa oleh pihak Pendakwaan dari tempat kejadian dari 13.7.2009 hingga ke saat ini.

28. Berasaskan keterangan SP5 dan SP7, pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut adalah berada di dalam milikan, jagaan dan kawalan Tertuduh. Di atas keterangan ini sahaja terdapat keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan dan Tertuduh boleh dilepaskan berasaskan alasan ini.

29. Tiada definisi untuk ‘milikan’ di dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC di dalam kes Pendakwaraya lawan Sim, Odita, Muhammad Architects Sdn Bhd [2008] 3 CLJ 623 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah perlu merujuk kepada definisi untuk milikan di dalam kes-kes yang telah diputuskan. Di dalam kes ini responden telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan milikan secara fizikal perisian yang melanggar hakcipta oleh responden.

Di dalam kes tersebut Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC memutuskan seperti berikut:

30. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah lanjut mengenai isu ini di mana daripada Nota Keterangan tersebut, amat jelas saksi awam SP4 mengesahkan tiada surat-surat yang ditunjuk oleh pihak pendakwaan diterima oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Pulau Pinang (Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18, P19 dan muka surat 42, 43, 44 dan 45 Nota Keterangan) untuk membuktikan surat-surat yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1.

31. Fakta ini seterusnya telah disahkan oleh saksi pendakwaan ketujuh iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat bahawa Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18 dan P19 (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010) tiada di dalam rekod Mahkamah Syariah. Oleh yang demikian Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18 dan P19 tidak seharusnya diterima sebagai ekshibit kerana tiada fakta mengesahkan kewujudan ekshibit-ekshibit tersebut.

32. Pihak Pembelaan ingin berhujah bahawa pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” amat jelas telah mencabul hak ‘privacy’ dan ‘privillege’ Tertuduh dan keluarga sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Artikel 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” adalah tanpa sebarang kebenaran daripada pembuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut dan tidak relevan kepada pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh.

33. Pihak Pendakwaan turut memanggil SP6 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” yang kononnya mengikut pihak Pendakwaan diekstrak dari cakera keras tersebut. Walaubagaimanapun SP6 menggunapakai peruntukan undang-undang Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 kerana beliau mempunyai ‘privilege’ ke atas gambar-gambar berbentuk perlakuan tersebut yang merupakan satu bentuk komunikasi di antara Tertuduh dan SP6. Mahkamah sendiri telah turut memutuskan bahawa ekshibit “P-20” hingga “P-33” adalah dokumen-dokumen yang dilindungi di bawah privilege di bawah Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan oleh yang demikian tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti di Mahkamah (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010). Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

34. Pihak Pembelaan bersandarkan satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Mustapha Hussain J di dalam Palldas a/l Arumugam v Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 CLJ 661, 665 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) menyatakan bahawa perlakuan juga satu bentuk komunikasi di antara isteri dan Tertuduh.

35. Di dalam kes Public Prosecutor lawan Abdul Majid [1994] 3 MLJ 457 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 6 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan)James Foong J telah memutuskan bahawa isteri tertuduh boleh dipaksa memberi keterangan kecuali komunikasi yang dibuat oleh tertuduh kepada beliau melainkan jika keizinan tertuduh diperolehi seperti yang diperlukan di bawah S122 Akta itu.

36. Di samping itu Pemohon ingin menyatakan bahawa pengemukaan “P21” hingga “P33” tersebut telah mencabul hak ‘privacy’ Pemohon dan keluarga Pemohon sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Artikel 10 dan 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

37. Tertuduh berhujah bahawa milikan tidak boleh dibuktikan melalui keterangan persekitaran (‘circumstantial evidence’) iaitu dengan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, “P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21” hingga “P33” yang merupakan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan hanya kerana dokumen-dokumen tersebut didakwa terdapat di dalam cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh).

38. SP5 iaitu pegawai yang terlibat semasa geledah dan SP7 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat sendiri mengesahkan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Oleh yang demikian milikan secara fizikal tidak dibuktikan langsung (rakaman video prosiding perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).

39. Adalah dihujahkan juga bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan premis tempat kejadian kerana tiada gambar-gambar tempat kejadian dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan. Di samping itu, tiada rajah kasar disediakan oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7). Walaupun pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil SP3 untuk memberi keterangan tetapi gagal memberi lokasi tempat kejadian yang tepat dan tempat kejadian tidak dikenalpasti (mukasurat 40 Nota Keterangan). Selain itu premis tempat kejadian adalah rumah sewa yang turut berada di dalam kawalan SP3 yang sudah tentu mempunyai akses kepada premis tersebut. Oleh yang demikian bukan Tertuduh sahaja ada akses kepada premis tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh). Oleh yang demikian tempat kejadian tidak dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan.

SP3 di dalam pemeriksaan balas hanya memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

C : How many unit?

J : I’m not sure.

40. Sekali lagi pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada kes Pendakwa Raya v. Goh Hoe Cheong [2006] MLJU 0468 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 0471 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan)di mana K N Segara J memutuskan bahawa apabila tiada gambar dan pelan kasar tempat tertuduh ditahan di ‘baggage assembly area” maka terdapat keraguan di dalam kes pendakwaan.

41. Di antara ketiga-tiga Pegawai Polis tersebut yang hadir untuk pemeriksaan di Bangunan tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut, Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah telah dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai SP5 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai penggeledahan tersebut.

42. SP5 ketika pemeriksaan utama telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 46 – 47 Nota Keterangan) bahawa:

43. SP5 ketika pemeriksaan balas telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 47 – 49 Nota Keterangan) bahawa, antaranya:

“Saya diminta bantuan daripada Insp. Mazira yang menyiasat bersabit laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/09.”

“Saya hanya dimaklumkan untuk bantuan tentang bersabit kes itu.”

“Saya diminta untuk beri bantuan pemeriksaan dan rampasan oleh Insp. Kamarudin kepada Insp. Siti Mazira bersabit Patani Report.”

“Pada 13-7-2009 masuk jam 6.30 petang.”

“Tak nampak si tertuduh masa itu di kawasan itu.”

“Semasa masuk buat pemeriksaan Insp. Mazira telah perkenalkan diri dengan tunjukkan kad kuasa polis, waran tiada.”

“Masa masuk dalam rumah, nampak satu wanita dan 2 orang kanak-kanak.”

“Saya membantu Insp. Mazira untuk membuat pemeriksaan rumah.”

44. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa melalui Borang Senarai Geledah dan keterangan SP5, dapat disimpulkan bahawa Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tiada di dalam Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut pada jam 6.30 petang.

45. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa tiada keterangan daripada SP5 mengenai masa di dalam Borang Senarai Geledah tidak dimasukkan.

46. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa masa di dalam kertas pertuduhan dan di dalam keterangan SP5 tidak sama. Tiada penerangan mengenainya daripada SP5. Begitu juga tiada penerangan mengenainya daripada SP7.

47. SP6 telah dipanggil untuk pemeriksaan utama hanya disuruh membaca sehelai kertas yang didakwa sebagai borang geledah oleh pihak pendakwaan. Tiada pengecaman yang dibuat dengan SP6 berkenaan ketiga-tiga anggota polis yang datang ke premis tersebut pada 13.7.2009.

48. SP7 telah dipanggil untuk pemeriksaan utama oleh DPP menyatakan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian.

49. Ada anggota polis lain yang memasuki premis tersebut pada masa material tetapi tidak dipanggil kerana berdasarkan keterangan SP5 semasa pemeriksaan utama:

Isu Kaedah Analisis Forensik Komputer (SP1)

50. Saksi pakar SP1 dipertikaikan oleh pihak Pembelaan berdasarkan sebab-sebab berikut:

e. Daripada Nota Keterangan tersebut, tiada keterangan daripada SP1 yang menunjukkan kelayakan beliau dan samada beliau pernah memberi keterangan di mahkamah dan mahkamah menerima keterangan beliau.

EnCase Certified Examiner (EnCE) Certification

Guidance Software, the creator of EnCase, sponsors the EnCE certification program. EnCE certification is open to the public and private sectors and is specific to the use and mastery of EnCase computer forensics analysis. Requirements for taking the EnCE certification exam don’t depend on taking the Guidance Software EnCase training courses. Candidates for this certificate are required to have a licensed copy of EnCase.

Tertuduh ingin juga merujuk kepada kes R v Harris [2006] 1 Cr App Rep 55 (di mukasurat 65 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan)seperti berikut:

(1) Expert evidence presented to the court should be and seen to be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation.

(3) An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions on which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which detract from his concluded opinions.

(4) An expert should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise.

Tertuduh ingin juga merujuk kepada Australian Medical Association di dalam buku “Expert Evidence” muka surat 326 seperti berikut:

Expert Medical Witness – Policy Statement (March 1998)

2. Conflict of Interest

That the AMA believes that, when requested to provide an expert opinion and faced with conflict of interest, a practitioner should declare this or decline to offer an opinion.

SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

C : “Qualified untuk handle Encase?

: Saya berkursus untuk belajar Encase dan jalankan analisa, tak ingat nama company tapi ada sijil”

(mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan)

Bagi isu ini pihak Pembelaan memohon agar Mahkamah yang Mulia ini menggunapakai peruntukan Seksyen 5 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan dibaca bersama Seksyen 56 dan Seksyen 57 Akta Keterangan 1950 untuk mengambilkira kes-kes yang telah diputuskan mengikut Common Law atau undang-undang yang berkuatkuasa di England mengenai kaedah pembuktian forensik komputer memandangkan tiada kes berkaitan pembuktian cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang diputuskan dengan piawaian forensik antarabangsa di Malaysia pada masa ini.

Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada kes R v. Trapp [2009] S.J. No. 64; 2009 SKPC 109; 2009SK.C. LEXIS 686 (di mukasurat 2-10 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan)di mana pakar telah menunjukkan kepada mahkamah penggunaan ‘hash function’ atau ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘hash value’ merupakan proses yang sangat kritikal dan penting di samping pengimejan forensik dilakukan sebelumnya. Di dalam kes tersebut, pakar telah menggunakan SHA-1 sebagai ‘hash function’, ‘hash value’ penggiraan ‘hash value’ ditunjukkan dan dibandingkan dengan salinan imej forensik semasa perbicaraan. Berdasarkan keterangan saksi SP1, telah jelas bahawa saksi SP1 tidak melakukan analisa yang betul dan tepat untuk memenuhi piawaian forensik antarabangsa yang ditetapkan berdasarkan Piawaian Daubert, di dalam kes Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993)(mukasurat 13 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan), yang merupakan satu piawaian yang diterimapakai oleh semua badan forensik di seluruh dunia,seperti di bawah:

Daubert Test for Reliability

Witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:

-The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data

-The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods

-The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case

Daubert Factors

1. Whether the theory or technique has been scientifically tested.

2. Whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review or publication.

3. The (expected) error rate of the technique used.

4. Acceptance of the theory or technique in the relevant scientific community.

SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas menyatakan bahawa beliau tidak membuat pengimejan bahan bukti di dalam bentuk salinan imej-imej forensik bagi keseluruhan kandungan cakera keras (‘harddisk’) (mukasurat 26 Nota Keterangan) seperti yang ditetapkan oleh piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa (Piawaian Daubert). Oleh yang demikian SP1 tidak mengikut kaedah yang diiktiraf oleh piawaian komputer forensik antarabangsa dan bahan bukti tidak disahkan kesahihan dan integritinya. Tertuduh juga telah menerima 13 keping DVD salinan klip video yang disalin dengan menggunakan format DVD yang bukan mengikuti piawaian format pengimejan forensic antarabangsa yang ditetapkan di mana apabila diperiksa oleh Tertuduh telah mendapati metadata setiap fail klip video tidak sama dengan metadata yang diterangkan oleh SP1 dan bilangan klip video juga berbeza bilangan yang diberi dengan keterangan SP1 semasa perbicaraan. Terdapat juga kandungan yang sama dikira berulang-ulang semasa perbicaraan.

Fakta ini dinyatakan semasa pemeriksaan utama SP1:

“Selepas analisa/kenalpasti video2 lucah yang terkandung tindakan seterusnya adalah masukan video2 ini ke dalam DVD. Tidak ingat berapa keping. Saya masih boleh cam.”

(Rujuk DVD dalam sampul putih-di dalam ada 13 keping tanda X1-X13. Dicamkan SP1. Ditanda sebagai P3a-m) (mukasurat 13 Nota Keterangan).

Dan mereka juga telah membuat kesimpulan bahawa:

“A principle was introduced based on the concept of synergy claiming that insignificant pieces of event datum may collectively be of significant forensic importance.”

Diikuti juga di dalam kertas penyelidikan oleh Svein Yngvar Willassen yang bertajuk “Hypothesis Based Investigation of Digital Timestamps” dengan jelas menerangkan di dalam abstract bahawa:

Semasa pemeriksaan balas SP1 telah mengesahkan ada ‘error’ semasa ujitayang dibuat dengan menggunakan ‘software Encase’.(Mukasurat 20 Nota Keterangan).

Tertuduh telah mengemukakan bantahan terhadap Laporan Forensik SP1 yang mana Laporan Forensik yang cuba ditender di Mahkamah bertarikh 28.7.2009 yang amat ketara berlainan dengan Laporan Forensik bertarikh 27.7.2009 yang diberikan oleh pihak pendakwaan di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 51A Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Pihak Tertuduh terpaksa membangkitkan bantahan apabila pihak pendakwaan sendiri tidak mematuhi prosedur-prosedur di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 51A dan Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah di mana apabila pihak Pendakwaan gagal memberikan salinan di dalam tempoh waktu yang ditetapkan dan penerimaan Laporan Forensik tersebut sebagai ekshibit adalah bertentangan dengan kes-kes yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah di mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal mematuhi tempoh penyerahan laporan yang ditetapkan di bawah Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, ianya ‘fatal’ kepada kes pendakwaan dan laporan forensik tersebut tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti.

51. SP1 juga gagal memberi sebarang keterangan bagaimana beliau menjaga ‘hard disk’ tersebut selepas menerimanya dari Pegawai Penyiasat dari tarikh 13.7.2009 ke 26.7.2009 dan dari tarikh analisa ke tarikh pertama sebutan kes. Adalah dihujahkan di sini bahawa rantaian kawalan dan rantaian bukti telah terputus (“break in the chain of custody and break in the chain of evidence’). SP1 di dalam pemeriksaan semula hanya memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

“J : Ianya ada dalam kawalan saya. Disimpan dalam makmal forensic disimpan dalam peti khas untuk hard disc yang mana kunci dipegang oleh saya sendiri.”

52. Kes ini perlu dibezakan dengan kes-kes Mahkamah yang telah diputuskan berkenaan ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD) kerana cakera keras mempunyai kapasiti penyimpanan data yang lebih besar dan dibandingkan dengan ‘compact disc‘, malah tiada material yang boleh dimasukkan semula ke dalam ‘compact disc’ melainkan hanya berlaku pada cakera keras – (data yang terdahulu akan terbatal (dengan izin ‘fast overwrite‘)).

53. Apabila cakera keras tersebut dimainkan dengan set komputer yang bukan dirampas dari tempat kejadian, ianya tidak terdiri daripada satu sistem yang lengkap dan sekiranya ianya dimainkan dengan bukan sistem komputer yang asal dan komputer yang lain cakera keras tersebut telah dicemari (‘tampering with evidence‘) dan ini tidak seharusnya dibenarkan berlaku oleh Mahkamah. Dirujuk kepada buku bertajuk “Cyber Forensics – A Field Manual for Collecting, Examining, and Preserving Evidence of Computer Crimes”, 2^nd Edition oleh Albert J. Marcella, Jr. dan Doug Menendez ms 288, 289, 276-281 menyatakan keperluan buku log bagi merekod setiap aktiviti siasatan dan analisis forensik wajib dinyatakan semasa perbicaraan di mahkamah.

54. Tertuduh berhujah bahawa milikan tidak boleh dibuktikan melalui keterangan persekitaran (‘circumstantial evidence‘) iaitu dengan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Ekshibit-ekshibit “P11”, “P12”, “P13”, “P14, “P15”, “P16”, “P17”, “P18”, “P19”, “P20”, “P21” hingga “P33” yang merupakan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan hanya kerana dokumen-dokumen tersebut didakwa terdapat di dalam cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh).

“Irrelevant and Prejudicial Facts Or Evidence

55. SP5 iaitu pegawai yang terlibat semasa geledah dan SP7 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat sendiri mengesahkan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Oleh yang demikian milikan secara fizikal tidak dibuktikan langsung (rakaman video prosiding perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).

56. Keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP1 di dalam mahkamah mestilah bersifat a posteriori evidence dan analisis yang dilakukan mestilah bersifat a posteriori analysis. Semua teori dan teknik yang digunakan untuk tujuan analisis forensik dan perbicaraan di mahkamah juga mestilah suatu yang ‘scientific cognition a priori’ dan ‘a posteriori truths’ bukan bersifat hypothetical atau junk science di mana setiap keterangan wajib mematuhi sepenuhnya Piawaian Daubert (Piawaian Forensik Komputer Antarabangsa). Di dalam kes ini SP1 telah memberi keterangan yang nyata tidak bersifat a priori mahupun a posteriori kerana setiap keterangan SP1 tidak disokong oleh analisis berangka forensik (forensics numerical analysis) berdasarkan Piawaian Daubert dan di dalam Buku Expert Evidence, Fourth Edition di mukasurat 62 hingga 66.

Immanuel Kant di dalam bukunya yang bertajuk, “Critique of Pure Reason” – The Cambridge Edition of The Work of Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Elements, Pt II. Div. I Bk. I. Ch. II. (B128) muka surat 226:

“The empirical derivation, however, to which both of them resorted, cannot be reconciled with reality of the scientific cognition a priori that we posses, that namely of pure mathematics and general natural science, and is therefore refutted by the fact^a.”

^a das Factum

57. Oleh itu, laporan Forensik SP1 (Ekshibit “P35”) tidak komprehensif dan konklusif.

Isu 106 Klip Video Tersebut Mestilah Lucah di Sisi Undang-undang

59. Di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“2nd Ground

Therefore, the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCDs is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films becomes critical. Here as per the finding of the learned Magistrate not only were only four VCDs screened but unfortunately the titles of the four VCDs were not even identified. Hence, there is no evidence before the court of which of the four VCDs out of the 18 VCDs exh. P1 (A-R) were of obscene material and neither was there proof whether the remaining 14 VCDs were of obscene material or otherwise.

60. Di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“Intipati (b)

Intipati (c)

[12] Dalam perkara ini, saya juga bersetuju dengan penghakiman dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Chung Wan Li (supra) apabila hakim dipetik berkata:

61. Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah di sisi undang-undang, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“Screen Testing For Obscenity

[15] However, I find that the second vital ingredient in this case, ie, that the 65 DVDs are obscene was not proved.

15.1. There is no evidence at all that the 65 DVDs were subject to a screen test (uji tayang) for the court to make a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene.

15.2. SP1 merely testified that he was satisfied that the 65 DVDs were obscene by looking at the covers of the DVDs.

15.3. SP4, the I.O. of the case, said he had screen tested them at random in his office and found them to be obscene.

[20] The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

63. Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil Insp. Mohd Razif b. Mohd Zaid I/16542 sebagai SP1 untuk memberi keterangan bahawa 106 klip video tersebut adalah lucah. SP1 telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 4 – 11 Nota Keterangan) bahawa: “Ada 150 video. Dalam senarai, ada 106 yang lucah. Saya ada list saya buat dalam list laporan forensic saya.” SP1 seterusnya telah diberi keterangan bahawa di antara klip video tersebut adalah lucah, tidak lucah, tidak dapat dimainkan, ada gambar lucah, tiada video lucah, tiada bahan lucah, tidak boleh dimainkan, mohon delete temporary file.

66. Pegawai Penyiasat juga tidak menyediakan senarai klip video lucah tersebut kerana tiada senarai diberikan mengikut Seksyen 51A Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Sekiranya pihak Pendakwaan mendakwa senarai klip video yang dilampirkan bersama Laporan Forensik (ekshibit “P35”) maka senarai tersebut tidak boleh diambilkira kerana Laporan Forensik tersebut telah dicabar kesahihannya dengan jumlah uji tayang yang dibuat di Mahkamah dan penerimaan Laporan Forensik tersebut sebagai ekshibit tidak mengikut lunas undang-undang.

67. Bagi intipati kedua pertuduhan, Pihak Tertuduh berhujah bahawa tiada definisi yang khusus bagi ‘lucah’ di dalam udang-undang.

68. SP7 selaku Pegawai Penyiasat juga gagal memberikan definisi yang tepat mengenai lucah di sisi perundangan. Beliau di dalam pemeriksaan balas turut menyatakan bahawa apa yang berlaku di dalam rumah di antara pasangan tidak boleh diambilkira sebagai lucah dan ini sangat bertentangan dengan apa yang beliau lakukan dengan menghadapkan Tertuduh dengan pertuduhan terhadap klip video beast1.Mpg dan dollah2.mpg (mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan) di mana kedua-dua klip video tersebut merupakan klip antara Tertuduh dengan bekas isteri yang diambil semasa masih lagi suami isteri. Ini merupakan pencabulan hak asasi manusia dan bertentangan dengan Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Pihak Pembelaan ingin merujuk kepada kes Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan):

69. Tiada definisi bagi perkataan ‘lucah’ berdasarkan perundangan yang boleh digunapakai di dalam rumah samada di dalam Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967, Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan Kanun Kesiksaan.

70. Mengikut Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Volume 1, 24^th Edition di muka surat 1115 dengan jelas menerangkan bahawa:

“The word “obscene” has not been defined in the Code.”

71. Definisi Lucah (‘Obscene’) atau Kelucahan (‘Obscenity’) bergantung kepada keadaan, tempat dan konteks semasa ianya berlaku. Apabila seseorang tanpa seurat benang di tubuh berada di rumahnya tanpa kehadiran orang luar tiada sesiapa boleh mengatakan bahawa beliau berkelakuan lucah. Keadaan yang sama juga jika sesuatu rakaman dibuat di dalam rumah dengan diri sendiri tanpa kehadiran orang lain atau dengan kehadiran pasangan yang sah di sisi undang-undang sahaja berada di rumah di mana di dalam konteks tersebut perlakuan tidak dikira bersifat lucah.

72. Di dalam kes-kes ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD), ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD) tersebut diedar, dijual dan disebarkan untuk orang awam yang sudah tentu akan memberi kesan kepada orang awam terutamanya golongan muda yang memilikinya. Ini berbeza dengan kes ini di mana pihak polis telah memasuki premis tanpa waran geledah yang sah di sisi undang-undang dan rampasan harta peribadi dibuat yang jelas bukan untuk tatapan umum.

73. Mengikut Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Volume 1, 24^th Edition di mukasurat 1122, faktor yang perlu diambilkira di dalam menentukan sesuatu material itu lucah adalah material berunsur lucah tersebut jatuh ke tangan siapa. Di dalam kes ini Pegawai Penyiasat telah memasuki tempat kejadian dan material tersebut berada di tangan beliau. Hanya beliau membuat kesimpulan bahawa material itu lucah.

74. Oleh yang demikian, kesimpulan yang tidak dapat dielakkan ialah Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tidak mempunyai kandungan lucah di sisi undang-undang pada setiap masa yang material, bahan yang dikatakan lucah tersebut.

75. Pihak Pembelaan menyatakan bahawa memandangkan kedua-dua intipati penting di peringkat pendakwaan ini bagi membuktikan prima facie kes terhadap Tertuduh tidak dapat dibuktikan menurut undang-undang, kesimpulan yang tidak boleh dielakkan ialah Tertuduh dilepaskan dan dibebaskan serta merta tanpa memanggil kes pembelaan.

76. Pihak Pembelaan menyatakan bahawa pihak Pendakwaan masih gagal untuk membuktikan prima facie kes terhadap Tertuduh dengan butir-butirannya seperti di perenggan di bawah.

77. Menurut Nota Keterangan, terdapat ruang (‘gap’) di antara ekshibit-ekshibit di mahkamah yang menyebabkan pihak Pembelaan tidak dapat berhujah sepenuhnya dan ini telah memprejudiskan Tertuduh. Pihak Pembelaan ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah bahawa di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 17.8.2010 tiada keterangan mengenai ekshibit-ekshibit “P4” “P5”, “P6”, ”P7, “P8’ dan “P10”. Oleh yang demikian pihak Pembelaan tidak dapat mengutarakan hujah berkenaan ekshibit “P4”, “P5”, “P6”, “P7”, “P8” dan “P10”. Walaubagaimanapun sekiranya ekshibit “P4”, “P5”, “P6”, “P7, “P8’ dan P10” adalah salinan dokumen-dokumen yang diesktrak oleh SP1, pihak Pembelaan membangkitkan bantahan mengenai penerimaan salinan dokumen-dokumen tersebut kerana pihak Pendakwaan gagal mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950.

78. Kertas pertuduhan adalah bersangkut dengan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009. Ini menggambarkan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani adalah ‘First Information Report’. Dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini menyebabkan pihak Pembelaan tidak mempunyai peluang untuk memeriksa balas pengadu.

79. SP5 telah memberi keterangan bahawa pemeriksaan dan penggeledahan yang dibuat di Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 (mohon rujuk mukasurat 47 Nota Keterangan). Keterangan SP5 ini menunjukkan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 ialah ‘First Information Report’ (yang tidak pernah dikemukakan di mahkamah) yang membolehkan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan di Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut. Barang-barang yang dirampas adalah untuk laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 bukannya report polis lain. Mana-mana ‘First Information Report’ lain yang menggunakan barang-barang geledah menurut Borang Senarai Geledah pada Tarikh tersebut di Premis tersebut telah mencabuli hak setiap rakyat Malaysia yang telah dijamin dan termaktub di dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia.

80. Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Chong Chieng Jen lawan Mohd Irwan Hafiz bin Md Radzi & Anor [2009] 8 MLJ 364 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana komputer riba pemohon telah dirampas apabila satu waran geledah dikeluarkan oleh Majistret apabila pemohon disyaki menyimpan bahan berunsur hasutan. Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk mengetepikan waran geledah dan memerintahkan komputer riba dikembalikan kepada Pemohon. Di dalam kes ini Rhodzariah Bujang JC menyatakan seperti berikut:

81. Apalagi di dalam kes ini jika tiada waran geledah diperolehi dari mana-mana Mahkamah dan ini sudah tentu mengganggu hak ‘privacy’ Tertuduh sebagaimana yang termaktub di bawah Artikel 10 dan 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

82. Adalah mustahil sesuatu tempat itu digeledah terlebih dahulu sebelum adanya ‘First Information Report’ atau sesuatu tempat itu digeledah mendahului ‘First Information Report’. Tambahan lagi Laporan Analisa oleh SP1 adalah berkenaan dengan Dang Wang Rpt 29694/09 bersabit Jalan Patani Rpt 5070/2009.

83. Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 sebagai ‘First Information Report’ adalah amat penting di dalam kes ini memandangkan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani tersebut. Kesan dan akibat Laporan Polis Jalan Patani tersebut tidak dikemukakan ialah mahkamah mestilah menggunapakai s. 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 yang menyatakan bahawa sekiranya Laporan Polis Jalan Patani tersebut dikemukakan, ianya tidak berpihak kepada pihak Pendakwaan.

84. SP-5 memberi keterangan bahawa tiada waran untuk melakukan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan tersebut. Bagi situasi ini, pihak Pendakwaan mestilah mematuhi S.62 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan segala intipati S.62 mestilah dipenuhi terlebih dahulu sebelum membuat pemeriksaan atau penggeledahan tanpa waran. Tiada apa-apa keterangan mengenai situasi ini maka penggeledahan atau pemeriksaan pada Tarikh tersebut di Bangunan tersebut adalah tidak sah di sisi undang-undang.

85. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi pendakwaan pertama (SP1) sebagai saksi pakar. Pengadu asal tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi. Maklumat pertama (“First Information Report’) adalah dari seorang bernama Norina Zainol Abidin yang tidak dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai saksi pertama kerana berdasarkan laporan beliau, polis telah datang ke premis tersebut pada 13.7.2009 tanpa waran geledah dan alasan yang munasabah untuk memasuki premis tersebut. Laman web yang dikatakan lucah
http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com
merupakan laman blog yang kosong oleh itu tidak wujud isu kelucahan atau isu yang melanggar kesopanan awam pada laman blog tersebut. Amat ketara bahawa laporan pertama tersebut tidak benar dan merupakan laporan yang palsu yang sengaja direka-reka oleh Pengadu asal untuk menceroboh hak persendirian Tertuduh. Oleh yang demikian cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang ditender sebagai ekshibit tidak sepatutnya dirampas pada hakikat sebenarnya kerana tiada peralatan atau peranti atau modem atau talian rangkaian yang dilanggani pada tarikh 13hb. Julai, 2009 yang dijumpai di tempat kejadian mengikut seksyen 248 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998.

Pihak Pembelaan mengemukakan petikan Laporan (“First Information Report”) untuk perhatian dan penelitian Mahkamah yang mulia ini:

“Pada tarikh 13.06.09 jam lebih kurang 11.00 malam, ketika saya berada di pejabat (alamat seperti di atas), saya telah mendapat panggilan telefon daripada kawan saya bernama Surianom Miskam, memaklumkan saya bahawa beliau telah melihat gambar-gambar saya di dalam laman web “Kelab Seks Melayu”. Saya terus melayari laman web tersebut iaitu di www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com “ dan mendapati adalah benar terdapat sebanyak 5 keping gambar saya berpakaian penuh, yang terdapat di laman web tersebut, di mana saya percayai 5 keping gambar tersebut telah diambil dari laman web facebook saya sendiri. Selain daripada 5 keping gambar saya yang berpakaian, terdapat juga 4 keping gambar lain yang di dalam keadaan bogel, di mana gambar-gambar tersebut adalah bukan milik saya. Turut terdapat “comment yang disertakan di bawah gambar-gambar tersebut yang berbunyi”mencari zakar sepanjang 9 inci, Surianom Miskam, 019-5722499 dan 03-8925425 ext. 2203”

Pada tarikh 24.06.09, jam lebih kurang 9 malam, ketika saya berada di pejabat (alamat seperti di atas), sekali lagi saya melayari web, iaitu laman web “Kelab Seks Melayu” di www.kelabseksmelayu. wordpress.com dan mendapati 5 keping gambar saya berpakaian penuh yang saya percayai telah diambil dari laman web facebook saya masih berada di laman web tersebut. Malahan, terdapat informasi tmabahan berhubung diri saya yang berbunyi “Happy Birthday Yang Ke-32 Norina Zainol Abidin(Pegawai Kerajaan Yang Menjadi Ahli Kelab Seks Melayu Seumur Hidup)” di laman web yang sama, di mana informasi tersebut bukanlah dimasukkan oleh saya. Malahan, saya tidak pernah menjadi Ahli Kelab Seks Melayu ataupun mana-mana kelab yang tidak bermoral dan bermaruah. Tujuan laporan ini dibuat untuk menjaga maruah dan kepentingan peribadi saya dan juga status serta kerjaya saya sebagai pegawai Kerajaan. Sekian.

86. Tiada sebarang keterangan daripada SP1 dan SP7 yang menerangkan bagaimana laman web tersebut dikesan daripada ‘internet protocol’ dari ‘service provider’ kepada internet yang terdapat dari premis tempat kejadian. SP5 dan SP7 mengesahkan di dalam keterangan masing-masing bahawa tiada modem atau peranti dijumpai. Apa yang boleh digarapkan daripada keterangan-keterangan ini bahawa tiada bukti kukuh mengaitkan tempat kejadian dengan laporan pengadu “First Information Report”. SP5 memberi keterangan bahawa set komputer tidak disambung ke sumber kuasa dan tidak berfungsi. Beliau menyatakan bahawa komputer di tempat kejadian rosak. Oleh yang demikian bagaimana hard disk boleh dirampas sedangkan untuk akses kepada internet memerlukan peranti modem, talian internet yang pada masa material membawa satu internet protocol (IP) yang unik yang boleh dikesan dan dikaitkan dengan “MAC address” (Networking Card) pada komputer yang disyaki tersebut. Tiada keterangan mengenai analisis forensik rangkaian dan analisis forensik Facebook yang dibuat oleh SP1 untuk membuktikan bahawa Tertuduh boleh dikaitkan dengan laman web yang dinyatakan sebelum ini. Nama Domain (‘domain name’) www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com tidak dibuktikan siapa tuanpunya atau pemiliknya atau siapa yang mendaftar ‘domain name’ tersebut.

87. Di samping itu tiada keterangan daripada SP1 dan SP7 bahawa Tertuduh adalah ‘friend’ yang diterima oleh Pengadu asal untuk akaun ‘Facebook’ Pengadu asal. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang menunjukkan bahawa Tertuduh ada akses kepada maklumat akaun ‘Facebook’ Pengadu asal.

At its simplest the internet is a collection of computers which are connected through the telephone network to communicate with each other.

As explained by the judge [1998] FSR 265 at p 267:

Pihak Pembelaan bersandarkan kepada satu kes Frangione v. Vandadongen [2010] O. J. No. 2337 di mana Mahkamah Agung Ontario memutuskan seperti berikut:

[33] Counsel have referred to several cases in Ontario that have dealt with the relatively new issue of production of the contents of Facebook sites given the proliferation of social networking sites. Our courts have observed and accepted that “Facebook” is a social networking sites used by members to communicate information about one’s personal life to other members of the Facebook community. When a person registers with Facebook, at www.facebook.com website, he creates his own profile and privacy settings. Profile information is displayed to people in the networks specified by the user in his privacy settings e.g a user may choose to make his private profile information available to others within his school, geographic area, employment network, or to “friends” of “friends”. A user can set privacy options that limit access to his profile only to those to whom he grants permission the so called “friends” of the user (Murphy v. Perger, [2007] O.J. No. 5511 (S.C.J.); Leduc, supra[19] Wicev. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co.[2009] O.J. No. 2946 (S.C.J.); Kourtesis v. Joris [2007] O.J. No. 5539 (S.C.J).

88. Kesimpulannya berdasarkan hujahan-hujahan yang dikemukakan di atas, terdapat kecacatan yang material dan amat memudaratkan kes pihak Pendakwaan. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan setiap satu intipati pertuduhan dan seterusnya membuktikan satu kes ‘prima facie’ terhadap Tertuduh. Oleh yang demikian Tertuduh pohon dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa dipanggil membela diri untuk pertuduhan di atas.

……………………………..

Mohamad Izaham bin Mohamed Yatim

Tertuduh

Cases Referred:

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[2009] MLJU 0935

Malayan Unreported Judgments

Pendakwa Raya v Kok Seong Yoon

2009 MLJU 0935

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO MT(5) 41-66-2008

HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU)

DECIDED-DATE-1: 4 AUGUST 2009

HUE SIEW KHENG, JC
Mohd Fazaly Ali bin Mohd Ghazaly (TPR, Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Johor) bagip pihak perayu
Azmi Ahmad Bakri (Azmi Asram Shujaa & Co) bagi pihak responden
Hue Siew Kheng, JC:

Background

[1] This is an appeal against the decision of the learned magistrate made on 2 December 2008 wherein the respondent was acquitted and discharged without calling for his defence.

[2] The charge against the respondent was for having in his possession 65 obscene DVDs on 22.4.2006, thereby committing an offence under s.5(1)(a) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 and punishable under s.5(2) of the same Act.

[3] The petition of appeal discloses 7 grounds but can be broadly categorized under 2 main grounds: that the learned magistrate had erred in law and in fact in holding that the prosecution had not proved possession and also the adverse inference pursuant to s.114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 should not have been invoked due to the failure to call 2 other persons who were also arrested together with the respondent on the night of the raid.

Brief facts

[4] On 21.4.2006 at about a quarter to midnight, SP1 one ASP Nik Mathelan bin Nik Mohamed led a raid on the premises of Sky Video Trading at No. 6, Danga Bay, Lot 20704, Batu 4 ½ Jalan Skudai, Johor Bahru. It was a crime prevention operation, targeted at pornography and prostitution.

[5] During the raid, 3 persons were arrested, including the respondent. The other 2 persons arrested were subsequently released as the police were of the view that they were customers at the said premises.

[6] A search of the premises revealed 65 pornographic DVDs which were found beneath the counter rack. The raiding party also found 120 DVDs and 19 VCDs without the “Sijil B”, an offence under s. 18(4) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 for which the respondent was also charged.

[7] The respondent had pleaded guilty to the offence pursuant to the s. 18(4) charge and fined accordingly. However, in respect of the charge under s.5(1) for being found in possession of the 65 DVDs alleged to be obscene, the respondent claimed trial. After full trial was conducted, the learned magistrate had acquitted and discharged him without calling for his defence.

The charge

[8] The charge preferred against the respondent under s.5(1) of the 2002 Act requires proof of 2 main ingredients i.e. that-

(i) the respondent at the material time was in possession of the 65 obscene
films in the form of DVD; and

(ii) that the 65 films (DVDs) are obscene.

[9] Having read the appeal record and the Written Submission of the appellant and having heard both parties, I am in agreement with the learned deputy public prosecutor that the element of possession has been proved through the prosecution witnesses SP1, 2 and 3 who were members of the raiding party.

[10] The 65 DVDs alleged to be obscene were found under the counter of the premises and at the material time of the raid, the respondent was alone in the premises manning the counter. He attempted to flee when SP1 identified himself as a police officer.

[11] The facts of this case are similar to Mohd. Ibrahim v PP [1963] MLJ 289 wherein the appellant was found to be in possession of 65 copies of the book “Tropic of Cancer”. The impugned books were found under the counter of his shop. The appellant in Mohd. Ibrahim (supra) was employed to manage the sale of books and though an attempt was made to absolve himself of knowledge as he could not read English, nevertheless the court held that the inference was irresistible that the 65 copies found in the shop for the purpose of being sold and that the appellant was the person in charge of selling of the books on the shop was in possession of them and in possession of them for purposes of sale. He also failed in his argument that knowledge was negated by his ignorance of the English language as the court held that he could have obtained the services of an English – speaking clerk in ordering the books.

[12] In this case, there was the uncontroverted evidence of SP1 and SP3 that the 65 DVDs were found under the counter and the respondent was found at the time of raid, behind this counter. Knowledge can also be inferred from the fact that he attempted flight when SP1 identified himself as a public officer. Therefore, viewed in its totality the prosecution had proved the element of possession.

[13] There is no cause for the adverse inference to be invoked as it is trite that the calling of witnesses is at the discretion of the prosecution and the burden is on the prosecution throughout to prove its case. I find no gap here, neither can it be said that there was any suppression of evidence.

[14] Therefore the learned magistrate had erred in holding that the element of possession was not proved and in invoking the adverse presumption.

Screen testing for obscenity

[15] However, I find that the second vital ingredient in this case, i.e. that the 65 DVDs are obscene was not proved.

15.1 There is no evidence at all that the 65 DVDs were subject to a screen
test (uji tayang) for the court to make a finding that the 65 DVDs are
obscene.

15.2 SP1 merely testified that he was satisfied that the 65 DVDs were
obscene by looking at the covers of the DVDs.

15.3 SP4, the I.O. of the case, said he had screen tested them at random in
his office and found them to be obscene.

15.4 Although at one point of the proceedings the learned APP applied to
reserve screen-testing of the DVDs, the learned defence counsel had
responded that there was no need for screen-testing (pg. 29 of Appeal
Record). Unfortunately the court appeared to have agreed with learned
defence counsel because nowhere in the Notes of Evidence does it appear
that screen testing was done.

[16] In the case of PP v Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 , the learned High Court Judge held that “the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCD’s is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films”. In Chung’s case (supra), the learned High Court Judge did not approve of the random testing that was conducted during the trial.

[17] His Lordship Mohd. Zawawi Salleh, J.C., concurred with the learned High Court judge in the case of PP v Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 . His Lordship held in Lee Swee Sing’s case that there is no provision in the Film Censorship Act 2002 which allows for random testing. A comparison was drawn with the provision of s.37(j) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which allowed for a 10% of the sample of the drugs to be tested.

[18] In this case, there was no screen testing at all carried out during the trial. How then can the court arrive at a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene? It is patently clear that the prosecution had failed to prove that the 65 DVDs were obscene and the learned magistrate should have so found.

For the reasons as adumbrated above the acquittal and discharge of the respondent is hereby affirmed as the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case against the respondent as per the charge.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

LOAD-DATE: 01/12/2010

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U.S. Supreme Court

STANLEY v. GEORGIA, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)

394 U.S. 557

STANLEY v. GEORGIA.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.
No. 293.
Argued January 14-15, 1969.
Decided April 7, 1969.

Under authority of a warrant to search appellant’s home for evidence of his alleged bookmaking activities, officers found some films in his bedroom. The films were projected and deemed to be obscene. Appellant was arrested for their possession. He was thereafter indicted, tried, and convicted for “knowingly hav[ing] possession of . . . obscene matter” in violation of a Georgia law. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding it “not essential to an indictment charging one with possession of obscene matter that it be alleged that such possession was `with intent to sell, expose or circulate the same.’” Appellant contends that the Georgia obscenity statute is unconstitutional insofar as it punishes mere private possession of obscene matter. Georgia, relying on Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , argues the statute’s validity on the ground that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.” Id., at 485. Held: The First Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth prohibits making mere private possession of obscene material a crime. Pp. 560-568.

(a) Neither Roth, supra, nor subsequent decisions of the Court were made in the context of a statute punishing mere private possession of obscene material, but involved governmental power to prohibit or regulate certain public actions respecting obscene matter. Pp. 560-564.

(b) The Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and to be generally free from governmental intrusions into one’s privacy and control of one’s thoughts. Pp. 564-566.

(c) The State may not prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct, Roth, supra, distinguished, or proscribe such possession on the ground that it is a necessary incident to a statutory scheme prohibiting distribution, see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 . Pp. 566-568.

224 Ga. 259, 161 S. E. 2d 309, reversed and remanded. [394 U.S. 557, 558]

Wesley R. Asinof argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.

J. Robert Sparks argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Lewis R. Slaton.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

An investigation of appellant’s alleged bookmaking activities led to the issuance of a search warrant for appellant’s home. Under authority of this warrant, federal and state agents secured entrance. They found very little evidence of bookmaking activity, but while looking through a desk drawer in an upstairs bedroom, one of the federal agents, accompanied by a state officer, found three reels of eight-millimeter film. Using a projector and screen found in an upstairs living room, they viewed the films. The state officer concluded that they were obscene and seized them. Since a further examination of the bedroom indicated that appellant occupied it, he was charged with possession of obscene matter and placed under arrest. He was later indicted for “knowingly hav[ing] possession of . . . obscene matter” in violation of Georgia law. 1 Appellant [394 U.S. 557, 559] was tried before a jury and convicted. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S. E. 2d 309 (1968). We noted probable jurisdiction of an appeal brought under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2). 393 U.S. 819 (1968).

Appellant raises several challenges to the validity of his conviction. 2 We find it necessary to consider only one. Appellant argues here, and argued below, that the Georgia obscenity statute, insofar as it punishes mere private possession of obscene matter, violates the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. For reasons set forth below, we agree that the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.

The court below saw no valid constitutional objection to the Georgia statute, even though it extends further than the typical statute forbidding commercial sales of obscene material. It held that “[i]t is not essential to an indictment charging one with possession of obscene matter that it be alleged that such possession was `with intent to sell, expose or circulate the same.’” Stanley v. State, supra, at 261, 161 S. E. 2d, at 311. The State and appellant both agree that the question here before us is whether “a statute imposing criminal sanctions upon the mere [knowing] possession of obscene matter” is constitutional. In this context, Georgia concedes that the present case appears to be one of “first [394 U.S. 557, 560] impression . . . on this exact point,” 3 but contends that since “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), the States are free, subject to the limits of other provisions of the Constitution, see, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 -645 (1968), to deal with it any way deemed necessary, just as they may deal with possession of other things thought to be detrimental to the welfare of their citizens. If the State can protect the body of a citizen, may it not, argues Georgia, protect his mind?

It is true that Roth does declare, seemingly without qualification, that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment. That statement has been repeated in various forms in subsequent cases. See, e. g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 186 -187 (1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 635. However, neither Roth nor any subsequent decision of this Court dealt with the precise problem involved in the present case. Roth was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and advertising, and an obscene book, in violation of a federal obscenity statute. 4 The defendant in a companion case, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), was convicted of “lewdly keeping for sale obscene and indecent books, and [of] writing, composing and publishing an obscene advertisement of them . . . .” Id., at 481. None of the statements cited by the Court in [394 U.S. 557, 561] Roth for the proposition that “this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press” were made in the context of a statute punishing mere private possession of obscene material; the cases cited deal for the most part with use of the mails to distribute objectionable material or with some form of public distribution or dissemination. 5 Moreover, none of this Court’s decisions subsequent to Roth involved prosecution for private possession of obscene materials. Those cases dealt with the power of the State and Federal Governments to prohibit or regulate certain public actions taken or intended to be taken with respect to obscene matter. 6 Indeed, with one [394 U.S. 557, 562] exception, we have been unable to discover any case in which the issue in the present case has been fully considered. 7 [394 U.S. 557, 563]

In this context, we do not believe that this case can be decided simply by citing Roth. Roth and its progeny certainly do mean that the First and Fourteenth Amendments recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity. But the assertion of that interest cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections. Neither Roth nor any other decision of this Court reaches that far. As the Court said in Roth itself, “[c]easeless vigilance is the watchword to prevent . . . erosion [of First Amendment rights] by Congress or by the States. The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests.” 354 U.S., at 488 . Roth and the cases following it discerned such an “important interest” in the regulation of commercial distribution of [394 U.S. 557, 564] obscene material. That holding cannot foreclose an examination of the constitutional implications of a statute forbidding mere private possession of such material.

It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. “This freedom [of speech and press] . . . necessarily protects the right to receive . . . .” Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 -308 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, see Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948), is fundamental to our free society. Moreover, in the context of this case – a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person’s own home – that right takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.

“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

See Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). [394 U.S. 557, 565]

These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us. He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases – the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his library. Georgia contends that appellant does not have these rights, that there are certain types of materials that the individual may not read or even possess. Georgia justifies this assertion by arguing that the films in the present case are obscene. But we think that mere categorization of these films as “obscene” is insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.

And yet, in the face of these traditional notions of individual liberty, Georgia asserts the right to protect the individual’s mind from the effects of obscenity. We are not certain that this argument amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State has the right to control the moral content of a person’s thoughts. 8 To [394 U.S. 557, 566] some, this may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment. As the Court said in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 -689 (1959), “[t]his argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. . . . And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.” Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Nor is it relevant that obscene materials in general, or the particular films before the Court, are arguably devoid of any ideological content. The line between the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn at all. See Winters v. New York, supra, at 510. Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.

Perhaps recognizing this, Georgia asserts that exposure to obscene materials may lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence. There appears to be little empirical basis for that assertion. 9 But more important, if the State is only concerned about printed or filmed materials inducing antisocial conduct, we believe that in the context of private consumption of ideas and information we should adhere to the view that “[a]mong free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be [394 U.S. 557, 567] applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law . . . .” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L. J. 877, 938 (1963). Given the present state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits.

It is true that in Roth this Court rejected the necessity of proving that exposure to obscene material would create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct or would probably induce its recipients to such conduct. 354 U.S., at 486 -487. But that case dealt with public distribution of obscene materials and such distribution is subject to different objections. For example, there is always the danger that obscene material might fall into the hands of children, see Ginsberg v. New York, supra, or that it might intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general public. 10 See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967). No such dangers are present in this case.

Finally, we are faced with the argument that prohibition of possession of obscene materials is a necessary incident to statutory schemes prohibiting distribution. That argument is based on alleged difficulties of proving an intent to distribute or in producing evidence of actual distribution. We are not convinced that such difficulties [394 U.S. 557, 568] exist, but even if they did we do not think that they would justify infringement of the individual’s right to read or observe what he pleases. Because that right is so fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).

We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime. 11 Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by today’s holding. As we have said, the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home. Accordingly, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Footnotes

[ Footnote 1 ] “Any person who shall knowingly bring or cause to be brought into this State for sale or exhibition, or who shall knowingly sell or offer to sell, or who shall knowingly lend or give away or offer to lend or give away, or who shall knowingly have possession of, or who shall knowingly exhibit or transmit to another, any obscene matter, or who shall knowingly advertise for sale by any form of notice, printed, written, or verbal, any obscene matter, or who shall knowingly manufacture, draw, duplicate or print any obscene matter with intent to sell, expose or circulate the same, shall, if such person has knowledge or reasonably should know of the obscene nature of such matter, be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than five years: Provided, however, in the event the [394 U.S. 557, 559] jury so recommends, such person may be punished as for a misdemeanor. As used herein, a matter is obscene if, considered as a whole, applying contemporary community standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion.” Ga. Code Ann. 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).

[ Footnote 2 ] Appellant does not argue that the films are not obscene. For the purpose of this opinion, we assume that they are obscene under any of the tests advanced by members of this Court. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).

[ Footnote 3 ] The issue was before the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), but that case was decided on other grounds. MR. JUSTICE STEWART, although disagreeing with the majority opinion in Mapp, would have reversed the judgment in that case on the ground that the Ohio statute proscribing mere possession of obscene material was “not `consistent with the rights of free thought and expression assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Id., at 672.

[ Footnote 4 ] 18 U.S.C. 1461.

[ Footnote 5 ] Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 -737 (1878) (use of the mails); United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 261 (1890) (use of the mails); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (publication); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 508 (1904) (use of the mails); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913) (use of interstate facilities); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (publication); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 -572 (1942) (utterances); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946) (use of the mails); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (possession with intent to sell); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libel).

[ Footnote 6 ] Many of the cases involved prosecutions for sale or distribution of obscene materials or possession with intent to sell or distribute. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Our most recent decision involved a prosecution for sale of obscene material to children. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968). Other cases involved federal or state statutory procedures for preventing the distribution or mailing of obscene material, or procedures for predistribution approval. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Still another case dealt with an attempt to seize obscene material “kept for the purpose [394 U.S. 557, 562] of being sold, published, exhibited . . . or otherwise distributed or circulated . . . .” Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 719 (1961); see also A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964). Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), was a proceeding in equity against a book. However, possession of a book determined to be obscene in such a proceeding was made criminal only when “for the purpose of sale, loan or distribution.” Id., at 422.

Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court of Ohio interpreted the Ohio statute to require proof of “possession and control for the purpose of circulation or exhibition.” State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22, 27-28, 179 N. E. 2d 777, 781 (1962), rev’d on other grounds, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). The interpretation was designed to avoid the constitutional problem posed by the “dissenters” in Mapp. See State v. Ross, 12 Ohio St. 2d 37, 231 N. E. 2d 299 (1967).

Other cases dealing with nonpublic distribution of obscene material or with legitimate uses of obscene material have expressed similar reluctance to make such activity criminal, albeit largely on statutory grounds. In United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1890), the Court held that federal law did not make criminal the mailing of a private sealed obscene letter on the ground that the law’s purpose was to purge the mails of obscene matter “as far as was consistent with the rights reserved to the people, and with a due regard to the security of private correspondence . . . .” 135 U.S., at 261 . The [394 U.S. 557, 563] law was later amended to include letters and was sustained in that form. Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420 (1896). In United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1957), the court denied an attempt by the Government to confiscate certain materials sought to be imported into the United States by the Institute for Sex Research, Inc., at Indiana University. The court found, applying the Roth formulation, that the materials would not appeal to the “prurient interest” of those seeking to import and utilize the materials. Thus, the statute permitting seizure of “obscene” materials was not applicable. The court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional questions presented by the claimant, but did note its belief that “the statement . . . [in Roth] concerning the rejection of obscenity must be interpreted in the light of the widespread distribution of the material in Roth.” 156 F. Supp., at 360, n. 40. See also Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264 (1966), where this Court granted the Solicitor General’s motion to vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss an information charging a violation of a federal obscenity statute in a case where a husband and wife mailed undeveloped films of each other posing in the nude to an out-of-state firm for developing. But see Ackerman v. United States, 293 F.2d 449 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1961).

[ Footnote 8 ] “Communities believe, and act on the belief, that obscenity is immoral, is wrong for the individual, and has no place in a decent society. They believe, too, that adults as well as children are corruptible in morals and character, and that obscenity is a source of corruption that should be eliminated. Obscenity is not suppressed primarily for the protection of others. Much of it is suppressed for the purity of the community and for the salvation and welfare of the `consumer.’ Obscenity, at bottom, is not crime. Obscenity is sin.” Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity. 63 Col. L. Rev. 391, 395 (1963).

[ Footnote 9 ] See, e. g., Cairns, Paul, & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1009 (1962): see also M. Jahoda, The Impact of Literature: A Psychological Discussion of Some Assumptions in the Censorship Debate (1954), summarized in the concurring opinion of Judge Frank in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 814-816 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1956).

[ Footnote 10 ] The Model Penal Code provisions dealing with obscene materials are limited to cases of commercial dissemination. Model Penal Code 251.4 (Prop. Official Draft 1962); see also Model Penal Code 207.10 and comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957); H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 316-328 (1968); Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 Col. L. Rev. 669 (1963).

[ Footnote 11 ] What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia statute’s infringement of fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making mere possession criminal.

Nor do we mean to express any opinion on statutes making criminal possession of other types of printed, filmed, or recorded materials. See, e. g., 18 U.S.C. 793 (d), which makes criminal the otherwise lawful possession of materials which “the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation . . . .” In such cases, compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of the individual to possess those materials.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring.

I agree with the Court that the mere possession of reading matter or movie films, whether labeled obscene or not, cannot be made a crime by a State without violating [394 U.S. 557, 569] the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. My reasons for this belief have been set out in many of my prior opinions, as for example, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (concurring opinion), and Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (dissenting opinion).

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, concurring in the result.

Before the commencement of the trial in this case, the appellant filed a motion to suppress the films as evidence upon the ground that they had been seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The motion was denied, and the films were admitted in evidence at the trial. In affirming the appellant’s conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court specifically determined that the films had been lawfully seized. The appellant correctly contends that this determination was clearly wrong under established principles of constitutional law. But the Court today disregards this preliminary issue in its hurry to move on to newer constitutional frontiers. I cannot so readily overlook the serious inroads upon Fourth Amendment guarantees countenanced in this case by the Georgia courts.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The purpose of these clear and precise words was to guarantee to the people of this Nation that they should forever be secure from the general searches and unrestrained seizures that had been a hated hallmark of colonial rule under the notorious writs of assistance of the British Crown. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 . This most basic of Fourth Amendment guarantees was frustrated [394 U.S. 557, 570] in the present case, I think, in a manner made the more pernicious by its very subtlety. For what happened here was that a search that began as perfectly lawful became the occasion for an unwarranted and unconstitutional seizure of the films.

The state and federal officers gained admission to the appellant’s house under the authority of a search warrant issued by a United States Commissioner. The warrant described “the place to be searched” with particularity. 1 With like particularity, it described the “things to be seized” – equipment, records, and other material used in or derived from an illegal wagering business. 2 And the warrant was issued only after the Commissioner had been apprised of more than adequate probable cause to issue it. 3

There can be no doubt, therefore, that the agents were lawfully present in the appellant’s house, lawfully authorized to search for any and all of the items specified in the warrant, and lawfully empowered to seize any such [394 U.S. 557, 571] items they might find. 4 It follows, therefore, that the agents were acting within the authority of the warrant when they proceeded to the appellant’s upstairs bedroom and pulled open the drawers of his desk. But when they found in one of those drawers not gambling material but moving picture films, the warrant gave them no authority to seize the films.

The controlling constitutional principle was stated in two sentences by this Court more than 40 years ago:

“The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 .

This is not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence 5 in plain view. For the record makes clear that the contents of the films could not be determined by mere inspection. And this is not a case that presents any questions as to the permissible scope of a search made incident to a lawful arrest. For the appellant had not been arrested when the agents found the films. After finding them, the agents spent some 50 minutes exhibiting them by means of the appellant’s projector in another upstairs room. Only then did the agents return downstairs and arrest the appellant.

Even in the much-criticized case of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 , the Court emphasized that “exploratory [394 U.S. 557, 572] searches . . . cannot be undertaken by officers with or without a warrant.” Id., at 62. This record presents a bald violation of that basic constitutional rule. To condone what happened here is to invite a government official to use a seemingly precise and legal warrant only as a ticket to get into a man’s home, and, once inside, to launch forth upon unconfined searches and indiscriminate seizures as if armed with all the unbridled and illegal power of a general warrant.

Because the films were seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, they were inadmissible in evidence at the appellant’s trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 . Accordingly, the judgment of conviction must be reversed.

[ Footnote 1 ] “[T]he premises known as 280 Springside Drive, S. E., two story residence with an annex on the main floor constructed of brick and frame, in Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia, in the Northern District of Georgia . . . .”

[ Footnote 2 ] “[B]ookmaking records, wagering paraphernalia consisting of bet slips, account sheets, recap sheets, collection sheets, adding machines, money used in or derived from the wagering business, records of purchases, records of real estate and bank transactions, the money for which was derived from the wagering business, and any other property used in the wagering business, which are being used and/or have been used in the operation of a bookmaking business or represent the fruits of a bookmaking business being operated in violation of Sections 4411, 4412 and 7203 IRC of 1954.”

[ Footnote 3 ] Before the Commissioner were no less than four lengthy and detailed affidavits, setting out the grounds for the affiants’ reasonable belief that the appellant was engaged in an illegal gambling enterprise, and that the paraphernalia of his trade were concealed in his house.

[ Footnote 4 ] The fact that almost no gambling material was actually found has no bearing, of course, upon the validity of the search. The constitutionality of a search depends in no measure upon what it brings to light. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 .

[ Footnote 5 ] See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 . [394 U.S. 557, 573]

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9 MLJ 490, *; [2009] 9 MLJ 490

The Malayan Law Journal

PDF Print Format
Kum Wah Sdn Bhd v RHB Bank Bhd (formerly known as Malayan Banking Corp Bhd) (United Frank Sdn Bhd & Ors, third parties)
[2009] 9 MLJ 490
SUIT NO D2–22–2139 OF 2001
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)
DECIDED-DATE-1: 6 JULY 2009
NOOR AZIAN J
CATCHWORDS:
Banking – Banker and customer – Duty of banker – Forgery – Debits in applications for cashier’s order – Whether applications made by plaintiff – Whether plaintiff discharged onus in proving signatures on applications were not those of its signatories – Whether defendant bank negligent in its duty to customer – Whether third parties liable to defendant if latter held liable to plaintiff

Evidence – Expert evidence – Handwriting expert – Whether gazetted document examiner more qualified to give evidence

HEADNOTES:
The plaintiff was a family company that was involved as wholesaler, dealer and retailer of wine and liquor. The three directors of the plaintiff company were all brothers. The plaintiff opened its current account in the form of an overdraft facility (‘the plaintiff’s account’) with United Malayan Banking Corporate Bhd, which through a series of mergers became to be known as the RHB Bank Bhd, the defendant. The signatories to the plaintiff’s account were the three directors, although the plaintiff asserted that for the banking facility it only used a rubber stamp bearing the plaintiff company’s name. On 19 June 2001, the plaintiff’s account was debited by RM848,806.45, which was made up as follows: RM6,302.15 in favour of EON Finance; RM374,402.15 in favour of Tan Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock; and RM468,502.15 in favour of United Frank Sdn Bhd. Of these, although the first debit of RM6,302.15 was debited from the plaintiff’s account it was never paid out to EON Finance Bhd. The second sum of RM374,402.15 in favour of Tan Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock was allowed to be banked into their joint account ie Tan Keng Pan and/or Ho Thiam Hock. All the three debits were in the form of applications for cashier’s order. The plaintiff argued that its account with the defendant bank was wrongfully debited by the sum of RM848,806.45. It then filed the present suit against the defendant for breach of mandate and/or negligence resulting in the wrongful debit of RM848,806.45 from its account. By this action the plaintiff sought a [*491] declaration that the debit was unlawful and without authority and that therefore the sum of RM848,806.45 ought to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant in turn filed a third party proceedings against United Frank Sdn Bhd, Tan Keng Pan and Ho Thiam Hock and claimed the sums of RM468,500 from United Frank Sdn Bhd and RM374,000 from the other two parties. The defendant claimed that it was entitled to be compensated by the third parties in respect of any damages and loss that it may have to pay in the event that it was held liable for the wrongful debits from the plaintiff’s account. The defendant submitted that it was entitled to claim for damages against the third parties for payments made under a mistake under s 73 of the Contracts Act 1950 and/or alternatively under the principles of monies had and received. There was no representation by the first third party ie United Frank Sdn Bhd but the court was informed that it was wound up. Tan Keng Pan and Ho Thiam Hock confirmed that they did not have any dealings with the directors of the plaintiff company. Ho Thiam Hock, who was in charge of daily operations of Sri Saran Daya Sdn Bhd, a money changer company, submitted that the payment of RM374,000 was for a bona fide valuable consideration ie in giving foreign currencies to an unknown person. Both the plaintiff and the defendant called their own handwriting experts as expert witnesses to verify whether the signatures that appeared on the three cashier’s order applications were those of the signatories to the plaintiff’s account. The issues to be tried were whether the three cashier’s order applications for the amount claimed were made by the plaintiff and whether the third parties were liable to the defendant in the event the latter was held liable to the plaintiff for the amount debited from the plaintiff’s account.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim with costs:
(1)   The three directors of the plaintiff appeared from their demeanour to
be honest witnesses. As such there was no reason to doubt their
evidence that they had not given the defendant bank the mandate to
issue the three cashier’s orders (see para 20).
(2)   The expert witness that the plaintiff called upon to give evidence at
the trial was more qualified to give evidence in respect of whether the
signatures on the three cashier’s order applications were forgeries
because he is a gazetted document examiner. This witness was convincing
in concluding that the signatures on the three cashier’s order
applications were not those of the plaintiff. As such, the plaintiff
had discharged its onus of proof as required under s 101 of the
Evidence Act 1950 in establishing that the three signatures were not
those of its signatories. Further, on the balance of probabilities the
documents did not have the mandate of the plaintiff with reference to
the rubber stamp (see para 20).
[*492]
(3)   Although the defendant bank had a duty to call its customers to verify
or check in respect of cashier’s order applications above RM20,000 it
would appear that the defendant had not done so. The fact that the
defendant allowed the cashier’s order for RM374,000 issued in the name
Tan Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock to be banked into a joint account bearing the
names Tan Keng Pan and/or Ho Thiam Hock is another piece of evidence
that would support the defendant’s negligence (see paras 21–23).
(4)   Tan Keng Pan and Ho Thiam Hock acted in good faith and there was no
mistake when they were paid for exchange of currencies. It was an
unknown person who had gained by the defendant’s mistake. Thus s 73 of
the 1950 Act would not apply in this case and the third parties were
not liable to the defendant (see paras 33–34).

Plaintif merupakan syarikat keluarga yang terlibat sebagai pemborong, pengedar dan peruncit wain dan arak. Ketiga-tiga pengarah plaintif syarikat merupakan adik-beradik. Plaintif membuka akaun semasanya dalam bentuk kemudahan overdraf (‘akaun plaintif’) dengan United Malayan Banking Corporate Bhd, yang mana berikutan dengan beberapa siri penggabungan, kini dikenali sebagai RHB Bank Bhd, defendan. Penandatangan akaun plaintif adalah ketiga-tiga pengarah tersebut, walaupun plaintif menegaskan bahawa bagi tujuan kemudahan perbankan, plaintif hanya menggunakan cap getah nama syarikat plaintif. Pada 19 Jun 2001, akaun plaintif didebitkan sebanyak RM848,806.45, yang mana pecahannya adalah seperti berikut: RM6,302.15 untuk EON Finance; RM374,402.15 untuk Tan Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock; dan RM468,502.15 untuk United Frank Sdn Bhd. Daripada kesemua ini, walaupun jumlah pertama sebanyak RM6,302.15 telah didebitkan daripada akaun plaintif tetapi jumlah tersebut tidak pernah dibayar kepada EON Finance Bhd. Jumlah kedua RM374,402.15 untuk Tan Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock dibenarkan dimasukkan ke akaun bersama iaitu Tan Keng Pan dan/atau Ho Thiam Hock. Ketiga-tiga debit ini dalam bentuk permohonan untuk perintah juruwang. Plaintif berhujah bahawa akaunnya dengan bank defendan telah salah didebitkan dengan jumlah RM848,806.45. Plaintif kemudiannya memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas kemungkiran mandat dan/atau kecuaian kerana debit salah sejumlah RM848,806.45 daripada akaunnya. Menerusi tindakan ini, plaintif memohon pengisytiharan bahawa debit tersebut adalah menyalahi undang-undang dan tanpa kebenaran dan jumlah RM848,806.45 harus dibayar kepada plaintif oleh defendan. Defendan pula memfailkan prosiding pihak ketiga terhadap United Frank Sdn Bhd, Tan Keng Pan dan Ho Thiam Hock dan menuntut sejumlah RM468,500 daripada United Frank Sdn Bhd dan RM374,000 daripada dua pihak yang lain tersebut. Defendan [*493] menyatakan bahawa defendan berhak dipampas oleh pihak-pihak ketiga atas sebarang kerugian dan pampasan yang defendan mungkin kena bayar jika defendan didapati bertanggungan atas salah debit daripada akaun plaintif. Defendan berhujah bahawa defendan berhak untuk menuntut ganti rugi terhadap pihak-pihak ketiga untuk bayaran yang telah dibuat atas kesilapan di bawah s 73 Akta Kontrak 1950 dan/atau secara alternatif di bawah prinsip-prinsip wang yang ada dan telah diterima. Tiada perwakilan bagi pihak ketiga yang pertama iaitu United Frank Sdn Bhd tetapi mahkamah dimaklumkan bahawa United Frank telah digulung. Tan Keng Pan dan Ho Thiam Hock mengesahkan bahawa mereka tiada urusan dengan pemgarah-pengarah plaintif syarikat. Ho Thiam Hock, yang bertanggungjawab atas urusan harian Sri Saran Daya Sdn Bhd, sebuah syarikat penggurup wang, menyatakan bahawa bayaran sebanyak RM374,000 adalah untuk balasan bernilai bona fide iaitu memberikan wang asing kepada orang yang tidak dikenali. Kedua-dua plaintif dan defendan memanggil pakar tulisan masing-masing sebagai saksi pakar untuk mengesahkan sama ada tandatangan-tandatangan yang tertera di atas ketiga-tiga permohonan perintah juruwang merupakan penandatangan akaun plaintif. Isu-isu yang perlu diputuskan ialah sama ada ketiga-tiga permohonan perintah juruwang bagi jumlah yang dituntut dibuat oleh plaintif dan sama ada pihak-pihak ketiga bertanggungan terhadap defendan jika defendan diputuskan bertanggungan terhadap plaintif untuk jumlah yang didebitkan daripada akaun plaintif.

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif dengan kos:
(1)   Melihat kepada tingkah laku ketiga-tiga pengarah plaintif menunjukkan
bahawa mereka saksi yang jujur. Oleh itu, tiada alasan untuk meragui
keterangan mereka bahawa mereka tidak memberikan mandat kepada defendan
bank untuk mengeluarkan tiga perintah juruwang (lihat perenggan 20).
(2)   Saksi pakar yang dipanggil plaintif memberi keterangan di perbicaraan
lebih berkelayakan untuk memberikan keterangan sama ada
tandatangan-tandatangan pada ketiga-tiga permohonan perintah juruwang
adalah palsu oleh sebab dia merupakan pemeriksa dokumen yang
diwartakan. Saksi ini amat meyakinkan apabila menyimpulkan bahawa
tandatangan-tandatangan pada ketiga-tiga permohonan perintah juruwang
bukanlah milik plaintif. Oleh itu, plaintif berjaya membuktikan atas
beban pembuktian seperti yang dikehendaki di bawah s 101 Akta
Keterangan 1950 dalam mengesahkan bahawa ketiga-tiga tandatangan
tersebut bukanlah milik penandatangan plaintif. Selanjutnya, atas
imbangan kebarangkalian, [*494] dokumen-dokumen tersebut tidak
mendapat mandat daripada plaintif dengan merujuk kepada cap getah
tersebut (lihat perenggan 20).
(3)   Walaupun defendan bank bertanggungjawab menghubungi
pelanggan-pelanggannya untuk mengesah atau memeriksa
permohonan-permohonan perintah juruwang yang berjumlah RM20,000 ke
atas, tetapi defendan tidak berbuat demikian. Fakta bahawa defendan
membenarkan perintah juruwang untuk sejumlah RM374,000 atas nama Tan
Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock dimasukkan ke dalam akaun bersama atas nama Tan
Keng Pan dan/atau Ho Thiam Hock merupakan satu lagi bukti kecuaian
defendan (lihat perenggan 21–23).
(4)   Tan Keng Pan dan Ho Thiam Hock betindak secara suci hati dan tiada
kesilapan apabila mereka dibayar untuk penukaran wang asing. Adalah
tidak diketahui siapakah yang mendapat keuntungan atas kesilapan
defendan. Maka s 73 Akta 1950 tidak terpakai atas kes ini dan
pihak-pihak ketiga tidak bertanggungan terhadap defendan (lihat
perenggan 33–34).

Notes
For cases on duty of banker, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2005 Reissue) paras 1818–1824.
For cases on handwriting expert, see 7(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2006 Reissue) paras 1465–1473.

Cases referred to
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Hasbudin Haslin [1998] 2 CLJ Supp 332, CA
Barclay’s Bank Ltd v WJ Simms & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 677, QBD

Legislation referred to
Contracts Act 1950 s 73
Evidence Act 1950 s 101

David Hoh (Kingston Tan and HQ Kwong with him) (Heiley Hassan, Tan & Partners) for the plaintiff.
Kumar Kanagasingam (Suhaiza Zakaria with him) (Lee Hishamuddin Allen & Gledhill) for the defendant.
NS Guok (SK Thong with him) (Thong Seng Kong & Assoc) for the third parties.

Noor Azian J:

[1] On 19 June 2001, the plaintiff’s (Kum Wah Sdn Bhd) account with the defendant, RHB Bank Bhd (formerly known as United Malayan Banking [*495] Corp Bhd) was debited by the sum of RM848,806.45 which the plaintiff alleged was wrongfully done by the defendant.

[2] The plaintiff then filed this suit against the defendant for breach of mandate and/or negligence resulting in the wrongful and unilateral debit from the plaintiff’s account with the defendant of the sum of RM848,806.45.

[3] The plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the debit of the said sum from the plaintiff’s account was unlawful and without authority and that the said sum be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.

[4] The defendant filed third party proceedings against United Frank Sdn Bhd (‘FTP’) and Tan Kang Pan (‘STP’) and Ho Thiam Hock (‘TTP’).

[5] In respect of the third party proceedings, the defendant claimed that it had made payments to FTP, STP and TTP in the following amounts:

(1)	FTP —	RM468,500; and
(2)	STP/TTP —	RM374,000.

[6] The defendant claims that it is entitled to be compensated by the STP and TTP in respect if any damages and loss that it may have to pay in the event the defendant is held responsible to the plaintiff for the amount the plaintiff claimed was wrongfully paid by the defendant to the STP and TTP under s 73 of the Contracts Act 1950 or amount that was had and received by both the STP and the TTP.

[7] For the trial the plaintiff called five witnesses, they being:

(1)	PW1	— Tai Lai Kee.
		Former bank manager of RHB
		Bank, Pudu branch.
(2)	PW2	— Look See Kuan.
		One of the three directors
		of the plaintiff.
(3)	PW3	— Look See Kee. One
		of the three directors of
		the plaintiff.
(4)	PW4	— Bala Shanmugam
		a/l M Vadivelu. Forensic
		document examiner.
(5)	PW5	— Look Kan Chai.
		One of the three directors
		of the plaintiff.

[*496]

[8] The defendant called six witnesses:

(1)	DW1	— Aziz bin
		Abdullah. Assistant
		superintendent of police.
(2)	DW2	— Goh Sing Min.
		Defendant’s branch
		manager
(3)	DW3	— Leong Fang Lang.
		Head cashier with the
		defendant.
(4)	DW4	— Aw Peng Onn.
		Defendant’s
		manager.
(5)	DW5	— Mohd Azmi Mohd
		Yusoff. At one time an
		assistant bank manager of
		the defendant.
(6)	DW6	— Harcharan Singh
		Tara. Chemico-Legal and
		Forensic consultant.

[9] The third parties called one witness:

(1)	TPW1	— Ho Thiam Hock in
		charge of daily operations
		of Sri Saran Daya Sdn Bhd,
		a money changer company.
		Gave foreign currencies to
		unknown person who had
		banked in the RM374,000
		into the RHB bank account
		No
		2–14213–9000292–7.

[10] The brief facts of the case is that the plaintiff was established since 21 June 1978 as a family company involved as wholesaler, dealer and retailer of wine and liquor.

[11] There are three directors of the plaintiff’s company ie PW2, PW3 and PW5 and they are all siblings being 66 years old, 72 years old and 65 years old respectively.

[12] On 19 June 2001 the plaintiff’s account was debited for the following sums:

(1)	RM6,302.15	— In favour of EON
		Finance Bhd;
(2)	RM374,402.15	— In favour of Tan
		Kang Pan @ Ho Thiam Hock;
		and
(3)	RM468.502.15	— In favour of
		United Frank Sdn Bhd.

[13] Although the RM6,302.15 was debited from the plaintiff’s account with the defendant, the defendant never actually paid out this amount to EON Finance Bhd.

[14] The TTP confirmed that they did not have any dealings with the plaintiff nor with the directors, PW2, PW3 and PW5.

[15] The plaintiff opened its current account in the form of overdraft facility with the defendant (then known as United Malayan Banking Corp [*497] Bhd which through a series of mergers became to be known now as RHB Bank Bhd) since 12 November 1979 ie 22 years prior to the relevant date. Initially, the plaintiff’s account was at the defendant’s Pudu branch (located in Sg Besi) where upon merger with the defendant’s Jalan Pasar branch in May 2001, the plaintiff’s account was transferred to the Jalan Pasar branch.

[16] Originally the plaintiff’s overdraft facility was RM700,000 but in 1979 it was increased to 1.5m vide the defendant’s letter of offer of 26 December 2000 — exh ‘P3’. The overdraft was for a working capital.

[17] The signatories to the plaintiff’s account were three ie PW2, PW3 and PW5 as well as the plaintiff’s rubber stamp. The plaintiff asserted that for the banking facility it only used the rubber stamp as in exh ‘P18(a)’.

[18] After a trial of 29 days, four days before the first trial judge, one day before the second trial judge and 24 days before myself and notes of evidence totaling 269 pp, I allowed the plaintiff’s claim with cost and ordered the defendant to refund the amount debited with interest from the date the amount was debited ie 19 June 2001 until 19 November 2007. The defendant’s claim against the STP and TTP was dismissed with cost.

[19] The issue before the court is a question of fact ie whether the applications for the cashier’s order for the amount claimed were made by the plaintiff. The relevant application forms for this case are marked as exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and ‘D6’.

[20] In considering the plaintiff’s claim for breach of mandate and/or negligence resulting in the wrongful and unilateral debit from the plaintiff’s account with the defendant of the sum of RM848,806.45, the following were considered:

No mandate given by the plaintiff for issuance of exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and
‘D6’

(1) Direct evidence of PW2 and PW3 denying giving mandate

I have no reason to doubt the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW5 who at such
ripe ages of 66 years, 72 years and 65 years are running a family
business. Observing their demeanor they appear simple people and I
agree that they bear out as honest witnesses.

(2) Signature of PW2 and PW3 as found in exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and ‘D6’ are
forgeries

Both parties called their own expert witnesses and it was their
evidence that took up most of the trial time. That was why the trial
took so long.

[*498]

Bala Shanmugam (PW4) was the expert witness for the plaintiff and
Harcharan Singh Tara (DW6) was the expert witness for the defendant.

Based on their qualifications and experiences, I am more inclined to
accept that PW4 is more qualified to give evidence in respect of
whether the signatures on exhs ‘D4’; ‘D5’ and ‘D6’ are forgery. DW6 may
have been the director general of the Malaysian Chemistry Department
but he was never gazetted as a document examiner in the government
service. He said ‘I am not a gazetted document examiner. I have never
produced a technical report. Yes, a technical report can only be
produced by a gazetted document examiner.’. As such I am of the
considered opinion that PW4 is more qualified and experienced to give
testimony in respect of signatures on the three documents mentioned.

From the elaborate evidence adduced through PW4 and the extensive
cross-examination of the same witness by the defendant’s counsel, I am
satisfied on the balanced of probabilities that the two signatures on
all the three exhibits are not those of PW2 and PW3.

I will not elaborate in detail but suffice if I were to say that the
plaintiff’s expert witness (PW4) was able to convince me that the
signatures on the three documents are not that of the plaintiff’s.

The plaintiff had discharged their onus of proof as required by s 101
of the Evidence Act 1950 in establishing that the signatures on the
three documents are not those of the signatories to the plaintiff’s
account with the defendant.

(3) Plaintiff’s forged rubber stamp

I totally agree that there is a difference in the rubber stamp used on
the three documents. PW2 and PW3 had described the discrepancy in the
rubber stamp, they used for banking facility and the one used on the
documents ie ‘No:’ (with colon) as opposed to ‘No.’ (with full
stop).

On the balance of probabilities also, I am satisfied that the documents
did not have the mandate of the plaintiff with reference to the rubber
stamp.

(b) Negligence by the defendant

[21] From the testimonies of the defendant’s witnesses, the defendant had a duty to call its customers to verify/check in respect of applications for cashiers orders exceeding RM20,000. DW2 gave evidence to this effect.

[22] Here again, considering the witnesses, PW2, PW3 and PW5, the simple old brothers who ran the family business I am more inclined to believe [*499] them ie they did not receive any phone calls from anybody from the defendant to check/verify if the plaintiff had applied for the cashier’s order.

[23] Another piece of evidence that would support the sheer negligence of the defendant is that the cashier’s order for RM374,000 issued in the names of STP @ TTP (Tan Kang Pan @ Ho Thiam Hock) was allowed to be banked into their joint account (Tan Kang Pan and/or Ho Thiam Hock). This demonstrates the extreme carelessness on the part of the defendant. Judicial notice can be taken that in banking procedure, @ is an account of one person identified by more than one name whilst joint account is an account of more than one person.

[24] I am therefore of the considered opinion, based on the aforesaid reasons that the application for the cashier’s order were never made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was therefore allowed with cost.

[25] In respect of the third party proceedings, only the STP and the TTP were represented.

[26] The defendant alleged that as a result of payment to the STP and the TTP without mandate of the plaintiff and/or under a mandate, the defendant is entitled to recover damages against the STP and the TTP under s 73 of the Contracts Act 1950 and/or alternatively under the principles of monies had and received.

[27] The defence of the STP and TTP is essentially that the payment of RM374,000 on 19 June 2001 into their joint account held by them was for a bona fide valuable consideration ie in consideration that Sri Saran Daya Sdn Bhd (a company operating a money changer business) changing a sum of USD30,000, Pound Sterling 30,000, Hong Kong Dollar 200,000 to a person not known to both the STP and the TTP.

[28] The agreed issues to be tried between the parties are as follows:

(a) whether the STP and TTP are liable to pay the defendant for the
judgment sum in the event the defendant is held liable to the plaintiff;

(b) if the defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff, whether the defendant
had made a mistake in making the payment to the STP and TTP as pleaded;
and

(c) whether the defendant is entitled to claim for damages against the STP
and TTP for payment under mistake under s 73 of the Contracts Act 1950
and/or alternatively under monies had and received.

[*500]

[29] The relevant evidence adduced in respect of the third party proceedings were:

(a) Three applications for cashier’s order exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and ‘D6’ was for
the following:

(i) RM468,500 — For United Frank Sdn Bhd; ‘D4’.

(ii) RM374,000 — For Tan Kang Pan @ Ho Thiam Hock; ‘D5’.

(iii) RM6,300 — For EON Finance Bhd; ‘D6’.

(b) In respect of the cashier’s order for RM374,000 it was banked in into
the joint account of the STP and TTP in spite of the cashier’s
order bearing their names as alias.

(d) The TTP had given the currency to a person who came to the premises of
the TTP’s company.

[30] I have no doubt about the evidence given by TPW1. However I would like to state again that the defendant’s branch that accepted the cashier’s order for the sum of RM374,000 was definitely careless in allowing a cheque bearing the names of the STP and TTP as alias to be banked in into their joint account.

[31] The STP and TTP into whose account the cashier’s order was banked in gave valuable consideration.

[32] It was in fact the defendant who was negligent in not verifying the three application forms and subsequently allowing the cashier’s order for RM374,000 to be banked in into the joint account of the STP and the TTP. If the bank staff had been vigilant and careful and noticed the discrepancy, it would ring a bell and the cashier’s order would be stopped.

[33] Section 73 of the Contracts Act 1950 is in respect of the liability of a person to whom money is paid, or thing delivered, by mistake or under coercion. In the case as for the STP and TTP there was no mistake, they were paid for exchange of currencies. They acted in good faith. It was unknown person who had gained by the defendant’s mistake. In the case of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Hasbudin Haslin [1998] 2 CLJ Supp 332, the case of Barclay’s Bank Ltd v WJ Simms & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 677 was referred to where Geoff J said:

[*501]

It follows that the payee has given consideration; with the consequence
that although the payment has been caused by the bank’s mistake, the
money is irrecoverable from the payee unless the transaction of payment
is itself set aside.

[34] Based on the aforesaid, I find that the STP and TTP is not liable to the defendant who is found liable for the plaintiff’s losses. Therefore, the defendant’s counterclaim against STP and TTP is dismissed with costs.

[35] With respect to the FTP, the court was informed that it was wound up (exh ‘P25’). Since there was no representation for the FTP and the defendant did not ask for any order, I would strike out the claim against the FTP.

ORDER:
Plaintiff’s claim allowed with costs.

***********************************************************************************************

U.S. Supreme Court

DAUBERT v. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)

509 U.S. 579

WILLIAM DAUBERT, ET UX., ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MERRELL
DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-102

Argued March 30, 1993
Decided June 28, 1993

Petitioners, two minor children and their parents, alleged in their suit against respondent that the children’s serious birth defects had been caused by the mothers’ prenatal ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription drug marketed by respondent. The District Court granted respondent summary judgment based on a well-credentialed expert’s affidavit concluding, upon reviewing the extensive published scientific literature on the subject, that maternal use of Bendectin has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects. Although petitioners had responded with the testimony of eight other well-credentialed experts, who based their conclusion that Bendectin can cause birth defects on animal studies, chemical structure analyses, and the unpublished “reanalysis” of previously published human statistical studies, the court determined that this evidence did not meet the applicable “general acceptance” standard for the admission of expert testimony. The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed, citing Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014, for the rule that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific community.

Held:

The Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provide the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. Pp. 4-17.

(a) Frye’s “general acceptance” test was superseded by the Rules’ adoption. The Rules occupy the field, United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 , and, although the common law of evidence may serve as an aid to their application, id., at 51-52, respondent’s assertion that they somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Nothing in the Rules as a [509 U.S. 579, 2] whole or in the text and drafting history of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert testimony, gives any indication that “general acceptance” is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules’ liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to “opinion” testimony. Pp. 4-8.

(b) The Rules – especially Rule 702 – place appropriate limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence by assigning to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. The reliability standard is established by Rule 702′s requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific . . . knowledge,” since the adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in science’s methods and procedures, while the word “knowledge” connotes a body of known facts or of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as true on good grounds. The Rule’s requirement that the testimony “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” goes primarily to relevance by demanding a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility. Pp. 9-12.

(c) Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. Many considerations will bear on the inquiry, including whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. Throughout, the judge should also be mindful of other applicable Rules. Pp. 12-15.

(d) Cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising “general acceptance” standard, is the appropriate means by which evidence based on valid principles may be challenged. That even limited screening by the trial judge, on occasion, will prevent the jury from hearing of authentic scientific breakthroughs is simply a consequence of the fact that the Rules are not designed to seek cosmic understanding but, rather, to resolve legal disputes. Pp. 15-17.

951 F.2d 1128 (CA9 1991), vacated and remanded. [509 U.S. 579, 3]

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II-A, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-B, II-C, III, and IV, in which WHITE, O’CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. ___.

Michael H. Gottesman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Kenneth J. Chesebro, Barry J. Nace, David L. Shapiro, and Mary G. Gillick.

Charles Fried argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Charles R. Nesson, Joel I. Klein, Richard G. Taranto, Hall R. Marston, George E. Berry, Edward H. Stratemeier, and W. Glenn Forrester. *

[ Footnote * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Texas et al. by Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota,, Marc Racicot, Attorney General of Montana, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, and Brian Stuart Koukoutchos; for the American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics et al. by Joan E. Bertin, Marsha S. Berzon, and Albert H. Meyerhoff; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White and Roxanne Barton Conlin; for Ronald Bayer et al by Brain Stuart Koukoutchos, Priscilla Budeiri, Arthur Bryant, and George W. Conk; and for Daryl E. Chubin et al. by Ron Simon and Nicole Schultheis. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Miguel A. Estrada, Michael Jay Singer, and John P. Schnitker; for the American Insurance Association by William J. Kilberg, Paul Blankenstein, Bradford R. Clark, and Craig A. Berrington; for the American Medical Association et al. by Carter G.. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, and Jack R. Bierig; for the American Tort Reform Association by John G. Kester and John W. Vardaman, Jr.; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Timothy B. Dyk, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association by Louis R. Cohen and Daniel Marcus; for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., et al. by Victor E. Schwartz, Robert P. Charrow, and Paul F. Rothstein; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Scott G. Campbell, Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard A. Samp; and for Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. by Martin S. Kaufman. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. by Richard A. Meserve and Bert Black; for the American College of Legal Medicine by Miles J. Zaremski; for the Carnegie Commission on Science,, Technology, and Government by Steven G. Gallagher, Elizabeth H. Esty, and Margaret A. Berger; for the Defense Research Institute, Inc., by Joseph A. Sherman, E. Wayne Taff, and Harvey L. Kaplan; for the New England Journal of Medicine et al. by Michael Malina and Jeffrey I. D. Lewis; for A Group of American Law Professors by Donald N. Bersoff; for Alvan R. Feinstein by Don M. Kennedy, Loretta M. Smith, and Richard A. Oetheimer; and for Kenneth Rothman et al. by Neil B. Cohen. [509 U.S. 579, 1]

OJ JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we are called upon to determine the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial.

Petitioners Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller are minor children born with serious birth defects. They and their parents sued respondent in California state court, alleging that the birth defects had been caused by the mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription antinausea drug marketed by respondent. Respondent removed the suits to federal court on diversity grounds.

After extensive discovery, respondent moved for summary judgment, contending that Bendectin does not cause birth defects in humans and that petitioners would be unable to come forward with any admissible evidence that it does. In support of its motion, respondent submitted an affidavit of Steven H. Lamm, physician and epidemiologist, who is a well-credentialed expert on the risks from exposure to various [509 U.S. 579, 2] chemical substances. 1 Doctor Lamm stated that he had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and human birth defects – more than 30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients. No study had found Bendectin to be a human teratogen (i.e., a substance capable of causing malformations in fetuses). On the basis of this review, Doctor Lamm concluded that maternal use of Bendectin during the first trimester of pregnancy has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects.

Petitioners did not (and do not) contest this characterization of the published record regarding Bendectin. Instead, they responded to respondent’s motion with the testimony of eight experts of their own, each of whom also possessed impressive credentials. 2 These experts had concluded that Bendectin can cause birth defects. Their conclusions were based upon “in vitro” (test tube) and “in vivo” (live) animal studies that found a link between Bendectin and malformations; pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of Bendectin that purported to show similarities between the [509 U.S. 579, 3] structure of the drug and that of other substance known to cause birth defects; and the “reanalysis” of previously published epidemiological (human statistical) studies.

The District Court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. The court stated that scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is based is “`sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs.’” 727 F.Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989), quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (CA9 1978). The court concluded that petitioners’ evidence did not meet this standard. Given the vast body of epidemiological data concerning Bendectin, the court held, expert opinion which is not based on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to establish causation. 727 F.Supp., at 575. Thus, the animal cell studies, live animal studies, and chemical structure analyses on which petitioners had relied could not raise, by themselves, a reasonably disputable jury issue regarding causation. Ibid. Petitioners’ epidemiological analyses, based as they were on recalculations of data in previously published studies that had found no causal link between the drug and birth defects, were ruled to be inadmissible because they had not been published or subjected to peer review. Ibid.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 951 F.2d 1128 (1991). Citing Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923), the court stated that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific community. 951 F.2d, at 1129-1130. The court declared that expert opinion based on a methodology that diverges “significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the field . . . cannot be shown to be `generally accepted as a reliable technique.’” Id., at 1130, quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (CA9 1985). [509 U.S. 579, 4]

The court emphasized that other Courts of Appeals considering the risks of Bendectin had refused to admit reanalyses of epidemiological studies that had been neither published nor subjected to peer review. 951 F.2d, at 1130-1131. Those courts had found unpublished reanalyses “particularly problematic in light of the massive weight of the original published studies supporting [respondent's] position, all of which had undergone full scrutiny from the scientific community.” Id., at 1130. Contending that reanalysis is generally accepted by the scientific community only when it is subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ reanalyses as “unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review process, and generated solely for use in litigation.” Id., at 1131. The court concluded that petitioners’ evidence provided an insufficient foundation to allow admission of expert testimony that Bendectin caused their injuries and, accordingly, that petitioners could not satisfy their burden of proving causation at trial.

We granted certiorari, 506 U.S. 914 (1992), in light of sharp divisions among the courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony. Compare, e.g., United States v. Shorter, 257 U.S. App. D.C. 358, 363-364, 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (applying the “general acceptance” standard), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987), with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (CA3 1990) (rejecting the “general acceptance” standard).

In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye case, the “general acceptance” test has been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial. See E. Green & C. Nesson, Problems, Cases, and Materials on Evidence 649 (1983). Although under increasing [509 U.S. 579, 5] attack of late, the rule continues to be followed by a majority of courts, including the Ninth Circuit. 3

The Frye test has its origin in a short and citation-free 1923 decision concerning the admissibility of evidence derived from a systolic blood pressure deception test, a crude precursor to the polygraph machine. In what has become a famous (perhaps infamous) passage, the then Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described the device and its operation and declared:

“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone, the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” 54 App. D.C., at 47, 293 F., at 1014 (emphasis added).

Because the deception test had “not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made,” evidence of its results was ruled inadmissible. Ibid.

The merits of the Frye test have been much debated, and scholarship on its proper scope and application is legion. 4 [509 U.S. 579, 6] Petitioners’ primary attack, however, is not on the content, but on the continuing authority, of the rule. They contend that the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 5 We agree.

We interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988). Rule 402 provides the baseline:

“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules [509 U.S. 579, 7] prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”

“Relevant evidence” is defined as that which has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Rule 401. The Rule’s basic standard of relevance thus is a liberal one.

Frye, of course, predated the Rules by half a century. In United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), we considered the pertinence of background common law in interpreting the Rules of Evidence. We noted that the Rules occupy the field, id., at 49, but, quoting Professor Cleary, the Reporter, explained that the common law nevertheless could serve as an aid to their application:

“`In principle, under the Federal Rules, no common law of evidence remains. “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided. . . .” In reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated powers.’” Id., at 51-52.

We found the common law precept at issue in the Abel case entirely consistent with Rule 402′s general requirement of admissibility, and considered it unlikely that the drafters had intended to change the rule. Id., at 50-51. In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), on the other hand, the Court was unable to find a particular common-law doctrine in the Rules, and so held it superseded.

Here there is a specific Rule that speaks to the contested issue. Rule 702, governing expert testimony, provides:

“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, [509 U.S. 579, 8] or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”

Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes “general acceptance” as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a “general acceptance” standard. The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid “general acceptance” requirement would be at odds with the “liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules and their “general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to `opinion’ testimony.” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S., at 169 (citing Rules 701 to 705). See also Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991) (“The Rules were designed to depend primarily upon lawyer-adversaries and sensible triers of fact to evaluate conflicts”). Given the Rules’ permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention “general acceptance,” the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made “general acceptance” the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials. 6

That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place [509 U.S. 579, 9] no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. 7 Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules, the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.

The primary locus of this obligation is Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify. “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” an expert “may testify thereto.” (Emphasis added.) The subject of an expert’s testimony must be “scientific . . . knowledge.” 8 The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word “knowledge” [connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.] The term “applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986). Of course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be “known” to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science. See, e.g., Brief for Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. as Amici Curiae 9 (“Indeed, scientists do not assert that they know what is immutably `true’ – they are committed to searching for new, temporary theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena”); Brief for American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8 (“Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about [509 U.S. 579, 10] the universe. Instead, it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement” (emphasis in original). But, in order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be [derived by the scientific method.] Proposed testimony must be supported by [appropriate validation] – i.e., “good grounds,” based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific knowledge” establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 9

Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” This condition goes primarily to relevance. “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, nonhelpful.” 3 Weinstein & Berger 70202., p. 702-18. See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (CA3 1985) (“An additional consideration under Rule 702 – and another aspect of relevancy – is whether expert testimony proffered in the [509 U.S. 579, 11] case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute”). The consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of “fit.” Ibid. “Fit” is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes. See Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 258 (1986). The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific “knowledge” about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night. Rule 702′s “helpfulness” standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.

That these requirements are embodied in Rule 702 is not surprising. Unlike an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. See Rules 702 and 703. Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge – a rule which represents “a `most pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon `the most reliable sources of information,’” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed.Rule Evid. 602, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 755 (citation omitted) – is premised on an assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.

Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to [509 U.S. 579, 12] Rule 104(a), 10 whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. 11 This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid, and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test. But some general observations are appropriate.

Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested. “Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.” Green, 645. See also C. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science 49 (1966) (“[T]he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test”); K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. [509 U.S. 579, 13] 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability”).

Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability, see S. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers 61-76 (1990), and, in some instances, well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published, see Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990). Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of “good science,” in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected. See J. Ziman, Reliable Knowledge: An Exploration of the Grounds for Belief in Science 130-133 (1978); Relman & Angell, How Good Is Peer Review?, 321 New Eng.J.Med. 827 (1989). The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.

Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error, see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-354 (CA7 1989) (surveying studies of the error rate of spectrographic voice identification technique), and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation, see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (CA2 1978) (noting professional organization’s standard governing spectrographic analysis), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).

Finally, “general acceptance” can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A “reliability assessment does not require, although [509 U.S. 579, 14] it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community.” United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d, at 1238. See also 3 Weinstein Berger 70203., pp. 702-41 to 702-42. Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and “a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community,” Downing, 753 F.2d, at 1238, may properly be viewed with skepticism.

The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. 12 Its overarching subject is the scientific validity – and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability – of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.

Throughout, a judge assessing a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable rules. Rule 703 provides that expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts or data are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.” Rule 706 allows the court at its discretion to procure the assistance of an expert of its own choosing. Finally, Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially [509 U.S. 579, 15] outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . . .” Judge Weinstein has explained: “Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge, in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules, exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.” Weinstein, 138 F.R.D., at 632.

III

We conclude by briefly addressing what appear to be two underlying concerns of the parties and amici in this case. Respondent expresses apprehension that abandonment of “general acceptance” as the exclusive requirement for admission will result in a “free-for-all” in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions. In this regard, respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987). Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56. Cf., e.g., Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (CA6) (holding that scientific evidence that provided foundation for expert testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, was not sufficient to allow a jury to find it more probable than not that defendant caused plaintiff’s injury), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (CA5 [509 U.S. 579, 16] 1989) (reversing judgment entered on jury verdict for plaintiffs because evidence regarding causation was insufficient), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (CA5 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Green, 680-681. These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising “general acceptance” test, are the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 702.

Petitioners and, to a greater extent, their amici exhibit a different concern. They suggest that recognition of a screening role for the judge that allows for the exclusion of “invalid” evidence will sanction a stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy, and will be inimical to the search for truth. See, e.g., Brief for Ronald Bayer et al. as Amici Curiae. It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and scientific analyses. Yet there are important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment – often of great consequence – about a particular set of events in the past. We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding, [509 U.S. 579, 17] but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes. 13

To summarize: “General acceptance” is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence – especially Rule 702 – do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.

The inquiries of the District Court and the Court of Appeals focused almost exclusively on “general acceptance,” as gauged by publication and the decisions of other courts. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Footnotes

[ Footnote 1 ] Doctor Lamm received his master’s and doctor of medicine degrees from the University of Southern California. He has served as a consultant in birth-defect epidemiology for the National Center for Health Statistics, and has published numerous articles on the magnitude of risk from exposure to various chemical and biological substances. App. 34-44.

[ Footnote 2 ] For example, Shanna Helen Swan, who received a master’s degree in biostistics from Columbia University and a doctorate in statistics from the University of California at Berkeley, is chief of the section of the California Department of Health and Services that determines causes of birth defects, and has served as a consultant to the World Health Organization, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institutes of Health. Id., at degree 113-114, 131-132. Stuart A. Newman, who received his bachelor’s in chemistry from Columbia University and his master’s and doctorate in chemistry from the University of Chicago, respectively, is a professor at New York Medical College, and has spent over a decade studying the effect of chemicals on limb development. Id., at 54-56. The credentials of the others are similarly impressive. See id., at 61-66, 73-80, 148-153, 187-192, and Attachments 12, 20, 21, 26, 31, and 32 to Petitioners’ Opposition to Summary Judgment, in No. 84-20, 3-G(I) (SD Cal.).

[ Footnote 3 ] For a catalog of the many cases on either side of this controversy, see P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 1-5, pp. 10-14 (1986 and Supp. 1991).

[ Footnote 4 ] See, e.g., Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw.U.L.Rev. 643 (1992) (hereinafter Green); Becker & Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years – the Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory [509 U.S. 579, 6] Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 Geo. WashLRev. 857, 876-885 (1992); Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye is Sixty-Five Years Old; Should He Retire?, 16 West St.U.L.Rev. 357 (1989); Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 Ford.L.Rev. 595 (1988), Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C.L.Rev. 1 (1988); Proposals for a Model Rule on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 26 Jurimetrics J. 235 (1986); Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 1197 (1980); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 7, 119, 125-127 (1987).

Indeed, the debates over Frye are such a well-established part of the academic landscape that a distinct term – “Frye ologist” – has been advanced to describe those who take part. See Behringer, Introduction, Proposals for a Model Rule on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 26 Jurimetrics J., 237, 239 (1986), quoting Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 Jurimetrics J. 254, 264 (1984).

[ Footnote 5 ] Like the question of Frye’s merit, the dispute over its survival has divided courts and commentators. Compare, e.g., United States v. (Frye is superseded by the Rules of Evidence, Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (CA2 1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979) with Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1111, 1115-1116 (CA5 1991) (en banc) (Frye and the Rules coexist), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992), 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence 70203., pp. 702-36 to 702-37 (1988) (hereinafter Weinstein & Berger) (Frye is dead), and M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 703.2 (3d ed. 1991) (Frye lives). See generally P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 1-5, n. 28-29 (citing authorities).

[ Footnote 6 ] Because we hold that Frye has been superseded and base the discussion that follows on the content of the congressionally enacted Federal Rules of Evidence, we do not address petitioners’ argument that application of the Frye rule in this diversity case, as the application of a judge-made rule affecting substantive rights, would violate the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

[ Footnote 7 ] THE CHIEF JUSTICE “do[es] not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility,” post, at 4, but would neither say how it does so nor explain what that role entails. We believe the better course is to note the nature and source of the duty.

[ Footnote 8 ] Rule 702 also applies to “technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Our discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered here.

[ Footnote 9 ] We note that scientists typically distinguish between “validity” (does the principle support what it purports to show?) and “reliability” (does application of the principle produce consistent results?). See Black, 56 Ford.L.Rev. at, 599. Although “the difference between accuracy, validity, and reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no more than a hen’s kick,” Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 256 (1986), our reference here is to evidentiary reliability – that is, trustworthiness. Cf., e.g., Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed.Rule Evid. 602, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 755. (“`[T]he rule requiring that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact’ is a `most pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon `the most reliable sources of information.’” (citation omitted)); Advisory Committee’s Notes on Art. VIII of Rules of Evidence, 29 U.S.C. App., p. 770 (hearsay exceptions will be recognized only “under circumstances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness”). [In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.]

[ Footnote 10 ] Rule 104(a) provides:

“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) [pertaining to conditional admissions]. In making its determination, it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.” These matters should be established by a preponderance of proof. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 -176 (1987).

[ Footnote 11 ] Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on “novel” scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended. Indeed, theories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule Evidence 201.

[ Footnote 12 ] A number of authorities have presented variations on the reliability approach, each with its own slightly different set of factors. See, e.g., Downing, 753 F.2d, at 1238-1239 (on which our discussion draws in part); 3 Weinstein & Berger 70203., pp. 7021 to 7022 (on which the Downing court in turn partially relied); McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L.Rev. 879, 911-912 (1982); and Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 231 (1983) (statement by Margaret Berger). To the extent that they focus on the reliability of evidence as ensured by the scientific validity of its underlying principles, all these versions may well have merit, although we express no opinion regarding any of their particular details.

[ Footnote 13 ] This is not to say that judicial interpretation, as opposed to adjudicative factfinding, does not share basic characteristics of the scientific endeavor: “The work of a judge is in one sense enduring, and in another, ephemeral. . . . In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross and a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound and fine.” B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 178-179 (1921).

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The petition for certiorari in this case presents two questions: first, whether the rule of Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923), remains good law after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence; and second, if Frye remains valid, whether it requires expert scientific testimony to have been subjected to a peer review process in order to be admissible. The Court concludes, correctly in my view, that the Frye rule did not survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and I therefore join Parts I and II-A of its opinion. The second question presented in the petition for certiorari necessarily is mooted by this holding, but the Court nonetheless proceeds to construe Rules 702 and 703 very much in the abstract, and then offers some “general observations.” Ante, at 12.

“General observations” by this Court customarily carry great weight with lower federal courts, but the ones offered here suffer from the flaw common to most such observations – they are not applied to deciding whether particular testimony was or was not admissible, and therefore they tend to be not only general, but vague and abstract. This is particularly unfortunate in a case such as this, where [509 U.S. 579, 2] the ultimate legal question depends on an appreciation of one or more bodies of knowledge not judicially noticeable, and subject to different interpretations in the briefs of the parties and their amici. Twenty-two amicus briefs have been filed in the case, and indeed the Court’s opinion contains no fewer than 37 citations to amicus briefs and other secondary sources.

The various briefs filed in this case are markedly different from typical briefs, in that large parts of them do not deal with decided cases or statutory language – the sort of material we customarily interpret. Instead, they deal with definitions of scientific knowledge, scientific method, scientific validity, and peer review – in short, matters far afield from the expertise of judges. This is not to say that such materials are not useful or even necessary in deciding how Rule 702 should be applied; but it is to say that the unusual subject matter should cause us to proceed with great caution in deciding more than we have to, because our reach can so easily exceed our grasp.

But even if it were desirable to make “general observations” not necessary to decide the questions presented, I cannot subscribe to some of the observations made by the Court. In Part II-B, the Court concludes that reliability and relevancy are the touchstones of the admissibility of expert testimony. Ante, at 10-11. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides, as the Court points out, that “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” But there is no similar reference in the Rule to “reliability.” The Court constructs its argument by parsing the language “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, . . . an expert . . . may testify thereto. . . .” Fed. Rule Evid. 702. It stresses that the subject of the expert’s testimony must be “scientific . . . knowledge,” and points out that “scientific” “implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science” and that the word “knowledge” [509 U.S. 579, 3] “connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Ante, at 9. From this it concludes that “scientific knowledge” must be “derived by the scientific method.” Ante, at 10. Proposed testimony, we are told, must be supported by “appropriate validation.” Ante, at 10. Indeed, in footnote 9, the Court decides that “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.” Ante, at 10, n. 9 (emphasis in original).

Questions arise simply from reading this part of the Court’s opinion, and countless more questions will surely arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its teaching to particular offers of expert testimony. Does all of this dicta apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis of “technical or other specialized knowledge” – the other types of expert knowledge to which Rule 702 applies – or are the “general observations” limited only to “scientific knowledge”? What is the difference between scientific knowledge and technical knowledge; does Rule 702 actually contemplate that the phrase “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” be broken down into numerous subspecies of expertise, or did its authors simply pick general descriptive language covering the sort of expert testimony which courts have customarily received? The Court speaks of its confidence that federal judges can make a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid, and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Ante, at 12. The Court then states that a “key question” to be answered in deciding whether something is “scientific knowledge” “will be whether it can be (and has been) tested.” Ante, at 12. Following this sentence are three quotations from treatises, which not only speak of empirical testing, but one of which states that the “`criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability’” Ante at 12-13. [509 U.S. 579, 4]

I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its “falsifiability,” and I suspect some of them will be, too.

I [do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility] in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role. I think the Court would be far better advised in this case to decide only the questions presented, and to leave the further development of this important area of the law to future cases. [509 U.S. 579, 1]

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August 11, 2010 The Mathematical Theory of Nothing Leave a comment

“Strange days are these, in which, men are taught in falsehood school, and one who dares to tell the truth is at once called a LUNATIC AND FOOL”. – Socrates

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August 9, 2010 The Mathematical Theory of Nothing 5 comments

[1985] 1 AC 528, [1984] 3 All ER 908, [1984] 3 WLR 1227, 81 Cr App Rep 54, 149 JP 225

McC v Mullan and others
HOUSE OF LORDS
[1985] 1 AC 528, [1984] 3 All ER 908, [1984] 3 WLR 1227, 81 Cr App Rep 54, 149 JP 225
HEARING-DATES: 8, 9, 10 OCTOBER, 22 NOVEMBER 1984
22 November 1984
CATCHWORDS:
Magistrates — Civil liability — Excess or absence of jurisdiction — Sentence — Imposing sentence which magistrates had no power to impose — Extent of magistrates’ civil liability for acting without jurisdiction — Magistrates’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964, s 15.

Magistrates — Civil liability — Malicious action within jurisdiction — Whether magistrates under civil liability for acting within jurisdiction but maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause — Justices of the Peace Act 1979, s 44.

HEADNOTE:
The respondent was convicted by magistrates in Northern Ireland of the offence of failing to comply with an order to attend an attendance centre which had been imposed on him as the result of a previous offence. The magistrates ordered him to be detained at a young offenders centre allegedly without first informing him of his right to apply for legal aid, as required by art 15(1) of the Treatment of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1976. On an application by the respondent for judicial review, the detention order was quashed by the Northern Ireland Divisional Court on the grounds of that irregularity, and he was released from detention. He then brought an action against the magistrates claiming damages for false imprisonment. Since s 15 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964 provided that no action would lie against a magistrate unless he had acted ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’, the question whether the magistrates had acted within their jurisdiction was tried as a preliminary issue. The judge at first instance held that they had, but on appeal the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland held that they had not. The magistrates appealed to the House of Lords. At the hearing of the appeal before the House the questions arose (i) whether an action lay against magistrates if they acted within their jurisdiction but maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause and (ii) as to the extent to which magistrates were liable to an action for damages if they did not have jurisdiction or exceeded their jurisdiction, such a cause of action being expressly recognised by s 15 of the 1964 Act.

Held — (1) In Northern Ireland, as in England and Wales, magistrates, or any other court of summary jurisdiction, were not liable in damages for the consequences of an unlawful sentence imposed by them which could be quashed for irregularity, if they had jurisdiction to enter on the proceedings and acted within their jurisdiction when imposing sentence.  However, magistrates were liable for the consequences of imposing a sentence which they had no power to impose on the offender for the offence, because they were then acting without or in excess of jurisdiction (see p 910 j, p 912 f to h, p 916 to p 917 d, p 920 d to f, p 922 a b d e, p 923 d to f, p 924 j to p 925 a f g, p 926 a to c and p 928 j to p 929 d and f g, post) Groome v Forrester (1816) 5 M & S 314, M’Creadie v Thomson1907 SC 1176 and O’Connor v Isaacs [1956] 2 All ER 417 applied Sirros v Moore [1974] 3 All ER 776 explained.
(2) The quashing of a magistrates’ decision or order by certiorari for excess or want of jurisdiction was not conclusive against the magistrates on the issue of their civil liability for acting without jurisdiction, since an excess of jurisdiction affording sufficient grounds for judicial review was not to be equated with an excess of jurisdiction for the consequences of which magistrates were personally liable (see p 910 j, p 917 f g j, p 918 j, p 920 g to j, p 924 j and p 929 a to d, post) Johnston v Meldon (1891) 30 LR Ir 15 applied Case (1612) 10 Co Rep 68b and Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 1 All ER 208 considered.
(3) Although, on the facts, the magistrates had had power to try the respondent, to convict him and to impose a detention sentence for the offence for which they convicted him, they had had no power to impose that sentence on the respondent because he had not been informed of his right to legal aid as required by art 15 of the 1976 order.  That requirement was a statutory condition precedent to the magistrates’ having jurisdiction to pass an otherwise appropriate sentence.  Their failure to observe that condition precedent was not a mere procedural irregularity but amounted to their acting ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ within the meaning of s 15 of the 1964 Act.  The appeal would therefore be dismissed (see p 910 j, p 920 c d and j to p 921 b, p 924 c to j p 929 b to d, post).
Per Lord Elwyn-Jones, Lord Bridge and Lord Templeman.  In England and Wales the former common law cause of action against a magistrate for acting within his jurisdiction but maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, referred to in s 44 of the Justice of Peace Act 1979, is now obsolete and no longer lies (see p 910 j, p 916 f g and p 929 g h, post).

NOTES:
For the civil liability of magistrates, see 1 Halsbury’s Laws (4th edn) paras 206–215 and 29 ibid paras 278–279, and for cases on the subject, see 1(1) Digest (Reissue) 183–195, 1901–163.
For the Justices of the Peace Act 1979, s 44, see 49 Halsbury’s Statutes (3rd edn) 836.
As from 25 December 1981 s 15 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964 was replaced by art 5 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, SI 1981/1675.
Article 15 of the Treatment of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 corresponds to s 21 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. For s 21 of the 1973 Act, see 43 Halsbury’s Statutes (3rd edn) 314.
Section 45 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1979 makes provision for the liability of justices of the peace in England and Wales in respect of acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction. For s 45 of the 1979 Act, see 49 Halsbury’s Statutes (3rd edn) 837.

CASES-REF-TO:

Anderson v Gorrie [1895] 1 QB 668, CA.
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 1 All ER 208, [1969] 2 AC 147, [1969] 2 WLR 163, HL.
Calder v Halket (1840) 3 Moo PCC 28, [1835--42] All ER Rep 306, 13 ER 12.
Groome v Forrester (1816) 5 M & S 314, 105 ER 1066.
Gwinne v Poole (1692) 2 Lut 1560, 125 ER 858.
Houlden v Smith (1850) 14 QB 841, 117 ER 323.
Johnston v Meldon (1891) 30 LR Ir 15.
M’Creadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176.
Marshalsea Case (1612) 10 Co Rep 68b, 77 ER 1027.
Morgan v Hughes (1788) 2 Term Rep 225, 100 ER 123.
O’Connor v Isaacs [1956] 2 All ER 417, [1956] 2 QB 288, [1956] 3 WLR 172, CA.
Pease v Chaytor (1863) 3 B & S 620, 122 ER 233.
Polley v Fordham (No 2) (1904) 91 LT 525, [1904--7] All ER Rep 651, DC.
R v Cockshott [1898] 1 QB 582, [1895--99] All ER Rep 253, DC.
R v Kettering Justices, ex p Patmore [1968] 3 All ER 167, [1968] 1 WLR 1436, DC.
R v McGinlay (1976) 62 Cr App R 156, CA.
R (Martin) v Mahony [1919] 2 IR 695.
R v Nat Bell Liquors Ltd [1922] 2 AC 128, [1922] All ER Rep 335, PC.
Sirros v Moore [1974] 3 All ER 776, [1975] QB 118, [1974] 3 WLR 459, CA.
Willis v Maclachlan (1876) 1 Ex D 376, CA.

INTRODUCTION:
Appeal

The defendants, Charles Mullan, Bruce Hill and Marjorie Porter, appealed with leave of the Appeal Committee of the House of Lords granted on 1 March 1984 against the order of the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland (Lord Lowry LCJ, Jones and O’Donnell LJJ) dated 21 December 1983 ordering that the judgment and order of Hutton J made on 29 June 1983 on a preliminary point of law, namely whether the plaintiff, McC (a minor) (the respondent), had a cause of action against the appellants for the making of the training school order dated 31 August 1978 and his detention thereunder, be reversed and directing that the action proceed to trial. The facts are set out in the opinion of Lord Bridge.

COUNSEL:
W A Campbell QC, Patrick Coghlin and C R Trimble (all of the Northern Ireland Bar) for the appellants.

Richard Ferguson QC and T T Ferriss (both of the Northern Ireland Bar) for the respondent.

JUDGMENT-READ:
Their Lordships took time for consideration.

22 November. The following opinions were delivered.

PANEL: LORD KEITH OF KINKEL, LORD ELWYN-JONES, LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH, LORD BRANDON OF OAKBROOK AND LORD TEMPLEMAN

JUDGMENTBY-1: LORD KEITH OF KINKEL

JUDGMENT-1:
LORD KEITH OF KINKEL. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Bridge. I have some reservations on the question, which does not require to be decided in the present appeal, whether the liability of justices for acts done within their jurisdiction but with malice and without probable cause should be treated as having fallen into desuetude. I should prefer to leave this question to be decided after full argument in an appropriate case.
In all other respects, however, I agree entirely with the speech of my noble and learned friend, and would dismiss the appeal for the reasons he gives.

JUDGMENTBY-2: LORD ELWYN-JONES

JUDGMENT-2:
LORD ELWYN-JONES. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord Bridge. For the reasons he has given I would dismiss the appeal.

JUDGMENTBY-3: LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH

JUDGMENT-3:
LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH.  My Lords, this is an appeal brought by leave of your Lordships’ House from an order of the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland (Lord Lowry LCJ, Jones and O’Donnell LJJ) reversing an order of Hutton J, who decided a preliminary point of law in favour of the present appellants (defendants in the action) and dismissed the action brought by the present respondent (plaintiff in the action) for damages for false imprisonment.
The matter arises in this way.  On 5 December 1977 the respondent pleaded guilty before the Belfast Juvenile Court to an offence of having in his possession four car keys for use in connection with theft.  On 23 January 1978, when he was just 14 years of age, the respondent was ordered to attend the attendance centre at Millfield College of Technology on 28 January and subsequently at times to be fixed by the officer in charge of the centre.  On 6 July 1978 the respondent appeared again before the same court charged with failing to attend the attendance centre on certain dates when he had been required to do so.  After further adjournments the respondent was ordered on 31 August 1978 to be sent to St Patrick’s Training School, Belfast, where he was detained.  The appellants are respectively the resident magistrate and the two lay justices by whom the training school order was made.
In due course the respondent applied to the Divisional Court in Northern Ireland for an order of certiorari to quash the training school order.  He relied on art 15(1) of the Treatment of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1976, SI 1976/226, which provides:

‘A magistrates’ court on summary conviction or a court of assize or county court on conviction on indictment shall not pass a sentence of imprisonment, Borstal training or detention in a young offenders centre on a person who is not legally represented in that court and has not been previously sentenced to that punishment by a court in any part of the United Kingdom, unless either–(a) he applied for legal aid and the application was refused on the ground that it did not appear his means were such that he required assistance or (b) having been informed of his right to apply for legal aid and had the opportunity to do so, he refused or failed to apply.’

It is now common ground that the training school order was a ‘sentence of . . . detention in a young offenders centre’ within the meaning of that article.  The respondent had never before been sentenced to that punishment.  In the proceedings before the Belfast Juvenile Court he was not legally represented and he had never applied for legal aid.  Before the Divisional Court there were conflicting affidavits whether the respondent had ever been informed of his right so to apply.  He deposed that he had not.  The clerk of the court deposed that the resident magistrate, who presided in the Belfast Juvenile Court on all relevant occasions, had informed the respondent of his right to apply for legal aid at the first hearing, on 5 December 1977, of the proceedings which led to the making of the attendance centre order.  It was common ground that he had not been so informed again at any time after the making of the attendance centre order and before the making of the training school order.
The Divisional Court (Lord Lowry LCJ and Jones LJ) accepted the clerk’s evidence, but held that this was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of art 15(1) of the 1976 order on the ground that the proceedings for breach of the attendance centre order which led to the making of the training school order were separate and distinct from those which preceded and led to the making of the attendance centre order accordingly, the training school order could not lawfully be made as the respondent had not been again informed of his right to apply for legal aid in the course of the later proceedings.  The Divisional Court quashed the training school order by order of certiorari on 17 November 1978 and the respondent was thereupon released.
On 12 March 1980 the respondent’s writ in the action for damages for false imprisonment was issued.  The statement of claim in the action recites the relevant history of the proceedings for breach of the attendance centre order leading to the making of the training school order which I have in substance already recounted and this history is admitted in the appellants’ defence.  The defence does not plead that the resident magistrate informed the respondent on his first appearance before the Belfast Juvenile Court on 5 December 1977 of his right to apply for legal aid.  Accordingly, on the pleadings as they stand, the issue of law which the Divisional Court resolved in the respondent’s favour concerning whether this fact, if proved, would satisfy the requirements of art 15(1) of the 1976 order simply does not arise in the civil proceedings.
On 28 July 1982 an order was made by consent for the determination as a preliminary issue of law of the question, in substance, whether on the facts pleaded any action would lie against the appellants.  This in turn depends on whether the appellants, in making the training school order, ‘acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ within the meaning of those words in s 15 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964 (which I shall call ‘the 1964 Northern Ireland Act’), the provision in force when the writ was issued which has since been re-enacted as art 5 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, SI 1981/1675.  As indicated at the outset, Hutton J decided the preliminary question in favour of the appellants but was reversed by the Court of Appeal.
The appellants in their printed case and at the outset of the oral argument before your Lordships sought to reopen the point decided in favour of the respondent by the Divisional Court in Northern Ireland concerning whether it was sufficient to justify the making of the training school order that the resident magistrate informed the respondent of his right to apply for legal aid on his first appearance before the Belfast Juvenile Court on 5 December 1977.  This point was never raised before Hutton J or the Court of Appeal.  The respondent objected to the point being taken before your Lordships and continues to deny that he was ever informed as alleged.  In these circumstances it was, as your Lordships thought, manifestly impossible, in these proceedings on a preliminary issue of law, to allow the point to be raised.  It is perhaps right to mention, however, that this implies no opinion whether the decision of the Divisional Court in Northern Ireland on this point was right or wrong.  If properly raised, the point would remain open either in the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland or in this House.
Section 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act provides as follows:

‘No action shall succeed against any person by reason of any matter arising in the execution or purported execution of his office of resident magistrate or justice of the peace, unless the court before which the action is brought is satisfied that he acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.’

Considered in isolation the implication of this section seems clearly to be that, if somebody suffers an actionable wrong pursuant to an order made by justices (I shall use this convenient shorthand plural to include the singular and to denote any court of summary jurisdiction properly constituted) acting as such, it is a complete defence that they acted within their jurisdiction, but no defence if they acted ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’.  I believe this first impression to be amply confirmed by a consideration of the relevant Irish legislative history, the analogous legislation in England and Wales and the decided cases, to all of which I must later refer.  It follows that the detention of the respondent pursuant to the appellants’ order from 31 August to 17 November 1978 will establish a cause of action if, but only if, that order was made ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ within the meaning of those words in s 15.
There are many words in common usage in the law which have no precise or constant meaning.  But few, I think, have been used with so many different shades of meaning in different contexts or have so freely acquired new meanings with the development of the law as the word ‘jurisdiction’.
Consider two extremes of a very wide spectrum.  Jurisdiction meant one thing to Coke CJ when he said in Marshalsea Case (1612) 10 Co Rep 68b at 76a, 77 ER 1027 at 1038:

‘. . . when a Court has jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But when the Court has not jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is coram non judiceand actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . .’

The Court of the Marshalsea in that case acted without jurisdiction because, its jurisdiction being limited to members of the King’s household, it entertained a suit between two citizens neither of whom was a member of the King’s household.  Arising out of those proceedings a party arrested ‘by process of the Marshalsea’ could maintain an action for false imprisonment against, inter alios, ‘the Marshal who directed the execution of the process’.  This is but an early and perhaps the most quoted example of the application of a principle illustrated by many later cases where the question whether a court or other tribunal of limited jurisdiction has acted without jurisdiction (coram non judice) can be determined by considering whether at the outset of the proceedings that court had jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings at all.  So much is implicit in Coke CJ’s phrase ‘jurisdiction of the cause’.
At the other end of the spectrum, jurisdiction meant something entirely different to the majority of your Lordships’ House who, in Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 1 All ER 208, [1969] 2 AC 147, decided that the commission, having misconstrued the Order in Council which it was required to apply, and therefore asked itself the wrong question, had so far exceeded its jurisdiction that a purported decision of the commission was a nullity which escaped the statutory prohibition imposed by s 4(4) of the Foreign Compensation Act 1950 that ‘The determination by the Commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be called in question in any court of law’.
Your Lordships’ task is to try to discern somewhere within this wide spectrum a sensible line to be drawn by which to determine whether or not justices are acting ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ within the meaning of s 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act.  The question on which side of the line the instant case falls is one we are obliged to answer.  I understand all your Lordships to agree that the answer to this question is not seriously in doubt.  But this is, so far as I know, the first case ever to come before this House related specifically to the civil liability of justices arising from the performance or purported performance of their duties as such.  It is obviously desirable, so far as it may be possible, that the House, beyond deciding the appeal on its particular facts, should make some attempt, however daunting the prospect may seem, to discover and pronounce any principles of general application in relation to justices’ civil liability and, if essentially the same principles apply both in Northern Ireland on the one hand and in England and Wales on the other, to say so.
I do not find it necessary to consider any legislation before the Justices Protection Act 1848 (which I shall call ‘the 1848 English Act) and the Justices Protection (Ireland) Act 1849 (which I shall call ‘the 1849 Irish Act).  The first two sections of the 1849 Irish Act reproduced, if not quite verbatim, for present purposes with identical effect, the first two sections of the 1848 English Act.  Sections 1 and 2 of the 1849 Irish Act provide as follows:

‘[1.] Every Action hereafter to be brought against any Justice of the Peace in in any of Her Majesty’s Superior Courts of Law at Dublin for any Act done by him in the Execution of his Duty as such Justice, with respect to any Matter within his Jurisdiction as such Justice, shall be an Action on the Case as for a Tort and in the Declaration it shall be expressly alleged that such Act was done maliciously, and without reasonable and probable Cause and if at the Trial of any such Action, upon the General Issue being pleaded, the Plaintiff shall fail to prove such Allegation, he shall be nonsuit, or a Verdict shall be given for the Defendant.

2. For any Act done by a Justice of the Peace in a Matter of which by Law he has not Jurisdiction, or in which he shall have exceeded his Jurisdiction, any Person injured thereby, or by any Act done under any Conviction or Order made or Warrant issued by such Justice in any such Matter, may maintain an Action against such Justice in the same Form and in the same Case as he might have done before the passing of this Act, without making any Allegation in his Declaration that the Act complained of was done maliciously, and without reasonable and probable Cause: Provided nevertheless, that (in any Case where a Conviction may be quashed either upon Appeal or upon Application to Her Majesty’s Court of Queen’s Bench) no such Action shall be brought for anything done under such Conviction or Order until after such Conviction or Order shall have been quashed, either upon Appeal or upon Application to Her Majesty’s Court of Queen’s Bench nor shall any such Action be brought for anything done under any such Warrant which shall have been issued by such Justice to procure the Appearance of such Party, and which shall have been followed by a Conviction or Order in the same Matter, until after such Conviction or Order shall have been so quashed as aforesaid or if such last-mentioned Warrant, shall not have been followed by any such Conviction or Order, or if it be a Warrant upon an Information for an alleged indictable Offence, nevertheless if a Summons were issued previously to such Warrant, and such Summons were served upon such Person, either personally or by leaving the same for him with some Person at his last or most usual Place of Abode, and he did not appear according to the Exigency of such Summons, in such Case no such Action shall be maintained against such Justice for anything done under such Warrant.’

These two sections remained in force in Northern Ireland until repealed by the 1964 Northern Ireland Act. The long title to the 1964 Northern Ireland reads as follows:

‘An Act to amend and consolidate the law relating to the offices of justice of the peace, resident magistrate and clerk of petty sessions, the jurisdiction of, and the practice and procedure before, magistrates’ court, and to matters connected therewith.’

In this Act the provisions of s 1 of the 1849 Irish Act disappeared altogether, but, in substance, the provisions of s 2 of the 1849 Irish Act were re-enacted by s 15, which I have already set out, and by s 16, which provides:

‘(1) Where the conviction or order of a magistrates’ court may be quashed either on appeal or upon application to the High Court, no action by reason thereof or by reason of any warrant issued in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction or order or issued to enforce it, shall be commenced against the resident magistrate or justice of the peace who made it until it has been so quashed.
(2) No action shall be brought as the result of the issue of a warrant which is issued in default of appearance in answer to a summons and after the service of such summons has been proved.’

The 1964 Northern Ireland Act also introduced the following important new provision contained in s 20:

‘(1) The Ministry [of Home Affairs], with the approval of the Ministry of Finance, may defray the whole or part of any expenses incurred by a resident magistrate or other justice of the peace or by a clerk of petty sessions in or in connection with any proceedings or claim brought as a result of the execution, or purported execution, of his office if and in so far as it appears to the Ministry to be reasonable, having regard to the circumstances, that such expenses, or part thereof should not be borne by him personally.
(2) In this section ”expenses” includes damages or costs and any sums payable in connection with a settlement of proceedings or of a claim.’

Sections 15, 16 and 20 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act, which were in force at the date of the issue of the writ in the instant proceedings, have since been repealed and replaced by arts 5, 6 and 10 respectively of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, SI 1981/1675. The only material change is that, in art 10 of the 1981 order, the Lord Chancellor is substituted for the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Treasury is substituted for the Ministry of Finance.
Sections 1 and 2 of the 1848 English Act remained in force until repealed by the Justices of the Peace Act 1979. The relevant part of the long title of the 1979 Act reads as follows:

‘An Act to consolidate certain enactments relating to justices of the peace . . . with amendments to give effect to recommendations of the Law Commission.’

In the 1979 Act ss 1 and 2 of the 1848 English Act are replaced by the following sections:

’44. If apart from this section any action lies against a justice of the peace for an act done by him in the execution of his duty as such a justice, with respect to any matter within his jurisdiction as such a justice, the action shall be as for a tort, in the nature of an action on the case and–(a) in the statement or particulars of claim it shall be expressly alleged that the act in question was done maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, and (b) if that allegation is not proved at the trial of the action, judgment shall be given for the defendant, if it is in the High Court, or, if it is in the county court, the plaintiff shall be non-suited or judgment shall be given for the defendant.

45.–(1) This section applies–(a) to any act done by a justice of the peace in a matter in respect of which by law he does not have jurisdiction or in which he has exceeded his jurisdiction, and (b) to any act done under any conviction or order made or warrant issued by a justice of the peace in any such matter and in the following provisions of this section ”the justice”, in relation to any act falling within paragraph (a) above, means the justice of the peace by whom it is done, and, in relation to a conviction, order or warrant falling within paragraph (b) above, means the justice of the peace by whom the conviction or order is made or the warrant issued.
(2) Any person injured by an act to which this section applies may maintain an action against the justice without making any allegation in his statement or particulars of claim that the act complained of was done maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause.
(3) In respect of any act done under any such conviction or order as is mentioned in subsection (1)(b) above no action shall be brought against the justice until the conviction or order has been quashed, either on appeal or upon application to the High Court.
(4) In respect of any act done under any such warrant as is mentioned in subsection (1)(b) above which was issued by the justice to procure the appearance of a person (in this subsection referred to as ”the complainant”)–(a) where the issue of the warrant has been followed by a conviction or order in the same matter, no action shall be brought by the complainant against the justice until the conviction or order has been quashed, either on appeal or upon application to the High Court, and (b) where the issue of the warrant has not been followed by any such conviction or order, or the warrant was issued upon an information for an alleged indictable offence, no action shall be brought by the complainant against the justice if, before the issue of the warrant, a summons was issued and was served on the complainant (either personally or by leaving it for him with some person at his last or most usual place of abode) and he did not appear in accordance with the summons.’

The English provision analogous to s 20 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act transferring the financial burden of civil liability, in appropriate cases, from justices to the public purse was introduced by s 27 of the Administration of Justice Act 1964, now re-enacted by s 53 of the 1979 Act.  The machinery is different from that in Northern Ireland and the burden is transferred to local, not central, funds, but the principle intended to be applied is, I believe, the same.  The English statute provides that a justice of the peace ‘shall be entitled to be . . . indemnified’ in respect of costs reasonably incurred by him, damages and costs awarded against him, or sums reasonably paid in settlement ‘if, in respect of the matters giving rise to the proceedings or claim, he acted reasonably and in good faith’.  In like circumstances I would certainly expect that justices would be effectively indemnified under the provisions applicable in Northern Ireland.
The language of s 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act plainly abolishes the old common law ‘action on the case as for a tort’ against a justice in respect of anything done by him maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause within his jurisdiction.
It was not open to the draftsman of the 1979 Act to take the same course in England.  In the process of consolidation (there being no relevant Law Commission recommendation: see Law Commission no 94) he was constrained to reproduce the previous statutory provisions, which are purely procedural in character, but was entitled by using the opening words: ‘If apart from this section any action lies etc . . .’ to manifest his doubt as to the survival of the old common law cause of action.
My Lords, I am fully conscious that anything I say on this topic is obiter, since no question of malice, either within or without jurisdiction, arises in this appeal.  But when the whole subject of justices’ liability arising out of the execution or purported execution of their office is under consideration by this House for the first time, even though this aspect of the subject was not argued, I should be sorry to pass it by without comment.  It is, of course, clear that the holder of any judicial office who acts in bad faith, doing what he knows he has no power to do, is liable in damages.  If the Lord Chief Justice himself, on the acquittal of a defendant charged before him with a criminal offence, were to say, ‘That is a perverse verdict,’ and thereupon proceed to pass a sentence of imprisonment, he could be sued for trespass.  But, as Lord Esher MR said in Anderson v Gorrie [1895] 1 QB 668 at 670:

‘. . . the question arises whether there can be an action against a judge of a Court of Record for doing something within his jurisdiction, but doing it maliciously and contrary to good faith. By the common law of England it is the law that no such action will lie.’

The principle underlying this rule is clear.  If one judge in a thousand acts dishonestly within his jurisdiction to the detriment of a party before him, it is less harmful to the health of society to leave that party without a remedy than that nine hundred and ninety-nine honest judges should be harassed by vexatious litigation alleging malice in the exercise of their proper jurisdiction.
If the old common law rule was different in relation to justices of the peace, I suspect the different rule has its origins in society’s view of the justice, reflected in Shakespeare’s plays, as an ignorant buffoon.  How long this view persisted and how long there was any justification for it, I am not a good enough legal or social historian to say.  But it clearly has no application whatever in today’s world either to stipendiary magistrates or to lay benches.  The former are competent professional judges, the latter citizens from all walks of life, chosen for their intelligence and integrity, required to undergo some training before they sit, and advised by legally qualified clerks.  They give unstinting voluntary service to the community and conduct the major part of the criminal business of the courts.  Without them the system of criminal justice in this country would grind to a halt.  In these circumstances, it would seem to me a ludicrous anachronism that, whilst a judge sued for an act within his jurisdiction alleged to have been done maliciously is entitled to have the proceedings dismissed in limine, a magistrate, in the like case, should have to go to trial to defend himself against the accusation of malice.  It follows that, in my opinion, the old common law ‘action on the case as for a tort’ against justices acting within their jurisdiction maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause no longer lies.
By contrast with s 1, the position is entirely different in relation to the re-enacted provisions of s 2 of the 1848 English Act and the 1849 Irish Act.  Whether or not the language used was, as Hutton J in my opinion rightly held it was, declaratory of the common law, the words ‘may maintain an Action against such Justice in the same Form and in the same Case as he might have done before the passing of this Act’ gave statutory force, which survives in s 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act and s 45 of the 1979 Act, to the old common law rule that justices were civilly liable for actionable wrongs suffered by citizens pursuant to orders made without jurisdiction.  It follows that it is now a statutory rule expressed in positive terms in s 45(2) of the 1979 Act.  I have already indicated my opinion that the negative form in which the rule is expressed in s 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act has a similar positive effect.  It must follow from this that both courts below were right to reject the argument based on the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Sirros v Moore [1974] 3 All ER 776, [1975] QB 118, which sought to equate the immunity from suit of those purporting to exercise the limited jurisdiction of inferior courts, including justices, with that of judges of the superior courts.  Whatever the juridical basis for the distinction between superior and inferior courts in this regard, and however anomalous it may seem to some, the distinction unquestionably remains part of the law affecting justices and will continue to do so as long as the language of either s 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act or s 45 of the 1979 Act remains in legislative force in the two jurisdictions.
The provisions introduced in 1964, which have the effect of indemnifying justices against personal liability in appropriate circumstances, have two significant consequences.  First, they must contemplate that a justice may be liable for having acted ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ even though he was in no way blameworthy, and the statutory phrase must be so construed as to cover this possibility.  Second, they go far to meet Lord Denning MR’s concern expressed in the passage from his judgment in v Moore [1974] 3 All ER 776 at 785, [1975] QB 118 at 136 where he said:

‘Each should be protected from liability to damages when he is acting judicially. Each should be able to do his work in complete independence and free from fear. He should not have to turn the pages of his books with trembling fingers, asking himself: ”If I do this, shall I be liable in damages?” ‘

Finally, I can find nothing in the language of s 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act which suggests that it set out to amend, as opposed to consolidate, the previous law or, in particular, that the phrase ‘he acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ should convey any different meaning than the words in s 2 of the 1849 Irish Act ‘For any Act done by a Justice of the Peace in a Matter of which by Law he has not Jurisdiction, or in which he shall have exceeded his Jurisdiction’. This is an a fortiori conclusion in relation to s 45 of the 1979 Act, which reproduces verbatim in sub-s (1)(a) the language of s 2 of the 1848 English Act.
Lord Lowry LCJ, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the instant case, seems to take the view that the fact of the training school order having been quashed by certiorari was conclusive that it was made ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ for the purpose of establishing civil liability against the appellants. He said:

‘. . . there is no ground, in a case like the present, on which certiorari could be granted except want of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction.’

I assume that by the words ‘in a case like the present’ he meant to exclude cases of certiorari granted for errors of law on the face of the record.  But he went on to refer to the Anisminic case [1969] 1 All ER 208, [1969] 2 AC 147 in a sense which would seem to imply that the extended concept of acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction which that landmark decision of your Lordships’ House introduced must be applied to extend the range of justices’ potential civil liability under s 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act.  If that was indeed his meaning, I must respectfully but emphatically dissent from it.
I would observe in passing that from 1848 down to the present time there have been innumerable cases where orders of justices have been quashed for want of jurisdiction, but remarkably few where they have been successfully sued for damages.  It would be wrong, however, to attach much, if any, significance to this, since no cause of action against justices lies merely in respect of a conviction recorded, a fine imposed or other order made without jurisdiction.  The conviction, fine or order will be quashed, with or without costs against the justices, the fine if paid will be repaid, and that will be the end of it.  The only cause of action which can arise is for trespass to the person (unlawful arrest or imprisonment) or trespass to goods (unlawful distress): see Polley v Fordham (No 2) (1904) 91 LT 525, [1904--7] All ER Rep 651, O’Connor v Isaacs [1956] 2 All ER 417, [1956] 2 QB 288.
But I think the equiparation by Lord Lowry LCJ of an excess of jurisdiction which will afford a sufficient ground to quash an order by certiorari with an excess of jurisdiction sufficient to deprive the justices who made the order of their statutory protection under s 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act is refuted by authority.  In Johnston v Meldon (1891) 30 LR Ir 15 the plaintiff had been convicted by justices of a statutory offence of unlawful fishing, fined and imprisoned in default of payment of the fine.  The conviction was quashed on the ground that by his defence the plaintiff, having set up a bona fide claim of title to fish where he did, had raised an issue as to the ownership of the several fishery in the waters where the act complained of took place, which, being a question of title, the justices had no jurisdiction to decide.  The plaintiff sued the justices for false imprisonment.  The Exchequer Division (Palles CB, Andrews and Murphy JJ) held that, despite the quashing of the conviction, there being no allegation of malice, the action would not lie.  Giving the leading judgment, Palles CB said (at 28–29):

‘I hold then, that upon the now plaintiff claiming . . . to be entitled to fish, the jurisdiction of the justices to inquire terminated, and that their subsequent conviction was without jurisdiction and consequently null. The plaintiff next contends that this fact per se, and irrespective of any knowledge or belief in the minds of the justices is sufficient to sustain the action this position is however wholly unsustainable. There is, as pointed out by Lord Blackburn, in Pease v. Chaytor ( (1863) 3 B & S 620, 122 ER 233) a distinction between questioning the validity of a judgment of a court of limited jurisdiction, for the purpose of preventing the enforcement of that judgment, and questioning it for the purpose of maintaining an action against the judges of that court . . . In the first class of cases–certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus–the rule is that no court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision upon a point upon which the limits of its jurisdiction depends, and which point is collateral to the merits of the case and I agree with Lord Blackburn when he says ”that such would be the rule in any proceeding taken by one party for the purpose of enforcing the judgment of an inferior court, or by the other for resisting it.” In the present case, upon the construction which I have put upon the statute, the limit to the jurisdiction of the justices depended upon the bona fides of the claim of title, which point was collateral to the merits, and so the conviction was rightly quashed. In the second class of cases, actions brought against the persons who, acting with a limited jurisdiction, have by mistake exceeded their jurisdiction, the rule of law is different. According to the decision of the Privy Council in Calder v. Halket ((1840) 3 Moo PCC 28, [1835--42] All ER Rep 306), such a person is not liable to an action of trespass for want of jurisdiction, ”unless he knew or ought to have known of the defect.” Whether we should hold upon the evidence, that the defendants had knowledge that the claim of title was bona fide, or such means of knowledge as will sustain an action against them without the existence of malice and the absence of reasonable and probable cause, appear to me to be the real questions on which the decision of this case must depend.’

Having thus formulated the tests to be applied and following an extensive review of the authorities, the Chief Baron expressed his reasons for deciding in favour of the justices in two rather different ways, of which I find the second easier to follow and more convincing than the first. He points out (at 36) that, once a claim of title is raised, the justices must at least examine its bona fides and that, in this sense, their jurisdiction continues. He concludes (at 36–37):

‘Having, then, this jurisdiction and bona fide intending to act in it, they proceeded inverso ordine. They erroneously thought the bona fides of the claim to be immaterial. Instead of determining it, they erroneously determined the title, and thus convicted upon insufficient and erroneous grounds but still their act was a judicial one, in a matter in which, as against the plaintiff in the present action, they had a continuing jurisdiciton to inquire, and the act complained of, the arrest, was one which, if a certain state of facts had been proved before them, it would have been within their authority to have ordered in the exercise of that continuing jurisdiction.’

This case shows that the quashing of a decision or order by certiorari for want of jurisdiction cannot be conclusive against the justices on the issue of their civil liability, at all events where they have erred, even by misdirecting themselves, in deciding some collateral issue which it is necessary for them to decide in order to determine whether they have jurisdiction to proceed in the matter.
A safer guide then than the innumerable certiorari cases will be found in the few cases since 1848 where persons exercising a limited jurisdiction have been held liable in damages for consequences flowing from a purported exercise of the jurisdiction held to be beyond the relevant limit.
In Houlden v Smith (1850) 14 QB 841, 117 ER 323 the defendant was the judge of the Spilsby County Court in Lincolnshire. His jurisdiction was limited to a geographical area which did not include Cambridge. The plaintiff was sued to judgment in the Spilsby County Court for a cause of action arising within its geographical area. The judge then ordered the issue of a judgment summons against the plaintiff who lived and carried on business in Cambridge and when he failed to appear committed him for contempt. The plaintiff was held entitled to recover damages for false imprisonment. Giving judgment Patteson J said (14 QB 841 at 851–853, 117 ER 323 at 327):

‘That this commitment was without jurisdiction is plain that the defendant ordered it under a mistake of the law and not of the facts is equally plain for it is impossible that he could be ignorant that the plaintiff dwelt and carried on his business in Cambridgeshire, the service of all the processes having been proved to have been made there, and the defendant having originally specially allowed the plaint to be made in his Court, within the jurisdiction of which the cause of action accrued, the defendant (the now plaintiff) residing in Cambridgeshire . . . Here the defendant had not only no jurisdiction to commit the plaintiff to the gaol of Cambridgeshire, but he had no jurisdiction to summon him to shew why he had not paid the debt. That summons ought to have been issued out of the County Court of Cambridge.’

The next case is Wills v Maclachlan (1876) 1 Ex D 376. The defendant was exercising the function of a revising barrister under the County Voters Registration Act 1865. The statute empowered him ‘to order any Person to be removed from his Court who shall interrupt the Business of the Court, or refuse to obey his lawful Orders in respect of the same’. He ordered the removal of the plaintiff from his court on the ground that, in the previous year whilst the defendant was sitting as a revising barrister, the plaintiff had wrongfully withheld certain documents and had thereby caused a person who claimed to be registered as a voter to be deprived of his vote. The plaintiff sued for damages for trespass and was nonsuited in the county court. On appeal to the Exchequer Division a new trial to assess damages was ordered on the ground that the defendant, though he honestly believed he had the power to do what he did, on the facts and on a proper application of the statutory language had no such power.

Polley v Fordham (No 2) (1904) 91 LT 525, [1904--7] All ER Rep 651 is an important decision. A summons against the plaintiff for failing to have his child vaccinated within six months of her birth was heard by the defendant, a metropolitan police magistrate, who convicted and imposed a fine. When the fine was not paid the defendant issued a warrant of distress which was levied on the goods of the defendant. The statutory offence was complete when the child attained the age of six months. An information charging the offence was required by statute to be laid within 12 months of the offence. The summons on its face showed that the child was more then 18 months old when the information was laid and thus that the proceedings were out of time.
The Divisional Court held on appeal from the county court that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for trespass to goods. Giving the leading judgment, Lord Alvestone CJ said (91 LT 525 at 527, [1904--7] All ER Rep 651 at 654):

‘I can quite imagine that if on the face of the summons the jurisdiction of the court appeared, it was not necessary to negative the existence or to make any statements with regard to any matters which might subsequently become important when any particular defence was raised. But I cannot help pointing out that this is not a case in which the summons showed it to be possible that the magistrate would have jurisdiction, but it is a case which on the face of it the summons showed that the time had gone by, and that the court had no jurisdiction.’

It will be seen that certainly Houlden v Smith and Polley v Fordham (No 2) were true cases of the court, in Coke CJ’s phrase, not having ‘jurisdiction of the cause’.  The ’cause’ in v Smith was that commenced by the issue of the judgment summons.  In Polley v Fordham it was that commenced by the information for the vaccination offence.  In both it was apparent from the facts before the court that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings at all.  As in Marshalsea Case (1612) 10 Co Rep 68b, 77 ER 1027 the court had no jurisdiction over the person, so in Houlden v Smith it had no jurisdiction over the place, in Polley v Fordham (No 2) it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter (an offence which as charged was no longer cognisable) to which in each case ‘the cause’ related.
In Willis v Maclaghlan there really was no ’cause’.  The revising barrister simply made an order for which his statutory power afforded no authority and which resulted in a trespass to the person.
Lord Lowry LCJ in giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal referred to R v Cockshott [1898] 1 QB 582, [1895--9] All ER Rep 253 and R v Kettering Justices, ex p Patmore [1968] 3 All ER 167, [1968] 1 WLR 1436.  These are both cases where convictions following summary trials by justices were quashed because the mandatory statutory requirement to inform the defendants of their right to elect trial by jury had in neither case been complied with.  In such a case, if the conviction had led to imprisonment or seizure of goods, I think the justices would have been liable in an action for trespass, for the good reason that a statutory condition precedent to the justices having ‘jurisdiction of the cause’ was never satisfied.
But once justices have duly entered on the summary trial of a matter within their jurisdiction, only something quite exceptional occurring in the course of their proceeding to a determination can oust their jurisdiction so as to deprive them of protection from civil liability for a subsequent trespass.  As Johnston v Meldon (1891) 30 LR Ir 15 shows, an error (whether of law or fact) in deciding a collateral issue on which jurisdiction depends will not do so.  Nor will the absence of any evidence to support a conviction: see R (Martin) v Mahony [1910] 2 IR 695, R v Nat Bell Liquors Ltd [1922] 2 AC 128, [1922] All ER Rep 335.  It is clear, in my opinion, that no error of law committed in reaching a finding of guilt would suffice, even if it arose from a misconstruction of the particular legislative provision to be applied, so that it could be said that the justices had asked themselves the wrong question.  I take this view because, as I have intimated earlier, I do not believe that the novel test of excess of jurisdiction which emerges from the Anisminic case [1969] 1 All ER 208, [1969] 2 AC 147, however valuable it may be in ensuring that the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior courts over inferior tribunals is effective to secure compliance with the law and is not lightly to be ousted by statute, has any application whatever to the construction of s 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act or s 45 of the 1979 Act.
Justices would, of course, be acting ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ within the meaning of s 15 if, in the course of hearing a case within their jurisdiction, they were guilty of some gross and obvious irregularity of procedure, as for example if one justice absented himself for part of the hearing and relied on another to tell him what had happened during his absence, or of the rules of natural justice, as for example if the justices refused to allow the defendant to give evidence.  But I would leave for determination if and when they arise other more subtle cases one might imagine in which it could successfully be contended in judicial review proceedings that a conviction was vitiated on some narrow technical ground involving a procedural irregularity or even a breach of the rules of natural justice.  Such convictions, if followed by a potential trespass to person or goods, would not, in my opinion, necessarily expose the justices to liability in damages.
I have felt it appropriate in this first consideration by your Lordships’ House of the subject matter of justices’ liability in damages for acts done in execution or purported execution of their office to examine at some length the principles on which such liability can be founded on want of jurisdiction invalidating the proceedings ab initio or alternatively, given initial jurisdiction, on ouster of jurisdiction during a trial.  But the instant case arises in a narrower and in some sense distinct field.  Here there is no question but that the appellants had jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings against the respondent for failure to comply with the attendance centre order, to conclude that he was guilty of such failure, which appears never to have been in dispute, and to pass an appropriate sentence.  The only defect relied on to deprive the appellants of jurisdiction to make the training school order was the failure in those proceedings (considered as distinct from the earlier proceedings which led to the making of the attendance centre order) to inform the respondent of his right to apply for legal aid, as we must assume they were required to do by art 15 of the 1976 order, whether or not he had been informed of that right on his first appearance before the Belfast Juvenile Court on 5 December 1977.
This directs attention to another line of authority more precisely in point.  In Groome v Forrester (1816) 5 M & S 314, 105 ER 1066 the plaintiff, a former overseer of the parish, had been convicted by the defendant justices of the statutory offence of refusing to hand over to his successors in that office a certain book belonging to the parish called the Bastardy Ledger.  He was thereupon committed to prison ‘until he should have yielded up all and every the books concerning his said office of overseer belonging to the parish’.  He sued for and recovered damages for false imprisonment.  The defendants having obtained a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit, Lord Ellenborough CJ discharged the rule.  He held the committal to be void and in excess of jurisdiction in that the committal in terms requiring delivery up of an unspecified and unidentified number of books was not supported by the conviction for failure to hand over a single specified book.
In this respect it would appear to me that the law of Scotland in 1907, although not governed by statute, was entirely in line with the common law of England, Wales and Ireland, as declared in s 2 of the 1848 English Act and the 1849 Irish Act and later re-enacted in s 15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act and s 45 of the 1979 Act.  M’Creadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176 was the case of a lady who sued for damages for false imprisonment the magistrate in a burgh police court who, having duly convicted her of an offence which carried a maximum penalty of a fine or imprisonment in default of payment, sentenced her to 14 days’ imprisonment without the option.  Omitting reference to the Scottish technicalities of pleading, I content myself by saying that, in effect, the Inner House affirmed the Lord Ordinary ( Johnston) in holding that the action lay without any averment of malice.  A passage from the judgment of the Lord Justice-Clerk (Macdonald) expresses the principle so clearly that I cite it in full.  Having discussed the immunity of magistrates acting within their jurisdiction and without malice, he continued as follows (at 1183–1184):

‘But while this is so, it is a totally different question whether a magistrate who when sitting as such does official acts which he has no power to do under a statute in accordance with which he is bound to act, and which judicial acts have the effect of restraining the liberty of the subject, and subjecting him to penalty in his person, is immune from civil consequences for the wrong he has done. I do not think that this has ever been held, and the opposite has been held in many cases. Where a magistrate, professing to sit as such, and dealing with a case which he has no jurisdiction to deal with at all, commits what is an undoubted wrong upon a citizen, both by principle and practice he is held liable for the wrong done. If that is so, can it be said that a magistrate who has before him a case which he can competently try under an Act of Parliament on which the complaint is founded, and who, instead of dealing with the case as it is before him, and on conviction awarding such punishment as the Act prescribes and allows, proceeds knowingly to pronounce a sentence which is not competent under the Act of Parliament, and thereby sends a person to prison contrary to the Act of Parliament,–I say, can it be said that he is in any more favourable position than a magistrate trying a case in circumstances where he has no jurisdiction? In the one case his sentence is illegal, because he has no complaint before him on which he can pronounce a sentence at all. In the other he has a complaint before him, on which he cannot pronounce the sentence which he does pronounce. The wrong is as great in the latter case as in the former. For as well might he have no jurisdiction at all as step outside the jurisdiction which he does possess, to do something which he could not do if he held himself within the limits prescribed to him by the law under which he was called to exercise his jurisdiction. The case of Groome v. Forrester ( (1816) 5 M & S 314, 105 ER 1066), decided in England, is a forcible illustration of the fact that there may be liability in a magistrate, not merely for acting without jurisdiction, but for doing an act in excess of the jurisdiction he was called upon to exercise.’

With the single exception of the word ‘knowingly’ in the phrase ‘proceeds knowingly to pronounce a sentence which is not competent under the Act of Parliament’, I would adopt and indorse this passage as expressing the law applicable throughout the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (assuming it has not changed in Scotland since 1907) with complete accuracy. I dissent from the word ‘knowingly’ because I do not see how ignorance of the terms of the statute regulating their powers of sentence in any particular case could afford justices any defence.

O’Connor v Isaacs [1956] 2 All ER 417, [1956] 2 QB 288 was an action for damages against justices for false imprisonment tried by Diplock J. The plaintiff failed both before the judge and in the Court of Appeal on the ground that the cause of action was statute-barred. The Court of Appeal did not examine the question whether the justices exceeded their jurisdiction but the opinion is implicit in the judgment of Diplock J that the justices exceeded their jurisdiction by ordering the plaintiff to pay maintenance to his wife without making any finding, which under the relevant legislation was the necessary foundation for such an order, that the plaintiff had been guilty of persistent cruelty to his wife. The plaintiff having been more than once imprisoned for failure to make the payments ordered, it followed, as I understand the judgment, that apart from the limitation point his action for damages would have succeeded.
These three cases establish the clear principle that justices, though they have ‘jurisdiction of the cause’ and conduct the trial impeccably, may nevertheless be liable in damages on the ground of acting in excess of jurisdiction if their conviction of the defendant before them or other determination of the complaint against him does not provide a proper foundation in law for the sentence imposed on him or order made against him and in pursuance of the sentence or order he is imprisoned or his goods are seized.
I should mention in passing the decision of the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division in R v McGinlay (1976) 62 Cr App R 156. There the defendants had been sentenced to borstal training by the Crown Court in default of compliance with the requirements of s 21(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 which enacts provisions applicable in England and Wales indistinguishable in effect from the provisions of art 15(1) of the 1976 order applicable in Northern Ireland. The defendants appealed against sentence. Giving the judgment of the court, Scarman LJ said (at 158):

‘[Counsel for the defendants'] submission can be very shortly stated. He says that when the Crown Court was dealing with these offences, it did not have the power to pass a sentence of Borstal training because it had failed to comply with the obligations laid upon it by section 21(1) of the Act of 1973. We do not so read the statutory provision. Undeniably the Crown Court did have power, upon a committal by magistrates for sentence, to pass a sentence of Borstal training for these offences. It acted unlawfully because it failed to offer the defendants the opportunity of legal aid and representation that was their right. But in our judgment that unlawful act of the Court did not deprive it of its character as a Court which had power to pass a sentence of Borstal training.’

The court proceeded to allow the appeals and to substitute probation orders for the sentences of borstal training, not on any technical legal ground, but purely on the merits of the two cases.  I am not prepared to give any weight, in relation to the question in issue in this appeal, to the obiter dictum of Scarman LJ which I have quoted above, in delivering the extempore judgment of the court, whose mind cannot have been focused on any such issue.
I turn, at long last, to consideration of the decision in Sirros v Moore [1974] 3 All ER 776, [1975] QB 118, on which Hutton J relied for his decision in favour of the appellants.  It was a very unusual case.  The plaintiff, a Turkish citizen, had been convicted by a stipendiary magistrate for breach of the Aliens Order 1953, SI 1953/1671.  He was fined and recommended for deportation.  Pending a decision by the Home Secretary whether or not to implement that recommendation, he would have been liable to be detained unless the magistrate made a direction to the contrary, which in fact he did.  The plaintiff appealed to the Crown Court.  That court, although a superior court of record when trying cases on indictment, is a court of limited jurisdiction when exercising its appellate jurisdiction from magistrates’ courts, which it inherited from the previous courts of quarter sessions, at least in this sense, that its proceedings are subject to judicial review by the High Court as were the proceedings of quarter sessions.
In the course of the appeal to the Crown Court, the plaintiff, unrepresented, made clear that he was only challenging the recommendation for deportation, not the fine.  The judge of the Crown Court, erroneously thinking that he had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the recommendation for deportation, dismissed the appeal.  As the plaintiff was leaving the court, or just after, the judge ordered that he should be detained.  Later the same day the judge refused an application made on the plaintiff ‘s behalf by counsel for bail.  On the following day the plaintiff was released pursuant to an order of habeas corpus made by the Divisional Court.
The plaintiff sued the judge and the police officers who had detained him pursuant to the judge’s order for damages for false imprisonment.  The issue came before the Court of Appeal on appeal from an order to strike out the plaintiff ‘s writ and statement of claim, which the Court of Appeal affirmed.  I have already indicated my view that, in the light of the statutory provisions relating to the liability of justices acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, the sweeping judgment of Lord Denning MR in favour of abolishing the distinction between superior and inferior courts in this respect cannot possibly be supported in relation to justices.  The narrower question whether other courts of limited jurisdiction can and should be given the same immunity from suit as the superior courts, in which Lord Denning MR was supported in his view by Ormrod LJ, is one on which I express no concluded opinion, though my inclination is to think that this distinction is so deeply rooted in our law that it certainly cannot be eradicated by the Court of Appeal and probably not by your Lordships’ House, even in exercise of the power declared in the Practice Statement (Note [1966] 3 All ER 77, [1966] 1 WLR 1234) made by the House.  So fundamental a change would, in my present view, require appropriate legislation.
The decision to strike out the writ and statement of claim in Sirros v Moore was, however, supported on a much narrower ground by Buckley LJ and, as an alternative to his main grounds, by Ormrod LJ.  It was their reasoning which was applied in the instant case by Hutton J.  The essence of this approach is expressed in the judgment of Buckley LJ, which Hutton J cited and on which he relied, in the following terms ( [1974] 3 All ER 776 at 791, [1975] QB 118 at 143):

‘If it was within the powers of the judge to determine whether Mr Sirros should or should not be detained in custody consequent on hearing the appeal, the fact that he may have followed an irregular course in doing so would not render the judge personally liable to a claim such as Mr Sirros seeks to prosecute in this action. If the judge had jurisdiction to procure Mr Sirros’s detention, any irregularity of procedure may afford good grounds for appeal but cannot deprive the judge’s act of its judicial character, so as to render it coram non judice. It is suggested that when the judge gave his direction to ”stop him” he was already functus officio, as the hearing of the appeal had then been concluded, with the consequence that the direction was not a judicial act at all. I feel unable to accept this argument. The judge, in my opinion, clearly thought and intended that the order which he had made would result without more in the detention of Mr Sirros in custody. The direction to ”stop him” was not a new and distinct decision. It was an implementation of the consequence which the judge believed and intended to follow from the order which he had made. This would, in my opinion, hold good, whether the judge gave the direction at the moment when he saw Mr Sirros disappearing through the door of the court or some minutes later. I would, however, accept the learned judge’s evidence that the former was the truth. If the learned judge was mistaken, as I think he was, in thinking that it would follow from his order without more that Mr Sirros should be detained in custody, but he could have produced that result by an order in some other form, his error was one of form or procedure, not of jurisdiction.’

In my opinion, the decision in Sirros v Moore can be supported on this very narrow ground. The Crown Court judge was seised of the appeal. He had jurisdiction to determine the case de novo. If he thought it appropriate to affirm the recommendation for deportation but to overrule the magistrate’s direction that, pending the Home Secretary’s decision, the plaintiff should not be detained, he was authorised to do so. By refusing bail after the plaintiff ‘s detention, he demonstrated that this was indeed his intention. He implemented this intention by a hopelessly irregular procedure, which properly resulted in the plaintiff ‘s release by order of habeas corpus the next day. But the irregularity of procedure was not shown to deprive him, for the purpose of his immunity from civil liability, of the protection attaching to acts done within his jurisdiction, when the order he had made irregularly had produced exactly the same result as the order which he could and, by inference, would have made if the procedure adopted had followed its regular course.
Can it be said that the appellants’ omission to inform the respondent of his right to apply for legal aid was a mere procedural irregularity? I have reached the conclusion that it cannot. The language of art 15(1) of the 1976 order, in any case in which it applies, prohibits in the clearest terms the imposition of any of the custodial sentences mentioned unless one or other of the conditions referred to in sub-paras (a) and (b) of the paragraph has been satisfied. As already mentioned, s 21(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 has the same effect. Parliament plainly attached importance to ensuring that none of these custodial sentences should be imposed for the first time on a defendant not legally represented unless the defendant’s lack of representation was of his own choice. The philosophy underlying the provision must be that no one should be liable to a first sentence of imprisonment, borstal training or detention, unless he has had the opportunity of having his case in mitigation presented to the court in the best possible light. For an inarticulate defendant, as so many are, such presentation may be crucial to his liberty. It is impossible to say in this or any other case that, if the requirements of art 15(1) had been satisfied, it would have made no difference to the result. For these reasons I am of opinion that the fulfilment of this statutory condition precedent to the imposition of such a sentence as the appellants here passed on the respondent is no less essential to support the justices’ jurisdiction to pass such a sentence than, for example, in the case of a sentence of immediate imprisonment, a prior conviction of an offence for which a sentence of imprisonment can lawfully be passed. There is an analogy here between fulfilment of this statutory condition precedent necessary to give justices jurisdiction to pass an otherwise appropriate sentence and the fulfilment, at an earlier stage, of the statutory condition precedent, where applicable, requiring the defendant to be informed of his right to elect trial by jury which is necessary to give the justices ‘jurisdiction of the cause’, i e to try the case summarily. In neither case can the omission to fulfil the condition precedent be considered a mere procedural irregularity.
It follows that the appellants acted ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ within the meaning of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act and I would accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.

JUDGMENTBY-4: LORD BRANDON OF OAKBROOK

JUDGMENT-4:
LORD BRANDON OF OAKBROOK. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord Bridge. In so far as the specific question raised for decision by this appeal, namely the civil liability of justices for acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction is concerned, I agree with his analysis of the relevant law. It follows that I agree with him that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
In the course of his speech my noble and learned friend has dealt with a further question, namely the common law liability of justices for acts done within their jurisdiction but with malice and without reasonable cause. He has expressed the view that such liability is now obsolete not only in Northern Ireland but also in England. Neither question arises for decision in the present appeal, but, so far as Northern Ireland is concerned I agree with his view for the reasons which he gives. So far as England is concerned, the question is not wholly free from doubt it was not argued, save incidentally, before your Lordships and I would, therefore, prefer to reserve my opinion on it.

JUDGMENTBY-5: LORD TEMPLEMAN

JUDGMENT-5:
LORD TEMPLEMAN. My Lords, the respondent was convicted of a criminal offence by a juvenile court and was ordered to attend an attendance centre. He failed to attend regularly and was tried and convicted by the appellant magistrates of the offence of failing to attend the attendance centre. For that offence the respondent was ordered to be detained at a training school. By art 15(1) of the Treatment of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1976, SI 1976/226:

‘A magistrates’ court . . . shall not pass a sentence of . . . detention in a young offenders centre on a person who is not legally represented in that court and has not been previously sentenced to that punishment . . . unless either–(a) he applied for legal aid and the application was refused on the ground that it did not appear his means were such that he required assistance or (b) having been informed of his right to apply for legal aid and had the opportunity to do so, he refused or failed to apply.’

None of the conditions required to be satisfied before a sentence of detention could be imposed was satisfied in the case of the respondent.  The sentence imposed on the respondent was therefore an unlawful sentence.  The respondent was detained in the training centre pursuant to the order made by the magistrates but his sentence was subsequently quashed and he was released.  In the present proceedings the respondent seeks against the appellant magistrates who imposed the sentence of detention damages for false imprisonment in respect of his detention for two and a half months in the training school prior to his release.
The magistrates’ courts which sentenced the respondent to detention was properly constituted and convened and the proceedings were properly instituted.  The respondent was properly tried and convicted.  The magistrates fell into error by an innocent mistake: they thought the respondent had previously been offered and had declined legal aid and that it was unnecessary to give him a further opportunity of applying for legal aid.  If, when the magistrates sentenced the respondent to detention they were acting within their jurisdiction, then although the sentence was rightly quashed the magistrates are not personally liable for the consequences.  If the magistrates acted outside their jurisdiction they are personally liable if they knew or ought to have known of the defect.  The question to be determined on this appeal is whether the magistrates acted within their jurisdiction or without jurisdiction.
On behalf of the magistrates it was submitted that they were entitled to try the respondent for the offence of failing to attend an attendance centre, they had jurisdiction to convict the respondent of that offence and did so.  They were entitled to impose a sentence of detention for the offence of which the respondent was convicted.  Therefore they had jurisdiction to impose that sentence on the respondent.  They made an error of law in not ensuring that the conditions of art 15 of the 1976 order were complied with and, in particular, in not inviting the respondent to apply for legal aid but this was an error in the course of the proceedings which they had jurisdiction to entertain and was therefore an error within jurisdiction.  For that error the sentence was quashed but the magistrates are not liable for damages for false imprisonment resulting from the sentence.  On behalf of the respondent it was said that, though the magistrates had jurisdiction to try and to convict the respondent and to sentence him for the offence of failing to attend an attendance centre, they had no jurisdiction to impose a sentence of detention on the respondent who had not been accorded his legal aid rights.  A magistrate, it is said, acts without jurisdiction if he imposes a sentence which the magistrate is not entitled to impose on the accused for the offence.
The authorities define and illustrate the circumstances in which a judge of an inferior court may be said to act without jurisdiction so as to make him personally liable for his actions.  A magistrate is only granted limited powers.  He must act as a member of a properly constituted court, held in the proper place and duly convened.  He can only try certain offenders.  He can only try certain offences.  If in the course of conducting an authorised trial the magistrate for any reason falls into error and convicts a person who ought to have been acquitted the magistrate acts within jurisdiction although the conviction is liable to be reversed on appeal or quashed on a case stated.  Similarly, a magistrate is only given certain specific and limited powers of sentencing.  If he has conducted an authorised trial but does not convict, then he will have no power to sentence.  If he has conducted an authorised trial and made an authorised conviction but imposes a sentence which he has no power to impose either on the defendant or for the offence for which the defendant has been convicted, then the magistrate acts without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.  In all other circumstances the sentence will be within jurisdiction even if it is liable to be quashed or reduced.

Marshalsea Case (1612) 10 Co Rep 68b, 77 ER 1027 decided that, in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction, it is necessary to examine three questions, namely in what actions the court has jurisdiction, to what places that jurisdiction is confined and to what persons the jurisdiction extends. The Court of Marshalsea only had jurisdiction to entertain pleas of the Crown, its jurisdiction did not extend more than 12 miles from the King’s lodgings and in civil litigation both parties must be members of King’s household save in question of trespass, where it sufficed that one of the parties was of the King’s household. It followed that an order made by the Marshalsea Court for the committal of one party to proceedings in which neither party was a member of the King’s household was an order without jurisdiction and the committal constituted false imprisonment. The court had no jurisdiction over the offender.

Gwinne v Poole (1692) 2 Lut 1560, 125 ER 858 decided that the liability of magistrates as judges of inferior courts for acts done in a judicial capacity but without jurisdiction was limited to cases where the magistrates knew or ought to have known that they were acting outside their jurisdiction. In the present case the magistrates did not know that the sentence that they were imposing on the respondent was unlawful but the respondent alleges they ought to have known.

Morgan v Hughes (1788) 2 Term Rep 225, 100 ER 123 decided that magistrates, as judges of inferior courts, could be made liable in damages for wrongful judicial actions within their jurisdiction if the plaintiff could show that the magistrates acted maliciously and without probable cause.  No question of malice arises in the present case.  The respondent is not entitled to damages unless the magistrates in sentencing him to detention acted without jurisdiction.
In Groome v Forrester (1816) 5 M & S 314, 105 ER 1066 the plaintiff, who had been convicted of refusing to deliver up a particular book, was committed to prison ‘until he shall have yielded up all and every the books concerning his said office of overseer, belonging to the said parish . . .’  The committal was held to be void and in excess of jurisdiction.  The committal required delivery up of an unspecified and unidentified number of books but the plaintiff had only been convicted of failure to hand over one single specified book.  The committal was therefore a sentence for offences for which the plaintiff had not been convicted.  The court had no jurisdiction.
In Calder v Halket (1840) 3 Moo PCC 28, [1835--42] All ER Rep 306 a magistrate who had jurisdiction over Indians but not Europeans was held to act outside his jurisdiction when he ordered a British subject to be detained.  He had no jurisdiction over the offender.  But it did not appear from the evidence that the magistrate ‘was at any time informed of the European character of the Plaintiff, or knew it before, or had such information as to make it incumbent on him to ascertain that fact’ (see 3 Moo PCC 28 at 78, [1835--42] All ER Rep 306 at 310).  Following Gwinne v Poole the action against the magistrate failed because ‘a Judge is not liable in trespass for want of jurisdiction, unless he knew, or ought to have known, of the defect and it lies on the Plaintiff, in every such case to prove that fact’.  In the present case, if the magistrates acted without jurisdiction, the respondent will contend that they ought to have known, or ought to have ascertained, that it was necessary to afford him an opportunity to apply for legal aid before they sentenced him to detention.
In 1848 the principles of the common law with regard to the liability of magistrates were recognised and modified by the Justices Protection Act 1848 and by the Justices Protection (Ireland) Act 1849.  Section 1 of the 1849 Irish Act directed that every action against a magistrate ‘for any Act done by him in the Execution of his Duty as such Justice, with respect to any Matter within his Jurisdiction as such Justice’, must allege ‘that such Act was done maliciously, and without reasonable and probable Cause’.  Section 2 provided:

‘For any Act done by a Justice of the Peace in a Matter of which by Law he has not Jurisdiction, or in which he shall have exceeded his Jurisdiction, any Person injured thereby . . . may maintain an Action against such Justice in the same Form and in the same Case as he might have done before the passing of this Act, without making any Allegation in his Declaration that the Act complained of was done maliciously, and without reasonable and probable Cause . . .’

But it was provided that any unlawful conviction must first be quashed before a civil action could be brought against the magistrate for damages.
In Houlden v Smith (1850) 14 QB 841, 117 ER 323 a judge of a county court, an inferior court for present purposes, whose jurisdiction was limited to Lincolnshire tried and sentenced a resident of Cambridge and was held to have acted without jurisdiction and to be liable to damages for false imprisonment. The judge had no jurisdiction over the offender.
In Pease v Chaytor (1863) 1 B & S 658, 121 ER 859 a magistrate had jurisdiction to commit for non-payment of rates but the Act conferring jurisdiction provided that–

‘if the validity of such rate or the liability of the person from whom it is demanded to pay the same be disputed, and the party disputing the same give notice thereof to the justices, the justices shall forbear giving judgment thereupon.’

Wightman and Blackburn JJ decided that the jurisdiction conferred on the magistrates by statute was by the same statute taken away once the accused bona fide disputed liability for rates but that the magistrates were not liable for continuing and convicting if there were grounds on which they could reach the conclusion that the defendant was not bona fide disputing liability.  Mellor J held that the magistrates knew or ought to have known that the liability for rates was bona fide disputed and therefore the magistrates proceeded thereafter without jurisdiction.  All the judges were agreed that the magistrates by reason of the express words of the statute ceased to have jurisdiction over an offender who bona fide disputed liability for rates.
In Willis v Maclachlan (1876) 1 Ex D 376 a revising barrister under the County Voters Registration Act 1865 was authorised ‘to order any Person to be removed from his Court who shall interrupt the Business of the Court, or refuse to obey his lawful Orders in respect of the same’.  The barrister ordered removal of the plaintiff from his court on the grounds that the previous year the plaintiff had wrongfully withheld certain documents and had thereby caused a person who claimed to be registered as a voter to be deprived of his vote.  The barrister had no power to try or sentence the plaintiff for the offence for which he was ordered to be removed from the court and it was held that the removal order was made without jurisdiction and that the revising barrister was liable in damages to the plaintiff although he honestly believed that he had power to do what he did.  In this case the court had no jurisdiction over the offence.
In Johnston v Meldon (1891) 30 LR Ir 15 the accused should have been acquitted of a criminal offence of unlawful fishing if he bona fide believed that he was lawfully exercising a right to fish because he held title to a several fishery in the waters.  The magistrates convicted the accused and sentenced him to prison because they decided that the accused did not in fact have a good title in the fishery.  The Exchequer Division held that in the absence of any allegation that the magistrates had acted maliciously, the accused could not make the magistrates liable for damages for false imprisonment even though the conviction had been quashed.  The trial, conviction and sentence were within jurisdiction because the court had power to try the offence and the offender.  The judgments are however confused by expressions which fail to distinguish between an unlawful act in excess of jurisdiction and an unlawful act within jurisdiction.
In R v Cockshott [1898] 1 QB 582, [1895--9] All ER Rep 253, followed in R v Kettering Justices, ex p Patmore [1968] 3 All ER 167, [1968] 1 WLR 1436, convictions following summary trial by justices were quashed because the mandatory requirement to inform the defendants of their right to elect trial by jury had not been complied with.  These decisions did not concern the personal liability of the magistrates but in my view the magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the particular accused until the prior requirements had been satisfied.  The magistrates had no jurisdiction over the defendants.
In Polley v Fordham (No 2 ) (1904) 91 LT 525, [1904--7] All ER Rep 651 the plaintiff was summoned and fined and his goods seized for failure to vaccinate his child within six months after the birth of that child.  The Vaccination Acts 1867 to 1898 which created this offence stipulated that the complaint must be made within 12 months of the offence.  The summons showed that at the date of the complaint the child was more than 18 months old.  It was held that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to convict and had notice of the defect and was therefore rightly ordered to pay damages in a civil action brought by the plaintiff against the magistrate who had sentenced him to prison for a breach of the Acts.  The magistrate had no jurisdiction over the offence if the complaint was out of time.
In M’Creadie v Thomson 1907 SC 1176 a magistrate who had power to fine and to imprison if the fine were not paid sentenced the plaintiff to 14 days without giving her the option of a fine.  The plaintiff served 12 days in prison and the magistrate was held liable in damages for false imprisonment.  The trial and conviction had been within jurisdiction but the magistrate had no jurisdiction to impose a sentence of imprisonment on the offender.
By the Magistrates’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964 the liability of a magistrate in Northern Ireland for acts within his jurisdiction which had been preserved by s 1 of the Justices Protection Act (Ireland) 1849 ceased to have effect.  Section 2 of the 1849 Irish Act which preserved an action against magistrates who acted without jurisdiction was replaced by s 15 of the 1964 Act (now art 5 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, SI 1981/1675) in these terms:

Hence the question in this case is whether in making a detention order the appellant magistrates ‘acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ because the respondent had not applied or been invited to apply for legal aid.
In O’Connor v Isaacs [1956] 2 All ER 417, [1956] 2 QB 288 magistrates had power to order a husband to pay maintenance if he had been guilty of persistent cruelty. It was held that the magistrates acted without jurisdiction, where, having found that persistent cruelty had not been proved, they nevertheless ordered the husband to pay maintenance. There can be no jurisdiction to sentence unless there is first a conviction.
Finally, in Sirros v Moore [1974] 3 All ER 776, [1975] QB 118, where a magistrate had power to direct the detention of an alien recommended for deportation but followed an irregular course in doing so, it was held that the magistrate was not liable in damages for false imprisonment. Buckley LJ said ( [1974] 3 All ER 776 at 791, [1975] QB 118 at 143):

‘If the judge had jurisdiction to procure Mr Sirros’s detention, any irregularity of procedure may afford good grounds for appeal but cannot deprive the judge’s act of its judicial character, so as to render it coram non judice.’

The magistrate had jurisdiction over the offence and the offender and jurisdiction to detain.
In my opinion the authorities disclose that a magistrate is not liable in damages for the consequences of an unlawful sentence passed by him in his judicial capacity in a properly constituted and convened court if he has power to try the offence and the offender, duly convicts the offender of the offence and imposes a sentence which he has power to impose for the offence and on the offender.  If the magistrate fails to convict the offender of the offence or if he imposes a sentence which he has no power to impose on the offender for the offence he acts without jurisdiction and, if the sentence results in imprisonment, is liable to the accused in a civil action for damages for false imprisonment.
If, in the course of a trial which a magistrate is empowered to undertake, the magistrate misbehaves or does not accord the accused a fair trial, or is guilty of some other breach of the principles of natural justice or reaches a result which is vitiated by any error of fact or law, the decision may be quashed but the magistrate acting as such acts within jurisdiction.  Similarly, if the magistrate after a lawful trial imposes a sentence which he is authorised to impose on the defendant for the offence, but follows a procedure which is irregular, the sentence may be quashed but the magistrate acts within jurisdiction.
In the present case the magistrates were given power to try and to convict the respondent for the offence of which he was in fact convicted.  The magistrates were given power to impose a sentence of detention for the offence.  But the magistrates were not given power to impose a sentence of detention on the respondent because art 15(1) of the 1976 order expressly prohibited the imposition of such a sentence on the respondent.  The magistrates accordingly acted without jurisdiction.
For these reasons and for the reasons advanced by my noble and learned friend Lord Bridge, I would dismiss the appeal.
This appeal demonstrates that the time is ripe for the legislature to reconsider the liability of a magistrate and the rights of a defendant if an unlawful sentence results in imprisonment.  There is no liability on a judge of the High Court acting as such and no right for a defendant to damages for an unlawful sentence imposed by a High Court judge harm may be prevented or cut short by bail and an appeal procedure which results in the sentence being quashed.
Buckley LJ said in Sirros v Moore [1974] 3 All ER 776 at 788, [1975] QB 118 at 139–140, in which case the principles and the authorities are fully discussed:

‘The High Court constitutes the sole arbiter (though subject to correction on appeal) as to what matters fall within its own jurisdiction. In my judgment, it should now be taken as settled both on authority and on principle that a judge of the High Court is absolutely immune from personal civil liability in respect of any judicial act which he does in his capacity as a judge of that court. He enjoys no such immunity, however, in respect of any act not done in his capacity as a judge.’

On the other hand a magistrate is personally liable where an innocent error of law or fact results in an unlawful sentence of imprisonment imposed without jurisdiction. A magistrate is not personally liable for an innocent error of law or fact which results in an unlawful sentence or imprisonment within jurisdiction. So far as the defendant is concerned imprisonment produces the same suffering whether the unlawful sentence is defective but within jurisdiction or defective and made without jurisdiction. I agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Bridge, that the former cause of action against a magistrate for acting within jurisdiction but maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause is obsolete or obsolescent. The principles which protect High Court judges from harassment by civil suits alleging malice apply equally to magistrates. Magistrates are better selected, better trained and better advised than they were in the days when Palmerston tried poachers. A possible solution is to extend to magistrates the immunity which protects the High Court judge acting as such. An appellate court or an independent tribunal could be accorded a discretionary power to award compensation to a defendant who suffers an unlawful sentence of imprisonment whether the court acted within or without jurisdiction in imposing the sentence.

DISPOSITION:
Appeal dismissed.

SOLICITORS:
Treasury Solicitor, agents for Crown Solicitor, Belfast (for the appellants); Saunders & Co, agents for Francis Keenan, Belfast (for the respondent).

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SEPANDAI TUPAI MELOMPAT, JATUH JUGA AKHIRNYA: CHECKMATE!

August 3, 2010 The Mathematical Theory of Nothing 2 comments

CHECKMATE!

“Although no objection had been raised to the admission of this inadmissible evidence, the judge was nevertheless under an automatic duty to stop it from being adduced for inadmissible evidence does not become admissable by reason of failure to object.”

Alcontara a/l Ambross Anthony v Public Prosecutor

[1996] 1 MLJ 209

BREACH OF NATURAL JUSTICE: UTRA BADI A/L K PERUMAL V LEMBAGA TATATERTIB PERKHIDMATAN AWAM & ANOR [1998] 3 MLJ 676 CIVIL SUIT NO 22-322 OF 1991 HIGH COURT (PENANG)

April 28, 2010 The Mathematical Theory of Nothing 1,305 comments

3 MLJ 676, *; [1998] 3 MLJ 676

The Malayan Law Journal
UTRA BADI A/L K PERUMAL V LEMBAGA TATATERTIB PERKHIDMATAN AWAM & ANOR
[1998] 3 MLJ 676
CIVIL SUIT NO 22-322 OF 1991
HIGH COURT (PENANG)
DECIDED-DATE-1: 30 MAY 1996
VINCENT NG J
CATCHWORDS:
Administrative Law – Termination of service of member of public service – Whether wording in show cause letter which contained two alternative punishments nullified the charge for want of clarity – Whether show cause letter should state which of the alternative punishments is to be used – Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Order 1980 general order 26

Administrative Law – Rights and liabilities of public servants – Right to be heard – Whether extraneous matters were considered – Whether plaintiff was given reasonable opportunity to be heard on other relevant information

Administrative Law – Right to mitigation – Dismissal or reduction in rank of public servant – Whether public servant ought to be given reasonable opportunity of being heard in mitigation before punishment is imposed – Federal Constitution art 135(2) – Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Order 1980 general order 23

HEADNOTES:
The plaintiff, a hospital attendant, was an employee of the second defendant. A sample of urine taken from him was tested positive for morphine. The first defendant requested the plaintiff to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him on the ground that he was a drug addict. The charge was made under general order 26 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Order 1980 which contained two alternative punishments against him, namely to dismiss or to reduce in rank. The plaintiff gave his explanation on the charge proffered against him. The first defendant dismissed the plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s appeal to the Appeal Board was rejected. The plaintiff applied for a declaration that his purported dismissal was null and void. There were three issues before the court, ie that: (i) the wording in the show cause letter which contained two alternative punishments nullified the charge for want of clarity; (ii) the first defendant has taken into account other material information which had never been put to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the other relevant information that appeared to have been considered in the decision making process which led to his dismissal; and (iii) that the first defendant has failed to give the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to mitigate.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim with costs:
(1)   There is nothing wrong with the way the charge is worded considering
that it is in direct compliance with general order 26 and it contained all
the necessary particulars to enable the plaintiff to prepare his written
representaton in answer thereto, though, an outline of the charge would
usually suffice (see p 684D-E).
[*677] (2)   There were no extraneous matters considered other than the fact that
the plaintiff’s test was tested positive for morphine. The explanation in the
first defendant’s letter that other relevant information was considered
actually referred to what the plaintiff had written in his reply to the show
cause letter and nothing more (see p 685F-G).
(3)   It would be unjust to deny the civil servant an oportunity to be heard
in mitigation before punishment is imposed on him, as the punishment itself
involves a further decision-making process.The right of the plaintiff to be
heard in mitigation is implicitly encompassed in general order 23 of the
General Orders and in art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution. Consequently,
as it is common ground that the first defendant had not given the plaintiff
any opportunity to be heard in mitigation before punishment, the decision
making process pertaining thereto is fatally flawed (see pp 689D and 691A-C).
(4)   In the instant case, it is beyond the ambit of a judicial review for
the court to touch on the decision itself and consider whether, if the
plaintiff was rightly found to be a drug addict he could be allowed to
continue to work in an institution such as a hospital. What has to be decided
within the court’s purview is that due to non-compliance of general order 23
of the General Orders and of art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution in the
manner in which the first defendant had made their decision on the punishment
imposed, the termination of the plaintiff’s services had been rendered
nugatory, null and void and of no effect (see pp 691H-I and 692B).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif, seorang atendan hospital, adalah pekerja defendan kedua. Contoh air kencing yang diambil daripadanya telah diuji positif mengandungi morfin. Defendan pertama meminta plaintif menunjuk sebab mengapa tindakan disiplin tidak patut diambil terhadapnya atas alasan bahawa dia adalah penagih dadah. Pertuduhan dibuat di bawah perintah am 26 Perintah-Perintah Am Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Bab D) 1980 yang mengandungi dua hukuman alternatif terhadapnya, iaitu untuk dipecat atau diturunkan pangkat. Plaintif memberikan penerangan atas pertuduhan ke atasnya. Defendan pertama memecat plaintif.

Rayuan plaintif kepada Lembaga Rayuan telah ditolak. Plaintif memohon satu deklarasi bahawa pemecatannya adalah batal dan tak sah. Terdapat tiga isu di hadapan mahkamah, iaitu bahawa: (i) perkataan dalam surat tunjuk sebab yang mengandungi dua hukuman alternatif membatalkan pertuduhan kerana tidak jelas; (ii) defendan pertama telah mengambil kira maklumat material yang lain yang tidak pernah ditunjukkan kepada plaintif, dan plaintif tidak diberikan peluang yang munasabah untuk dibicarakan atas maklumat lain yang relevan yang telah diambil kira dalam proses membuat [*678] keputusan yang membawa kepada pemecatannya; dan (iii) defendan pertama telah gagal untuk memberikan plaintif peluang yang munasabah untuk pengurangan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif dengan kos:
(1)   Tidak ada apa yang salah dengan cara pertuduhan itu dibuat mengambil
kira bahawa ia mematuhi perintah am 26 dan ia mengandungi semua butir-butir
yang diperlukan untuk membolehkan plaintif menyediakan representasi bertulis
untuk menjawabnya, walaupun garis kasar pertuduhan biasanya mencukupi (lihat
ms 684D-E).
(2)   Tidak ada perkara yang tidak relevan diambil kira melainkan fakta
bahawa ujian plaintif telah diuji positif mengandungi morfin. Penerangan
dalam surat defendan pertama bahawa maklumat lain yang relevan telah diambil
kira sebenarnya merujuk kepada apa yang plaintif telah tulis dalam jawapan
kepada surat tunjuk sebab dan tidak ada yang lain (lihat ms 685F-G).
(3)   Adalah tidak adil untuk menafikan kakitangan awam peluang untuk
dibicarakan berkaitan dengan pengurangan sebelum hukuman dikenakan ke
atasnya, kerana hukuman itu sendiri melibatkan proses membuat keputusan
selanjutnya.Hak plaintif untuk didengar berkaitan dengan pengurangan adalah
terkandung secara tersirat dalam perintah am 23 Perintah-Perintah Am dan
dalam perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Oleh yang demikian, oleh
kerana adalah diketahui umum bahawa defendan pertama tidak memberikan peluang
kepada plaintif untuk dibicarakan berkaitan dengan pengurangan sebelum
hukuman, proses membuat keputusan berhubung dengannya adalah salah (lihat ms
689D dan 691A-C).
(4)   Dalam kes ini, adalah diluar rangkuman kajian semula kehakiman untuk
mahkamah menyentuh keputusan itu sendiri dan mempertimbangkan sama ada, jika
plaintif didapati seorang penagih dadah, dia boleh dibenarkan untuk
meneruskan pekerjaan di institusi seperti hospital. Apa yang perlu diputuskan
dalam skop mahkamah adalah oleh sebab ketidakpatuhan kepada perintah am 23
Perintah-Perintah Am dan perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dalam cara
defendan pertama membuat keputusan telah menjadikan keputusan mereka atas
hukuman yang dikenakan, penamatan perkhidmatan plaintif telah menjadi tidak
berguna, batal dan tak sah dan tidak mempunyai kesan (lihat ms 691H-I dan
692B).]

Notes

For a case on termination of service of member of public service, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1995 Reissue) para 451.

For cases on the rights and liabilities of public servants, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1995 Reissue) paras 404-452. [*679]

Cases referred to
Alan Noor bin Kamat v Inspector General of Police & Anor [1987] 1 CLJ 51
Asriyah bte Sairy v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia Federal Court Civil Appeal No 01-41-94
Bachhittar Singh v State of Punjab & Anor 1963 AIR SC 395
C Apparao v The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range, Waltair & Anor 1958 AIR 269 And Pra
Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697
Ganesh Balakrishna Deshmukh v State of Madhya Bharat (1956) Mad Bha 172
Gangadhar Gurusiddappa v Union of India 1963 AIR Mys 193
Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v Public Service Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 513, [1994] 3 MLJ 61
High Commissioner of India v IM Lall 1948 AIR PC 121
Hiro Lilaram Chablani v State of Hyderabad 1955 AIR Hyde 48
Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] 1 MLJ 64
Pancha Moorthy a/l Suppaya v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia Federal Court Civil Appeal No 01-40-94
Pergamon Press Ltd, Re [1970] 3 All ER 53
PP v Lee Eng Kooi [1993] 2 MLJ 322
Shamsiah bte Ahmad Sham v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1990] 3 MLJ 364
Shri Sitaram Sugar Co Ltd v Union of India & Ors [1990] 3 SCC 223
Smt Maneka Gandhi v Union of India 1978 AIR SC 597
Sobhagmal v State 1954 AIR Raj 207
Sher Singh, Malhan, Petition er v State Madhya Pradesh 1955 AIR Nag 175 42 CN 40
State of Bihar v Abdul Majid 1954 AIR SC 245
State of Bombay v Amarsinh Raval 1963 AIR Guj 244
Syed Mahadzir bin Syed Abdullah v Ketua Polis Negara & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 391
Tribhuwan Nath Pandey v Union of India 1953 AIR 138 Nag
Tropiland Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Seberang Perai [1996] 4 MLJ 16
Vasant Pandurang Deval v The State of Bombay 1963 AIR 269 Bom

Legislation referred to

All India Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules 1969 Pt IV

Evidence Act 1950 ss 91 and 92

Constitution [India] art 311(2)

Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985

Federal Constitution art 5(1), 8(1), 135(2)

Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) General Orders (Chapter D) Regulations 1969 regulation 27

Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980 general orders 23, 26, 26(5), 33, 34, 35(1), 36, Pt II [*680]

Karpal Singh ( Jagdeep Singh with him) ( Karpal Singh & Co) for the plaintiff.

Syed Marzidy bin Syed Marzuki (Federal Counsel) for the defendants.

LAWYERS: Karpal Singh ( Jagdeep Singh with him) ( Karpal Singh & Co) for the plaintiff.

Syed Marzidy bin Syed Marzuki (Federal Counsel) for the defendants.

JUDGMENTBY: VINCENT NG J

The plaintiff was at all material times a hospital attendant in the General Hospital Penang and was an employee of the second defendant.

In this case, he is suing the defendants for the following reliefs: (i) a declaration that the purported dismissal of the plaintiff as hospital attendant Tingkatan Biasa in the General Hospital, Penang is null and void and of no effect and that the plaintiff is still a hospital attendant Tingkatan Biasa entitled to all the salaries and benefits due to him; and (ii) an inquiry to determine the salaries, emoluments and other benefits due to the plaintiff; interest and costs.

By a letter dated 31 January 1991, the plaintiff was asked to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him on the grounds that he was a drug addict as the sample of urine taken from him was tested positive on 5 May 1990 for morphine. The letter (marked ‘DP10′) is set out in full as follows:
Bahawa satu laporan telah diterima oleh Lembaga Tatatertib yang
menyatakan bahawa Tuan/En Utra Badi a/l K Perumal, Atendan Hospital
T/Biasa di Hospital Besar, Pulau Pinang telah berkelakuan melanggar
tatakelakuan dan membolehkan tindakan tatatertib diambil terhadap tuan.
(2) Lembaga Tatatertib, setelah menimbangkan segala maklumat yang
diterima, berpendapat bahawa tuan patut dikenakan tindakan
tatatertib dengan tujuan buang kerja atau turun pangkat di bawah
perintah am 26, Perintah-Perintah Am Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan
Tatatertib) (Bab D) 1980 atas pertuduhan-pertuduhan berikut:
Bahawa tuan, En Utra Badi a/l K Perumal, semasa bertugas
sebagai Atendan Hospital T/Biasa di Hospital Besar, Pulau
Pinang dalam satu ujian air kencing tuan secara mengejut
pada 5 Mei 1990 telah disahkan sebagai penagih dadah kerana
ujian contoh air kencing yang diambil didapati positif
mengandungi morfin. Perbuatan tuan menjadi seorang penagih
dadah adalah merupakan satu perbuatan yang boleh
menjatuhkan reputasi Perkhidmatan Awam dan adalah melanggar
tatakelakuan di bawah perintah am 4(2)(d) dalam
Perintah-Perintah Am Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib)
(Bab ‘D’) 1980.
Jika tuan didapati bersalah, tuan boleh dihukum mengikut
perintah am 36 dalam Perintah-Perintah Am yang sama.
(3) Mengikut perintah am 26, Perintah-Perintah Am Pegawai Awam
(Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Bab D) 1980 tuan adalah diminta
membuat satu representasi secara bertulis yang mengandungi
alasan-alasan yang tuan hendak gunakan untuk tuan membebaskan
diri tuan. Representasi tersebut hendaklah dikemukakan kepada
Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam, melalui Ketua Jabatan tuan
dalam tempoh 14 hari dari tarikh tuan menerima surat ini.
Sekiranya tuan tidak membuat representasi tersebut dalam tempoh
masa yang ditetapkan itu, tuan akan dianggap sebagai tidak hendak
membela diri dan perkara ini akan diputuskan oleh Lembaga
Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam, Hospital Besar, Pulau Pinang
berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang sedia ada sahaja.

[*681] The plaintiff was given 14 days to reply from the date of receipt of the said letter.

On 7 February 1991, the plaintiff by a letter of even date (marked ‘DP12′) wrote to the first defendant giving his explanation on the charge proffered against him as follows:
Surat tuan Bil Rujukan (5) dlm HB/PP/PER/TT/1240 (SULIT) bertarikh 31
Januari 1991 telah selamat diterima dan diucapkan terima kasih.
Untuk makluman tuan, saya bukanlah seorang penagih dadah sepertimana
yang dinyatakan didalam surat tuan. Saya sekali lagi merayu di atas
jasa baik tuan untuk bersimpati dengan rayuan saya yang hina ini
untuk menjalankan ujian air kencing sekali lagi di atas diri saya.
Ujian air kencing yang dibuat pada 5 Mei 1990 besar kemungkinan
merupakan satu kesilapan teknik. Mungkin air kencing itu bukan air
kencing saya.
Untuk makluman tuan, pekerja-pekerja di Hospital Besar, Pulau Pinang
sangat mengetahui di atas kelakuan saya dan saya bukanlah seorang
penagih dadah. Begitu juga dengan kaum keluarga saya, semuanya sangat
mengetahui bahawa saya bukan seorang penagih dadah. Saya sangat benci
pada dadah dan tidak pernah melibatkan diri dengan penagih dadah.
Saya tidak berhasrat untuk merosakan rekod perkhidmatan saya selama 27
tahun dengan Kerajaan dan tidak pernah dikenakan sebarang tindakan
tatatertib oleh Jabatan.
Kerjasama tuan di atas rayuan saya ini sangat-sangatlah diharapkan dan
disanjung tinggi dan diatas rayuan saya ini untuk menjalankan ujian air
kencing sekali lagi akan mendapat persetujuan dan pertimbangan yang
sewajarnya daripada tuan.

About one month later, on 20 March 1991, the Pengerusi, Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Kumpulan D Pulau Pinang forwarded to the plaintiff a letter (marked ‘DP13′) dismissing him from service wef 20 March 1991, which reads as follows:
Lembaga Tatatertib di dalam mesyuarat yang ke 2/1991 pada 20 Mac 1991
setelah menimbangkan dengan teliti pertuduhan ke atas tuan dan jawapan
yang diberi oleh tuan serta maklumat-maklumat lain yang berkaitan,
memutuskan bahawa tuan dikenakan hukuman buang kerja mulai 20 Mac 1991
mengikut perintah am 36(i) Perintah-Perintah Am Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan
dan Tatatertib) (Bab D) 1980.
(2) Mengikut Peraturan l2(1) dan l3(1) Peraturan-Peraturan Lembaga
Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam 1972 (PU (A) 48) tuan adalah dengan
ini diberi peluang untuk membuat rayuan kepada Lembaga Rayuan
Tatatertib melalui Ketua Jabatan tuan di dalam tempoh 14 hari
mulai dari tarikh penerimaan surat keputusan Lembaga Tatatertib
ini.

Soon after receipt of DP13 the plaintiff by his letter dated 26 March 1991 (marked ‘DP14′) wrote an appeal to the Lembaga Rayuan Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam, Kumpulan ‘D’. He set out in detail his grounds in the following terms:
Atendan Hospital,
Hospital Besar,
Pulau Pinang.
26 Mac 1991.
[*682] Pengerusi,
Lembaga Rayuan Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam,
Kumpulan ‘D’,
Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam,
Pulau Pinang.
Melalui: Saluran-saluran tertentu
Tuan,
Per: Rayuan terhadap keputusan Lembaga Tatatertib pada 20 Mac 1991 yang
mengenakan hukuman buang kerja
Saya dengan hormatnya merujuk kepada surat tuan bil (13) dlm
HB/PP/PET/TT/1240 (SULIT) bertarikh 20 Mac 1991 dan ingin merayu
terhadap keputusan tersebut atas alasan-alasan yang berikut:
(a)   Dalam mencapai keputusan ini, pihak Lembaga tidak mengambil kira
akan alasan-alasan yang telah saya berikan ke atas tuduhan yang
dibuat terhadap saya dan dengan itu keputusan itu adalah dibuat
secara terburu- buru dan tanpa sebab-sebab yang berasas;
(b)   Saya telah mengemukakan pembelaan yang kuat terhadap tuduhan ke
atas diri saya mengenai ujian air kencing di mana bukti-bukti
bertulis mengenai ubat yang dimakan oleh saya pada ketika itu
telah pun dibuktikan;
(c)   Ujian air kencing secara mengejut yang dijalankan pada 7 Mei 1990
tidak dilakukan dengan sempurna dan ia menimbulkan keraguan sama
ada:
(i)   air kencing saya telah diperiksa atas nama saya; atau
(ii) air kencing orang lain telah diuji atas nama saya.
(d)   Semasa ujian air kencing dijalankan, saya hanya diberi sebuah
botol yang kosong tanpa sebarang lebel padanya dan dengan itu ada
kemungkinan besar air kencing saya diuji atas nama orang lain dan
air kencing orang lain diuji atas nama saya.
(e)   Kemungkinan yang lebih besar yang membawa kesan dadah dalam air
kencing saya ialah bahawa pada ketika itu saya telah makan/minum
‘Linctus Codeine’ kerana sakit batuk;
(f)   Lapuran ujian air kencing ini telah diberitahu kepada saya pada
24 September 1990, iaitu lebihkurang 41/2 bulan selepas ujian air
kencing dibuat. Tetapi jika keputusan ujian itu dikeluarkan
dengan segera maka saya mungkin akan membuat satu lagi ujian
melalui seorang doktor atau ahli kimia yang lain dan dengan itu
ujian mengejut yang dijalankan oleh pihak hospital dapat dicabar;
(g)   Saya tidak diberi peluang langsung untuk mencabar atau membela
diri ke atas ujian air kencing yang dijalankan oleh pihak
hospital; oleh itu keraguan adalah ditimbulkan sama ada ujian itu
dikendalikan dengan sempurna.
(h)   Untuk menentukan sama ada seorang yang terlibat dengan dadah
memerlukan banyak ujian dan ia tidak boleh ditentukan dengan satu
ujian air kencing secara mengejut; tambahan pula dalam kes ini,
seperti yang tersebut di atas, ada kemungkinan terdapat kesan
dadah akibat saya memakan ubat pada ketika itu.
[*683] (i)   Lembaga Tatatertib tidak memberi pertimbangan yang wajar terhadap
banyak keraguan yang timbul dari hasil ujian air kencing yang
mengejut ini dan dengan itu keputusan yang dibuat terhadap saya
adalah tidak adil;
(j)   Saya mempunyai rekod perkhidmatan yang bersih selama 27 tahun dan
pegawai-pegawai atasan saya yang pernah saya bertugas dengan
mereka telah memberi pengesahan bertulis bahawa saya bukanlah
seorang yang terlibat dengan dadah dan bahawa saya adalah orang
yang berkelakuan baik;
(k)   Hukuman pembuangan kerja adalah suatu hukuman yang sangat berat
dan muktamad. Oleh itu, tuduhan terhadap seseorang pekerja itu
hendaklah terbukti tanpa sebarang keraguan walau sedikit
sekalipun. Jika terdapat atau timbulnya sedikit keraguan
sekalipun ke atas bukti tuduhan itu, maka faedah keraguan itu
haruslah diberi kepada orang yang kena tuduh itu.
Oleh yang demikian, memandangkan terlalu banyak keraguan yang telah
timbul terhadap tuduhan ke atas diri saya dalam kes ini maka saya
merayu supaya hukuman yang dikenakan terhadap saya dibatalkan atau
dikaji semula kerana sekali lagi saya ingin menegaskan bahawa saya
bukanlah seorang pengagih dadah atau orang yang terlibat dengan dadah.
Sekian, terimakasih.
Saya yang menurut perintah,
tt (Utara Badi a/l Perumal)

The plaintiff’s appeal was rejected vide a letter from Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia Kuala Lumpur (marked ‘DP17′) which states thus:
Saya diarah menarik perhatian kepada surat tuan terhadap keputusan
Lembaga Tatatertib Kumpulan ‘D’ Hospital Besar, Pulau Pinang yang telah
mengenakan hukuman buang kerja ke atas tuan.
(2) Lembaga Rayuan Tatatertib (Kumpulan ‘D’) dalam mesyuaratnya yang
ke 526 pada 17 Jun 1991 setelah menimbangkan dengan teliti rayuan
tuan itu, telah memutuskan bahawa hujah-hujah yang dikemukakan
bagi menyokong rayuan tuan itu tidak dapat diterima sebagai boleh
mengubah keputusan Lembaga Tatatertib yang telah menjatuhkan
hukuman buang kerja ke atas tuan. Dengan hal yang demikian,
Lembaga Rayuan mengambil keputusan menolak rayuan tuan.
(3) Keputusan Lembaga Rayuan Tatatertib ini adalah muktamad.

The plaintiff sought to move the court for a declaration by way of invoking this court’s power of judicial review. This law is now well settled, and pointedly so, when on 8 May 1996 the Federal Court held, in Civil Appeal No 01-41-94 ( Asriyah bte Sairy v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia) and Federal Court Civil Appeal No 01-40-94 ( Pancha Moorthy a/l Suppaya v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia) that there can be declarations made in relation to unlawful dismissal of a government servant. See also Halimatussaadiah v Public Service Commission, Malaysia [1992] 1 MLJ 513 as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 and Syed Mahadzir bin Syed Abdullah v Ketua Polis Negara & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 391 [*684] which was also affirmed on appeal to the Federal Court; in both the cases, declarations were sought for wrongful dismissal of a Government servant.

The plaintiff, through his solicitor, Mr Karpal Singh, raised only three issues. Firstly, he contended that the wording in DP10 (show cause letter) which contained two alternative punishments under general order 26 (or indeed, more than two punishments under general order 36) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980, has nullified the charge itself for want of clarity. He contended that the first defendant should only have stated which of the alternative punishments they intended to use against him, to enable the plaintiff to be prepared for the serious consequences of the charge and be better able to direct his mind to the possibility of such a punishment; it being obvious that dismissal from the service is the most severe punishment that can be imposed upon a civil servant found guilty of misconduct. With respect, I find this objection untenable as, essentially, it pertains to the penalty rather than the charge being equivocal and I do not see how it could affect the validity of the charge. There is nothing wrong with the way the charge is worded in DP10 considering that it is in exact compliance with general order 26 and it contained all the necessary particulars to enable the plaintiff to prepare his written representation in answer thereto. In my view, the charge was properly drafted with enough particulars rendered, to enable the plaintiff to respond to the allegations made and for the purpose of exculpating himself, though an outline of the charge would usually suffice. See Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 535. The second issue was that the lst defendant had taken into account other material information which had never been put to the plaintiff. He contended that this must have happened, in view of the expression in DP13:
… setelah menimbangkan dengan teliti pertuduhan ke atas tuan dan
jawapan yang diberi oleh tuan serta maklumat-maklumat lain yang
berkaitan. (Emphasis added.)

This would mean that other matters extraneous to the charge itself, which were never made available to the plaintiff, appeared to have been taken into consideration by the Board, without any opportunity accorded to the plaintiff to make his representation on those extraneous matters. In essence, the complaint is that the plaintiff was not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the other relevant information that appeared to have been considered in the decision making process which led to his dismissal from service.

In Shamsiah bte Ahmad Sham v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1990] 3 MLJ 364, the employer had taken into account the employee’s record of past conduct without giving her an opportunity to explain or controvert its contents. Jemuri Serjan SCJ (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, in allowing the appeal had this to say (pp 368D, 369I):
… What we are saying is that if these materials which have such
damning effect on her case are to be used against her she should be
given a right to [*685] be heard on them. It is not a matter of
pure technicality but it is absolutely fundamental in law that the
appellant should have been given an opportunity of stating her case
regarding her past conducts, considering that the dismissal of a civil
servant is no light matter. …
We wish to add that it has been held that tribunals must not continue
privately to obtain evidence or other information between the
conclusion of the hearing and the making of the decision, without
notifying the parties so as to give them an opportunity to make
submissions on it.

On this issue, reverting to the current matter, the defence called En Karnail Singh a/l L Sohan Singh (DW1), who was at the material time the Deputy Medical Superintendent of Penang General Hospital and also a member of the Disciplinary Board. He explained that by the expression ‘maklumat-maklumat lain yang berkaitan’ in the para 1 of DP13, the Board had meant and was intended to refer to the contents in paras 2, 3 and 4 of the plaintiff’s reply to DP12. He further said that the Board did not take into account any other information but only the result of the urine test. He was positive that, that was the only reason for the plaintiff’s dismissal. And, he acknowledged that there was no oral enquiry, as all representations were made in writing, and that the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to mitigate before imposition of punishment. It is noted that Mr Karpal had in this regard, quite correctly conceded that DP13 is not caught within ss 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act since it was not a document that was required to be reduced into writing under the General Orders.

Thus, after having carefully studied and considered the evidence of DW1, I am satisfied that the defendants have given a full, adequate and acceptable explanation as to what that impugned phrase in DP13 meant, and I accept DW1′s assertion that there were no extraneous matters considered by the Board other than the fact that plaintiff’s urine was tested positive for morphine. I am also minded to accept DW1′s explanation that the other relevant information (‘maklumat-maklumat lain yang berkaitan’) referred to was what the plaintiff had written in his letter of representation (DP12) and nothing more. In the event, the plaintiff’s second challenge on the Board’s procedure does not commend itself to me, and is, as with the first point, devoid of any merit.

It is however, the third and last point taken by Mr Karpal Singh, which I must now turn to, that has engendered in me some considerable interest, and I am sure, the interest of our superior courts hereafter. This issue poses the question: Whether a civil servant is clothed with any right to an opportunity to mitigate before punishment, especially in cases where two or more punishments are held out to him as alternative or possible punishments?

The plaintiff complains that the first defendant — a decision maker — has failed to give the plaintiff, whose interest will be adversely affected by the decision to dismiss him, an opportunity to be heard on the issue of punishment. It is submitted that this right to mitigate is also an implied requirement under art l35(2) of the Federal Constitution which found expression and affirmation through incorporation in general order 23 [*686] of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980 (General Orders) and regulation 27 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) General Orders (Chapter D) Regulations 1969. Mr Karpal Singh contends that, as the penalty/punishment was expressed in equivocal terms, the plaintiff shouldnot be dismissed or reduced in rank unless he has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to mitigate. The plaintiff was informed in DP13 that he had been dismissed. It was thus urged upon this court that such a drastic measure which involved loss of the plaintiff’s very livelihood ought, in fairness, to require that he be given the opportunity to make a plea in mitigation for the lighter of the two alternative punishments stated in the charge. My attention was drawn to art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution, which states:
No member of such a service [public service] as aforesaid shall be
dismissed or reduced in rank without being given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard.

On the question of the possible punishments, Mr Karpal, had also made heavy weather of the last sentence in para 2 of DP10 which reads: ‘Jika tuan didapati bersalah, tuan boleh dihukum mengikut perintah am 36 dalam Perintah-Perintah Am yang sama’, and general order 36 sets out nine possible punishments. Though, I am inclined to agree with Mr Karpal’s contention that DP10 is the type of document which the law requires to be reduced to writing, in which case, ss 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 is applicable to preclude the defendant from contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms. In support of this contention, counsel cited my decision in PP v Lee Eng Kooi [1993] 2 MLJ 322 — pertaining to a similar issue of the police report which was required under s 107(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code to be reduced to writing — which has been upheld by the Federal Court under Criminal Appeal No 05-63-93. However, I find, and I am fully satisfied that the language ‘dengan tujuan buang kerja atau turun pangkat di bawah perintah am 26′ appearing in the first sentence of the same paragraph of DP10 would have the net effect of sufficently clarifying the last sentence of DP10, as, the impugned phrase has essentially to be read in the context of the clear expression in the first sentence of the same paragraph in the same document. Be that as it may, yet it is nevertheless beyond question that at least two alternative, and in that sense, equivocal punishments have been held out to him. This being the case, Mr Karpal’s third contention calls for this court’s careful deliberation.

As far back as in 1987, Ajaib Singh J in the case of Alan Noor bin Kamat v Inspector General of Police & Anor [1987] l CLJ 51 had this to say (at p 56):
… After considering these explanations and having found that the
plaintiff had failed to exculpate himself, it was incumbent upon the
Inspector General of Police thereafter to give the plaintiff an
opportunity to make a plea in mitigation on punishment. This right of
the plaintiff to be heard in mitigation is implied in regulation 27 of
the General Orders and in art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution for
otherwise it cannot be said that the plaintiff had [*687] been
given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. He had to be heard
throughout the proceedings from the beginning to the end. Isn’t it a
fair and reasonable expectation of any person condemned for a wrong
that he would be heard in mitigation before any punishment is imposed
on him?

However, Ajaib Singh J decision in Alan Noor went up on appeal to the Supreme Court, but though the appeal was dismissed, Salleh Abas LP made certain obiter comments which are somewhat at variance with the dicta of Ajaib Singh J in the court below. This is what the Lord President had to say:
As it stands, this passage appears to be misleading. This passage
should be read in the light of the factual situation of this case,
wherein the show cause letter dated 14 May 1980 was completely silent
as to the comtemplated punishment to be imposed at the end of the
disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, in order to ensure that the
respondent understood and appreciated the seriousness of the
proceedings he was facing, the learned trial judge was right in
insisting that another chance must be given to him, which he called a
plea of mitigation. If, however, the show cause letter had included the
proposed punishment, for example, by the inclusion of such statement
as: ‘This proceeding is taken against you with a view to dismissal or
reduction in rank …’ or ‘This proceeding is taken under general order
30 with a view to dismissal or reduction in rank …’, or such other
phraseology as would give the effect of making the respondent
understand the nature of the proceedings and what they would lead to,
there is no necessity for the appellants to give another opportunity of
being heard before the punishment is imposed.

The above dicta of Salleh Abas LP is clearly obiter and for reasons below, I am, with respect, not pursuaded to adopt it.

Even at first blush, it had struck me as somewhat unjust to deny the plaintiff here an opportunity to mitigate where it involves alternative punishments, before penalty is imposed in criminal jurisprudence, as:
(a)   the two alternative punishmentsnotified to the plaintiff were
tentative, drastically distinct in effect and distinctively equivocal in
specie, one from the other.
(b)   the heavier of the two alternative punishments is severely penal in
nature.
(c)   the very question of which one of the two alternative punishments to
mete out to the plaintiff would itself essentially entail a deliberative
decision making process on the part of the defendant Board.

Unlike some other jurisdictions, both India and Malaysia are each governed by a written Constitution. It is noteworthy, that the exercise of termination of employment of a government servant in India is subject to the provisions of art 311 of the Indian Constitution which is equivalent to our art 135(2).

There is a striking similarity in the language employed, by the formulators of the two Constitutions, in art 135(2) (‘art 135(2)’) of the Federal Constitution and art 311(2) (‘art 311(2)’) of the Indian Constitution. Article 135(2) reads as follows:
[*688] No member of such a service as aforesaid shall be dismissed or reduced
in rank without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard:
Provided that this Clause shall not apply to the following cases:
(a) where a member of such a service is dismissed or reduced in rank
on the grounds of conduct in respect of which a Criminal charge
has been proved against him;

And art 311(2) reads:
No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the
charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard
in respect of those charges. …
Provided that this clause shall not apply –
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the
ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal
charge; … .

Though proviso (a) of our art 135(2) is wholly irrelevant to the current discussions, yet it is nevertheless of interest to note that it has been held by our Court of Appeal that this proviso (a) precludes invocation of art 135(2) not only by a civil servant who has been convicted of a criminal charge, but also, by such employee who is bound over under s 173A(ii)(b) with no conviction recorded. See Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261.

It would follow that the decisions of the Indian courts upon such analogous provision are to be accorded greater weight and regarded as of great persuasive force in our decisions here. It is pertinent to note that Pt IV of the All India Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules 1969 (which deals with the procedure for disciplinary action against Indian civil servants) require the holding of an inquiry, unlike our General Orders which, in Pt II (in the case of dismissal or reduction in rank) provide for only a show cause letter and written representations; albeit, with provision for the Disciplinary Authority to appoint a committee of inquiry (under general order 26(5)), but even then, if further clarification is necessary. Yet, despite the fact that holding of an inquiry is mandatory in India, it has been consistently held in a copious and welter of Indian cases, (which followed the Privy Council decision in High Commissioner of India v IM Lall AIR 1948 PC 121), that it is manifest in art 311 that a civil servant has a right to a reasonable opportunity of showing cause twice before an order of dismissal is imposed. These two stages under art 311 are: first, when the charges are enquired into, and secondly, when after the enquiring authority has come to the conclusion that the charge or charges has been established and there arises the question of the proper punishment to be imposed, a notice has then to be given to show cause against the nature of punishment to be imposed; see Sher Singh, Malhan, Petition er v State Madhya Pradesh AIR 1955 Nag 175; 42 CN 40.

The ratio in Sher Singh has been faithfully echoed in similar vein in the following other Indian cases:
[*689] (i)   Tribhuwan Nath Pandey v Union of India AIR 1953 Nag 138
(ii)   Sobhagmal v State AIR 1954 Raj 207
(iii)   Hiro Lilaram Chablani v State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 Hyde 48
(iv)    Ganesh Balakrishna Deshmukh v State of Madhya Bharat (1956) Mad
Bha 172
(v)   C Apparao v The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range,
Waltair & Anor AIR 1958 And Pra 269
(vi)   Bachhittar Singh v State of Punjab & Anor AIR 1963 SC 395
(vii)   State of Bombay v Amarsinh Raval AIR 1963 Guj 244
(viii)   State of Bihar v Abdul Majid AIR 1954 SC 245
(ix)   Vasant Pandurang Deval v The State of Bombay AIR 1963 Bom 269
(x)   Gangadhar Gurusiddappa v Union of India AIR 1963 Mys 193
(xi)   The High Commissioner of India v IM Lall AIR 1948 PC 121.

I have earlier expressed a tentative opinion that it would be unjust to deny the civil servant an opportunity to be heard in mitigation before punishment is imposed on him, as the punishment itself involves a further decision-making process. Now, upon careful reading of the speech of Lord Thankerton, delivered on behalf of the Privy Council in IM Lall, I find eminently pursuasive and authoritative dicta to fortify that opinion. The reason being also that the expressed alternative punishments are merely suggested punishments, and hence hypothetical, until a definite decision has been come to on the charges. I need do no more in this regard than to quote the relevant passage in Lord Thankerton’s speech, which was logically and aptly articulated thusly:
In the opinion of their Lordships, no action is proposed within the
meaning of the subsection until a definite conclusion has been come to
on the charges, and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally
determined on. Prior to that stage, the charges are unproved and the
suggested punishments are merely hypothetical. It is on that stage
being reached that the statute gives the civil servant opportunity for
which sub-s (8) makes provision. Their Lordships would only add that
they see no difficulty in the statutory opportunity being reasonably
afforded at more than one stage. If the civil servant has been through
an enquiry under R55, it would not be reasonable that he should ask for
a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out, but that would not
exhaust his statutory right, and he would still be entitled to
represent against the punishment proposed as the result of the findings
of the enquiry.

Pertaining to the right to mitigate, I have not overlooked the language used in general order 35(1), which, if read in isolation, may appear to militate against the plaintiff’s case, as being in effect a denial of the right to mitigate. It reads:
Notwithstanding anything in General Order 23, if after considering the
report and documents submitted by the Head of Department general orders
33 and 34(1), the appropriate Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion
that the officer merits dismissal or reduction in rank, it may
forthwith direct [*690] accordingly; or if it is of the opinion
that the officer should be inflicted with a lesser punishment or
otherwise dealt with, the Disciplinary Authority may forthwith inflict
upon the officer such lesser punishment or deal with him such a manner
as it may deem fit.

However, it is crystal clear that General Order 35(1) is only applicable in the context of General Order 33 (which deals with an officer where criminal proceedings against him results in his conviction) and also General Order 34 (1) (which concerns procedure in the case of preventive detention and banishment). And, in the context of criminal proceedings, be it noted that regulation 28 defines the term ‘convicted’ or ‘conviction’ to include a finding or an order involving a finding of guilt in a criminal court. Hence, General Order 35(1), which allows a Disciplnary Authority to ‘forthwith inflict upon the officer such lesser punishment’ of ‘dismissal’ or ‘reduction in rank’ or ‘deal with him in such manner as it may deem fit’– thereby implying that the civil servant is not clothed with any right to mitigate on the punishment — is manifestly and plainly intended by the legislature to be invoked only where the servant’s case falls strictly within the ambit of the proviso (a) of art 135(2) or General Order 34(1) and not otherwise. This is logically so, as in the firstplace, such civil servant who is caught within proviso (a) of art 135(2) is expressly barred by the supreme law of the land from the right to be heard or an opportunity to show cause before being removed or reduced in rank. Here, it is crucial to note that it has never been the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff is caught within proviso (a) of art 135(2).

It ought to be borne in mind that unlike a reduction in rank, the extreme punishment of dismissal from service severely affects the civil servant’s future, in terms of loss of livehood and his family’s loss of his financial support; to him it is loss of the ultimate stake in his future. Thus, I hold that when the Board decided to dismiss the plaintiff, a decision making process was undertaken; and the decision to dismiss him was done as much in the process of exercising a quasi-judicial function as the decision to reject his written representations to exculpate himself on the show cause notice.

If art 135(2) is read in conjunction with arts 5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution, it cannot be denied that procedural fairness in dealing with matters affecting the citizens is also part of our law, as the word ‘law’ in both articles encompasses both substantive law and enacted procedure. See Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] 1 MLJ 64, Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697, Smt Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 and Shri Sitaram Sugar Co Ltd v Union of India & Ors [1990] 3 SCC 223. See also Tan Tek Seng, in which this point was extensively discussed by Gopal Sri Ram JCA, delivering the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal. As this nation moves towards a modern society, governed by just and justiciable laws, firmly and fairly enforced, with its executive actions avowed to be anchored upon the principles of transparency and accountability, it is inevitable that an increasingly more liberal and purposeful approach would have to be taken by the courts, in interpreting the rights of the citizenry, in the light [*691] of and to implement the true brooding spirit of the framers of the Federal Constitution. It is thus my considered decision that the right of the plaintiff to be heard in mitigation is implicitly encompassed in general order 23 of the General Order and in art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution, unless proviso (a) thereof is applicable (not the case here). He has to be heard throughout the proceedings from the beginning to the end. And, with respect, I agree with the dicta encapsulated in the rhetorical question posed by Ajaib Singh J in the case of Alan Noor: ‘Isn’t it a fair and reasonable expectation of any person condemned for a wrong that he would be heard in mitigation before any punishment is imposed on him?’ Consequently, in my judgment, as it is common ground that the first defendant had not given the plaintiff any opportunity to be heard in mitigation before punishment, the decision making process pertaining thereto is fatally flawed.

As I have held that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed due to procedural error on the part of the first defendant which has seriously prejudiced the rights of the plaintiff, I shall now finally turn to consider the nature of relief or order that is open for this court to make. It is trite law, in our as well as other Commonwealth jurisdictions, that the scope of judicial review is limited only to review of the decision-making process and not the decision itself. (See Tropiland Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Seberang Perai [1996] 4 MLJ 16.)

It is in the vital interest of the citizenry that the powers of the court on judicial review ought, in a democracy, essentially to be preserved if only to check and curb the occasional excesses or capricious ness of the executive and public administrative bodies. Indeed, if we are to maintain the essential basic principles governing a democracy, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to intercede in favour of the citizen when such lapses are manifest (as happened in Tropiland Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Seberang Perai). The courts have thus jealously and vigilantly guarded its powers of judicial review. It must be borne in mind that the courts have often exercised its powers of judicial review in the teeth of ouster of jurisdiction provisions in certain statutes, eg for writ of habeas corpus despite s 11C of the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985. In judicial review, the court does not sit as an appellate body and has no appellate power to exercise. So, quite rightly, in its vigilance to protect and most importantly, to preserve such powers, the courts have been consistenly averse to review or interfere with the decision per se of the executive or public administrator in such cases.

Thus, in the instant case before me, it is plainly beyond the ambit of a judicial review for this court to touch on the decision itself and consider whether, if the plaintiff was rightly found to be a drug addict, he could be allowed to continue to work in an institution such as a hospital. Though, even on this score it may also be noted that the plaintiff had in para (c) of DP14, asserted that the urine tested was not his urine as he had not taken prohibited drugs but only cough mixture. And, it is equally untenable for me here to decide whether the lesser of the two alternative penalties ought to have been imposed, as this point was not taken by either party, and [*692] quite apart from the fact that such deliberation is precluded by the lack of any printed or oral evidence on (nor do I see) to what lower rank a hospital attendant — such as the plaintiff — could be reduced.

Obviously, for the current purposes, what has to be decided — within this court’spurview — is, and I so hold that, due to non-compliance of general order 23 of the General Orders and of art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution in the manner in which the first defendant had made their decision on the punishment imposed, the termination of the plaintiff’s services had been rendered nugatory, null and void and of no effect.

In the circumstances, therefore I allow the plaintiff’s claim with costs and declare that the punishments imposed on him are null and void and of no effect. I further declare that the plaintiff is still a hospital attendant and is entitled to all his salaries and benefits due to him as such. The parties are to determine the plaintiff’s salaries and other emoluments due to him failing which an inquiry will be held by the senior assistant registrar of this court to determine these issues.

Plaintiff’s claim allowed.

LOAD-DATE: June 3, 2003

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Scientific Evidence and Law

The contrasts between law and science are often described in binary terms: science seeks truth, the law does justice; science is descriptive, but law is prescriptive; science emphasises progress, whereas the law emphasises process... [C]omparisons between science and the law often celebrate science's unique commitment to systematic testing of observations and its willingness to submit its conclusions to critical probing and falsification. Hence, the Intellect, Reason and Judgment as conclusions and verdicts of the Cognitive Faculties by which laws are prescribed a priori and science is described as the scientific cognition a priori within a posteriori truth. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, 'Digital Metadata, Timestamp and The Theory of Relativity' - Faculty of Mathematics, University of Cambridge, 15 JJ Thomson Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9EW United Kingdom, Published Nov. 2010)

Wissenschaftlicher Beweis und Gesetz

Die Kontraste zwischen Gesetz und Wissenschaft werden häufig in den binären Bezeichnungen beschrieben: Wissenschaft sucht Wahrheit, das Gesetz tut Gerechtigkeit; Wissenschaft ist beschreibend, aber Gesetz ist vorschreibend; Wissenschaft hebt Fortschritt hervor, während t er Gesetz hervorhebt Prozeß... Vergleiche zwischen Wissenschaft und dem Gesetz feiern häufig einzigartige Verpflichtung der Wissenschaft zur systematischen Prüfung von Beobachtungen und seine Bereitwilligkeit, seine Zusammenfassungen beim kritischen Prüfen und bei der Fälschung einzureichen. Folglich wird der Intellekt, der Grund und das Urteil als Zusammenfassungen und Urteilssprüche der kognitiven Lehrkörper, von denen Gesetzen einem priori und eine Wissenschaft vorgeschrieben werden, als das wissenschaftliche Erkennen ein priori innerhalb a posteriori der Wahrheit beschrieben. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, ' Digital Metadata, Zeitstempel und die Theorie Relativität ' - der Universität von Cambridge, 15 JJ Thomson von Allee, Cambridge CB3 9EW Vereinigtes Königreich, November 2010)

Évidence et loi scientifiques

Les contrastes entre la loi et la science sont souvent décrits en termes binaires : la science cherche la vérité, la loi fait la justice; la science est descriptive, mais la loi est préscriptive ; la science souligne le progrès, tandis que la loi souligne des comparaisons de processus … entre la science et la loi célébrer souvent l'engagement unique de la science à l'essai systématique des observations et sa bonne volonté de soumettre ses conclusions au sondage et à la falsification critiques. Par conséquent, l'intellect, la raison et le jugement comme conclusions et verdicts des corps enseignant cognitifs par lesquels des lois sont prescrites a priori et la science est décrit comme connaissance scientifique a priori dans a posteriori la vérité. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, 'Digital Metadata, horodateur et la théorie d'université de relativité '- de Cambridge, avenue de 15 JJ Thomson, Cambridge CB3 9EW Royaume-Uni, édité novembre 2010)

Evidência e lei científicas

Os contrastes entre a lei e a ciência são descritos frequentemente em termos binários: a ciência procura a verdade, a lei faz a justiça; a ciência é descritiva, mas a lei é prescriptive; a ciência emfatiza o progresso, visto que a lei emfatiza comparações do processo … entre a ciência e a lei comemorar frequentemente o compromisso original da ciência a testar sistemático das observações e o seu voluntariedade submeter suas conclusões a sondar e a falsification críticos. Daqui, o intellect, a razão e o julgamento como conclusões e verdicts das faculdades cognitive por que as leis são prescritas a priori e a ciência são descritos como a cognição científica a priori dentro a posteriori da verdade. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, ' Digital Metadata, timestamp e a teoria da universidade do relativity ' - de Cambridge, avenida de 15 JJ Thomson, Cambridge CB3 9EW Reino Unido, Nov. 2010)

Prova e legge scientifiche

I contrasti fra legge e la scienza sono descritti spesso nei termini binari: la scienza cerca la verità, la legge fa la giustizia; la scienza è descrittiva, ma la legge è normativa; la scienza dà risalto al progresso, mentre la legge dà risalto ai confronti di processo … fra la scienza e la legge celebrare spesso l'impegno unico della scienza alla prova sistematica delle osservazioni e la relativa compiacenza presentare le relative conclusioni al sondaggio ed alla falsificazione critici. Quindi, il intellect, il motivo ed il giudizio come conclusioni e verdetti delle facoltà conoscitive da cui le leggi si prescrivono a priori e la scienza è descritto come la cognizione scientifica a priori all'interno a posteriori della verità. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, 'Digital Metadata, timestamp e la teoria dell'università di relatività '- di Cambridge, un viale di 15 JJ Thomson, Cambridge CB3 9EW Regno Unito, pubblicato novembre del 2010)

Научные доказательство и закон

Контрасты между законом и наукой часто описаны в бинарные термины: наука изыскивает правду, закон делает правосудие; наука описательна, но закон прескриптивен; наука подчеркивает прогресс, тогда как закон подчеркивает сравнения процесса ... между наукой и законом часто празднуйте принятие окончательного решения науки уникально к систематический испытывать замечаний и свою готовность представить свои заключения к критически зондировать и фальсифицированию. Следовательно, интеллект, причина и суждение как заключения и вердикты познавательных факультетов которыми законы предписаны a priori и наука описаны как научная познавательность a priori в пределах a posteriori правды. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, ' цифров Metadata, timestamp и теория университета релятивности ' - cambridge, бульвара 15 JJ Thomson, королевства cambridge CB3 9EW соединенного, NOV 2010)

Evidencia y ley científicas

Los contrastes entre la ley y la ciencia se describen a menudo en términos binarios: la ciencia busca verdad, la ley hace la justicia; la ciencia es descriptiva, pero la ley es preceptiva; la ciencia acentúa progreso, mientras que t él ley acentúa proceso… Los omparisons de C entre la ciencia y la ley celebran a menudo la comisión única de la ciencia a la prueba sistemática de observaciones y su buena voluntad de someter sus conclusiones a sondar y a la falsificación críticos. Por lo tanto, la intelecto, la razón y el juicio como conclusiones y los veredictos de las facultades cognoscitivas por quienes los leyes son prescritos a priori y la ciencia se describe como la cognición científica a priori dentro a posteriori de la verdad. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, ' Digital Metadata, timestamp y la teoría de la universidad de la relatividad ' - de Cambridge, avenida de 15 JJ Thomson, Cambridge CB3 9EW Reino Unido, noviembre de 2010)

Prova e legge scientifiche

科学的な証拠及び法律

法律と科学間の対照は頻繁に二進言葉で記述されている: 科学は真実を、法律する正義を追求する; 科学は説明的であるが、法律は規定する; t が彼法律プロセスを... 強調する一方、科学は進歩を強調する重大な精査と偽造に結論を堤出する科学と法律間の比較は頻繁に観察の組織的テストへ科学の独特な責任及び自発性を祝う。それ故に、法律がアプリオリに規定されると科学はposteriori の真実内の科学的な認知としてアプリオリに記述されている認識能力の結論として知性、理由及び判断そして評決。(Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim 、' デジタルMetadata 、ケンブリッジ、15 JJ Thomson の道、ケンブリッジ CB3 9EW イギリス、2010 年11 月の相対性' - 大学のタイムスタンプ及び理論)

科學證據和法律

對比在法律和科學之間經常被描述用二進制術語: 科學尋找真相, 法律申張正義; 科學是描寫的, 但法律是規定的; 科學強調進展, 但是法律強調過程... 比較在科學並且法律之間經常慶祝科學的獨特的承諾對系統測試觀察和它的自願遞交它的結論給重要探查和偽造。因此, 智力、原因和評斷作為法律規定演繹認知教職員的結論和定案並且科學被描述作為科學認知演繹在推納真相之內。(Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, ' 數字式 Metadata, 時間戳和劍橋, 15 JJ Thomson 大道, 劍橋 CB3 9EW 英國相對' - 大學的理論, 被出版2010 11月)

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Scientific Evidence and Law

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Evidencia y ley científicas

Prova e legge scientifiche

科学的な証拠及び法律

科學證據和法律

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