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Article 145(3) Federal Constitution of Malaysia

[1997] 3 MLJ 681

REPCO HOLDINGS BHD v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)

GOPAL SRI RAM JCA

CRIMINAL REVISION NO W-43-7 OF 1997

2 October 1997

Constitutional Law — Constitution — Infringement of — Whether s 126(2) of the Securities Industry Act 1983 and s 39(2) of the Securities Commission Act 1993 were ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and were void to that extent

Constitutional Law — Legislature — Infringement of Constitution — Doctrine of prospective overruling — Power of the court to apply doctrine

Criminal Procedure — Prosecution — Right to conduct prosecution — Whether any other authority apart from the Public Prosecutor may be lawfully empowered to conduct prosecution — Federal Constitution art 145(3) — Securities Industry Act 1983 s 126(2) — Securities Commission Act 1993 s 39(2)

Securities — Conduct of prosecution under the Securities Industry Act 1983 — Whether any other authority apart from the Public Prosecutor may be lawfully empowered to conduct prosecution — Federal Constitution art 145(3) — Securities Industry Act 1983 s 126(2) — Securities Commission Act 1993 s 39(2)

The applicant, Repco Holdings Bhd (‘RepcO’), was charged by the Securities Commission (‘the commission’) – a body created by the Securities Commission Act 1993 (‘the SCA’) – for infringing s 86 of the Securities Industry Act 1983 (‘the SIA’). At the hearing, counsel for Repco took a preliminary objection to the locus standi of the two officers of the commission who appeared to prosecute the case. The prosecution was conducted by the two officers pursuant to the joint operation of s 126(2) of the SIA and s 39(2) of the SCA which, inter alia, allow prosecution of any offence under the Acts to be conducted by the Registrar of Companies or by any officer authorized by the Registrar or the Chairman of the commission or the commission. It was argued that s 126(2) of the SIA and s 39(2) of the SCA were ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and were void to that extent. The sessions judge, faced with the constitutional argument, acted under s 30 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and transmitted the record in the case to the High Court to determine the constitutionality of the two subsections.

Held, declaring both s 129(2) of the SIA and s 39(2) of the SCA to be unconstitutional, null and void:

  • (1)

The only authority that is constitutionally entitled to conduct prosecutions is the Attorney General as Public Prosecutor. The adjectival vehicle contained in s 376 and subsequent sections of the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6) (‘the CPC’) put this beyond doubt (see p 688B); PP v Datuk Harun bin Hj Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116 and PP v Lim Shui Wang & Ors [1979] 1 MLJ 65 followed.

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 682

  • (2)

Based on authorities, the expression ‘conduct’ appearing in art 145(3) and in the two impugned subsections carries the same meaning. Since the Constitution exclusively authorizes the Attorney General to conduct prosecutions, in must follow that no other authority may be lawfully empowered to exercise that function. Therefore, s 126(2) of the SIA which allows prosecution to be conducted by the Registrar of Companies or by any officer authorized by the Registrar or the Chairman of the commission is ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. However, if the Registar of Companies is a gazetted deputy public prosecutor and in such capacity conducts a prosecution of an offence under the SIA, that would not be caught by art 145(3) of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Chairman of the commission is not placed on an equal footing and therefore not authorized constitutionally to authorize or to conduct prosecutions under the SIA. Further, although for the purpose of carrying out their duties, members and servants of the commission are deemed to be public officers, they do not fall within the scope of s 380(i) of the CPC to allow them to conduct prosecution (see p 690C—G); Long bin Samat & Ors v PP [1974] 2 MLJ 152 and Johnson Tan Han Seng v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 66 followed.

  • (3)

In the same way, s 39(2) of the SCA wholly contravenes art 145(3). By reason of art 4(1) of the Federal Constitution, it being a law which is inconsistent with the Constitution, the subsection gives way and is therefore void and unconstitutional (see p 691B).

  • (4)

It would be a manifest injustice to render a retrospective ruling on the invalidity of the two impugned subsections. The declaration as to invalidity shall, therefore, be prospective only and shall include only the present case and cases registered from the date of the ruling (see p 692A—B); PP v Dato Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311 and Mamat bin Daud & Ors v Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119 followed.

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon, Repco Holdings Bhd (‘RepcO’), telah dipertuduhkan oleh Suruhanjaya Sekuriti (‘suruhanjaya tersebut’) – sebuah badan yang ditubuhkan oleh Akta Suruhanjaya Sekuriti 1993 (‘ASS’) – kerana melanggar s 86Akta Perindustrian Sekuriti 1983 (‘APS’). Di pembicaraan, peguam Repco membuat bantahan permulaan atas locus standi dua orang pegawai suruhanjaya tersebut yang hadir untuk mendakwa kes. Pihak pendakwa dikendalikan oleh dua orang pegawai tersebut menurut operasi bersama s 126(2) ASS dan s 39(2) APS yang, antara lain, membenarkan pendakwaan mana-mana kesalahan di bawah Akta-Akta tersebut untuk dijalankan oleh Pendaftar Syarikat atau oleh mana-mana pegawai yang diberikuasa oleh Pendaftar Syarikat atau Pengerusi suruhanjaya tersebut atau suruhanjaya tersebut. Adalah dihujahkan bahawa s 126(2) ASS dan

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 683

s 39(2) APS adalah ultra vires perkara 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan adalah terbatal setakat itu. Hakim sesyen, yang dihadapi dengan hujah perlembagaan, bertindak di bawah s 30 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 dan menghantar rekod kes ke Mahkamah Tinggi bagi menentukan perlembagaan dua subseksyen itu.

Diputuskan, mengisytiharkan kedua-dua s 129(2) APS dan s 39(2) ASS tidak menurut perlembagaan, tak sah dan terbatal:

  • (1)

Satu-satunya autoriti yang berhak di sisi perlembagaan untuk mengendalikan pendakwaan adalah Peguam Negara sebagai Pendakwa Raya. Susunan prosedur yang termaktub dalam s 376 dan seksyen-seksyen yang berikutnya dalam Kanun Acara Jenayah (NMB Bab 6) (‘KAJ’) meletakkan perkara ini di luar batas keraguan (lihat ms 688B); PP v Datuk Harun bin Hj Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116 dan PP v Lim Shui Wang & Ors [1979] 1 MLJ 65 diikut.

  • (2)

Berdasarkan autoriti-autoriti, ungkapan ‘menjalankan’ yang menonjol dalam perkara 145(3) dan dalam dua subseksyen yang dipersoalkan membawa maksud yang sama. Oleh kerana Perlembagaan memberikuasa kepada Peguam Negara secara eksklusif untuk menjalankan pendakwaan, ini bermakna bahawa tiada pihak berkuasa yang lain boleh mempunyai kuasa di sisi undang-undang untuk melaksanakan fungsi itu. Maka, s 126(2) APS yang membenarkan pendakwaan dijalankan oleh Pendaftar Syarikat atau mana-mana pegawai lain yang diberikuasa oleh Pendaftar atau Pengerusi suruhanjaya tersebut adalah ultra vires perkara 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Walau bagaimanapun, jika Pendaftar Syarikat adalah timbalan pendakwa raya yang diwartakan dan dalam keupayaan demikian menjalankan pendakwaan ke atas kesalahan di bawah APS, ini tidak terperangkap oleh perkara 145(3) Perlembagaan. Sebaliknya, Pengerusi suruhanjaya tersebut tidak berada dalam kedudukan yang sama dan dengan itu tidak diberikuasa menurut perlembagaan untuk memberikuasa atau untuk menjalankan pendakwaan di bawah APS. Selanjutnya, walaupun untuk tujuan menjalankan tugas, ahli-ahli dan pekerja-pekerja suruhanjaya tersebut dianggap sebagai pegawai awam, mereka tidak dirangkumi oleh skop s 380(i) KAJ bagi membenarkan mereka menjalankan pendakwaan (lihat ms 690C—G); Long bin Samat & Ors v PP [1974] 2 MLJ 152 dan Johnson Tan Han Seng v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 66 diikut.

  • (3)

Dalam cara yang sama, s 39(2) ASS pada keseluruhannya menyalahi perkara 145(3). Disebabkan perkara 4(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, ia merupakan undang-undang yang tidak konsisten dengan Perlembagaan, subseksyen itu memberi laluan dan dengan itu adalah tak sah dan melanggar perlembagaan (lihat ms 691B).

  • (4)

Adalah sungguh tidak adil untuk membuat keputusan secara kebelakangan atas ketaksahan dua subseksyen yang dipersoalkan.

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 684

Dengan itu, perisytiharan atas ketaksahan haruslah menjadi prospektif sahaja dan harus termasuk hanya kes ini dan kes-kes yang didaftarkan dari tarikh keputusan (lihat ms 692A—B); PP v Dato Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311 dan Mamat bin Daud & Ors v Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119 diikut.]

Notes

For a case on infringement of Constitution, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) para 993.

For cases on securities, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 766–793.

For a case on the right to conduct prosecution, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) para 2040.

Cases referred to

Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 (refd)

Johnson Tan Han Seng v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 66 (folld)

Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and another appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd)

Long bin Samat & Ors v PP [1974] 2 MLJ 152 (folld)

Mamat bin Daud & Ors v Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119 (folld)

PP v Datuk Harun bin Hj Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116 (folld)

PP v Lim Shui Wang & Ors [1979] 1 MLJ 65 (folld)

PP v Dato Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311 (folld)

Raymond v Attorney General [1982] 2 WLR 849 (refd)

Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan Malaysia & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261 (refd)

Legislation referred to

Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 30

Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6) ss 376, 380, 380(i)

Federal Constitution arts 4(1), 145(3)

Securities Commission Act 1993 s 39(2)

Securities Industry Act 1983 ss 86, 91, 126(2)

Muhammad Shafee Abdullah (Ng Aik Guan with him) for the applicant.

Azhar Mohamed and Shamsul Sulaiman (Deputy Public Prosecutors) for the respondent.

GOPAL SRI RAM JCA

(delivering oral judgment): This is an application under s 30(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. That section reads as follows:

30 (1) Where in any proceedings in any subordinate court any question arises as to the effect of any provision of the Constitution the presiding officer of the court may stay the proceedings and may transmit the record thereof to the High Court.

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 685

(2) Any record of proceedings transmitted to the High Court under this section shall be examined by a Judge of the Court and where the Judge considers that the decision of a question as to the effect of a provision of the Constitution is necessary for the determination of the proceedings he shall deal with the case in accordance with section 48 as if it were a case before him in the original jurisdiction of the High Court in which the question had arisen.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) shall be deemed to be rules of court for the purposes of Article 128(2) of the Constitution.

The matter arose in the following way.

The applicant, Repco Holdings Bhd (‘RepcO’) is a public limited company. Its shares are freely traded in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. On 27 January 1996, Repco issued a statement to the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. The statement contained certain facts which the Securities Commission considered to contravene s 86 of the Securities Industry Act 1983 (‘the SIA’). So it took steps to institute proceedings against Repco. On 21 October 1996, it applied for and obtained a summons from the Sessions Court in Kuala Lumpur against Repco. The charge annexed to the summons refers to the Repco’s statement I spoke of a moment ago and alleges an infringement of s 86 of the SIA and punishable under s 91 thereof.

The summons was returnable on 29 November 1996. Repco appeared before the sessions court on that day. The sessions court then fixed the case for hearing on 25 August 1997. On that date, counsel who appeared for Repco took a preliminary objection to the locus standi of the two officers who appeared to prosecute the case. These two officers were Ms Foo Lee Mei and Ms Seow Siew Mei. They were officers of the Securities Commission, a body created by the Securities Commission Act 1993 (‘the SCA’). The prosecution of the case against Repco was in the hands of these two officers pursuant to the joint operation of s 126(2) of the SIA and s 39(2) of the SCA. For completeness, I will reproduce both these sections in full. They read as follows.

Section 126(2) of the SIA:

126 (1) No prosecution for any offence under this Act shall be instituted except with the consent in writing of the Public Prosecutor.

(2) A prosecution for any offence against any provision of this Act may be conducted by the Registrar or by any officer authorized in writing by the Registrar or by any officer authorized in writing by the Chairman of the Commission.

Section 39(2) of the SCA:

39 (1) No prosecution for any offence under this Act shall be instituted except with the consent in writing of the Public Prosecutor.

(2) Any officer of the Commission authorized in writing by the Commission may conduct any prosecution of any offence under this Act.

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 686

So far as sub-s (1) of each of the foregoing are concerned, they make it clear that the institution of a prosecution under each enactment shall be only with the consent of the Public Prosecutor. The importance of this will appear later in this judgment. However, as may be noted, sub-s (2) of each of the aforesaid sections vests the conduct of prosecutions under each enactment in the hands of persons other than the Public Prosecutor.

Accordingly, before the sessions court, counsel for Repco took the point that the two ladies I mentioned earlier had no locus standi to conduct the prosecution in this particular case. It was argued that s 126(2) of the SIA and s 39(2) of the SCA were ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and were void to that extent. The sessions judge, faced with the Constitutional argument, acted under s 30 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and transmitted the record in the case to this court to determine the constitutionality of the two subsections I mentioned a moment ago. That is how I, sitting as a High Court judge, have come to hear this application.

So much for the factual background.

In order to appreciate the arguments advanced in favour of the applicant before the sessions court, and repeated in substance before me this morning by its counsel En Muhammad Shafee, it is necessary to hearken to the relevant provisions of the written law that govern the subject matter at hand. These are, art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution, s 376 of the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6) (‘the CPC’) and s 380 of the same Code. They are as follows.

First, art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution:

145 (3) The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Syariah court, a native court or a court-martial.

Next, s 376 of the CPC:

376 (i) The Attorney General shall be the Public Prosecutor and shall have the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this Code.

(ii) The Solicitor General shall have all powers of a Deputy Public Prosecutor and shall act as Public Prosecutor in case of the absence or inability to act of the Attorney General.

(iii) The Public Prosecutor may appoint fit and proper persons to be Deputy Public Prosecutors who shall be under the general control and direction of the Public Prosecutor and may exercise all or any of the rights and powers vested in or exercisable by the Public Prosecutor by or under this Code or any other written law except any rights or powers expressed to be exercisable by the Public Prosecutor personally.

(iv) The rights and powers vested in or exercisable by the Public Prosecutor by subsection (iii) and section 68(ii) shall be exercisable by the Public Prosecutor personally.

Third, s 380 of the CPC:

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 687

380 Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter contained –

(i) any public officer may prosecute in any Court in any case or class of cases in which he is by any written law authorized to prosecute in such Court;

(ii) in summary non-seizable cases in the Court of a Magistrate –

(a) the Public Prosecutor or a Deputy Public Prosecutor or a Police Officer may appear and conduct any prosecution;

(b) any officer of any Government department or of any local authority or statutory authority or any person employed by any local authority or statutory authority may appear and conduct any prosecution for an offence against any written law which it is the duty of the said department or authority specially to enforce;

(c) any private person may appear in person or by advocate or, in the State of Terengganu, by a pleader and prosecute for an offence against his own person or property.

It will be seem at once, from a reading of the plain language of art 145(3), that the Supreme Law, namely the Federal Constitution, has committed to the hands of the Attorney General the sole power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct and discontinue criminal proceedings. The phrase ‘institute, conduct or discontinue’ was considered by Abdoolcader J (as he then was) in PP v Datuk Harun bin Hj Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116. Of the expression ‘conduct’, his Lordship said (at p 119E—I):

‘Conduct’ in art 145(3) cannot but refer to the conduct of prosecutions in court, as it indeed appears ipsissimisverbis in s 377 of the CPC. And ‘control and direction’ in s 376(i) of the CPC is in respect of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings, and not of criminal procedure or the jurisdiction of the courts.

‘Conduct’ of criminal prosecutions and proceedings in art 145(3) cannot connote the regulation of criminal procedure or of the jurisdiction of the courts or the power or discretion to do so. Any contrary contention would in effect in my view be tantamount to the suggestion of the Public Prosecutor arrogating to himself the legislative powers vested in Parliament under item 4 and in particular para (b) there in List I (Federal List) in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, with perhaps also the not inconceptible resultant intrusion or at least a more than peripheral incursion into the sphere of art 121(1) of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the Federation is vested in two High Courts and in such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law – namely, the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 which specifies the subordinate courts and their respective civil and criminal jurisdiction.

Pursuing its signification, ‘to conduct’ means ‘to lead, guide, manage’ (Re Bhupalli Malliah 1959 AIR AP 477; Pride of Derby v British Celanese Ltd [1953] 1 Ch 149 at p 167, per Lord Evershed MR). It conveys the idea of leading and guiding, that is to say, the person who conducts the prosecution determines all important questions of policy involved in the course of the trial and the attitude to be adopted by the prosecution towards material objections raised or demands made by the accused with respect to the evidence.

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 688

Abdoolcader J’s interpretation of the phrase ‘institute, conduct or discontinue’ was approved and applied by the Federal Court in PP v Lim Shui Wang & Ors [1979] 1 MLJ 65.

It follows from the foregoing discussion that the only authority that is constitutionally entitled to conduct prosecutions is the Attorney General as Public Prosecutor. The adjectival vehicle contained in s 376 and subsequent sections of the CPC put this beyond doubt. The question then arises: Is Parliament entitled by written law to vest the power to conduct criminal prosecutions in an authority other than the Attorney General?

Encik Muhammad Shafee has argued that this question should receive a negative response. The Public Prosecutor upon whom lies a most onerous burden has considered the arguments and has come to the honest and inescapable conclusion that En Muhammad Shafee is correct in the contentions that he has advanced. Commendably therefore, the Public Prosecutor has instructed his deputy who has appeared before me today to concede that the two subsections referred to do indeed conflict with art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. However, this being an issue of public law, the agreement between counsel before me does not absolve this court of the duty to investigate the question of its own volition and decide whether the common ground upon which the parties before me stand is indeed maintainable in law. If I come to the conclusion that the impugned subsections are not ultra vires art 145(3), I am at liberty to so declare despite the agreement arrived at between counsel. However, having given the matter my most anxious consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the Public Prosecutor is correct in the concession he has made.

Acting with utmost fairness, En Azhar bin Mohamed, deputy public prosecutor, has cited to me cases which he says are useful in making my determination upon the issue at hand. I think I owe it to efforts of counsel to enter upon a discussion of the case which he has cited.

The first is Long bin Samat & Ors v PP [1974] 2 MLJ 152 where at p 158A—C, Suffian LP had this to say:

In our view, this clause from the supreme law clearly gives the Attorney General very wide discretion over the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions. Not only may he institute and conduct any proceedings for an offence, he may also discontinue criminal proceedings that he has instituted, and the courts cannot compel him to institute any criminal proceedings which he does not wish to institute or to go on with any criminal proceedings which he has decided to discontinue. (For the position in England, please see Viscount Dilhorne’s speech at pp 32–33 in Smedleys Ltd v Breed [1974] 2 All ER 21). Still less then would the court have power to compel him to enhance a charge when he is content to go on with a charge of a less serious nature.

Anyone who is dissatisfied with the Attorney General’s decision not to prosecute, or not to go on with a prosecution or his decision to prefer a charge for a less serious offence when there is evidence of a more serious offence which should be tried in a higher court, should seek his remedy elsewhere, but not in the courts.

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 689

The second authority which the learned deputy has drawn to my attention is Johnson Tan Han Seng v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 66 where, at p 70A—F, Suffian LP once again said of art 145(3):

… Before Merdeka Chap XXXVII of the FMS Criminal Procedure Code and the equivalent provisions of the SS Criminal Procedure Code set out his power. Today, only the FMS Code remains. Section 376(i) thereof provides generally that the Attorney General in his capacity as Public Prosecutor shall have the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under the Code. The next nine sections particularize his powers.

For instance, under s 381, he may enter a nolle prosequi after he has received the record of a preliminary enquiry. As noted by this court in Long bin Samat v PP [1974] 2 MLJ 152, there was ample judicial authority before Merdeka to show that the Attorney General enjoyed wide discretion in regard to criminal prosecutions. As s 376(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code was already in existence before Merdeka, our constitution-makers could have been content with relying on it alone to preserve after Merdeka the Attorney General’s pre-Merdeka power, and if they had done so, then it might be arguable that after Merdeka, it must be read subject to art 8: but our constitution-makers were not content to do so. They deliberately wrote art 145(3) into our Constitution which reads:

‘The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a native court or a court-martial.’

The language of this provision is very wide, for it includes the word ‘discretion’ which means liberty of deciding as one thinks fit. In view of the deliberate decision of our constitution-makers to write this provision into our Constitution, I do not think that it can be said that it must be read subject to art 8.

The importance of the propositions formulated by the learned Lord President in these two cases is that, as a matter of public law, the exercise of discretion by the Attorney General in the context of art 145(3) is put beyond judicial review. In other words, the exercise by the Attorney General of his discretion, in one way or another, under art 145(3), cannot be questioned in the courts by way of certiorari, declaration or other judicial review proceedings.

I think that the proposition is not only good law but good policy. For, were it otherwise, upon each occasion that the Attorney General decides not to institute or conduct or discontinue a particular criminal proceedings, he will be called upon to a court of law the reasons for his decision. It will then be the court and not the Attorney General who will be exercising the power under art 145(3). That was surely not the intent on our founding fathers who framed our Constitution for us.

Encik Muhammad Shafee has drawn my attention to a passage in a leading work upon the subject. It is a textbook entitled The Attorney General: Politics and the Public Interest by Prof Edwards whose other work, Law Officers of the Crown, has been often quoted with approval by our courts. At p 91 of the text, Prof Edwards expresses the following view. The word ‘conduct’, it was stated:

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 690

… appears to be wider that the phrase ‘carry on’ and suggests to our minds that when the Director intervenes in a prosecution which has been privately instituted, he may do so not exclusively for the purpose of pursuing it by carrying it on, but also with the object of aborting it; that is to say, he may ‘conduct’ the proceedings in whatever manner may appear expedient in the public interest.

The author was there quoting from the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Raymond v Attorney General [1982] 2 WLR 849 at p 853.

In my judgment, having regard to the authorities read before me, the expression ‘conduct’ appearing in art 145(3) and in the two impugned subsections carries the same meaning. Since the Constitution exclusively authorizes the Attorney General to conduct prosecutions, in must follow, as night follows day, that no other authority may be lawfully empowered to exercise that function. Therefore, it is my opinion, that s 126(2) of the SIA is ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution save to the extent I shall now indicate.

Subsection (2) of s 126 of the SIA refers to the conducting of a prosecution by the Registar of Companies or by someone authorized by such Registrar in writing. As a matter of practice, the Registar of Companies is usually a senior member of the Judicial and Legal Service. He or she is normally gazetted as a deputy public prosecutor. So, if the Registar of Companies is a gazetted deputy public prosecutor and in such capacity conducts a prosecution of an offence under the SIA, that would not be caught by art 145(3) of the Constitution. But the Chairman of the Securities Commission is not placed on an equal footing. He is therefore not authorized lawfully, that is to say constitutionally, to authorize or to conduct prosecutions under the SIA.

Neither does s 380(i) of the CPC, relied on by the prosecutors before the sessions court, provide any assistance to the Securities Commission. As pointed out by the learned deputy public prosecutor, the expression ‘public officer’ appearing in that section refers to members of the public service. While for the purpose of carrying out their duties, members and servants of the Securities Commission are deemed to be public officers, they do not fall within the scope of s 380(i) of the CPC.

Encik Muhammad Shafee has very properly drawn my attention to s 126(2) as it originally appeared before the amendment. I think it useful to reproduce the section as it originally stood:

126 (2) Without prejudice to the provision of section 379 of the Criminal Procedure Code, an advocate and solicitor may, with the previous permission in writing of the Public Prosecutor, be employed by the Government to conduct any criminal prosecution, or to appear in any criminal appeal, on behalf of the Government; such advocate and solicitor shall be paid by the Government such remuneration as may be agreed between the Government and the advocate and solicitor, and while so employed he shall be deemed to be a ‘public servant’ within the meaning of the Penal Code.

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 691

Section 126(2) as originally cast did not, in my judgment, contravene art 145(3), because of the careful way in which it was drafted. On the other hand, s 126(2) as presently worded cannot be read harmoniously with art 145(3) to the extent I have earlier indicated.

Turning now to s 39(2) of the SCA, it is my judgment that this subsection wholly contravenes art 145(3). By reason of art 4(1) of the Federal Constitution, it being a law which is inconsistent with the Constitution, the subsection gives way. I would declare it void and unconstitutional.

In arriving at my decision, I have not overlooked the important principles that govern the interpretation of written constitutions. Our Federal Constitution is a living document written for all time. Its language compresses within it ideas that are manifold and concepts that are multifaceted. The task of the judicial interpreter of such a document is not to place it in a coffin and nail the lid but to breathe life into it and to give effect to the full breadth and width of its great language. That is the spirit in which our courts have approached our Constitution on previous occasions. In this context, I need only mention the decisions of our Supreme Court in Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697; Mamat bin Daud & Ors v Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119; Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan Malaysia& Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261 and Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and another appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481.

There is, no doubt a presumption; even a strong presumption; that an Act of Parliament is constitutional. It would require much conviction to strike down a solemn act of legislation by a democratically elected Parliament. Nevertheless, once it has been amply demonstrated, as has been done in the present case, that an Act of Parliament contains provisions that are in direct conflict with the supreme law, it is the duty of this court to say so clearly and unequivocally.

For the reasons I have given thus far, I would declare s 126(2) of the SIA to be unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect, save to the extent earlier indicated. In the same way I would declare s 39(2) of the SCA to be unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect.

At the conclusion of arguments, the learned deputy drew my attention to the fact that there has been already some prosecutions pursuant to s 126(2) of the SIA and s 39(2) of the SCA. There are also part heard cases presently pending before the subordinate courts, some of which may be well advanced or nearing conclusion.

Now, as a general rule, the declaration of invalidity of a written law on the grounds that it runs foul of the Federal Constitution has retrospective effect. But, the court is fully authorized, having regard to public interest, to make a prospective declaration so as not to render invalid convictions entered and proceedings already concluded before the challenge is taken on the ground on unconstitutionality.

1997 3 MLJ 681 at 692

In my judgment, it will be a manifest injustice to render a retrospective ruling on the invalidity of the two impugned subsections. The declaration as to invalidity I now make shall, therefore, be prospective only and shall include only this case and cases registered from today. In doing so, I act on the authority of the Supreme Court’s decision in PP v Dato Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311 and Mamat bin Daud v Government of Malaysia. Accordingly, the ruling that I have just pronounced shall take effect from 2 October 1997.

Order accordingly.

Reported by Loo Lai Mee

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S419 and S422 CPC

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S62 CPC

Ghani and Others v Jones

Court of Appeal

29 October 1969

29 October 1969

[1969 G. No. 2947]

[1970] 1 Q.B. 693

Lord Denning M.R., Edmund Davies L J. and Sir Gordon Willmer

Talbot J.

1969 Oct. 14, 15, 16; 29

1969 Aug. 25; 28

Police—Powers—Retention of documents—Passports—Refusal to return documents and passports handed to police—Police suspicion of murder and belief in evidential value of documents—No evidence of reasonable grounds of belief or that owners concerned in murder—Whether police entitled to retain documents and passports—Owners’ right to relief.

Injunction—Mandatory—Interlocutory—Retention of documents and passports by police claim by owners—Relief sought substantially same as claimed in action—No reason to delay enforcement of right—Whether order should be granted.

Police officers inquiring into a woman’s disappearance searched, without a warrant, the house of her father-in-law. At their request he handed to them documents including the passports of himself, his wife and daughter, the plaintiffs living in the house. The plaintiffs, who were Pakistanis, later asked for the return of the passports and documents as they wished to visit Pakistan. The police refused to return them. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant, a senior police officer, for a mandatory order for the delivery up of the passports and documents, an injunction restraining their detention and damages for detinue.

On the plaintiffs’ interlocutory application, the police gave affidavit evidence of their belief that the woman had been murdered and that they would apprehend those concerned. They said that in the event of charges being preferred some of the documents would be of evidential value and others of potential evidential value. The defendant said that the plaintiffs could help the police inquiries and that if they left the United Kingdom they might not return. No one had been arrested or charged with the murder. Talbot J. ordered the return of the documents and passports.

On the defendant’s appeal:

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the police had not shown reasonable grounds for believing that the documents were material evidence to prove the commission of a murder, nor for believing that the plaintiffs were in any way implicated in or accessory to a crime, and since their affidavits did not justify their retention of the documents, they should be ordered to return them forthwith.

Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 201; [1968] 1 All E.R. 229, C.A. distinguished.

Entick v. Carrington (1765)19 State Tr. 1029; 2 Wils. 275 and Reg. v. Waterfield [1964] 1 Q.B. 164; [1963] 3 W.L.R. 946; [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, C.C.A. considered.

Dicta of Horridge J. in Elias v. Pasmore [1934] 2 K.B. 164, 173 disapproved.

*694

Per curiam. There is no power to issue a search warrant for murder (post, p. 705D).

The common law does not permit the police to ransack anyone’s house, or to search for papers or articles therein, or to search his person, simply to see if he may have committed some crime (post, p. 706G-H).

Where police officers enter a man’s house by virtue of a warrant, or arrest a man lawfully for a serious offence, they are entitled to take any goods which they find in his possession or in his house which they reasonably believe to be material evidence in relation to the crime for which he is arrested or for which they enter. If during their search they come upon any other goods which show him to be implicated in some other crime they may retain them, provided they act reasonably and detain them no longer than is necessary (post, p. 706A-B).

The wish to prevent the plaintiffs leaving the country pending police inquiries is not a legitimate ground for the retention of the passports by the police (post, p. 709F).

Observations on requisites to be satisfied in order to justify the taking of an article when no one has been arrested or charged (post, pp. 708G-709C).

Decision of Talbot J., post, p. 695; [1969] 3 W.L.R. 1158; [1969] 3 All E.R. 720 affirmed.

The following cases are referred to in the judgment of Lord Denning M.R.:

  • Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 201; [1968] 1 All E.R. 229, C.A..
  • Elias v. Pasmore [1934] 2 K.B. 164.
  • Entick v. Carrington (1765)19 State Tr. 1029; 2 Wils. 275.
  • King v. The Queen [1969] 1 A.C. 304; [1968] 3 W.L.R. 391; [1968] 2 All E.R. 610, P.C..
  • Pringle v. Bremner and Stirling (1867) 5 Macph., H.L., 55.
  • Reg. v. Waterfield [1964] 1 Q.B. 164; [1963] 3 W.L.R. 946; [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, C.CA.

The following additional cases were cited in argument in the Court of Appeal:

  • Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U.S. 616.
  • Chimel v. State of California (1969) U.S. (23L. Ed. 2d 685).
  • Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] A.C. 573; [1947] 1 All E.R. 567, H.L.(E.).
  • Crozier v. Cundey (1827) 6 B. & C. 232.
  • Dillon v. O’Brien and Davis (1887) 16 Cox C.C. 245, Ir.
  • Gordon v. Metropolitan Police Chief Comr. [1910] 2 K.B. 1080, C.A..
  • King v. The Queen [1969] 1 A.C. 304; [1968] 3 W.L.R. 391; [1968] 2 All E.R. 610, P.C..
  • Lawrie v. Muir, 1950 S.C.(J.) 19.
  • Levine v. O’Keefe [1930] V.L.R. 70.
  • Reg. v. Barnett (1829) 3 C. & P. 600.
  • Reg. v. Lushington, Ex parte Otto [1894] 1 Q.B. 420.
  • Warden of Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294.
  • Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383.

The following cases are referred to in the judgment of Talbot J.:

  • Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 201; [1968] 1 All E.R. 229, C.A..

*695

  • Crozier v. Cundey (1827) 613. & C. 232.
  • Dillon v. O’Brien and Davis (1887)16 Cox C.C. 245, Ir.
  • Elias v. Pasmore[1934] 2K.B. 164.
  • Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr. 1029; 2 Wils. 275.
  • Price v. Messenger (1800) 2 Bos. & P. 158.
  • Reg. v. Lushington, Ex parte Otto [1894] 1 Q.B. 420.
  • Reg. v. Waterfield [1964] 1 Q.B. 164; [1963] 3 W.L.R. 946; [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, C.C.A..
  • Reg. v. Waterfield
  • Canadian Pacific Railway v. Gaud [1949] 2 K.B. 239, CA.
  • Gordon v. Chief Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [1910] 2 K.B. 1080, C.A..

APPEAL from Talbot J., infra.

A summons, taken out by Abdul Ghani, the first plaintiff, Razia Begum, his wife, the second plaintiff, and Kaniz Radhma, a spinster and daughter of the first and second plaintiffs, the third plaintiff, in an action against Alan Jones, a detective chief superintendent of the Metropolitan police, the defendant, was heard in chambers and judgment was delivered in open court.

The facts are fully stated in the judgments of Talbot J. and Lord Denning M.R.

Anthony Lester for the plaintiffs.

Anthony Lewisohn for the defendant.

Cur. adv. vult.

August 28. TALBOT J.

read the following judgment. In this summons I have been asked to give my judgment in open court. In it the plaintiffs are asking for a mandatory order that the defendant, a detective chief superintendent of the Metropolitan police, do deliver up certain documents belonging to them and their passports, which they allege are wrongfully detained by him. The first and second plaintiffs are husband and wife, and the third plaintiff is their daughter. Proceedings were commenced by a writ issued on August 13, 1969, in which is made this claim for the mandatory order and also a claim for damages.

The matter arises in this way: the police are investigating the disappearance of one Mastoora Begum, the wife of Mohammed Sharif, a son of the first and second plaintiffs. This lady arrived in the United Kingdom on June 22, 1967, and has since disappeared. Inquiries lead the police to believe that she has been murdered and that the crime is believed to have been committed in 1968. No one has been arrested or detained, though the police believe they will apprehend those concerned.

On June 13, 1969, the defendant and other police officers visited the first plaintiff’s house and questioned him about the disappearance of Mastoora Begum. They searched the house, though, as I understand, they did not have a search warrant. They asked for the passports of the first plaintiff and of his wife, the second plaintiff, and he (the first plaintiff)*696 handed them to the police officers. The police officers took away the passports, and also five letters and a notebook.

On June 19, 1969, the police again visited the first plaintiff’s house and asked him for the passport of his daughter, the third plaintiff. This also was handed over to them.

Then the time came when the plaintiffs wanted their documents back, and in particular their passports. They asked for them and did not get them back. They then instructed solicitors and the solicitors wrote letters, four in all, the last being on August 14, asking for the return of these documents, but received no reply.

The plaintiffs want their passports back for a holiday in Pakistan. The police – that is the defendant and detective sergeant Laing – in their affidavits say they believe that in the event of charges being preferred, some of the documents will be of evidential value and others certainly of potential evidential value. That is set out in the affidavit of detective sergeant Laing. In the affidavit of the defendant he says he believes the documents referred to to be important documents in themselves; and he went on to add that in so far as the passports were concerned, he believed that all three plaintiffs could be of considerable assistance to his inquiries, and that if they left the United Kingdom they might not return.

Pausing there, that final reason given by the defendant, that the passports are required to prevent the plaintiffs leaving the country, is no longer relied upon as a valid reason for retaining these documents.

The letters and notebook belong to the first plaintiff, or to the first and second plaintiffs. The passports belong to the governments issuing them. The plaintiffs, however, as possessors of these passports, have a right to them.

The first point which is clear is that the defendant detains these documents and passports from the plaintiffs, and the burden is upon him to show that he lawfully detains them. The second point is this: has the defendant shown that he has a right to retain these documents? The third point is: if he has not any such lawful power, ought the court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, to order their return at this stage of the proceedings.

The first question involves a consideration of police powers to seize papers which they believe may be of material evidential value in possible criminal proceedings. It is an important consideration that police authorities should not be hindered in their investigations of a crime. It is certainly of equal importance that individual rights and liberties should not be infringed and taken away unless there is lawful reason for so doing.

Powers of the police to seize goods and documents were fully examined by the Court of Appeal in Chic Fashion:s (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299. As long ago as 1765, in Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr. 1029, it was decided that a general warrant authorising a search for seditious papers was illegal. The powers of the police in such cases must be derived either from a statute or from the common law. There is no statutory power which would authorise the defendant in this case to do what he is doing, and therefore I must determine whether the common law authorises his action.

*697

In 1800, in Price v. Messenger (1800) 2 Bos. & P. 158, seizure of goods not referred to in a search warrant was held lawful because the officer reasonably, though mistakenly, believed that they were included in the warrant.

In 1827, in Crozier v. Cundey (1827) 6 B. & C. 232, seizure of goods not mentioned in the warrant but which were likely to provide evidence of identity of those goods which were mentioned was held lawful.

In Dillon v. O’Brien and Davis (1887) 16 Cox C.C. 245, it was decided that where a man was arrested on warrant, a constable was entitled to take property found in his possession which was likely to form material evidence in his prosecution for a crime. Similarly, in Elias v. Pasmore [1934] 2 K.B. 164, it was decided that a constable arresting a man called Harrington for sedition was entitled to seize documents which were in his possession and which would form material evidence against the plaintiff in that action, Elias, on a charge of inciting Harrington to commit the crime of sedition.

In stating the principle to be derived from these cases, Lord Denning M.R. in the Chic Fashions case [1968] 2 Q.R. 299, 313 said:

“… when a constable enters a house by virtue of a search warrant for stolen goods, he may seize not only the goods which he reasonably believes to be covered by the warrant, but also any other goods which he believes on reasonable grounds to have been stolen and to be material evidence on a charge of stealing or receiving against the person in possession of them or anyone associated with him.”

That there are limitations on police powers in respect of property which they believe to be connected with a crime is shown by Reg. v. Waterfield [1964] 1 Q.B. 164, decided by the then Court of Criminal Appeal in 1963. Two police constables had information about a car being involved in a serious offence and tried to detain the car, though not charging or arresting the two men in it, and it was held that though there was a duty on the constables to preserve for use in court evidence of a crime, that duty did not authorise them to prevent the removal of the car in the circumstances.

It was in Reg. v. Lushington, Ex parte Otto [1894] 1 Q.B. 420 that it was laid down that constables have a power and duty to retain for use in court things which may be evidence of crime and which have come into their possession without wrong on their part. In that case there were proceedings for extradition and the articles had been produced by the owner under a subpoena duces tecum.

How then do these decided cases assist in this case? Let us take the main points of the evidence. There is suspected the serious crime of murder; the plaintiffs’ documents came into the hands of the police because they were handed to them by the first plaintiff; no one has been arrested or detained for the crime, and the plaintiffs are not shown by any evidence before me to be concerned in that crime; the police believe that the documents will be of evidential or potential evidential value, though no grounds are shown to support this belief; the plaintiffs particularly want their passports and their detention amounts to a restriction on their free movement from this country, a restriction which is laid upon persons who are not charged with any offence or shown to be implicated in the suspected*698 offence. These are the relevant circumstances, and I hope I have not omitted anything.

The question, narrowed down, therefore, is this: have the police common law powers to detain documents, which they believe will be useful evidentially in a suspected crime, from the owners, who have not been charged or arrested or shown to be implicated in the suspected crime?

The cases I have been referred to relating to search warrants limit the powers to keep the goods or papers found on the search to those connected evidentially with stolen property and which are believed, on reasonable grounds, to be so connected in order to support a charge against the owners or those associated with them. The other cases relate to the right to retain documents in proceedings which have been begun and which may form part of the evidence in those proceedings.

Taking all these matters into account, I am persuaded that there is no right vested in the police at common law to retain documents and passports belonging to persons not shown to be concerned in the suspected crime and where no reasonable grounds of belief that these documents will be useful evidentially in some crime are shown. To decide otherwise would be to accord to the police powers to take charge of property which they believe might be of evidential value irrespective of any connection the owners might have with the crime.

The final point concerns the equitable jurisdiction which I have to exercise. It is exceptional to grant, before trial of the action, an interlocutory injunction which gives substantially the relief claimed in the action, and in particular to make a mandatory order. Furthermore, before doing so, the court must be quite clear that the right exists. In this case, my opinion being that the defendant has no right to keep these documents from the plaintiffs, and as the legality of his actions has to be tested at the time of his refusal to deliver up – that appears in the Chic Fashions case – I can see no reason to delay enforcement of what I believe to be the plaintiffs’ rights. The order will therefore go.

Order accordingly. (L. N. W. )

Representation

Solicitors: Lawford & Co.; Solicitor, Metropolitan Police.

The defendant appealed.

The grounds of appeal were: (1) that the judge was wrong in law in holding that police officers had no common law powers to detain documents which they believed would be useful evidentially in a suspected crime, unless the owners of the documents had either been charged or arrested, or had been shown to be implicated in the suspected crime; (2) that the judge was wrong in law in holding that it was incumbent on the police officers to disclose in their affidavits, sworn for the purpose of interlocutory proceedings, the grounds for their belief that the documents were of evidential value in connection with the suspected crime; (3) that the judge was wrong in the exercise of his equitable jurisdiction in granting to the plaintiffs the relief claimed upon an interlocutory application.

*699

John Leonard Q.C. and Anthony Lewisohn for the appellant defendant. This is a murder investigation by the police. The original point of taking the plaintiffs’ passports was to prevent them getting out of the country. It is conceded that this is no justification. The passports were handed to the police voluntarily. Their retention is justified by their potential evidential value. The best evidence rule requires the production of the originals.

1. Police officers who lawfully acquire possession of articles which they have reasonable grounds to believe may be of evidential value in a criminal investigation can retain them until the articles are used in evidence or for a reasonable time. 2. A bare statement that a defendant has reasonable grounds for belief is a sufficient answer to an interlocutory application for the return of articles so acquired. 3. If the police are wrong and they have no reasonable grounds for retaining the articles they are liable in damages.

Suppose A borrows a knife from B, stabs someone with that knife and having so committed murder disappears and cannot be found. The knife is traced by the police who take it away before A is discovered. B demands the return of the knife. It would be absurd if the police were bound to return the knife to B, who may be implicated as an accessory. It is sufficient if it is reasonably needed as evidence.

Articles can be taken as an incident to a search warrant although not included in it: Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299. Cases reviewed in that case establish the power of the police to retain articles which may be used in evidence, e.g., Dillon v. O’Brien and Davis (1887)16 Cox C.C. 245. In Elias v. Pasmore [1934] 2 K.B. 164 the documents were on the premises but not in the possession of Hannington.

The statutory power of search is contained in section 26 (1) and (3) of the Theft Act, 1968. Impeding police inquiries in the case of murder could amount to an offence under section 4 of the Criminal Law Act, 1967. The right to retain articles cannot depend on whether a charge is ultimately made against anyone, or upon whether a conviction is obtained: see per Lord Denning M.R. in Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299, 312. The “best evidence” rule must be complied with; the original document must be produced if possible.

The restrictions on the powers of the police are: (1) the retention must be for a reasonable time; (2) one has to balance the interests of the individual who owns the article and the seriousness of the case. The current situation with regard to crime and the police must be regarded. The interlocutory order made means that the police have not had time to complete their investigations. Pringle v. Bremner and Sterling (1867) 5 Macph. H.L. 55 illustrates the principle of the interests of the state in prosecuting criminals.

The principle contended for does not depend on the fact that she documents were voluntarily handed over; the police obtained them lawfully. It is conceded that there must be a limit on what can be done without a search warrant. One cannot get a search warrant in a murder case.

The limitation on the powers of the police in Reg. v. Waterfield[1964] l Q.B. 164 went too far. The question there was whether the police were acting in the course of their duty. Reg. v. Lushington, Ex parte Otto [1894] 1 Q.B. 420 lays down the principle of the power of the police to*700 retain articles lawfully in their possession which may be evidence of a crime.

[Edmund Davies L.J. referred to articles by Professor P. J. Fitzgerald, "The Arrest of a Motor Car" (1965) Criminal Law Review, p. 23, and by Professor E. C. S. Wade, "Police Search" (1934) 50 Law Quarterly Review, p. 354.]

Levine v. O’Keefe [1930] V.L.R. 70 which was cited in Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299 was decided before Elias v. Pasmore [1934] 2 K.B. 164.

In summary, any discussion as to the right of the police to seize goods is irrelevant. The police could not have got a search warrant in this case. The only common law right to a search warrant was in the case of larceny. There are two functions of search warrants for stolen goods. One is to provide evidence; the other is to recover goods. The right of the police is independent of the outcome of the investigation. The right to retain possession must have a point of termination. If there is no charge or prosecution that must be at the point, which had not been reached here, when a reasonable time has elapsed.

Anthony Lester for the plaintiffs. It is conceded that the burden is on the defendant to show that he lawfully detained the plaintiffs’ goods. The detention must be justified at the time of the taking or at the time of the request for the return. The defendant here took as a bailee but lie committed a trespass when he refused to return the goods. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., Vol. 38 (1962), para. 1283 defines detinue. If the detention is to be justified, the taking must also be justified. It must be the same justification in each case.

There are eight elements in this case which make it unusual: (1) there has been no prosecution; (2) no arrest; (3) no application for a search warrant; (4) no suggestion by the defendant that the documents were the fruits or instruments of any crime; (5) no allegation that they were evidence of any crime committed by the plaintiffs; (6) no suggestion that they were necessary and material evidence against anyone; (7) the passports have unique characteristics in that they affect liberty of movement and, like driving licences, they speak as to very few facts; (8) it is admitted that, in the circumstances of this case, the police would have no right to search for or seize documents. There are competing interests here: of the community through the police and of the individual citizen. It is necessary to have a clear standard at common law, especially since there are no safeguards in any written constitution.

Entick v. Carrington (1765)19 State Tr. 1029 is the basic case. At p. 1073 Lord Camden lays down the law. It is precisely this case.

As to the illustration of the knife given for the appellant, as the law now stands the police would have to return the knife. One can only search or seize by virtue of a warrant, a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrant of arrest would allow the taking of articles as evidence if they were in the possession of the person arrested. Warrants of search and arrest give safeguards; there must be reasonable grounds for suspicion.

The stolen goods cases. In Price v. Messenger (1802) 2 Bos. & P. 158 a search warrant protected goods specified in the warrant and also goods reasonably believed to have been specified. Crozier v. Cundey (1827) 6B. & C. 232 shows that though the terms of the warrant can be extended this must not be unreasonable. The cases are reviewed in Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299. The Theft Act, 1968, goes beyond that case.

There are three special features at common law in the case of stolen goods: (1) ex hypothesi they may not belong to the person from whom they are taken; (2) they are stolen; (3) there is an interest in their being returned to their true owner.

The need for a search warrant provides four safeguards: (1) a sworn statement made to a magistrate; (2) a deposition of reasonable belief that the goods were stolen and were in possession of a particular person at a particular place; (3) if the warrant was improperly granted, the citizen can be protected; (4) the warrant limits the extent of search and seizure.

In warrantless searches the police must have reasonable grounds for belief that the items seized are either the fruits of a crime committed by a person from whom they are taken or instruments of such a crime or necessary or material evidence of such a crime. The principle of reasonableness is inherent in the search warrant situation.

Other search warrant cases. In Pringle v. Bremner and Stirling (1867) 5 Macph. H.L. 55, the search went beyond the warrant. Lord Chelmsford indicated that the legality of the seizure would depend upon the outcome of the proceedings. Reliance is put on Gordon v. Chief Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [1910] 2 K.B. 1080, 1094, where the coins were not shown to be material evidence. One can only search or seize by virtue of a warrant, a search warrant or warrant of arrest. These warrants give safeguards; there must be reasonable grounds for suspicion. The irony of the plaintiffs’ present position if the police contention is right is that they have less protection than if there were a warrant. There have been cases where the property has been returned pending the trial.

King v. The Queen [1969] 1 A.C. 304 reinforces the importance of complying with a search warrant. It shows that if the warrant is exceeded there is an illegality. It also illustrates how different is the stricter American view as to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. As we have looser rules as to admissibility, we should have stricter safeguards as to obtaining evidence. Reg. v. Barnett (1829) 3 C. & P. 600 is one of the many cases showing that money or goods taken which are not material to the charge must be returned. The test is: is it material to the charge?

Arrest warrant cases. One can hardly imagine a clearer case than Dillon v. O’Brien and Davis (1887) 16 Cox C.C. 245 where the doctrine of hot pursuit arises. This was the only case relied upon in Elias v. Pas more [1934] 2 K.B. 164 for a much wider proposition. It is essential that the person concerned from whom the property is taken is the suspected criminal. Parliament, as late as 1967, has addressed its mind to these problems and has set out the limits: see sections 4 (1) and 2 of the Criminal Law Act, 1967, and also section 26 of the Theft Act, 1968. This is the answer to the knife point. It is very significant that Parliament has gone no further. One must not extend the law beyond the safeguards applied to accused persons. To allow the police the wide powers which they claim, where there is no arrest or charge, is highly dangerous. Reliance*702 is put on Entick v. Carrington, 19 State Tr. 1029, where similar issues were raised.

Elias v. Pasmore [1934] 2 K.B. 164, 173, is expressed very widely and is inconsistent with Dillon v. O’Brien, 16 Cox C.C. 245. If pressed it would be contended that Elias v. Pasmore was wrongly decided. It was a case involving sedition and the documents were conceded to be relevant. If Elias v. Pasmore [1934] 2 K.B. 164 was based on the width of the principle of Horridge J., at p. 173, it was wrongly decided. Professor Wade’s article, “Police Search” in 50 L.Q.R. 354, is a valuable criticism of that case. The present case goes beyond Elias v. Pasmore in that there has been no arrest. Although Reg. v. Waterfield [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 is in the plaintiffs’ favour in that it is the only case in English law in which the police have taken property without a warrant and had to give it back, the reasons of the court were not fully given and it should be limited to its own circumstances. It is very far from the present case, although it is the one case where there was no warrant. The doctrine of “hot pursuit” may sometimes apply. The police would not get a search warrant here.

The American authorities. Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U.S. 616 showed that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property, such as the Fourth Amendment dealing with the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures” should be liberally construed. We have the same standard as the American Fourth Amendment, although we do not go so far. If there is any doubt as to the law it should be resolved in favour of the citizen. The importance of the fundamental right secured by the Fourth Amendment was emphasised in Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 392, 393. No English case has been found which is inconsistent with Weeks v. United States. In The Warden of Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294 the seizure was allowed; previously the instruments of a crime could be seized, but not the evidence. Chimel v. State of California (1969) U.S. (23L.Ed 2d 685) shows how far American law goes in protecting the accused.

All the American cases concerned the accused person. It would never have occurred to them that the same safeguards should not apply to a person not even accused, [Reference was made to Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] A.C. 573, per Viscount Simon at p. 584.]

In seizing goods, either one must have a warrant, or, if there is no warrant, there must be the same safeguards as if there was a warrant. The plaintiffs must be given reasonable grounds for the retention of the property at the time of the taking or the request. Retention cannot be justified without reasons being given.

In summary, the two issues of search and seizure should be kept separate. The question of the legality of searches depends upon the entry onto property. If there is no warrant, the same safeguards must be observed as are contained in actual search warrants.

As to seizure, on the cases the citizen or the police can only seize property pursuant to a search warrant or warrant of arrest or a Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] A.C. 573 arrest. It is essential that the legality of what has been done can be tested. The burden is on the police authority to justify. In Elias v. Pasmore [1934] 2 K.B. 164 there was a warrant. It is conceded*703 that in search and arrest cases, searches and seizures have been allowed beyond the warrant, but subject to the necessary conditions which the warrant contains. These are cases where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the articles seized may be material evidence for the trial in respect of a crime for which the warrant was issued or some similar crime was committed by a person from whom the article was taken. So far as third parties are concerned outside those implicated, they would be liable to produce evidence on subpoena and if they destroyed the evidence they would be liable under the Criminal Law Act, 1967. To extend the power of search and seizure to innocent third parties would be to deprive persons not accused of any crime to a greater restraint than if there were a warrant. If they cannot be seized without consent, they cannot be retained against the owner’s will. The American Fourth Amendment sets out the principle of the Entick v. Carrington position, 19 State Tr. 1029. That case has stood for two centuries. It should still stand.

The documents here relate to personal liberty. It is not suggested that they are material evidence. The police cannot unlawfully retain property on the basis of the best evidence rule. If ever there was a case which did not require an extension of police powers it is this. The documents were handed over voluntarily.

Leonard Q.C. in reply. It is fundamental to this case that the documents were handed over voluntarily. Entick v. Carrington, 19 State Tr. 1029 is very far from the present case. It is conceded that if the police had entered the house without permission, it would have been unlawful. It is a very different matter where they were given permission. The mischief that the common law has been guarding against is the entry into a man’s house and turning over his papers. As there was no trespass, provided the police have some need to retain the documents, they can keep them. Prima facie the police are committing a tort, but the documents are being kept for their evidentiary value. The police might be embarrassed by having to disclose reasons for their value as evidence.

Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299 makes it clear that provided the police have the right to go on the premises, they have the right to go beyond the warrant and seize other goods: see per Lord Denning, at p. 313. The element of criminal association is not necessary. The limitations are a reasonable belief that a felony has been committed and that it is material evidence. The interests of the citizen must be set against the seriousness of the offence.

[Lord Denning M.R. Have the police got to say why the goods or documents are reasonably required?]

No. Common sense must be relied upon. The fact that the retention of the passports immobilise the holders is an advantage to the police. It is inherent in the judgments in Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299 that the police may sometimes be justified in seizing property where there is no prosecution. A subpoena duces tecum is no help to the police where proceedings have not yet begun.

Reg. v. Waterfield [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 unreasonably hampers the activities of the police. It was either wrongly decided or depends on its own particular facts. In King v. The Queen [1969] 1 A.C. 304, Lord Hodson,*704 at p. 315, cited the opinion of Lord Cooper in Lawrie v. Muir, 1950 S.C. (J.) 19, 26, 27. The American cases are based on their constitution. They do not provide much help in this case.

The common law is a developing organism. Reasonable grounds for believing that a criminal offence has been committed and that the goods or documents are of reasonable evidentiary value is the test.

Cur. adv. vult.

October 29. The following judgments were read. LORD DENNING M.R.

On June 22, 1967, a woman named Mastoora Begum came from Pakistan to England to join her husband here. His name was Mohammed Sharif. They lived together in a house in Oxford with the husband’s father and mother, whose names are Abdul Ghani and Razia Begum. In November, 1968, the wife disappeared. No one has seen her since. In April, 1969, the husband left England and went back, presumably to Pakistan. The husband’s sister then came to England and stayed with her father and mother at the same house in Oxford.

The police made inquiries about the disappearance of the wife which led them to the belief that she had been murdered. On June 13, 1969, two detective officers from Scotland Yard – Chief Superintendent Jones and Detective Sergeant Laing – went to the house in Oxford where the husband’s father and mother and their daughter were living. The father asked the officers in. One of them questioned him about the disappearance of his son’s wife. The other searched the house. The police asked the father for their passports. He handed them his own and his wife’s passports. They took them away. They also took some letters received from other members of the family. On June 19, the police returned to the house and asked for the daughter’s passport. Her father gave it to them.

In July, 1969, the father instructed solicitors to ask for the return of the passports and other articles. The police refused to return them. On August 13, 1969, the father and mother and the daughter issued a writ against the chief superintendent, the defendant, and served with it a statement of claim asking for a mandatory order that the defendant do forthwith deliver up the passports and letters. Detective Sergeant Laing made an affidavit, saying:

“The information I have obtained as a result of my inquiries into the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the said Mastoora Begum leads me to believe that she has been murdered and that the crime was committed in 1968 and I am of opinion that the inquiries now being undertaken will lead to the apprehension of those concerned in her murder.

In the course of the inquiries Chief Superintendent Jones and myself acquired possession (inter alia) of the passports of the three plaintiffs, two letters from Mr. Ghani’s daughter, Nassim Akhtar, and three letters from his nephew, Subba Saddique. I believe that in the event of charges being preferred some of the documents will be of evidential value and others certainly of potential evidential value.”

*705 As to the husband’s sister, the affidavit said that she “was not in the United Kingdom at the time of the disappearance of the said Mastoora Begum, but there has been conduct on her part which was designed to impede police inquiries.”

Detective Chief Superintendent Jones concurred in that affidavit, and said:

“I believe that the documents referred to therein to be important in themselves, but insofar as the passports are concerned, I also sincerely believe that all these plaintiffs can be of considerable assistance to me in my inquiries, and that, if they leave the United Kingdom, they may not return.”

Neither affidavit alleged any belief that any of the plaintiffs was implicated in the suspected murder. Talbot J., held, ante, p. 698C-E, that the police had no right to retain the passports or letters and made a mandatory order for their return. The police officers appeal to this court. The case raises matters of importance on which there is very little direct authority in our books.

The first thing to notice is that the police officers had no search warrant. The reason is simple. No magistrate – no judge even – has any power to issue a search warrant for murder. He can issue a search warrant for stolen goods and for some statutory offences, such as coinage. But not for murder. Not to dig for the body. Nor to look for the axe, the gun or the poison dregs. The police have to get the consent of the householder to enter if they can: or, if not, do it by stealth or by force. Somehow they seem to manage. No decent person refuses them permission. If he does, he is probably implicated in some way or other. So the police risk an action for trespass. It is not much risk.

The second thing to notice is that the police officers kept the passports and letters without the consent of the holders. Mr. Leonard suggested that they took them with consent. This is a little far-fetched. Here were two police officers asking a Pakistani for the passports of himself and his wife. Of course he handed them to them. It would look bad for him if he did not. He bowed to their authority. Even if he consented to their looking at the passports, he did not consent to their keeping them. Even if he did consent to their keeping them, it was only for a while: and he could withdraw it at any time. As in fact he did. So it is all the same. They detain the passports without his consent.

The third thing to notice is that no one has been arrested for the murder or charged with it. The police officers believe that the woman has been murdered. They say so. In addition, although they do not say so, they must, I think, suspect that these three may in some way be implicated in it. Otherwise they would not hold on to the passports or papers as they do. But they have not arrested anyone or charged anyone. I can understand it. It would not be right for them to make an arrest or lay a charge unless the grounds were pretty strong.

So we have a case where the police officers, in investigating a murder, have seized property without a warrant and without making an arrest and have retained it without the consent of the party from whom they took it. Their justification is that they believe it to be of “evidential*706 value” on a prosecution for murder. Is this a sufficient justification in law?

I would start by considering the law where police officers enter a man’s house by virtue of a warrant, or arrest a man lawfully, with or without a warrant, for a serious offence. I take it to be settled law, without citing cases, that the officers are entitled to take any goods which they find in his possession or in his house which they reasonably believe to be material evidence in relation to the crime for which he is arrested or for which they enter. If in the course of their search they come upon any other goods which show him to be implicated in some other crime, they may take them provided they act reasonably and detain them no longer than is necessary. Such appears from the speech of Lord Chelmsford L.C., in Pringle v. Bremner and Stirling (1867) 5 Macph., H.L. 55, 60 and Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones [1968] 2 Q.B. 299.

Accepting those cases, I turn to two cases where the police acted against a man without the authority of a warrant or of an arrest. The first is Elias v. Pasmore. It is reported in [1934] 2 K.B. 164, but the facts are given more fully in (1934) 50 T.L.R. 196. Police officers there entered a house in Great Russell Street, of which Elias was the tenant. The police officers had only a warrant for the arrest of a man called Hannington. They had reasonable ground for believing that he had been guilty of sedition by attempting to cause disaffection among the police. They knew he was in the house. They entered and arrested him. They had no search warrant, authorising them to search the house. No search warrant is permissible to search for seditious papers. That is plain ever since since Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr. 1029. Whilst there, however, they searched the place, seized a number of seditious papers and took them to Scotland Yard. These papers implicated, not only Hannington, but also Elias. They showed that Elias had been inciting Hannington to commit sedition. The police prosecuted first Hannington and second Elias. The papers were used at the trial of Elias. Both men were convicted. Elias afterwards said that the police had no right to take his papers and brought an action for their return and for damages for their detention. Horridge J. rejected the claim. He said [1934] 2 K.B. 164, 173: “The interests of the state must excuse the seizure of documents, which seizure would otherwise be unlawful, if it appears in fact that such documents were evidence of a crime committed by anyone.”

I confess that I think those words “by anyone” go too far. The decision itself can be justified on the ground that the papers bowed that Elias was implicated in the crime of sedition committed by Hannington. If they had only implicated Elias in some other crime, such as blackmail or libel, I do not think the police officers would have been entitled to seize them. For that would be a flat contradiction of Entick v. Carrington, 19 State Tr. 1029. The common law does not permit police officers, or anyone else, to ransack anyone’s house, or to search for papers or articles therein, or to search his person, simply to see if he may have committed some crime or other. If police officers should so do, they would be guilty of a trespass. Even if they should find something incriminating against him, I should have thought that the court would not allow it to be used in evidence against him if the conduct of the police*707 officers was so oppressive that it would not be right to allow the Crown to rely upon it: see King v. The Queen [1969] 1 A.C. 304.

The other case is Reg. v. Waterfield [1964] 1 Q.B. 164. Two men named Lynn and Waterfield assaulted a man in King’s Lynn. Lynn wounded another man. They drove off in Waterfield’s car. Lynn drove it dangerously and ran into a brick wall. They parked it in the Market Place and went off. The police sergeant was anxious to examine it so as to obtain evidence of the collision with the wall. He told two police constables to keep watch on it and not let it go as he wanted to examine it. He told them it had been involved in a serious offence. At 7.30 p.m. Lynn came back and wanted to drive the car off. The police constable told him it had to remain where it was. Waterfield, the owner of the car, then came up and said to the police officer: “You cannot impound my car.” He told Lynn to drive it away. One of the police officers stood in the path of the car. Waterfieid said: “Drive at him, he will get out of the way.” Lynn did drive forward. The officer jumped aside. The car was driven away.

Lynn was charged with assaulting the police officer in the execution of his duty, and Waterfield with commanding it. The jury convicted them both. They appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeal (consisting of Lord Parker C.J., Ashworth J. and Hinchcliffe J.) allowed the appeal, and said, at p. 171:

“It is to be noted that neither [Lynn nor Waterfield] had been charged or was under arrest and accordingly the decision in Dillon v. O’Brien and Davis (1887) 16 Cox C.C. 245, does not assist the prosecution.

It was contended that the two police constables were acting in the execution of a duty to preserve for use in court evidence of a crime, and in a sense they were, but the execution of that duty did not in the view of this court authorise them to prevent the removal of the car in the circumstances. In the course of argument instances were suggested where difficulty might arise if a police officer were not entitled to prevent removal of an article which had been used in the course of a crime, for instance, an axe used by a murderer and thrown away by him. Such a case can be decided If and when it arises. …”

The court did, however, go on to certify, at p. 172, that a point of law of general public importance was involved, namely,

“… whether at common law a constable, without making a prior charge or arrest, has the duty to detain as prospective evidence any property found in a public place and which he has reasonable grounds to believe to be material evidence to prove the commission of a crime.”

The police did not ask for leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Lynn and Waterfield had been convicted on other grounds. No doubt the police at King’s Lynn did not wish to put the ratepayers to the expense of an appeal, simply to clear up the law.

*708

The decision causes me some misgiving. I expect that the car bore traces of its impact with the brick wall. The police had reason to believe that Lynn and Waterfield were implicated in a crime of which the marks on the car might be most material evidence at the trial. If Lynn and Waterfield were allowed to drive the car away, they might very well remove or obliterate all incriminating evidence. My comment on that case is this: The law should not allow wrongdoers to destroy evidence against them when it can be prevented. Test it by an instance put in argument. The robbers of a bank “borrow” a private car and use it in their raid, and escape. They abandon it by the roadside. The police find the car, i.e., the instrument of the crime, and want to examine it for finger prints. The owner of the “borrowed” car comes up and demands the return of it. He says he will drive it away and not allow them to examine it. Cannot the police say to him: “Nay, you cannot have it until we have examined it?” I should have thought they could. His conduct makes him look like an accessory after the fact, if not before it. At any rate it is quite unreasonable. Even though the raiders have not yet been caught, arrested or charged, nevertheless the police should be able to do whatever is necessary and reasonable to preserve the evidence of the crime. The Court of Criminal Appeal did not tell how Reg. v. Waterfield [1964] 1 Q.B. 164, is to be distinguished from such a case. The court simply said, at p. 171, that the police constables were under no duty “to prevent removal of the car in the circumstance.” They did not tell us what was the “circumstance” which took it out of the general rule. It may have been sufficient. I do not know.

Other instances were put in argument to test the position when no one had been arrested or charged. Edmund Davies L.J. drew from his unrivalled experience and told us that the great train robbers, when they were in hiding at Leatherslade Farm, used a saucer belonging to the farmer and gave the cat its milk. When seeking for the gang, before they were caught, the police officers took the saucer so as to examine it for finger prints. Could the farmer have said to them: “No, it is mine. You shall not have it?” Clearly not. His conduct might well lead them to think that he was trying to shield the gang. At any rate fit would have been quite unreasonable.

What is the principle underlying these instances? We have to consider, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual his privacy and his possessions are not to be invaded except for the most compelling reasons. On the other hand, we have to consider the interest of society at large in finding out wrongdoers and repressing crime. Honest citizens should help the police and not hinder them in their efforts to track down criminals. Balancing these interests, I should have thought that, in order to justify the taking of an article, when no man has been arrested or charged, these requisites must be satisfied:

First:

The police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that a serious offence has been committed – so serious that it is of the first importance that the offenders should be caught and brought to justice.

Second:

The police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing*709 that the article in question is either the fruit of the crime (as in the case of stolen goods) or is the instrument by which the crime was committed (as in the case of the axe used by the murderer) or is material evidence to prove the commission of the crime (as in the case of the car used by a bank raider or the saucer used by a train robber).

Third:

The police officers must have reasonable grounds to believe that the person in possession of it has himself committed the crime, or is implicated in it, or is accessory to it, or at any rate his refusal must be quite unreasonable.

Fourth:

The police must not keep the article, nor prevent its removal, for any longer than is reasonably necessary to complete their investigations or preserve it for evidence. If a copy will suffice, it should be made and the original returned. As soon as the case is over, or it is decided not to go on with it, the article should be returned.

Finally:

The lawfulness of the conduct of the police must be judged at the time, and not by what happens afterwards.

Tested by these criteria, I do not think the police officers are entitled to hold on to these passports or letters. They may have reasonable grounds for believing that the woman has been murdered. But they have not shown reasonable grounds for believing that these passports and letters are material evidence to prove the commission of the murder. All they say is that they are of “evidential value,” whatever that may mean. Nor have they shown reasonable grounds for believing that the plaintiffs are in any way implicated in a crime, or accessory to it. In any case, they have held them quite long enough. They have no doubt made photographs of them, and that should suffice.

It was suggested that a mandatory order should not be made for their return. The case, it was said, should go for trial, and the officers made liable in damages if they are wrong. But I think their affidavits fall so far short of any justification for retention that they should be ordered to return them forthwith. I cannot help feeling that the real reason why the passports have not been returned is because the officers wish to prevent the plaintiffs from leaving this country pending police inquiries. That is not a legitimate ground for holding them. Either they have grounds for arresting them, or they have not. If they have not, the plaintiffs should be allowed to leave – even if it means they are fleeing from the reach of justice. A man’s liberty of movement is regarded so highly by the law of England that it is not to be hindered or prevented except on the surest grounds. It must not be taken away on a suspicion which is not grave enough to warrant his arrest.

I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

EDMUND DAVIES L.J.

Having already had the advantage of considering the judgment delivered by the Master of the Rolls, I have to say that I agree with it and cannot usefully add anything. I accordingly concur in holding that this appeal should be dismissed.*710 Sir GORDON WILLMER. I also agree.

Representation

Solicitors: E.O. Lane; Lawford & Co.

Appeal dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal. By consent, stay of execution for 14 days. (A. H. B. )

© 2011 Sweet & Maxwell

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PS: Izamov is my Russian name, technically, just like Gary Kasparov, Karpov for the World Class Chess Grand Masters.

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Treating Statutes as ‘Sui Generis’ or ‘Pari Materia’ in Loh Kooi Choon [1977] 2 MLJ 187 (FCJ Raja Azlan Shah) against Tarmizi bin Yacob & Anor v Public Prosecutor and another appeal (ARIFIN ZAKARIA CJ (MALAYA), RICHARD MALANJUM CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK) AND JAMES FOONG FCJ) – CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS 05–37 OF 2004 (W) AND 05–38 OF 2004 (W) 27 July 2010

[1977] 2 MLJ 187

LOH KOOI CHOON v GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA

FC KUALA LUMPUR

ALI, RAJA AZLAN SHAH AND WAN SULEIMAN FJJ

FEDERAL COURT CIVIL APPEAL NO 157 OF 1975

7 June 1977

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Liberty of person — Amendment of Constitution with retrospective effect — Whether valid — Restrictive Residence Enactment (FMS Cap 39) — Federal Constitution, Articles 5, 7 and 159

In this case the appellant had been arrested and detained under a warrant issued under the provisions of the Restricted Residence Enactment. The appellant had not been produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest. He claimed damages but it was held that no action could be brought against the police officer as he was acting in compliance with a warrant issued by a competent authority. The appellant appealed but before the appeal was heard the Federal Constitution was amended by Act A354/76 which provided in effect that Article 5(4) of the Constitution shall not apply to the arrest or detention of any person under the existing law relating to restricted residence and that this amendment shall have effect from Merdeka Day. It was argued that the amendment was unconstitutional.

Held:

  • (1)

Parliament can alter the entrenched provisions of Article 5(4) to remove the provision relating to the production before a Magistrate of any arrested person under the Restricted Residence Enactment as long as the process of constitutional amendment as laid down in Article 159(3) is complied with. When that is done it becomes an integral part of the Constitution; it is the supreme law, and accordingly it cannot be said to be at variance with itself;

  • (2)

if Parliament retrospectively affects vested rights or pending proceedings, then it would be the duty of an appellate court to apply the law prevailing on the date of appeal before it. Subject to the constitutional limitation of Article 7 of the Constitution, to wit, protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, Parliament would be within the ambit of its competence if it deems fit to legislate retrospectively.

Editorial Note

In view of the demise of Ali F.J. the court asked both counsel for the parties under section 42 of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964 whether they consented to accept judgments by the remaining judges of the court, it being understood that if there was no majority opinion the proceedings should be re-heard. Both counsel consented.

Cases referred to

Vacher & Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors [1913] AC 107 118

Henry v Geopresco International Ltd [1975] 2 All ER 702 718

Assa Singh v Mentri Besar, Johore [1969] 2 MLJ 30

IC Golak Nath & Ors v State of Punjab & Ors [1967] 2 SCR 762

Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Dee v Union of India and State of Bihar [1952] SCR 89

Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan [1965] 1 SCR 933

Kasavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] SCR Supp 1

Adegbenro v Akintola & Anor [1963] 3 All ER 544 551

Hinds v The Queen [1976] 2 WLR 366 373

In re Pulborough School Board, Bourke v Nutt [1894] I QB 725 737

Barber v Pigden [1937] 1 KB 664 673

Letang v Cooper [1964] 2 All ER 929 933

Latikiro of Buganda v AG [1960] 3 All ER 849 851

1977 2 MLJ 187 at 188

Black Clanson v Papierwerke [1975] 1 All ER 810 815

FEDERAL COURT

Raja Abdul Aziz Addruse ( Dr Yaacob Hussain Merican with him) for the appellant.

Lim Beng Choon (Senior Federal Counsel) for the respondent.

RAJA AZLAN SHAH FJ

It is clear that the question at issue is fraught with political controversy. No doubt the appellant and other persons hold strong views one way or the other on the justice of the impugned Act. I should add that right now no feature of our system of government has caused so much discussion, received so much criticism, and been so frequently misunderstood, than the duties assigned to the courts and the functions which they discharge in guarding the Constitution. For that reason and also because it is rarely that this court is faced with a constitutional question of this kind it is desirable at the outset to make clear the functions of the courts.

The question whether the impugned Act is “harsh and unjust” is a question of policy to be debated and decided by Parliament, and therefore not meet for judicial determination. To sustain it would cut very deeply into the very being of Parliament. Our courts ought not to enter this political thicket, even in such a worthwhile cause as the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, for as was said by Lord Macnaghten in Vacher & Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors [1913] AC 107 118:

“Some people may think the policy of the Act unwise and even dangerous to the community. Some may think it at variance with principles which have long been held sacred. But a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment. The duty of the court, and its only duty, is to expound the language of the Act in accordance with the settled rules of construction. It is, I apprehend, as unwise as it is unprofitable to cavil at the policy of an Act of Parliament, or to pass a covert censure on the Legislature.”

It is the province of the courts to expound the law and “the law must be taken to be as laid down by the courts, however much their decisions may be criticised by writers of such great distinction”— per Roskill L.J. in Henry v Geopresco International Ltd [1975] 2 All ER 702 718. Those who find fault with the wisdom or expediency of the impugned Act, and with vexatious interference of fundamental rights, normally must address themselves to the legislature, and not the courts; they have their remedy at the ballot box.

The Constitution is not a mere collection of pious platitudes.It is the supreme law of the land embodying 3 basic concepts: One of them is that the individual has certain fundamental rights upon which not even the power of the State may encroach. The second is the distribution of sovereign power between the States and the Federation, that the 13 States shall exercise sovereign power in local matters and the nation in matters affecting the country at large. The third is that no single man or body shall exercise complete sovereign power, but that it shall be distributed among the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government, compendiously expressed in modem terms that we are a government of laws, not of men.

Clause (4) of Article 5 of the Constitution prescribes that a person arrested must be taken before a magistrate within 24 hours so that an independent authority exercising judicial powers may without delay apply its mind to his case. This safeguard is to a large extent covered by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code but its incorporation in the Constitution is deemed essential for assuring the minorities that their rights would be constitutionally guaranteed and that they shall not entertain any apprehension of the alleged despotism and arbitrariness of the majority and legislative omnipotence.This safeguard equally applies to any person arrested under the Restricted Residence Enactment (Cap. 39) (see Assa Singh v Mentri Besar, Johore [1969] 2 MLJ 30 “but evidently difficulties have arisen in the practical application of the enactment and hence the need for the amendment.” (see [1976] 2 MLJ xcii).

The question is how safe are the provisions in clause (4) of Article 5 from change. This question arose in a case which the Supreme Court in India in IC Golak Nath & Ors v State of Punjab & Ors [1967] 2 SCR 762 considered en banc. The same question had arisen twice before in India. On the first occasion in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v Union of India and State of Bihar [1952] SCR 89 the Supreme Court considered the validity of the Constitution First Amendment Act in 1950. One of the arguments against the validity of the amendment was that the power of amendment granted by the Constitution to Parliament did not extend to the abridgment or removal of any of the fundamental rights because such a law would be hit by Article 13 and void. This argument was not accepted. On the second occasion in Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan [1965] 1 SCR 933 the Seventeenth Amendment was challenged but this argument, though faintly argued, was not accepted by three judges who constituted the majority. In Golak Nath, supra, another challenge to the same amendment was made and succeeded. By a bare majority of 6:5 it was held that the powers of amendment did not extend to the taking away and abridging of the fundamental rights on the basis that there was no distinction between the Constitution and ordinary law. An Indian writer [ Tripathi on ‘Amending The Constitution’. has aptly summarised theGolak Nath constitutional crisis as an intellectual crisis in reality. He said:

“It does not seem to be a rash hypothesis that if any one around there could successfully state the distinction between the constitution and ordinary law in clear juridical terms at least one judge would have deserted the company of the majority and the power of Parliament to amend the fundamental rights would not have remained eclipsed for six long years …”

Six years later the Supreme Court in Kasavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] SCR Supp 1 had no difficulty in overruling Golak Nath practically without any dissent.

Whatever may be said of other Constitutions, they are ultimately of little assistance to us because our Constitution now stands in its own right and it is in the end the wording of our Constitution itself that

1977 2 MLJ 187 at 189

is to be interpreted and applied, and this wording “can never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other Constitutions” — see Adegbenro v Akintola & Anor [1963] 3 All ER 544 551. Each country frames its constitution according to its genius and for the good of its own society. We look at other Constitutions to learn from their experiences, and from a desire to see how their progress and well-being is ensured by their fundamental law.

Counsel for the appellant before us urged that any amendment affecting the fundamentality of the Constitution should be avoided at all costs. According to him that part of the Constitution must not be touched.In my view, a distinction must be made between those parts of the Constitution which the framers thought should not suffer change and those that can be changed.

Our Constitution prescribes four different methods for amendment of the different provisions of the Constitution:

  • (1)

Some parts of the Constitution can be amended by a simple majority in both Houses of Parliament such as that required for the passing of any ordinary law. They are enumerated in clause (4) of Article 159. and are specifically excluded from the purview of Article 159;

  • (2)

The amending clause (5) of Article 159 which requires a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament and the consent of the Conference of Rulers;

  • (3)

The amending clause (2) of Article 161E which is of special interest to East Malaysia and which requires a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament and the consent of the Governor of the East Malaysian State in question;

  • (4)

The amending clause (3) of Article 159 which requires a majority of two-thirds in both Houses of Parliament.

(For a detailed study of the subject, reference may be made to Tun Suffian, Art Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, 2nd edition, Chapter 21).

It is therefore plain that the framers of our Constitution prudently realised that future context of things and experience would need a change in the Constitution, and they, accordingly, armed Parliament with “power of formal amendment”. They must be taken to have intended that, while the Constitution must be as solid and permanent as we can make it, there is no permanence in it. There should be a certain amount of flexibility so as to allow the country’s growth. In any event, they must be taken to have intended that it can be adapted to changing conditions, and that the power of amendment is an essential means of adaptation. A Constitution has to work not only in the environment in which it was drafted but also centuries later. “The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. Man has no property in man; neither has any generation or property in the generations which are to follow … It is the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated.” (Thomas Paine, Rights of Man).

As fundamental rights are not the same as ordinary rights, they can only be suspended or abridged in the special manner provided for it in the Constitution. In my opinion, the purpose of enacting a written Constitution is partly to entrench the most important constitutional provisions against repeal and amendment in any way other than by a specially prescribed procedure. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Hinds v The Queen [1976] 2 WLR 366 373took the view that constitutions based on the Westminster model, in particular the provisions dealing with fundamental rights, form part of the substantive law of the state and until amended by whatever special procedure is laid down in the constitution for this purpose, impose a fetter upon the exercise by the legislature of the plenitude of its legislative power. A passage from the speech of Lord Diplock who delivered the majority judgment is apposite (page 374):

“One final general observation: where, as in the instant case, a constitution on the Westminster model represents the final step in the attainment of full independence by the peoples of a former colony or protectorate, the constitution provides machinery whereby any of its provisions, whether relating to fundamental rights and freedoms or to the structure of government and the allocation to its various organs of legislative, executive or judicial powers, may be altered by those peoples through their elected representatives in the Parliament acting by specified majorities, which is generally all that is required, though exceptionally as respects some provisions the alteration may be subject also to confirmation by a direct vote of the majority of the peoples themselves. The purpose served by this machinery for ‘entrenchment’ is to ensure that those provisions which were regarded as important safeguards by the political parties in Jamaica, minority and majority alike, who took part in the negotiations which led up to the constitution, should not be altered without mature consideration by the Parliament and the consent of a larger proportion of its members than the bare majority required for ordinary laws. So in deciding whether any provisons of a law passed by the Parliament of Jamaica as an ordinary law are inconsistent with the Constitution of Jamaica, neither the courts of Jamaica nor their Lordships’ Board are concerned with the propriety or expediency of the law impugned. They are concerned solely with whether those provisions, however reasonable and expedient, are of such a character that they conflict with an entrenched provision of the Constitution and so can be validly passed only after the Constitution has been amended by the method laid down by it for altering that entrenched provision.”

The framers of our Constitution have incorporated fundamental rights in Part II thereof and made them inviolable by ordinary legislation. Unless there is a clear intention to the contrary, it is difficult to visualise that they also intended to make those rights inviolable by constitutional amendment. Had it been intended to save those rights from the operation of clause (3) of Article 159, it would have been perfectly easy to make that intention clear by adding a proviso to that effect. I am inclined to think that they must have had in mind what is of more frequent occurrence, that is, invasion of fundamental rights by the legislative and executive organs of the State by means of laws, rules and regulations made in exercise of legislative power and not the abridgment of such rights by amendment of the Constitution itself in exercise of the power of constitutional amendment. That power, though it has been entrusted to Parliament, has been so hedged about with restrictions that its exercise can only be made after”mature consideration by Parliament and the consent of a larger proportion of its members than the bare majority required for ordinary laws.”

1977 2 MLJ 187 at 190

There have also been strong arguments in support of a doctrine of implied restrictions on the power of constitutional amendment. A short answer to the fallacy of this doctrine is that it concedes to the court a more potent power of constitutional amendment through judicial legislation than the organ formally and clearly chosen by the Constitution for the exercise of the amending power.

I concede that Parliament can alter the entrenched provisions of clause (4) of Article 5, to wit, removing the provision relating to production before the magistrate of any arrested person under the Restricted Residence Enactment as long as the process of constitutional amendment as laid down in clause (3) of Article 159 is complied with. When that is done it becomes an integral part of the Constitution, it is the supreme law, and accordingly it cannot be said to be at variance with itself. A passage from the Privy Council judgment in Hinds v. The Queen, supra, is of some assistance (page 392):

“That the Parliament of Jamaica has power to create a court … is not open to doubt, but if any of the provisions doing so conflict with the Constitution in its present form, then it could only do so effectively if the Constitution was first amended so as to secure that there ceased to be any inconsistency between the provisions and the Constitution …”

This reasoning, in my view, is based on the premise that the Constitution as the supreme law, unchangeable by ordinary means, is distinct from ordinary law and as such cannot be inconsistent with itself. It is the supreme law because it settles the norms of corporate behaviour and the principle of good government. This is so because the Federation of Malaya, and later, Malaysia, began with the acceptance of the Constitution by the nine Malay States and the former Settlements of Penang and Melaka, by the acceptance of it by Sabah and Sarawak that entered the Federation in 1963, as “the supreme law of the Federation … “(clause 1 of Article 4).It is thus the most vital working document which we created and possess. If it is urged that the Constitution is on the same level with ordinary law, then the Constitution is an absurd attempt on the part of the framers, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable.In the context of clause (1) of Article 160, “law” must be taken to mean law made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not made in exercise of the power of constitutional amendment under clause (3) of Article 159, with the result that clause (1) of Article 4 does not affect amendments made under clause (3) of Article 159.

In conclusion, I hold that clause (4) of Article 5 is nothing but a constitutional protection which can be taken away or abridged only in the manner in which the Constitution provides. There is a world of difference between legislative immunity and a constitutional guarantee. The Constitution, by its very nature, creates the distinction. A constitutional guarantee cannot be wiped out by a simple legislative process as opposed to constitutional amendment.

Can an amendment of a clause in the Constitution operate with retrospective effect? It was strenuously contended for the appellant that a law which takes away vested right must be presumed to be intended not to operate retrospectively for the simple reason that subsequent change in the law would not prejudice such right. I accept this statement, for which authority is to be found in many cases. But my decision is based on the language of section 4 of the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act A354) which reads:

“Provided that this Clause shall not apply to the arrest or detention of any person under the existing law relating to restricted residence, and all the provisions of this Clause shall be deemed to have been an integral part of this Article as from Merdeka Day.”

In so far as an Act of Parliament is concerned, the rule of construction is that in order to determine whether it is retrospective in its operation, the language of the Act itself must be looked into bearing in mind that an Act is not to be construed retrospectively unless it is clear that such was the intention of Parliament. If such was the intention that the Act was to be given retrospective effect even in respect of substantive right or pending proceeding, the courts have no alternative but to give effect to the Act even though the consequences might appear harsh and unjust.

The principle that parties are to be governed by the law in force on the date when an action is instituted and any subsequent amendment or alteration cannot affect vested right or pending proceeding, must always be read subject to the corollary that Parliament can always expressly provide that vested right or pending proceeding be affected by the amendment of the law.

If Parliament retrospectively affects vested right or pending proceeding, then it would be the duty of an appellate court to apply the law prevailing on the date of appeal before it. There is abundant authority for the proposition that an appellate court is entitled to take into consideration facts and events which have come into existence since the judgment under appeal was delivered: see In re Pulborough School Board, Bourke v Hutt [1894] I QB 725 737 and Barber v Pigden [1937] 1 KB 664 673.

It cannot be gainsaid that Parliament is endowed with plenary powers of legislation and that it is within the ambit of its competence to legislate with prospective or retrospective effect. Retrospective legislation is one of the incidents of plenary legislative powers and as such is not required to be spelt out in the Constitution. Subject to the constitutional limitation of Article 7 of the Constitution, to wit, protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, Parliament would be within the ambit of its competence if it deems fit to legislate retrospectively. There is no such restriction of legislative power with regard to restrictive residence. In the absence of any constitutional provision against retrospective legislation with regard to restrictive residence it is not right to argue that Parliament should apply such a restriction. “The ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not any general principle outside it” — per Frankfurter J.

The appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.

WAN SULEIMAN FJ

The appellant was the plaintiff in High Court K.L. Civil Suit No. 729 of 1973.

By a Summons-in-Chambers under Order 25 rule 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court the following points of law raised in the defence of the respondent/defendant came up for determination before the trial:—

1977 2 MLJ 187 at 191

  • (a)

whether the arrest of the plaintiff by the defendant, or its agents or servants on the 19th day of September, 1972 and subsequent detention of the plaintiff without him being produced before a magistrate within 24 hours is lawful by reason only of the validity of the warrant issued by the Minister of Home Affairs dated 13th day of September, 1972 under which the plaintiff was arrested, taking into account the provisions of section 32 of the Police Act No. 41 of 1967 and section 27 of the Prisons Ordinance No. 81 of 1952 and read with section 6 and/or section 39 of the Government Proceedings Ordinance, 1956; and

  • (b)

whether the plaintiff’s claim is bad in law by reason only of the failure on the part of the plaintiff to cite the servant and/or the agent of the defendant in his Statement of Claim.

The agreed facts of the case as set out in the judgment of the learned trial judge are as follows:—

On or about September 19, 1972, the Government of Malaysia by its servants or agents arrested the plaintiff under the authority of a Warrant of Arrest and Detention issued pursuant to the provisions of the Restricted Residence Enactment (F.M.S. Cap. 39) and thereafter detained the plaintiff at the Alor Star prison. On November 21 the same year, the plaintiff caused to be made to the High Court at Alor Star an application for an order that a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum be issued directing the commissioner of Prisons, Malaysia, to have the plaintiff’s body produced before the said court or, alternatively, for an order that the said Commissioner to show cause as to why the plaintiff should not be set at liberty. The documents pertaining to the said application were served on the said Commissioner of Prisons and on the Minister of Home Affairs on or about November 24, 1972. Before the application was set for hearing, i.e. on November 29, 1972, the plaintiff was released and allowed to return to his house at about 9.00 a.m. However, at about 4.00 p.m. on the same day, the plaintiff was re-arrested under a fresh Warrant of Arrest and Detention issued by the Minister of Home Affairs. The plaintiff accordingly claims damages against the defendant for wrongful imprisonment or detention from September 19 to November 29, 1972. He also claims for exemplary damages in respect of the second arrest and detention.

The learned trial judge held on the first issue, that since the omission on the part of the Police Officer and the Prison Officer in not producing the plaintiff before a magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest was an act in compliance with a warrant issued by a competent authority, they are protected from liability in tort by section 32(1) of the Police Act, 1967 and section 27 of the Prisons Ordinance, 1952. In consequence his Lordship held that no proceedings for damages against them personally can be maintained, so that the defendant in Civil Suit No. 729 of 1973 i.e. the Government of Malaysia is also protected from being sued by virtue of section 6(1) of the Government Proceedings Ordinance, 1956 read in conjunction with section 39 of the same Ordinance.

On the second issue his Lordship held for the reasons given in his judgment that the Statement of Claim was nor bad in law.

The appellant/plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of the application. The hearing before the learned judge was on October 17, 1975 and judgment delivered the following day.

In the memorandum of appeal, learned counsel for the appellant relied largely on the decision of this court in Assa Singh v Mentri Besctr Johore [1969] 2 MLJ 30. In that case this court held that though the Restricted Residence Enactment authorising the detention and/or the deprivation of liberty of movement of the subject did not have provisions similar to those in clauses (3) and (4) of Article 5 of the Constitution, this did not make it unconstitutional; and that despite such inconsistency with the Constitution, the Enactment was in force, but it must be applied with such adaptations as might be necessary to bring it into accord with the Constitution. It was also held that the provisions of clauses (3) and (4) of Article 5 of the Constitution should be read into the provisions of the Enactment.

The memorandum of appeal was filed on or about the 24th of June, 1976. However, with effect from August 27, 1976 Act A354/76 made the following amendment to Article 5(4) of the Constitution by adding this proviso to that clause:—

“Provided that this Clause shall not apply to the arrest or detention of any person under the existing law relating to restricted residence, and all the provisions of this Clause shall be deemed to have been an integral part of this Article as from Merdeka Day.”

The result of this amendment if valid would be to reverse with retrospective effect the decision in Assa Singh’s case.

Raja Abdul Aziz for the appellant submitted that the overall effect of the old Article 5 would have opened Government to a suit for wrongful imprisonment in this case, but the retrospective operation of the amendment if validly made would be to give Government complete protection.

The preliminary point therefore taken by learned counsel was — Is this amendment A354/76 constitutional? Raja Abdul Aziz’s submission is briefly this:

Under Article 159, the Constitution may be amended by federal law. A law passed to amend the Constitution is law within the meaning of the term “law” in Article 4 of the Constitution, that unlike the Indian Constitution, because of the manner in which the Indian Article 383 is worded, there is no distinction between a law passed under our Article 159 and a law passed under any other Article of our Constitution.

Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution reads:

“All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, (i.e. Part III ‘Fundamental Liberties’) shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.”

Article 13(2) provides that any future law enacted by any authority in India which takes away or abridges

1977 2 MLJ 187 at 192

rights conferred by Part III and any provision thereof shall be void to the extent of such contravention.

The definition of law in Article 13(3), though it includes both the ordinary legislative power of Parliament and such other matters as customs and usages, does not include a law amending the Constitution which is placed on an independent footing under Article 368. (See Basu’s Commentary on the Constitution of India, 5th Ed. Vol. 1).

It has been held that the Indian Parliament is competent to make amendments in derogation of fundamental rights by an amending Act in conformity with the requirements of Article 368. (5) (See also Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] SCR Supp 1).

In this country, Federal law, he points out, includes (under Article 160) any Act of Parliament. A law passed under Article 159 would have to follow the same legislative procedure as is prescribed in Article 66, like any other Act of Parliament, before it becomes Federal law.He arrives at the conclusion that the power under Article 159, though seemingly wide, is in truth non-existent since any law passed to amend the Constitution must inevitably be inconsistent with the Constitution, and must therefore because of Article 4, be void.

He then referred to three decisions: Letang v Cooper [1967] 2 SCR 762, Latikiro of Buganda v AG [1952] SCR 89 and Black Clauson v Papierwerke [1965] 1 SCR 933 as aids to construction best summed up in the headnote to the last mentioned authority thus:

“Where there is an ambiguity in a statute the court may have regard to the report of a Committee presented to Parliament containing proposals to legislation which resulted in the amendment of the statute, in order to determine the ‘mischief’ which the statute was intended to remedy.”

Having thus laid the foundation, he then referred to various paragraphs of the Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, particularly paras. 161 and 162. The substance of his arguments, if I understand him aright, is that the Fundamental Rights provision constituted a guarantee and once having been so guaranteed, cannot be amended. Whilst conceding that these fundamental liberties are not absolute, he relies on the wording of Articles 7(1), 9(3) and 10 as support for the proposition that the power of Parliament to pass laws to restrict these freedoms must be circumscribed by or be subject to the provisos to be found in Part II only. For instance, Parliament could pass laws to punish the subject for acts or omissions, or to enhance punishment, but not retrospectively (Article 7(1)). The right of every citizen to move freely throughout the country and to reside in any part of it may be modified or be circumscribed by law only for the purposes set out in Articles 9(2) and 9(3). Again the right to freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 10(1)(a), to assemble peaceably by Article 10(1)(b) and to form associations by Article 10(1)(c) can only be restricted by laws passed in accordance with clauses 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) and (3) respectively.

Article 149 is relied upon as another buttress to his argument that the guarantees in Part II of the Constitution cannot be whittled away except under the stringent limitations imposed by the Constitution itself. Clause (1) thereof specifically permits such legislation against subversion to be passed “notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions, inter alia, of Articles 5, 9 or 10″; in other words, without specific provision on that behalf written into the Constitution, there can be no amendment made to Articles 5, 9 or 10 or the other Articles on Fundamental Liberties coming within Part II of the Constitution.

Whilst I would agree that the word “law” in Article 4 means all laws which Parliament is competent to pass, including federal laws passed to amend the Constitution, I fail to note any ambiguity when Articles 4 and 159 are read together.

Paragraph 80 of the Constitutional Commission Report, as one would expect, considered this important matter, and recommended that “the method of amending the Constitution should be neither so difficult as to produce frustration nor so easy as to weaken seriously the safeguards which the Constitution provides”. Article 159(3) provides that (except for the provisions of lesser importance set out in clause 4) all amendments require the support of the votes of not less than ⅔ of the total number of members in each House.

Not only was amendment by a special majority in both Houses recommended by the drafters of the Constitution. One should also look at another provision of the Constitution to see what happens when the special requirements of Article 159 have been satisfied. Like any other Bill, a Constitution amending Bill would become law (under Article 66(5)) on being assented to by the Yang Dipertuan Agung, and as Senior Federal Counsel rightly points out, thenceforth becomes part of the Constitution, becomes integrated therein. The situation therefore cannot arise where it can ever be said to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

A more intriguing point raised was that there can be by implication parts of the Constitution which cannot be subject to any form of amendment whatsoever. In taking this line of reasoning, Raja Abdul Aziz appeared to be advancing the majority decision in an Indian Supreme Court decision of Golaknath v State of Punjab [1967] 2 SCR 762 wherein 6 out of a special Bench of 11 judges had overruled previous decisions and taken the view that though there is no express exception from the ambit of Article 368, the Fundamental Rights included in Part III of the Indian Constitution cannot, by its very nature be subject to the process of amendment provided for in Article 368, and that if any of such rights is to be amended, a new constituent Assembly must be convened for making a new Constitution or for radically changing it. (See Basu’s Commentary on the Constitution of India, 5th Edition, Vol. 5, page 495).

In the later decision of the Supreme Court Kesavananda v The State of Kerala [1973] SCR Supp 1, it was held inter alia at page 4, by a majority:

  • (i)

The decision of the majority in Golaknath that the word “law” in Article 13(2) include amendments

1977 2 MLJ 187 at 193

to the Constitution and that the article operated as a limitation upon the power to amend the Constitution in Article 368 is erroneous and is over-ruled;

  • (ii)

The power of amendment is plenary (full or complete). It includes within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles of the Constitution, including those fundamental rights;

  • (iii)

The power to amend does not include the power to alter the basic structure or frame-work of the Constitution so as to change its identity;

  • (iv)

(Which on the face of it seems to be inconsistent with issue (iii): There are no inherent or implied limitations on the power of amendment under Article 368.

Only issues (i) and (ii) are relevant for the purposes of this appeal. I have referred to issues (iii) and (iv) because counsel for appellant has thought fit to broaden the scope of his arguments by reference to them.

It should be noted that the judges supporting the majority view are not the same in all four issues. That there should be such a diversity of views among the leading jurists in India show that what appears at first to be a straightforward matter of interpretation of the written word has become complicated by the doctrine of “basic structure or framework”, those parts of the Constitution which are regarded by proponents of this doctrine as being of special sanctity.

Thus Sikri C.J. was (at page 164) “driven to the conclusion that the expression ‘amendment of this Constitution’ in Article 368 means any addition or change in any of the provisions of the Constitution within the broad contours of the Preamble and the Constitution to carry out the objectives in the Preamble and the Directive Principles. Applied to fundamental rights, it would mean that while fundamental rights cannot be abrogated reasonable abridgements of fundamental rights can be effected in the public interest.” and at page 165 — “The true position is that every provision of the Constitution can be amended provided in the result the basic foundation and structure of the Constitution remains the same.” The basic structure, he said, consists of: (1) Supremacy of the Constitution; (2) Republican and Democratic form of Government; (3) Secular character of the Constitution; (4) separation of powers between the Legislature, the executive and the judiciary; and (5) Federal character of the Constitution.

The restriction upon the amending power of the Indian Parliament, according to this view arises from what is contained in the Preamble to the Indian Constitution.

Coming back to the issue before us, there is thus persuasive authority that whilst abrogation of the fundamental rights may not come within the ambit of our Article 159, reasonable abridgement of such rights are constitutional; that Parliament should decide when such amendment is necessary and it is not for this court to question the wisdom or need for such amendment.

I do not feel that the issue before this court would call for my view on whether there are indeed inherent or implied limitations to the power of amendment under Article 159, and must perforce confine myself to the issue before us viz. is the amendment to the fundamental right set out in Article 5 by Act A354/76 constitutional?Nor do I feel called upon to answer the broader issue of whether the power to amend includes the power to abrogate a fundamental right.

The power to amend would not, in this country, be restricted by anything set out in a Preamble for there is no Preamble to our Constitution. It seems to me to be clear that if there is to be any restriction to the right to amend any of the fundamental rights set out in Part II, such restriction would have been.set out in one of the various clauses of Article 159 itself.

Another point raised by learned counsel for the appellant is the constitutional validity of this retrospective amendment. Counsel concedes that this is not a criminal matter so that there is no question of violating Article 7. His reference to the Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 16A, page 90, on Retrospective Laws does not further his cause, for even in the U.S., in the absence of express provision in the U.S. Constitution, no law is invalid merely because it is retrospective in operation (see page 94, section 415).

Mr. Lim has drawn our attention to a passage in Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes, 6th Ed., page 862, where under the heading “Prospective and retrospective operation” the following excerpt is relevant:

“Constitutional provisions, like statutes, always operate prospectively and not retrospectively unless words used … clearly indicate that a retrospective intention is intended …

But an express intention that a constitution shall operate retrospectively will be enforced. Nor will a retrospective intention clearly manifest be avoided by consideration of inconvenience or hardship.”

The effect of this amendment to Article 5 is to deprive the appellant of the protection afforded to him by the ruling of this court in Assa Singh’s case, that he cannot sue for damages for what would otherwise be unlawful detention for the period ending November 29, 1972, since it is clear that this amendment is constitutionally valid.

This appeal in substance questions the validity of a law made by Parliament, in the words of Article 4(3) of the Constitution, “on the ground that it makes provision with respect to any matter with respect to which Parliament … has no power to make laws …” What Raja Abdul Aziz says amounts to this: Parliament cannot amend any of the Fundamental Liberties Articles beyond what is expressly permitted by Part II itself. I should therefore treat this appeal as a proceeding for a declaration such as is envisaged in Article 4(3) and I declare that the amendment to Article 5(4) by Act A354/76 is valid.

I would therefore dismiss the appeal. No order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors: Rithauddeen & Aziz.

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[2011] 4 MLJ 1
Tarmizi bin Yacob & Anor v Public Prosecutor and another appeal
FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA)

ARIFIN ZAKARIA CJ (MALAYA), RICHARD MALANJUM CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK) AND JAMES FOONG FCJ

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS 05–37 OF 2004 (W) AND 05–38 OF 2004 (W)

27 July 2010
Criminal Procedure — Prosecution — Consent of public prosecutor — Charge amended from s 39B(1)(a) to s 39B(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 — Amendment made by deputy public prosecutor at trial — Whether trial a nullity — Whether informer should have been called to testify — Whether appellants acted together with common intention in preparing sale of cannabis

The appellants in both the appeals herein were convicted under s 39B(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA’) and sentenced to death. Their appeal to the Federal Court was against the dismissal of their respective appeals to the Court of Appeal against conviction and sentence. Initially both appellants were charged under s 39B(1)(a) of the DDA but at the end of the prosecution’s case the deputy public prosecutor amended the charge to one under s 39B(1)(c), to wit, that they, in furtherance of a common intention, carried out an act preparatory to or for the purpose of trafficking in 2,996.4g cannabis.

The prosecution’s narration of the events was that a chief inspector of police (PW10), posing as a drug buyer, was introduced by his informer (‘Mud’) to the second appellant to discuss the purchase of cannabis. At the appointed time and place for the sale and purchase to take place PW10 met with both appellants. While PW10 and the second appellant waited, the first appellant went to get the drugs and returned in about 20 minutes carrying a bag from which the first appellant took out and showed the cannabis to PW10. PW10 signalled the police party that lay in ambush observing the proceedings. The appellants fled on seeing the police approaching; the first appellant throwing away the bag he was carrying as he fled. Both appellants were apprehended by the police after a brief struggle. In calling for their defence the trial court found as a fact that both appellants had a common intention in acting together to ensure the sale of the cannabis and that they had knowledge of the drugs as inferred from their attempts to resist arrest and escape the police party and the act of the first appellant in throwing away the bag containing the drugs. Their defence failed to cast any reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case. In the Federal Court the appellants submitted that (i) the trial was a nullity because the public prosecutor had not consented to the charge being amended (ii) the prosecution ought to have called the informer ‘Mud’ to testify and/or offered him to the defence (iii) as the second appellant only negotiated the sale of the

4 MLJ 1 at 2

cannabis with PW10 and was never in possession of the drugs he was not involved in trafficking and (iv) as the first appellant did not participate in the negotiations or in the preparatory act but only had custody and control of the cannabis he should be found guilty of only possession and not trafficking.The prosecution replied that (i) consent to the amended charge was superfluous as the prosecution was conducted by a deputy public prosecutor (ii) Mud was not an agent provocateur but only an informer whose identity was protected by s 40 of the DDA. Mud merely introduced the second appellant to PW10 and did nothing else and (iii) the appellants acted together, with a common intention, to sell the cannabis to PW10.

Held, dismissing the appeals and affirming the appellants’ conviction and sentence:

  • (1)
    Consent of the public prosecutor to the amended charge was superfluous as the prosecution was conducted by the deputy public prosecutor in which case the consent of the public prosecutor was implicit in his actions and no further written consent of the public prosecutor was required:Garmaz s/o Pakhar & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR 701 followed. Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45 not followed (see paras 35 & 33).
  • (2)
    There was no necessity for the evidence of Mud in the narrative of the prosecution’s case. It was not disputed that the only role Mud played was to introduce PW10 to the second appellant. Just because Mud was known to the second appellant did not make him an agent provocateur (see para 43).
  • (3)
    In this case the trafficking was the sale of cannabis or the purchase of it by PW10. What transpired on the night of 5 April 1996 was the final chapter in the preparation of the trafficking of the drugs which constituted the supply and delivery of 3kg of the cannabis by the first appellant for the purpose of both the appellants jointly handing it over to PW10 in exchange for payment as earlier agreed. There was common intention to ensure the sale of the cannabis to PW10 (see paras 48 & 49).
  • (4)
    To constitute actual delivery it was not necessary that the agreed price had to be paid upon or before the physical delivery of the drugs. Here, the transaction was completed when the appellants produced the cannabis to PW10 and were only waiting for payment (see para 50).
  • (5)
    There was no misdirection in the evaluation of the evidence adduced or in the standard of proof applied by the trial judge in coming to his decision. Overwhelming evidence was adduced showing the roles played by the appellants to make the cannabis available to PW10 for purchase. The very act of each of them attempting to flee from the scene to avoid

    4 MLJ 1 at 3

    arrest by the police was a clear indication both of them knew what they were dealing in with PW10 (see paras 51 & 52).

Perayu-perayu di dalam kedua-dua rayuan telah disabitkan di bawah s 39B(1)(c) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (‘ADB’) dan telah dihukum mati. Rayuan mereka kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan adalah terhadap penolakan rayuan mereka masing-masing kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman. Pada awalnya, kedua-dua perayu telah dituduh di bawah s 39B(1)(a) ADB tetapi pada akhir kes pihak pendakwaan timbalan pendakwa raya telah meminda tuduhan kepada satu yang tertakluk di bawah s 39B(1)(c), iaitu, bahawa mereka, sebagai lanjutan niat bersama, telah melakukan tindakan persediaan kepada atau bagi tujuan pengedaran 2,996.4g kanabis. Penceritaan kejadian pihak pendakwaan adalah bahawa ketua penyiasat polis (‘PW10′), menyamar sebagai pembeli dadah, telah diperkenalkan oleh pemberi maklumat (‘Mud’) kepada perayu kedua untuk berbincang tentang pembelian kanabis. Pada masa dan tempat yang ditetapkan bagi jual beli tersebut, PW10 bertemu dengan kedua-dua perayu. Sementara PW10 dan perayu kedua sedang menunggu, perayu pertama pergi mendapatkan dadah dan pulang selepas 20 minit membawa beg di mana perayu mengeluarkan dan menunjukkan kanabis kepada PW10. PW10 memberi isyarat kepada pihak polis yang sedang berselindung di dalam belukar dan memerhatikan prosiding tersebut. Perayu-perayu terus melarikan diri apabila melihat kedatangan polis; perayu pertama membuang beg yang dibawanya semasa dia melarikan diri. Kedua-dua perayu telah ditangkap oleh polis selepas pergelutan singkat. Dalam memanggil pembelaan mereka, mahkamah perbicaraan mendapati adalah fakta bahawa kedua-kedua perayu mempunyai niat bersama untuk bertindak bersesama untuk memastikan jualan kanabis dan bahawa mereka mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dadah tersebut melihatkan kepada percubaan mereka untuk mengelakkan diri daripada ditahan dan melarikan diri daripada pihak polis dan tindakan perayu pertama membuang beg yang mengandungi dadah tersebut. Pembelaan mereka gagal untuk meletakkan sebarang keraguan berpatutan ke atas kes pendakwaan.

Dalam Mahkamah Persekutuan, perayu-perayu berhujah bahawa (i) perbicaraan adalah terbatal oleh kerana pendakwa raya tidak memberi kebenaran terhadap tuduhan yang dipinda; (ii) pihak pendakwaan sepatutnya memanggil pemberi maklumat ‘Mud’ untuk memberi keterangan dan/atau menawarkannya kepada pembelaan; (iii) memandangkan perayu kedua hanya berunding tentang penjualan kanabis dengan PW10 dan tidak pernah dalam milikan dadah tersebut, dia tidak terbabit dalam pengedaran; dan (iv) memandangkan perayu pertama tidak terlibat dalam perundingan atau tindakan persediaan tetapi hanya mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan kanabis tersebut, dia patut didapati bersalah hanya untuk milikan dan bukan untuk pengedaran. Pihak pendakwaan membalas bahawa (i) kebenaran kepada tuduhan yang dipinda tidak diperlukan memandangkan pendakwaan telah

4 MLJ 1 at 4

dilakukan oleh timbalan pendakwa raya (ii) Mud bukanlah ejen perangkap tetapi hanya pemberi maklumat yang mana identitinya dilindungi oleh s 40ADB. Mud sekadar memperkenalkan perayu kedua kepada PW10 dan tidak lebih dari itu; dan (iii) perayu-perayu bertindak bersama-sama, dengan niat bersama untuk menjual kanabis kepada PW10.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dan mengesahkan sabitan dan hukuman perayu-perayu:

  • (1)
    Kebenaran pendakwa raya untuk tuduhan yang dipinda adalah tidak perlu memandangkan pendakwaan telah dilakukan oleh timbalan pendakwa raya di mana kebenaran pendakwa raya adalah tersirat daripada tindakannya dan kebenaran bertulis selanjutnya oleh pendakwa raya adalah tidak perlu: Garmaz s/o Pakhar & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR 701 diikut; Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45 tidak diikut (lihat perenggan 35 & 33).
  • (2)
    Keterangan Mud adalah tidak perlu di dalam penceritaan kes pihak pendakwaan. Tidak dapat dipertikaikan bahawa peranan yang dimainkan oleh Mud hanyalah untuk memperkenalkan PW10 kepada perayu kedua. Hanya kerana Mud dikenali oleh perayu kedua tidak bermakna dia adalah ejen perangkap (lihat perenggan 43).
  • (3)
    Dalam kes ini pengedaran tersebut adalah penjualan kanabis atau pembeliannya oleh PW10. Apa yang berlaku pada malam 5 April 1996 adalah bab terakhir dalam persediaan untuk pengedaran dadah yang mana membawa kepada bekalan dan penyerahan 3kg kanabis oleh perayu pertama bagi tujuan untuk diberikan kepada PW10 oleh kedua-dua perayu sebagai ganti untuk pembayaran yang dipersetujui sebelum itu. Terdapat niat bersama untuk memastikan penjualan kanabis kepada PW10(lihat perenggan 48 & 49).
  • (4)
    Untuk membentuk penyerahan sebenar, adalah tidak perlu bahawa harga yang dipersetujui hendaklah dibayar apabila atau sebelum penyerahan fizikal dadah tersebut. Di sini, transaksi telah disempurnakan apabila perayu-perayu menyediakan kanabis kepada PW10 dan hanya menunggu untuk bayaran (lihat perenggan 50).
  • (5)
    Tidak terdapat salah arah dalam penilaian keterangan yang dikemukakan atau standard pembuktian yang digunakan oleh hakim bicara dalam membuat keputusannya. Keterangan kukuh yang dikemukakan menunjukkan peranan yang dimainkan oleh perayu-perayu untuk menyediakan kanabis untuk pembelian oleh PW10. Tindakan setiap daripada mereka yang cuba untuk melarikan diri daripada tempat kejadian untuk mengelakkan diri daripada ditahan oleh polis adalah petunjuk yang jelas bahawa kedua-duanya tahu akan urusniaga mereka dengan PW10 (lihat perenggan 51 & 52).
4 MLJ 1 at 5
Notes

For cases on consent of Public Prosecutor to prosecute, see 5(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2010 Reissue) paras 3093–3095.

Cases referred to

Garmaz s/o Pakhar & Anor v PP [1995] 3 SLR 701, HC (refd)

Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v PP [1997] 3 MLJ 1, CA (refd)

Lee Lee Chong v PP [1998] 4 MLJ 697, CA (refd)

Pendakwa Raya v Mansor bin Mohd Rashid & Anor [1996] 3 MLJ 560, FC (refd)

PP v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45 (refd)

PP v Sa’ari Jusoh [2007] 2 CLJ 197, FC (refd)

Ti Chuee Hiang v PP [1995] 2 MLJ 433, SC (refd)

Legislation referred to

Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ss 2, 39B(1)(a), (1)(c), 39B(2), 40A

Penal Code s 34

Appeal From: Criminal Appeal Nos W–05–53 of 1997 and W–05–54 of 1997 (Court of Appeal, Putrajaya).
Gurbachan Singh (Ratnam with him) (Bachan & Kartar) for the appellants.
Ahmad Bache (Deputy Public Prosecutor, Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondent.
Jaya Prakash watching brief for the Indonesian Consulate.

Richard Malanjum FCJ (delivering judgment of the court)
INTRODUCTION

[1] There are two appeals before us heard together. In both the appeals the respective appellants were convicted and sentenced to death on the amended charge under s 39B(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘the Act’) read with s 34 of the Penal Code and punishable under s 39B(2) of the Act by the High Court Kuala Lumpur on 5 August 1997. Their respective appeals to the Court of Appeal were dismissed on 2 December 2004. They now appeal to this court on 15 grounds of appeal.

[2] Initially both the appellants were charged under s 39B(1)(a) of the Act read with s 34 of the same Code and punishable under s 39B(2) of the Act. However, at the end of the case for the prosecution the learned deputy public prosecutor amended the charge to one of s 39B(1)(c) of the Act.

[3] In this judgment the appellant in the first appeal is described as the first appellant and the appellant in the second appeal as the second appellant and

4 MLJ 1 at 6

together as the appellants.

FACTUAL BACKGROUNDS

[4] The amended charge preferred against the appellants in the High Court reads:

Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 5 April 1996, lebih kurang 9.45 malam, di Jalan Raja Alang, Kampung Baru, Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan, dalam mencapai niat bersama, kamu telah di pihak kamu melakukan satu perbuatan persediaan untuk mengedar dadah berbahaya, iaitu 2996.4 gram cannabis, suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(c)Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Disemak 1980) dibaca bersama dengan seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2)Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952.

[5] It is the case for the prosecution that on 4 April 1996 at around 5pm. Chief Inspector Amir Hamzah bin Hanudin (‘PW10′) from the Unit Risikan Jenayah Ibu Pejabat Bukit Aman, acting as a drug buyer, was introduced by his source a person known as Mud to Agam, the second appellant, an Indonesian, at the Restoran Hashimah Paya Jaras, Sungai Buluh.

[6] After Mud had introduced PW10 to the second appellant he asked Mud to leave. PW10 then began discussion with the second appellant. PW10 informed the second appellant that he wished to buy 10 kilo of drugs ‘ganja’ (‘cannabis’). The second appellant agreed to supply at the price of RM1,700 per kilo. PW10 did not agree on the price. Further negotiation took place on the price and it was finally agreed at RM1,600 per kilo. The second appellant then told PW10 that the cannabis was at Kampung Baru, Kuala Lumpur in the area of Jalan Raja Alang and could only be collected in the evening or at night.

[7] At about 7pm on the same evening the second appellant invited PW10 to come with him to Kampung Baru to collect the cannabis. PW10 drove his car, a red GTO Mitsubishi with registration No WDX 983. The second appellant sat on the passenger seat.

[8] On arrival at the place the second appellant went out for 15–20 minutes but only to come back to say that the cannabis was not yet available. The second appellant then told PW10 they were to return to Paya Jaras and on the way back the second appellant informed PW10 that the cannabis could not be obtained that evening as it was not safe to do so. The second appellant then said to PW10 that he could get someone to deliver the cannabis at Paya Jaras with an additional payment of RM300. PW10 disagreed and advised the second appellant that if there was any further development he was to call him on his

4 MLJ 1 at 7

mobile phone. In reply the second appellant asked PW10 to come to Kampung Baru at the same location around 3pm the next day.[9] At around 11.30am the next day PW10 went to the Operation Room of the Narcotics Department Task Force of the Bukit Aman Police Headquarters at Cheras to brief the members of the task force (‘the police’) on the pending transaction at Jalan Raja Alang Kampung Baru in which he would pose as a buyer of the cannabis.

[10] It was therefore agreed during the briefing:

  • (a)
    that the police would focus on the agreed location;
  • (b)
    that PW10 would used the same car; and
  • (c)
    that the police would move to ambush only after PW10 had given the signal by opening the boot of his car.

[11] At around 7.50pm on 5 April 1996 the second appellant called PW10 on his mobile phone. The first four calls of the same number PW10 did not answer. It was only the fifth call that he answered and it was the second appellant.

[12] Over the phone the second appellant told PW10 that the cannabis was available and that PW10 was to come to Jalan Raja Alang in front of Yuli Clinic at around 9pm. PW10 agreed.

[13] PW10 then informed the police who were with him at the Golf Club PDRM of the agreed location and emphasised to them that the seller would be entering his car.

[14] PW10 arrived at the designated location at about 9.10pm and knew that the police had also arrived due to the presence of one member in short pants near the public telephone booth. PW10 parked his car under a street light in order to have clear sight of what might happen.

[15] At about 9.20pm the second appellant arrived with another person introduced to PW10 as Tarmizi, the first appellant. PW10 asked both of them to enter his car. The first appellant was seated on the front passenger seat while the second appellant was at the back seat. The first appellant proceeded to inform PW10 that he only had 3kg of the cannabis. PW10 agreed to buy and the first appellant asked for payment.

[16] When the first appellant asked for the money PW10 showed him and said that he would only pay upon seeing the cannabis. The first appellant

4 MLJ 1 at 8

therefore went out of the car walking to the rear of the car towards a corner not far from it. PW10 then asked the second appellant to come to the front seat.[17] While waiting for the first appellant PW10 was informed by the second appellant that only 3kg could be obtained for the transaction but he would arrange again next time.

[18] After about 15–20 minutes the first appellant came back. PW10 asked the second appellant to come out with him and moved to the rear of the car. The three met at the rear of the car. The first appellant told PW10 he had the cannabis inside the bag he was carrying. The first appellant brought it in front of PW10 and the second appellant. From inside the bag the first appellant proceeded to take out a compact bundle wrapped with transparent plastics. PW10 smelt it, looked at it and pressed it before suspecting it was cannabis.

[19] The first appellant and second appellant asked PW10 to be quick. PW10 went to get the money inside the car but at the same time pulling the lever to open the boot to signal the police to act. At that time the cannabis was still with the first appellant. When PW10 was about to return to the rear of the car he saw the police heading for the first appellant and second appellant. PW10 went back into his car, turned on the engine and sped off.

[20] The transaction between PW10 and the appellants were witnessed by Chief Inspector Fisol (‘PW5′) who led the police that night and Det Cpl Rosdi (‘PW8′). They were about 10–15 meters away from the car of PW10. They identified the first appellant as a tall, well-built man wearing a red short–sleeve T–shirt and dark jeans while the second appellant was wearing a white T–shirt and dark pants.

[21] When the signal to act came on PW5 and PW8 ran to apprehend the first appellant and second appellant respectively. However after a struggle with PW5 the first appellant managed to free himself and threw away the bag he was carrying before running away. PW5 did not pursue him but stayed back to watch over the bag thrown by the first appellant. It was Inspector Zambri who made another attempt to apprehend the first appellant. He too failed. He was injured when he was pushed and fell down. The first appellant was then pursued by Det Cpl Khalid (‘PW7′) who managed to arrest him after firing two shots at him and injuring his right leg. Several members of the police also came to assist PW7. The second appellant also tried to escape but was caught by PW8 with the help of Det Sjn Abdullah.

[22] The first appellant and second appellant were both identified by PW7 and PW8 as the two persons with PW10 that night based on their clothing.

4 MLJ 1 at 9

[23] After the arrest of the first appellant and second appellant PW5 examined the content of the bag in their presence. PW5 found three compressed slabs suspected to be cannabis. PW6, the chemist, (Cheong Meow Kioon) did the analysis of the three slabs seized by the police. In his evidence PW6 said that he was given three compressed slabs of plant material wrapped with plastic sheet and secured with adhesive tape. He found the nett weight of each slab to be 1,018.4g, 991.4g and 986.6g respectively and giving the total weight of 2,996.4g. And after he had carried out the essential analysis on the three slabs by way of several established and accepted tests he found all the plant material of the three slabs to be cannabis as defined in s 2 of the Act.

[24] At the end of the case for the prosecution and after giving the maximum evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution the learned High Court judge called for the defence of both the first appellant and second appellant. In doing so he made several findings of fact related to the issues raised by learned counsel for the first appellant and second appellant, inter alia:

  • (a)
    that the first appellant and second appellant were identified by PW10 and corroborated by PW5, PW7 and PW8. In addition both the first appellant and second appellant were arrested at the scene of the event;
  • (b)
    that the identification of the first appellant and second appellant was possible that night since the views of the prosecution’s witnesses who observed the event were not hampered. There were street lights and building lights in the vicinity;
  • (c)
    that PW6 concluded that the three slabs he analysed were cannabis as defined in s 2 of the Act;
  • (d)
    that the first appellant and second appellant had the common intention since they acted together in the preparation for the sale of the cannabis; and
  • (e)
    that the first appellant and second appellant had knowledge of the cannabis. The acts of the first appellant in struggling with the police to resist arrest, throwing the bag containing the cannabis and running away indicated such knowledge. And so was the second appellant who also struggled with the police in an attempt to escape.

[25] The learned trial High Court judge did not think that the failure by the Prosecution to tender as evidence the Police Report Dang Wangi No 7049/96 had jeopardised the prosecution’s case as he opined it was not a first information report. And neither did the learned trial High Court judge find any break in the chain of evidence adduced by the prosecution. The evidence of PW10 was also held to be admissible under s 40A of the Act.

4 MLJ 1 at 10

[26] In his unsworn statement the first appellant said that he happened to be at the scene of the event when he heard shouts of ‘Polis, polis, polis’. As he was an illegal immigrant and feared of being apprehended he ran off. In the process he dropped his watch and while looking for it he heard a gun shot and felt pain on his right thigh. He fainted.

[27] The learned trial High Court judge did not find the version of the first appellant as having cast any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. His reasons were as follows:

  • (a)
    that the first appellant did not deny that he was at the scene of the event that night;
  • (b)
    that there was no reason why the police would go for the first appellant if indeed there were other people in the vicinity at that time. Further it was illogical for the first appellant to say that he ran away as he was an illegal immigrant yet gave his watch a priority when he stopped to look for it at the risk of being arrested; and
  • (c)
    that there was nothing in the statement of the first appellant to contradict the evidence of the prosecution that at that time he was carrying a bag containing the cannabis and which he threw away when the police wanted to arrest him.

[28] The second appellant also made an unsworn statement from the dock. He said that on 4 April 1996 he did meet Mud with another person introduced to him as Abang Jo at the restaurant in Paya Jaras. While at the restaurant Mud and Abang Jo agreed to meet at Jalan Raja Alang the next day. The second appellant went on to say that he met Mud on 5 April 1996 at Jalan Raja Alang. Mud told him that there was a man in a car who asked him to go in. The second appellant said that he followed but did not enter the car. Then suddenly he heard gun shots and the shouts of ‘Polis, polis’. He was subsequently arrested.

[29] Having heard the version of the second appellant the learned trial High Court judge did not find it having cast any reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case for the following reasons:

  • (a)
    the second appellant did not deny that he was at the scene of the event that night;
  • (b)
    the second appellant did not say who was the man inside the car;
  • (c)
    the second appellant did not deny that he struggled with the police; and
  • (d)
    there was no reason or even suggested reason why the police would arrest the second appellant.
4 MLJ 1 at 11

[30] The learned trial High Court judge thus found both the first appellant and second appellant guilty of the charge preferred against them. He convicted and sentenced them accordingly.

[31] The Court of Appeal dismissed the respective appeals of the appellants. Briefly, the Court of Appeal held:

  • (a)
    that preparatory act for the purpose of trafficking drugs consists of several continuing acts;
  • (b)
    that the evidence of the chemist (‘PW6′) was credible. There was no necessity for him to show in detail what he did in his laboratory; and
  • (c)
    that the consent of the public prosecutor was implied in this case since the prosecution was conducted by a deputy public prosecutor.

[32] Before us learned counsel for the appellants only pursued grounds of Appeal Nos 13, 14 and 15. But he raised the issue of absence of consent of the public prosecutor for the amended charge.

ISSUE OF CONSENT ON THE AMENDED CHARGE

[33] Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial of his clients was a nullity in view of the absence of consent to the amended charge preferred against them at the close of the case for the prosecution. He cited the case of Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45. In that case the original charge was under s 39B(1)(a) of the Act but on the day of trial the learned deputy public prosecutor amended it to s 39A(1)(c) of the same Act. Harun J (as he then was) said this at p 1:

It will be observed that although the original and amended charges are two distinct offences, they are both created by the same section of the law viz s 39B(1) and both carry the same penalty. Both require the consent of the public prosecutor under s 39B(3). The learned deputy public prosecutor argued that the amendment was technical and as the public prosecutor had given his consent on the original charge he was at liberty to amend the charges in the manner he did. I do not think so. It was held in Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 231 that a consent to prosecute ‘is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side’. The public prosecutor has clearly exercised his mind in respect of the original charge when he gave his consent to prosecute some four months after the alleged offence. It was incumbent on him however to exercise the same degree of deliberation in respect of the amended charge. He has not done so … The facts of the case were fully before the public prosecutor at the time of giving his consent and he could have elected to proceed on the amended charge then. He did not do so. It would appear therefore that the public prosecutor

4 MLJ 1 at 12

has not given his consent to prosecute under the amended charge. That being so, the trial is a nullity on the authority of Lyn Hong Yap v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 226.

[34] In his response the learned deputy submitted to us that consent would be superfluous in this case as the prosecution was conducted by a deputy public prosecutor. In its judgment the Court of Appeal held the same view.

[35] We agree with the view of the Court of Appeal and the submission of the learned deputy. The law was concisely and correctly summarised by Yong Pung How CJ (Singapore) in Garmaz s/o Pakhar & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR 701 when he said this at p 720:

The settled Malaysian position has been to consider a deputy public prosecutor as being capable of exercising all the rights and powers of the public prosecutor … It follows from this proposition that where prosecution is conducted by a DPP, the consent of the public prosecutor is implicit in his actions and no further written consent of the public prosecutor is required. Indeed, this was the holding of the Privy Council inPublic Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi [1968] 1 MLJ 148. The ruling in Public Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi [1968] 1 MLJ 148 was followed inPerumal v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 265, Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Halipah [1982] 1 MLJ 155, Public Prosecutor v Datuk Haji Dzulkifli [1982] 1 MLJ 340 and Public Prosecutor v Lim Boon Hock [1985] 2 MLJ 219.

[36] The learned Chief Justice also noted that in Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok Harun J (as he then was) had not been referred to the Privy Council decision in Public Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi.

[37] And in fact Yusof Abdul Rashid J in Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Halipah declined to follow the judgment of Harun J. He preferred to follow Public Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi and said this at p 159:

It is to be noted that in the above case the prosecution was conducted before the High Court by a deputy public prosecutor who under the Criminal Procedure Code is vested with all the powers of the public prosecutor. On the authority of this case, it is clear that where the prosecution is conducted by a deputy public prosecutor the consent of the public prosecutor is implicit in his action and no written consent of the public prosecutor is required.

[38] In another case of Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 1 Mahadev Shankar JCA said this at pp 13–14:

If a deputy public prosecutor is present and goes on record when the accused is called upon to plead to an offence under this Act, no separate consent should be required (see Lyn Hong Yap v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 226 and Perumal v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 265).

4 MLJ 1 at 13

[39] As such we find no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants on the issue of absence of consent of the public prosecutor in respect of the amended charge.

GROUND 13 — THE FAILURE TO CALL AS A WITNESS THE INFORMER, MUD

[40] Next, learned counsel for the appellants argued that the learned judges of the Court of Appeal ‘erred and misdirected themselves in law and in fact in not holding that the informer (Mud) ought to have been called by the prosecution to unfold the narrative of the Prosecution’s case and/or offered him to the defence’. Learned counsel contended that PW10 was introduced by Mud to the second appellant and thus Mud must have been known to the second appellant. He cited the case of Ti Chuee Hiang v Public Prosecutor [1995] 2 MLJ 433 to support his contention.

[41] Learned deputy replied that Mud was only an informer hence his identity was protected by s 40 of the Act. He pointed out that Mud merely introduced the second appellant to PW10 and did nothing else. As such he was an Informer and not an agent provocateur. The learned deputy went on to say that Mud did less than the informer in Pendakwa Raya v Mansor bin Mohd Rashid & Anor [1996] 3 MLJ 560 yet the Federal Court in that case ruled that the informer was not an agent provocateur when it said this at p 578:

In Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 (SC), Mohd Azmi SCJ (now FCJ) in delivering the judgment of the court, opined (at p 494) that ‘whether a person is an informer or has become an active agent provocateur would depend on the facts of each particular case’. In our instant case under appeal though Cholar introduced PW9 to the second respondent and was present when both transactions involving cannabis were struck, there was no evidence that he had done anything apart from being present. It appears obvious that his presence during the negotiation process and the transactions was merely to lend credence to PW9′s intention to purchase the cannabis in the minds of the respondents.

On the particular facts and circumstances of the instant case under appeal, we are of the view that Cholar was not an agent provocateur. But even if he was, there is more than sufficient credible evidence of the respondents’ involvement in the negotiation and agreement to sell to PW9 the 902g of cannabis subsequently brought out by the second respondent from room ‘K’ in the said house.

[42] In its judgment the Court of Appeal held that the role of Mud in this case was merely to introduce the second appellant to PW10 unlike the informer in Ti Chuee Hiang v Public Prosecutor who played an active role as an agent provocateur to arrange for the accused to meet the police and subsequently for his arrest.

4 MLJ 1 at 14

[43] We have perused the whole evidence adduced. We are of the view that there was no necessity for the evidence of Mud in the narrative of the prosecution’s case. In fact it was not disputed that the only role of Mud was to introduce PW10 to the second appellant. Just because Mud was known to the second appellant did not make him an agent provocateur. We therefore agree with the view of the Court of Appeal that the role of Mud could not be compared to that of the informer in Ti Chuee Hiang v Public Prosecutor ‘who had enticed the appellant to walk into a deliberate trap, which had been planned and organised by PPP Noorhashim and executed by a team of six police officers led by K/Inspector Mohd Amin bin Abd Raof (‘PW3′) who was then attached to Cawangan Anti Dadah, Bukit Aman, Kuala Lumpur, on the date and at the time and place referred to in the charge’.

[44] Accordingly, we also find no merit in this issue as raised by learned counsel for the appellants.

GROUNDS 14 AND 15 — CUSTODY, CONTROL AND POSSESSION OF THE CANNABIS

[45] Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the second appellant only did the negotiation with PW10 and he was not in possession of the cannabis. As such there was no question of him involved in the trafficking of the cannabis.

[46] In respect of the first appellant’s learned counsel argued that he did not participate in the negotiation or in the preparatory act. He only had the custody and control of the cannabis. As such the presumption of possession applied and thus he should only be guilty of possession and not for trafficking. The case of Public Prosecutor v Sa’ari Jusoh [2007] 2 CLJ 197 was cited in support.

[47] In response the learned deputy submitted that the appellants were charged with common intention for the offence. And that the evidence adduced must be considered as a whole including the overwhelming evidence that the appellants acted together to effect the sale of the cannabis to PW10.

[48] On this issue the Court of Appeal held that the preparatory act for the purpose of trafficking drugs covers a number of continuing acts. It begins from an agreement until the successful handing over of the drugs to another party. The acts in between carried out to achieve the purpose included such acts as getting the supply, wrapping, sending and meeting between the parties. In this case the trafficking was the sale of cannabis or the purchase of it by PW10. And what transpired on the night of 5 April 1996 along Jalan Raja Alang was the final chapter in the preparation of the trafficking of the drugs which

4 MLJ 1 at 15

constituted the supply and delivery of 3kg of the cannabis by the first appellant for the purpose of the first appellant and second appellant jointly handing it over to PW10 in exchange for the payment as earlier agreed.[49] The appellants were charged with common intention to ensure the sale of the cannabis to PW10. And such sale was proved by direct evidence without relying on any of the statutory presumptions in the Act. We are therefore in entire agreement with the view of the Court of Appeal in finding that the contention of learned counsel for the appellants has no merit.

[50] On the issue of delivery it is now a settled law that to constitute actual delivery it is not necessary that the agreed price must be paid upon or before the physical delivery of the drugs (see Wan Mazuki bin Wan Abdullah v Public Prosecutor Criminal Appeal No 05–56 of 2008 (T). As such the decision in Public Prosecutor v Sa’ari Jusoh should not be narrowly construed. And in this case the transaction was in fact completed since the appellants had produced the cannabis to PW10 and were only waiting for the payment when the police moved in to apprehend them.

[51] In respect of the complaint that there was misdirection in the evaluation of the evidence adduced and the standard of proof applied by the learned trial High Court judge before coming to his decision, we agree with the Court of Appeal that there was no such misdirection shown or apparent.

[52] While in essence the basic defence of the appellants was one of mere denial, there were overwhelming evidence adduced indicating the roles played by the first appellant and second appellant in order to make the cannabis available for PW10 to purchase. Indeed the very act of each of them in attempting to flee from the scene and avoiding arrest by the police was one clear indication that both knew what they were dealing in with PW10 (see Lee Lee Chong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 4 MLJ 697).

[53] As learned counsel for the appellants did not pursue the other grounds of appeal we need not have to deal with them. At any rate we are not persuaded that any of them could have made the difference to our conclusion.

[54] The respective appeals of the first appellant and second appellant are therefore dismissed. We affirmed their respective convictions and sentences imposed by the High Court and upheld by the Court of Appeal.

Appeals dismissed and appellant’s conviction and sentence affirmed.
**********************************************************************************

IN PARI MATERIA

IN PARI MATERIA. Upon the same matter or subject. Statutes in pari materia are to be construed together. are to be construed together.

[Latin, Of the same matter; on the same subject.] The phrase used in connection with two laws relating to the same subject matter that must be analyzed with each other.

For example, the federal gift tax provisions supplement the federal estate tax provisions. The two are in pari materia and must be read together because the gift tax provisions were enacted to prevent the avoidance of estate taxes.

http://www.answers.com/topic/pari-materia

(sū’ī’ jĕn’ər-ĭs, sū’ē)
adj.
Being the only example of its kind; unique: “sui generis works like Mary Chesnut’s Civil War diary”(Linda Orr).

Sui generis ( /ˌsuːaɪ ˈdʒɛnərɪs/;[1] Latin: [ˈsʊ.iː ˈɡɛnɛrɪs]) is a Latin expression, literally meaning of its own kind/genus or unique in its characteristics.[2] The expression is often used in analytic philosophy to indicate an idea, an entity, or a reality which cannot be included in a wider concept.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sui_Generis_%28Latin_expression%29

Adj. 1. sui generis- constituting a class of its own; unique; “a history book sui generis”; “sui generis works like Mary Chestnut’s Civil War diary”

single – existing alone or consisting of one entity or part or aspect or individual; “upon the hill stood a single tower”; “had but a single thought which was to escape”; “a single survivor”; “a single serving”; “a single lens”; “a single thickness”
Based on WordNet 3.0, Farlex clipart collection. © 2003-2008 Princeton University, Farlex Inc.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/sui+generis

Categories: Absence of Jurisdiction, Abuse of Process of Court, Art of Counter-CyberForensics, Blog, Breach of Expert Duties, Breach of Natural Justice, Breach of Prosecution's Duties, Case Law Studies, Chain of Custody, Chain of Evidence, Conspiracy Theory, Control, Credibility of Expert Witness, Criminal & Civil Liability of Expert Witness, Criminal Behavioral Studies, Criminal Justice, Criminal Procedures Code (Act 593) - Malayan Law, Criminology, Custody, Cyber Forensics & Investigations, Damages, Definition of Possession in Law, Domain Names, E-mail, Electronic Evidence, Evidence Act 1950 (Malayan Law), Evidence Not Marked As Exhibit, Expert At Crime Scene, Expert Evidence, Expert Witness, Federal Constitutions, First Information Report (FIR), Forensics Standards, Freedom and Privacy, Freedom of Thought, Fundamental Human Rights, Gazetted Expert Witness, Human Rights, Marriage & Privacy, Illegally Obtained Evidence, Information, Intellectual Properties & Copyrights, Invasion of Privacy, Knowledge, Law of Tort, Limitation of Immunity of Judge in Lower Court, Limitations to The Immunity Rule, Malicious Prosecution, Manner in which lack of competency may rise, Marriage Rights, My Young Padawans on The Moves, Natural Justice, Networking and Internet, Padawan, Penal Codes, Power and Privacy, Private Property, Private Spaces, Prosecution, Retrospective of Privacy, S 120 Parties to Civil Suits and Wives and Husbands, S1 Evidence Act 1950, S10 Evidence Act 1950, S11 Evidence Act 1950, S12 Evidence Act 1950, S122 Evidence Act (Communication During Marriage), S13 Evidence Act 1950, S14 Evidence Act 1950, S15 Evidence Act 1950, S16 Evidence Act 1950, S17 Evidence Act 1950, S2 Evidence Act 1950, S3 Evidence Act 1950, S4 Evidence Act 1950, S44 Fraud or Collusion in Obtaining Judgement or Incompetency of Court May Be Rise, S45 Evidence Act 1950, S5 Evidence Act 1950, S56 Fact Judicially Noticeable Need To Be Proved, S57 Facts of Which Court Must Take Judicial Notice, S6 Evidence Act 1950, S65 Evidence Act 1950, S65(1)(c) Evidence Act 1950, S7 Evidence Act 1950, S8 Evidence Act 1950, S9 Evidence Act 1950, S93 Exclusion of Evidence To Explain or Amend Ambigious Document, Scientific Evidence and Law, Secret of The Bodies, Territories of Selfness, The Daubert Test, The Dyas Test, The Frye Test, The Jacobetz Refinement, The Kelly-Frye Test, The Kumho Gloss, The Post-Daubert Decisions, The Theory of Pure Democracy, The Williams Departure, Trial Within Trial, True Definition of Natural Justice, Vicarious Liability, Websites, Without Search Warrant

My Written Submission to Reverse the Decision made by the Recalcitrant Magistrate on Devilishly, Mischievously Malicious Prosecution and Remedy by Removing the Recalcitrant Magistrate from His Office: Malice Defeats Immunity (Judicial Immunity is Not Absolute!) – Deputy Public Prosecutor can’t afford to reply my submission (not even on single line of utterance) because they are on self-defeating side

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI KUALA LUMPUR

 

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: 41- 21-2011 

ANTARA

 

MOHAMAD IZAHAM BIN MOHAMED YATIM                           …PERAYU

 

DAN

PENDAKWA RAYA                                                                        …RESPONDEN)

 

[berkenaan perkara Mahkamah Majistret di Kuala Lumpur

Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009]

 

Antara

 

Pendakwa Raya

 

Dan

 

Mohamad Izaham bin Mohamed Yatim

 

HUJAHAN BERTULIS PIHAK PERAYU

 

Dengan izin Yang Arif Hakim,

Ini adalah hujahan bertulis pihak Perayu untuk rayuan terhadap keputusan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur yang menjatuhkan hukuman dan sabitan ke atas Perayu pada 25.2.2011 denda RM15,000.00 jika gagal bayar denda penjara 6 bulan di bawah Seksyen 5(2) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 bagi Kes Tangkap No.2-83-7119-2009 (kemudian daripada ini dirujuk sebagai “Kes Tangkap Tersebut”).

LATARBELAKANG KES:

1.         Perayu dihadapkan dengan pertuduhan seperti berikut:

Bahawa kamu pada 13/07/09 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat ******************************, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah didapati memiliki sebanyak 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK yang di bawah milikan kamu. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 5(2) akta yang sama”.

2.         Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil 7 orang saksi untuk membuktikan kes pendakwaan iaitu:

2.1       SP-1 iaitu Insp. Mohd Razif b. Mohd Zaid I/16542

2.2       SP-2 iaitu Zanariah binti Ibrahim

2.3       SP-3 iaitu Mohanaraj Naidi Subbiah

2.4       SP-4 iaitu Mohamad Zamri bin Roslan

2.5       SP-5 iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah I/17525

2.6       SP-6 iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus

2.7       SP-7 iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira binti Zakaria

3.         Ekshibit-ekshibit yang telah dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan dan ditanda di dalam Nota Keterangan :

3.1       P-1 – Borang Serah Menyerah (Borang D6)

3.2       P2(a), (b), (c), (d) – (n) – 7 DVC, 3 VCD, 2 Cd, 1 thumb drive dan hard disc

3.3       P3(a – m) – 13 keping DVD

3.4       P9Copy SP2

3.5       P11Quotation Baru

3.6       P12Surat Lawyer 1 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

3.7       P13Surat Lawyer 3 mohon hak penjagaan anak

3.8       P14Surat Lawyer 7

3.9       P15Surat Lawyer 7A2 contoh isteri derhaka yang nyata

3.10    P16(dalam softcopy)Surat lawyer 7A2 dokumen

3.11    P17(softcopy) surat lawyer 8 dokumen

3.12    P18Surat Lawyer 8 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

3.13    P19yearfocal – terdapat nama Saliza binti Ramli

3.14    P20S6301428.jpg

3.15    P21S6301429.jpg

3.16    P22S6301430.jpg

3.17    P23S6301431.jpg

3.18    P24 - S6301432.jpg

3.19    P25S6301433.jpg

3.20    P26S6301434.jpg

3.21    P27S6301435.jpg

3.22    P28S6301436.jpg

3.23    P29S6301437.jpg

3.24    P30S6301438.jpg

3.25    P31S6301439.jpg

3.26    P32S6301440.jpg

3.27    P33S6301441.jpg

3.28    P34 –  Dang Wangi Report D29694/2009

3.29    P35Laporan Analisa

3.30    P36Copy SP2

3.31    P37- Borang Senarai Geledah

4.         Ekshibit-ekshibit mengikut Rekod Rayuan bertarikh 13hb. Jun 2011 adalah seperti berikut:-

4.1       P-1 – Borang Serah Menyerah (Borang D6)

4.2       P2(a), (b), (c), (d) – (n) – 7 DVC, 3 VCD, 2 Cd, 1 thumb drive dan hard disc

4.3       P3(x1-x13) – 13 keping DVD

4.4       P4-Aku Mencintai Wahai Isteriku

4.5       P5-Kes Zina

4.6       P6- Puisi Untuk isteri Tersayang

4.7       P7-Quotation Total RM1,320,000.00

4.8       P-8-Quotation RM950,000.00

4.9       P-9-Quotation 3(i) RM1,450,000.00

4.10    P-10-Quotation 3 RM950,000.00

4.11    P11 – Quotation Baru RM950,000.00

4.12    P12 – Surat Mahkamah Tinggi (6.11.2004)

4.13    P13 – Surat Lawyer 1 (10.6.2003)

4.14    P14 – Surat Lawyer 3 (19.6.2003)

4.15    P15 – Surat Lawyers (19.6.2003)

4.16    P16 – Surat lawyer 7 (tidak disertakan tiada

dalam simpanan Mahkamah)

4.17    P17 – Surat Lawyer 7A2(tidak disertakan tiada

dalam simpanan Mahkamah)

4.18    P18 – Surat Lawyer 8(tidak disertakan tiada

dalam simpanan Mahkamah)

4.19    P18A-Surat Lawyer 8A(tidak disertakan tiada

dalam simpanan Mahkamah)

 

4.20    P19 – yearfocal

4.21    P20 – S6301428.jpg

4.22    P21 – S6301429.jpg

4.23    P22 – S6301430.jpg

4.24    P23 – S6301431.jpg

4.25    P24 – S6301432.jpg

4.26    P25 – S6301433.jpg

4.27    P26 – S6301434.jpg

4.28    P27 – S6301435.jpg

4.29    P28 - S6301436.jpg

4.30    P29 – S6301437.jpg

4.31    P30 – S6301438.jpg

4.32    P31 – S6301439.jpg

4.33    P32 – S6301440.jpg

4.34    P33 – S6301441.jpg

4.35    P34 – Laporan Polis Dang Wangi /029694/09

4.36    P35 – Laporan Analisa (Hard Disk Hitachi Desk Star)

4.37    P36 – Salinan Fotostat http://www.all4sure.com RM950,000.00

4.38    P37 – Borang Senarai Geledah

4.39    IDD1-Laporan Analisa

5.         Pada 14.9.2010 Perayu telah memfailkan permohonan agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar kes Tangkap Tersebut dengan disokong oleh  Afidavit Sokongan Perayu yang diikrarkan pada 14.9.2010 (kemudian daripada ini dirujuk sebagai “Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut”).

6.         Pada 21.9.2010 Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur telah menolak permohonan Perayu agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar kes Tangkap Tersebut.

7.         Pihak Perayu telah memfailkan rayuan terhadap keputusan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur tersebut.

8.         Pada 18.1.2011 setelah lima hari pendengaran rayuan ditetapkan, Yang Arif Hakim, Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 1 Kuala Lumpur telah menolak rayuan Perayu.

9.         Pihak Perayu telah memohon untuk memanggil 3 orang saksi pada peringkat kes pendakwaan untuk membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah tetapi telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah sebanyak 2 kali dan hanya Perayu memberi keterangan secara bersumpah.

10.       Pihak Perayu juga telah turut mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen berikut untuk membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan iaitu:

10.1    Salinan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report No.5070/09

10.2    Salinan Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan, Kes Mal No. 07004-014.199/03, Mahkamah Rendah Syariah Balik Pulau, Pulau Pinang

10.3    Salinan Sijil Kelahiran Abu Muhammad Abdullah No. AN 95545

10.4    Salinan Laporan Polis Bayan Lepas Report: 3010/03

10.5    Salinan Wakalah Peguam Syarie bertarikh 19.5.03

10.6    Penyata Tuntutan Kes Mal No. 07004-055-0036/04

10.7    Surat daripada Mahkamah Rendah Syariah Balik Pulau bertarikh 11.1.2005 beserta Nota Prosiding bertarikh 8.3.2004

10.8    Perintah Perceraian bertarikh 9.3.2004

10.9    Surat Perakuan Perceraian bertarikh 23.9.2004

10.10  Surat Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Negeri Pulau Pinang bertarikh 16.4.2004

10.11  Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Pulau Pinang bertarikh 31.3.2004

10.12  ‘Certificate of Incorporation of Code Genius Limited’ bertarikh 7.12.2001

10.13  Laporan Analisa bertarikh 27.7.2009 ditanda sebagai “ID-D1”; dan

10.14  Salinan karbon Senarai Geledah (tiada catatan masa) bertarikh 13.7.2009

11.       Salinan dokumen-dokumen dikemukakan tanpa memprejudiskan hak Perayu yang telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11” hingga “P-19” yang telah dibuat semasa kes pendakwaan.

12.       Pada 13.12.2010 apabila Perayu membuat permohonan agar kes ditangguhkan dengan mengemukakan otoriti bahawa rayuan terhadap keputusan Majistret menolak permohonan Perayu agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 menark diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap Tersebut perlu didengar terlebih dahulu, permohonan telah ditolak tanpa mengambilkira kes yang telah diputuskan dan dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Majistret yang mengikat Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

13.       Pihak Perayu telah mengemukakan kes Mahkamah Rayuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) kes Rowstead Systems Sdn Bhd v. Bumicrystal Technology (M) Sdn Bhd [2005] 2 CLJ 471 (di mukasurat 471 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa penangguhan prosiding perlu dibenarkan apabila terdapat rayuan berkenaan keputusan Hakim yang menolak permohonan daripada menarik diri daripada mendengar kes tersebut.

Di muka surat 471, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“As mentioned above, this case comes under the category of non-automatic disqualification. Hence the need to prove whether the element of bias exists. It has to be objectively decided, based on all the facts and circumstances of the case. But more important question to be asked is whether it is proper for such decision to be made by presiding judge against whom bias has been alleged? In other words, when a party alleges that a presiding judge is biased, and if the presiding judge himself decides he is not, would such decision not infringe the rule of natural justice in that “one should not be a judge in one’s own cause”. This, we think, is the crux of the instant case, even more so when the learned JC would have to decide the degree of bias that would be sufficient to affect his impartiality. In our judgment, this situation would come within the meaning of special circumstances.

 

We have taken into consideration the fact that in the event that a stay a proceedings was not granted and the learned JC be allowed to proceed with the hearing of this case, it would result in a waste of time and effort by all persons involved since if the Court of Appeal allows the appeal the whole proceedings conducted by the learned JC would have to be completely expunged. In the circumstances it would be more expedient to allow a stay of the proceedings until the hearing of the appeal has been completed.”

14.       Pada 13.12.2010 Perayu/Tertuduh di dalam akuan bersumpah telah memberi keterangan-keterangan seperti berikut:

14.1    Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Tertuduh berada di Johor Bahru, Johor.

14.2    Tertuduh tidak menandatangani Senarai Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009. Salinan Senarai Geledah tersebut tiada catatan masa.

14.3    Pada 4.11.2009 Tertuduh telah dipanggil oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7) untuk hadir memberi keterangan di Balai Polis Ampang, Selangor.

14.4    Tiada ekshibit ditunjukkan oleh SP7. Tertuduh dipaksa menandatangani kertas kosong.

14.5    Hard disk (“P-2”) bukan kepunyaan Tertuduh. Tertuduh tidak pernah membeli cakera keras (“hard disk”) di Malaysia.

14.6    Tertuduh tidak tahu apa yang dirampas oleh SP7 pada 13.7.2009.

14.7    Tertuduh mempertikaikan analisa dan Laporan Analisa yang disediakan oleh Saksi Pendakwaan Pertama (SP1) kerana analisa tidak betul dan tidak mengikut piawaian antarabangsa yang diiktiraf oleh mahkamah-mahkamah lain di dunia. SP1 juga menyatakan beliau tidak buat analisis. Tiada imej forensik (‘forensic image’) dibuat oleh SP1. Integriti fail yang diekstrak oleh SP1 amat diragui. ‘Timestamp’ yang penting untuk pengesahan tarikh kewujudan fail tidak mengikut hukum alam. Masa tidak boleh berpatah balik. (‘Theory Relativity’)

14.8    Tertuduh tidak dipanggil untuk melihat kandungan P2.

14.9    DVD (ekshibit “P3a-P3m”) telah dibawa oleh Tertuduh ke Balai Polis Kepong dan seorang anggota polis bernama Kopral Azmi  telah mengira klip video yang berada di dalam ekshibit ” P3a-P3m” hanya berjumlah 82 klip video sahaja.

14.10  Cara penyimpanan ekshbit “P-2” tidak mengikut prosedur untuk (dengan izin) ‘electronic evidence’. Tiada (dengan izin) ‘casing’ disediakan oleh SP1.

14.11  Perkara yang menjadi perbincangan di antara Tertuduh dan SP2 mengenai ‘property’ berbeza dengan ekshibit “P-9”

14.12  Tertuduh hanya pernah bertemu dengan SP3 pada tahun 2007.

14.13  Tertuduh turut mempertikaikan setiap salinan dokumen cetakan komputer yang dikemukakan iaitu ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11” hingga “P-19” (ditender di Mahkamah dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’)   dengan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan di perenggan 6.2 hingga 6.11 Hujahan Bertulis Pihak Pembelaan.

14.14  Tiada gambar tempat kejadian dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah.

14.15  Laporan Forensik yang diterima hanya bertarikh 27.7.2009 dan bukan seperti Ekshibit “P-35” bertarikh 28.7.2009.

14.16 Pengadu asal bagi salinan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report No. 5070/09 dikenali oleh Saksi Pendakwaan ke-enam (SP6) dan laporan polis dibuat untuk menganiaya SP6.

15.       Semasa pemeriksaan balas Perayu telah menafikan kesemua isu yang telah dibangkitkan oleh Pendakwaraya. Semasa pemeriksaan semula Perayu telah mengulangi fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan semasa pemeriksaan utama.

16.       Pada 24.12.2010 apabila kes ditetapkan untuk sambung bicara bagi kes Pembelaan dan sepina kepada saksi turut dicatitkan tarikh yang sama, waran tangkap dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah kerana dikatakan tarikh sambung bicara sebenarnya pada 23.12.2010.

17.       Pada 6.1.2011 tarikh yang ditetapkan untuk Sebutan waran tangkap, waran tangkap telah dibatalkan dan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menolak permohonan pihak Perayu untuk memanggil 2 orang saksi pembelaan dan menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 18.1.2011.

18.       Pada 17.1.2011 Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 1 telah menolak rayuan Perayu dan kes ditetapkan untuk sebutan di hadapan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 untuk Perayu melantik peguambela dan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 7.2.2011.

19.       Pihak Perayu menyediakan hujahan bertulis ini tanpa memprejudiskan hak pihak Perayu untuk membangkitkan isu bahawa tiada Nota-nota Keterangan untuk prosiding pada 19.10.2010, 13.12.2010, 23.12.2010, 6.1.2011 dan 18.1.2011 dibekalkan oleh Mahkamah di akhir kes pembelaan dan ini jelas bertentangan dengan peruntukan Seksyen 265, 266, 267,268 dan 433 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah (Akta 593).

20.       Walaubagaimanapun apabila pihak Perayu menerima Alasan Penghakiman dan Rekod Rayuan pada 5.5.2011 pihak Perayu mendapati Nota-nota Keterangan untuk prosiding pada  19.10.2010, 13.12.2010 dan 6.1.2011 telah dibekalkan di peringkat rayuan ini dan ini jelas tidak mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 265, 266, 267,268 dan 433 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah (Akta 593).

 

HUJAHAN PIHAK PERAYU

21.       Seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

Prosecution

“43.     Tiada pendakwaan berkenaan dengan apa-apa kesalahan d bawah Akta ini atau mana-mana peraturan yang dibuat di bawah Akta ini boleh dimulakan kecuali oleh atau dengan keizinan bertulis Pendakwa Raya.”

 

22.       Sepanjang prosiding perbicaraan di hadapan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur, pihak pendakwaan tidak mengemukakan izin pendakwaan secara bertulis dan ini adalah bercanggah dengan peruntukkan Seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002. Ini dibuktikan dengan senarai ekshibit Jilid 2 Rekod Rayuan-izin pendakwaan tidak dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah dan ditanda sebagai ekshibit.

23.       Walaubagaimanapun setelah menerima Rekod Rayuan pada 5.5.2011, pihak Perayu mendapati bahawa salinan izin pendakwaan telah dimasukkan ke dalam Lampiran Dokumen (mukasurat 115 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1) dan ini merupakan kali pertama pihak Perayu melihat salinan izin pendakwaan tersebut.

24.       Terdapat kecacatan material pada izin pendakwaan tersebut di mana izin pendakwaan diberi oleh seorang timbalan pendakwaraya yang bernama Mazelan Jamaludin tetapi ditandatangani oleh seorang timbalan pendakwaraya bernama Nor Aizam.

25.       Adalah menjadi hujahan Perayu bahawa izin pendakwaan mengikut peruntukkan Seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 adalah mandatori dan ketinggalan untuk mengemukakannya menjadikan prosiding perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut satu (dengan izin) ‘nullity’.

26.       Pihak Perayu merujuk kepada kes Abdul Hamid v PP [1956] MLJ 231 (di mukasurat 3 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) Smith J membuat pemerhatian seperti berikut:

“There is an essential difference to my mind between a sanction and a consent. A prosecution can be sanctioned without any deep consideration of the particular case : full consideration is required for consent since “consent” is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side (Stround 3rd Ediiton vol 1 page 582). The sanction was therefore no evidence of consent.”

 

27.      Pihak Perayu turut bersandarkan kepada kes Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok [1979] 1 MLJ 45 (di mukasurat 2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa prosiding adalah terbatal apabila tiada kebenaran untuk pertuduhan yang dipinda :

“The question is whether the court has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial on the amended charge without a fresh consent by the Public Prosecutor. As the matter is res integra I proceeded with the trial to save the public expense, the witnesses and jury being present in court. It will be observed that although the original and amended charges are two distinct offences, they are both created by the same section of the law viz. section 39B(1) and both carry the same penalty. Both require the consent of the Public Prosecutor under section 39B(3). The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor argued that the amendment was technical and as the Public Prosecutor had given his consent on the original charge he was at liberty to amend the charges in the manner he did. I do not think so. It was held in Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 231 that a consent to prosecute “is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side”. The Public Prosecutor has clearly exercised his mind in respect of the original charge when he gave his consent to prosecute some four months after the alleged offence. It was incumbent on him however to exercise the same degree of deliberation in respect of the amended charge. He has not done so. In Lim Seo v Regina [1962] MLJ 304 counsel was given sanction to prosecute undersection 379 of the Penal Code but he proceeded under section 381 of the Penal Code instead. It was held that counsel cannot depart from the specific authorisation of the Public Prosecutor. It seems to me that the same principles apply here. The facts of the case were fully before the Public Prosecutor at the time of giving his consent and he could have elected to proceed on the amended charge then. He did not do so. It would appear therefore that the Public Prosecutor has not given his consent to prosecute under the amended charge. That being so, the trial is a nullity on the authority of Lyn Hong Yap v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 226.”

28.       Di dalam kes ini pihak Pendakwaan perlu membuktikan setiap intipati (‘ingredients’) pertuduhan berkaitan seksyen 5(1) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang dikenakan terhadap Perayu/Tertuduh iaitu;

(1)       bahawa Perayu/Tertuduh mempunyai milikan ekslusif pada setiap masa yang material iaitu pada 13-7-2009 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat ********************************, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK;

dan

(2)       kandungan yang telah disahkah kesahihan dan integriti kandungannya melalui analisa forensik yang mengikut piawian forensik antarabangsa dan ianya mengandungi 106 klip video tersebut adalah lucah.

29.       Pihak Perayu merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 bahawa (di mukasurat 504 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu):

“I am of the view that the submission of the learned DPP in respect of the 1st ground comprising the 1st to the 3rd points is without merit. The charge preferred against the accused under s. 5(1) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 (“the Act”) requires proof of two essential ingredients:

 

(a) the accused was in exclusive possession at the material time, ie, 3p.m. on 18 November 2002 of the 18 obscene film’s in the form of VCD; and

 

(b) that the 18 film’s are of obscene material.

30.       Pihak Perayu juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 bahawa (di mukasurat 324 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu):

“[5] Bagi membuktikan satu kes prima facie dibawah s. 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah membuktikan bahawa:

 

(a) Responden mempunyai milikan terhadap VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas;

 

(b) tiada sebarang keraguan tentang identiti barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah; dan

 

(c) kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”).

31.       Pihak Perayu juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon [2010] 5 CLJ 77 bahawa (di mukasurat 79 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu):

“The Charge

 

[8] The charge preferred against the respondent under s. 5(1) of the 2002 Act requires proof of two main ingredients ie, that:

 

(i)   the respondent at the material time was in possession of the 65 obscene films in the form of DVD; and

 

(ii) that the 65 films (DVDs) are obscene.

Isu Milikan Eksklusif Pada Setiap Masa Yang Material

32.       Pihak Perayu merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 bahawa (di mukasurat 504 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu):

“I am of the view that the submission of the learned DPP in respect of the 1st ground comprising the 1st to the 3rd points is without merit. The charge preferred against the accused under s. 5(1) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 (“the Act”) requires proof of two essential ingredients:

 

(a) the accused was in exclusive possession at the material time, ie, 3p.m. on 18 November 2002 of the 18 obscene film’s in the form of VCD; and

 

(b) that the 18 film’s are of obscene material.

Pihak Perayu juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 bahawa (di mukasurat 324 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu):

“[5] Bagi membuktikan satu kes prima facie dibawah s. 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah membuktikan bahawa:

 

(a) Responden mempunyai milikan terhadap VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas;

 

(b) tiada sebarang keraguan tentang identiti barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah; dan

 

(c) kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”).

Pihak Perayu juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon [2010] 5 CLJ 77 bahawa (di mukasurat 79 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu):

“The Charge

 

[8] The charge preferred against the respondent under s. 5(1) of the 2002 Act requires proof of two main ingredients ie, that:

 

(i)   the respondent at the material time was in possession of the 65 obscene films in the form of DVD; and

 

(ii) that the 65 films (DVDs) are obscene.

33.       Apa yang boleh difahamkan daripada kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, hanya si tertuduh berada di gerai haram tersebut sepanjang masa dan si tertuduh kelihatan melayan pelanggan dan ketika serbuan dibuat sewaktu si tertuduh berada di gerai haram tersebut, terdapat VCD dan DVD yang dikatakan lucah di gerai haram tersebut. Di peringkat pendakwaan ini, untuk membuktikan intipati ini, pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan dan pemunyaan sebenar premis tersebut dan DVD tersebut, cukup sekadar membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif. Pemilikan eksklusif tidak sama dengan pemilikan sebenar atau pemilikan fizikal.

34.       Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material telah dibuktikan dengan cara berikut, iaitu:

“[9] Having read the appeal record and the written submission of the appellant and having heard both parties, I am in agreement with the learned deputy public prosecutor that the element of possession has been proved through the prosecution witnesses SP1, 2 and 3 who were members of the raiding party.

 

[10] The 65 DVDs alleged to be obscene were found under the counter of the premises and at the material time of the raid, the respondent was alone in the premises manning the counter. He attempted to flee when SP1 identified himself as a police officer.

 

[11] The facts of this case are similar to Mohamed Ibrahim v. PP [1962] 1 LNS 100 HC wherein the appellant was found to be in possession of 65 copies of the book “Tropic of Cancer”. The impugned books were found under the counter of his shop. The appellant in Mohamed Ibrahim (supra) was employed to manage the sale of books and though an attempt was made to absolve himself of knowledge as he could not read English, nevertheless the court held that the inference was irresistible that the 65 copies found in the shop for the purpose of being sold and that the appellant was the person in charge of selling of the books in the shop was in possession of them and in possession of them for purposes of sale. He also failed in his argument that knowledge was negated by his ignorance of the English language as the court held that he could have obtained the services of an English – speaking clerk in ordering the books.

 

[12] In this case, there was the uncontroverted evidence of SP1 and SP3 that the 65 DVDs were found under the counter and the respondent was found at the time of raid, behind this counter. Knowledge can also be inferred from the fact that he attempted flight when SP1 identified himself as a public officer. Therefore, viewed in its totality the prosecution had proved the element of possession.

 

[13] There is no cause for the adverse inference to be invoked as it is trite that the calling of witnesses is at the discretion of the prosecution and the burden is on the prosecution throughout to prove its case. I find no gap here, neither can it be said that there was any suppression of evidence.

 

[14] Therefore the learned magistrate had erred in holding that the element of possession was not proved and in invoking the adverse presumption.”

35.       Apa yang boleh difahamkan dari kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, ketika serbuan dibuat, si tertuduh berada keseorangan dan sedang menjaga kaunter di dalam premis yang diserbu tersebut, dan DVD yang dikatakan lucah tersebut dijumpai di bawah kaunter tersebut. Di peringkat pendakwaan ini, untuk membuktikan intipati ini, pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan dan pemunyaan sebenar premis tersebut dan DVD tersebut, cukup sekadar membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif. Pemilikan eksklusif tidak sama dengan pemilikan sebenar atau pemilikan fizikal.

 

36.       Pihak Perayu telah Berjaya mewujudkan satu keraguan yang munasabah daripada keterangan saksi-saksi pihak pendakwaan sendiri iaitu Saksi Pendakwaan Kelima dan Saksi Pendakwaan Ketujuh (Pegawai Penyiasat) kerana mengikut kedua-dua saksi, Perayu/Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009.

Isu Perayu Tiada di tempat Kejadian dan Pembuktian Milikan melalui Saksi Pakar SP1

37.       SP1 memberi keterangan semasa pemeriksaan utama seperti berikut:

“Selain itu, untuk dapatkan maklumat pengadu bersabit report itu dan barang kes yang saya terima iaitu unit HD R32559SK Hitachi” (mukasurat 2 Nota Keterangan).

Selain daripada itu SP1 turut memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

Hard disc dekstar dibaca dengan fastblock. Saya akan buka dari tarikh semakan. Ada senarai video, R3255559SK” (mukasurat 7 Nota Keterangan).

38.       Pihak Perayu telah membangkitkan bantahan mengenai cara pembuktian milikan yang dilakukan oleh SP1 :

OKT   : Saya bantah untuk tunjuk gambar. Ia tidak berkaitan dengan charge. Charge untuk bahan lucah. Possession cannot be proved by him. Dia esktrak saja.”

(mukasurat 15 Nota Keterangan).

 

39.       Walaubagaimanapun Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menolak bantahan pihak Perayu dan membenarkan pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan ekshibit “P-2” berdasarkan Nota Keterangan (mukasurat 19 Nota Keterangan):

Mahkamah   : Ia untuk pembuktian milikan hard disk ini samada ia milik kamu atau tidak.

            DPP                : It belongs to the investigation

            Mahkamah    : Benarkan

40.       Pihak Perayu ingin menekankan di sini walaupun SP4 dipanggil sebagai saksi pendakwaan tetapi tiada satu pun keterangan beliau turut diambilkira oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur bagi membuktikan kes pendakwaan melampaui keraguan yang munasabah.

41.       SP4 telah memberi keterangan-keterangan seperti berikut semasa pemeriksaan utama dan pemeriksaan balas:

Pohon untuk SP1 membuka hard disk P2

-       Surat Mahkamah Tinggi (P12) – tuntutan hak dana Abu Mohd Abdullah Mohd Izaham

-       SP4 tidak pernah terima.

-       Surat lawyer 3 (P13) – permohonan hak jaga anak bertarikh 3 Jun-

 

SP4 tidak pernah terima. Dalam kes hak penjagaan anak, En. Izaham adalah Plaintiff bukan Defendan. Dia yang memohon pada masa itu untuk dapatkan hak penjagaan anak. Tapi dalam surat ini nyatakan “Saya adalah Defendan”.

 

Saya pernah bersua dengan OKT. Beliau ada kes di Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Pulau Pinang pada tahun 2004 yang selesai pada 2007. Beliau memohon untuk hak penjagaan anak-anak pada masa itu.”

 

(mukasurat 47 Nota Keterangan)

 

“C        : Pernah jumpa ke?

J          : Sebelum ini tak pernah jumpa di mana-mana.

C         : Mula bertugas?

J          :Mula bertugas 1 Julai 2009.

C         :Sebelum ini?

J          :Sebelum ini tahun 2004 saya berada di Putrajaya.”

 

(mukasurat 49 Nota Keterangan)

 

C         : Kalau peguam mewakili anakguam, surat menyurat dibuat sendiri atau peguam?

J          : Kalau diwakili peguam, surat menyurat dibuat oleh peguam.

C         : Sebelum ada peguam adakah saya buat apa-apa surat?

J          : Tak pernah Nampak dalam fail mahkamah setelah disemak dalam fail.”

 

(mukasurat 50 Nota Keterangan)

 

42.       Pihak Perayu telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap ekshibit-ekshibit “P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14”, “P-15”, “P-16” ,“P-17” dan “P-18”tetapi ditolak oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2:

 

“OKT   : Saya bantah. Dokumen tidak wujud.

Mahkamah    : Ia sudah dikemukan tarikh lepas dan diterima sebagai ekshibit.

DPP                : We are not tendering through this witness, we are tendering whatever inside the hard disk by the forensic who found the evidence.”

 

(mukasurat 48 Nota Keterangan)

43.       Walaupun pihak Perayu telah diberi peluang untuk memeriksa balas untuk isu milikan tetapi prosedur yang betul telah tidak diterangkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 berdasarkan Nota Keterangan (mukasurat 29 Nota Keterangan):

Mahkamah   : Adakah anda ingin cross untuk possession.

            C(OKT)          : Boleh.

            M                     : Kalau hendak Tanya teruskan. Tidak ada time limit. Do you want to cross on possession?”

44.       Pihak Perayu telah membangkitkan bantahan dari awal bahawa Perayu tiada di tempat kejadian tetapi Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 menyatakan bantahan perlu dibuat kemudian selepas SP5 memberi keterangan dan mengikut keterangan SP5 hanya seorang wanita dan dua kanak-kanak dilihat beliau semasa serbuan :

“OKT              : Saya bantah sebab saya tiada di situ masa itu.

Mahkamah    : Bantah kemudian. Ini dia bagi tahu alamat tempat raid.”

(Tiada bukti waran geledah dan gambar tempat kejadian)

 

(mukasurat 52 Nota Keterangan)

DPP    : It is nothing to forensic

OKT    : Bantah dokumen ini kerana dokumen ini tidak dibuat mengikut analisis yang betul oleh pakar forensic semasa saksi SP1. Dimana masa dibuka saya tidak berada di tempat dibuka dan saya tidak mengesahkan kandungannya.

Mahkamah    : Bantahan direkod.

(mukasurat 69-70 Nota Keterangan)

“Saya lihat ada 2 orang kanak-kanak. Dan saya lihat sebelah kiri ada 2 bilik tidur dan satu bilik bacaan. Pemeriksaan dilakukan dalam bilik bacaan tersebut, saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah merampas satu unit hard disc di rak buku ititu Hitachi Desktar. No. Siri R32559XK”

 

Satu salinan diberi kepada penama.

 

(mukasurat 53 Nota Keterangan)

C         : Pada 13/7/2009 tarikh masuk itu pukul berapa?

J          : Jam 6.30 petang.

C         : Masa itu Nampak tak saya di kawasan itu?

J          : Tak Nampak

 

(mukasurat 54 Nota Keterangan)

45.       Keterangan dari SP6 mengesahkan bahawa tiada pengecaman tempat kejadian dibuat dan tiada gambar ditunjukkan kepada SP6 sebagai bukti milikan cakera keras (“hard disk”) di dalam rumah atau tempat kejadian :

 “Pada 13/7/2009, ada polis datang ke rumah. Saya tak ingat siapa. Ada polis lelaki dan perempuan membuat pemeriksaan dan seingat saya polis ambil CD dan satu thumbdrive.”

(mukasurat 59 Nota Keterangan)

“(Saksi dirujuk dengan hard disk P2a) dan diminta untuk membandingkan nama-nama senarai yang dirampas dalam Borang Geledah – ia tidak sama dengan nombor siri pada Borang Geledah. Saya tak tahu.”

DPP    : Saya hanya hendak saksi bacakan sahaja nombor siri pada hard disk itu.

46.       SP5 iaitu pegawai yang terlibat semasa geledah dan SP7 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat sendiri mengesahkan Perayu/Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Oleh yang demikian milikan secara fizikal tidak dibuktikan langsung (rakaman video prosiding perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).

47.       Tambahan lagi sekiranya Mahkamah yang Mulia ini meneliti Nota-nota Keterangan dan Alasan Penghakiman  Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 bertarikh 2.3.2011, nombor siri bagi cakera keras (‘hard disk’) yang dirujuk adalah berlainan dan berbeza-beza :

 

Keterangan SP1:

 

“Selain itu, untuk dapatkan maklumat pengadu bersabit report itu dan barang kes yang saya terima iaitu unit HD R32559SK Hitachi” (mukasurat 2 Nota Keterangan).

Hard disc dekstar dibaca dengan fastblock. Saya akan buka dari tarikh semakan. Ada senarai video, R3255559SK” (mukasurat 7 Nota Keterangan).

Selepas analisa dan jumpa video lucah P2A, sebagai juru analisa saya buat report polis tentang milikan videoklip lucah dalam Hitachi Desktar A1 (P2A). Saya masih boleh cam report saya. [Saksi dirujuk report]Ia adalah report saya.”

            Saksi dirujuk satu report dan diakui.

Keterangan SP6:

Saya dah kata saya tak setuju. Saya tidak tahu hal-hal computer ini.

Mahkamah    :           Bacakan No. siri pada hard disk itu untuk tujuan perbandingan dengan yang ada dalam senarai geledah.

No. Siri adalah SNR 32559XK”

(Mukasurat 59-60 Nota Keterangan)

 

Keterangan SP7 :

 

Dan telah merampas satu hard disk jenama Destar no. siri RX 3559 XK”

 

(Mukasurat 70 Nota Keterangan)

48.       Pohon Mahkamah yang Mulia ini merujuk mukasurat 295 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2 no siri di dalam report tersebut S/N: R32559XK bukan seperti keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP1 pada mukasurat 7 Nota keterangan. Ini menunjukkan bahawa terdapat keraguan yang munasabah terhadap ekshibit “P-2”.

49.       Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur turut memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa Perayu/Tertuduh adalah pemilik ekshibit “P-2” memandangkan terdapat satu klip video dalam ekshibit “P-2” iaitu dollahbest.

50.       Sebenarnya klip video dollahbest yang dimaksudkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 di dalam alasan penghakimannya,  tidak pernah wujud sama sekali kerana tiada di dalam senarai klip video yang ditayangkan di Mahkamah berdasarkan Nota Keterangan prosiding perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut pada 7.6.2010, 8.6.2010 dan 29.7.2010.

51.       Adalah dihujahkan juga bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan premis tempat kejadian kerana tiada gambar-gambar tempat kejadian dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan. Di samping itu, tiada rajah kasar disediakan oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7). Walaupun pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil SP3 untuk memberi keterangan tetapi gagal memberi lokasi tempat kejadian yang tepat dan tempat kejadian tidak dikenalpasti (mukasurat 40 Nota Keterangan). Selain itu premis tempat kejadian adalah rumah sewa yang turut berada di dalam kawalan SP3 yang sudah tentu mempunyai akses kepada premis tersebut. Oleh yang demikian bukan Perayu/Tertuduh sahaja ada akses kepada premis tersebut (dinafikan oleh Perayu/Tertuduh). Oleh yang demikian tempat kejadian tidak dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur tidak menganalisa secara mendalam keterangan SP3 yang tidak membuktikan tempat kejadian dan hanya menerima keterangan SP3 kerana SP3 mengenali Perayu/Tertuduh.

52.       SP3 di dalam pemeriksaan balas hanya memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

“C        :           How many unit?

J          :           I’m not sure.”

53.       SP7 mengesahkan tiada gambar tempat kejadian diambil :

“Q        :13.07.2009. Ada bawa jurukamera?

A         :Tidak ada”

(mukasurat 76 Nota Keterangan)

54.       Sekali lagi pihak Perayu merujuk kepada kes Pendakwa Raya v. Goh Hoe Cheong [2006] MLJU 0468 (di mukasurat 0471 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana K N Segara J memutuskan bahawa apabila tiada gambar dan pelan kasar tempat tertuduh ditahan di ‘baggage assembly area” maka terdapat keraguan di dalam kes pendakwaan.

55.       Di dalam kes kita pada hari ini, jika dilihat pada Borang Senarai Geledah  yang mesti diisi di tempat dan masa pemeriksaan, ianya merujuk kepada No. Repot 5070/09 Balai Jalan Patani, tempat/bangunan yang diperiksa ialah ******** ********* ********** ***********  Kuala Lumpur (Premis tersebut), nama penghuni atau sesiapa yang hadir iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus (Penghuni tersebut), nama pegawai polis yang hadir semasa pemeriksaan iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal, Insp Siti Mazira bt Zakaria dan D/Kpl Nora (Pegawai Polis tersebut), pada tarikh 13-7-2009 dan masa yang tidak disebut (Tarikh dan Masa tersebut), barang yang dijumpai adalah seperti yang tertera di dalam Borang Senarai Geledah tersebut. Ini adalah terkandung di dalam Borang Geledah yang diberikan kepada penama pada 13.7.2009. Walaubagaimanapun Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010 adalah berbeza kerana ada masa dicatatkan. Pihak Perayu telah membangkitkan bantahan berkenaan perbezaan di antara Borang Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009 dan Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010.

56.       Di antara ketiga-tiga Pegawai Polis tersebut yang hadir untuk pemeriksaan di Bangunan tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut, Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah telah dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai SP5 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai penggeledahan tersebut.

57.       SP5 ketika pemeriksaan utama telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 46 – 47 Nota Keterangan) bahawa:

“Pada 13-7-2009, saya terima arahan daripada ketua bahagian saya iaitu ASP Kamarudin untuk beri bantuan kepada pegawai penyiasat dari Pulau Pinang iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira untuk membuat rampasan dan pemeriksaan. Saya dan Insp. Mazira telah sampai di alamat *************************************, Kuala Lumpur. Saya dan Insp. Mazira telah sampai di alamat tersebut dan Insp. Mazira telah ketuk pintu rumah beberapa kali dan keluar seorang wanita. Insp. Mazira telah perkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai kanan polis dengan menunjukkan kad kuasa kepada wanita tersebut. Wanita tersebut dikenali sebagai Aini Suhailah binti Yunus. Kemudian kami masuk ke dalam rumah untuk buat pemeriksaan setelah menerangkan tujuan kehadiran kami bersama saya Insp. Siti Mazira dan seorang anggota perempuan iaitu Kopral Nora. Saya lihat ada 2 orang kanak-kanak. Dan saya lihat sebelah kiri ada 2 bilik satu bilik tidur dan satu bilik bacaan. Pemeriksaan dilakukan dalam bilik bacaan tersebut, saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah merampas satu unit hard disc di rak buku iaitu Hitachi Deskstar. No. Siri R32559XK, satu unit thumbdrive Data Traveller, juga di rak buku, 2 unit CD, 3 unit VCD dan 7 unit DVD dalam bilik tersebut. Dalam bilik tersebut juga saya lihat satu CPU dan monitor yang mana CPU tersebut dalam keadaan tidak bertutup dengan casing dan tiada sambungan wayar ke monitor atau power. Saya anggap ia tidak berfungsi. Lepas membuat pemeriksaan saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah buat rampasan ke atas barang-barang yang saya sebut tadi dan telah disenaraikan dalam senarai bongkah. Senarai bongkah dibuat oleh pegawai penyiasat dan lihat ia ditandatangani pemilik rumah iaitu Aini Suhailah. Satu salinan diberi kepada penama. Kemudian rampasan telah diambil oleh pegawai penyiasat. Saya nampak barang itu dirampas oleh Insp. Mazira sebab saya ada di belakang beliau. Suasana cerah kerana rampasan dibuat waktu siang. Barang kes sentiasa dalam kawalan Insp. Siti Mazira. Saya masih boleh camkan hard disk P2a dan P2b itu berdasarkan nombor siri. (Saksi dirujuk hard disc dan thumbdrive P2a dan P2b – dicamkan SP5). Hanya satu jenis hard disc sahaja yang ditemui. Pemeriksaan dilakukan hanya dalam bilik bacaan sahaja dan tiada apa-apa yang berlaku.”

58.       SP5 ketika pemeriksaan balas telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 47 – 49 Nota Keterangan) bahawa, antaranya:

“Saya diminta bantuan daripada Insp. Mazira yang menyiasat bersabit laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/09.”

 

“Saya hanya dimaklumkan untuk bantuan tentang bersabit kes itu.”

 

“Saya diminta untuk beri bantuan pemeriksaan dan rampasan oleh Insp. Kamarudin kepada Insp. Siti Mazira bersabit Patani Report.”

 

“Pada 13-7-2009 masuk jam 6.30 petang.”

 

“Tak nampak si tertuduh masa itu di kawasan itu.”

 

“Semasa masuk buat pemeriksaan Insp. Mazira telah perkenalkan diri dengan tunjukkan kad kuasa polis, waran tiada.”

 

“Masa masuk dalam rumah, nampak satu wanita dan 2 orang kanak-kanak.”

 

“Saya membantu Insp. Mazira untuk membuat pemeriksaan rumah.”

59.       Pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa melalui Borang Senarai Geledah dan keterangan SP5, dapat disimpulkan bahawa Perayu/Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tiada di dalam Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut pada jam 6.30 petang.

60.       Pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa merujuk kepada dokumen di perenggan 6.14 tiada catatan mengenai masa di dalam Borang Senarai Geledah tidak dimasukkan. Ini berlainan dengan Ekshibit “P-37” dan ini menunjukkan bahawa Borang Geledah telah diubahsuai.

61.       Pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa masa di dalam kertas pertuduhan dan di dalam keterangan SP5 tidak sama. Tiada penerangan mengenainya daripada SP5. Begitu juga tiada penerangan mengenainya daripada SP7.

62.       SP6 telah dipanggil untuk pemeriksaan utama hanya disuruh membaca sehelai kertas yang didakwa sebagai borang geledah oleh pihak pendakwaan. Tiada pengecaman yang dibuat dengan SP6 berkenaan ketiga-tiga anggota polis yang datang ke premis tersebut pada 13.7.2009.

63.       Borang Senarai Geledah yang disediakan oleh SP7 telah gagal mematuhi kehendak peruntukan Seksyen 36(1) dan (2) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 kerana tiada senarai lengkap klip video yang dirampas. Seksyen 36(1) dan (2) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

 

36. Notis penyitaan

 

36. (1) Jika apa-apa penyitaan dibuat di bawah Bahagian ini, Pegawai Penguat Kuasa atau pegawai polis yang membuat penyitaan itu hendaklah menyediakan suatu senarai tiap-tiap filem, bahan publisiti filem, buku, dokumen atau benda lain yang disita dan tempat filem, bahan publisiti filem, buku, dokumen atau benda lain itu telah dijumpai dan hendaklah menandatangani senarai itu.

 

(2) Senarai yang disediakan mengikut subseksyen (1) hendaklah diserahkan dengan serta-merta kepada penghuni tempat atau premis di mana filem, bahan publisiti filem, buku, dokumen atau benda lain yang disita itu dijumpai.

64.       Pihak Perayu ingin merujuk kepada kes Kalidasan A/L Manikam lawan Pendakwaraya Rayuan Jenayah No. 41-44A-2009 (Mukasurat 1 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) di mana Yang Arif Hakim Yaacob bin Haji Md. Sam telah memutuskan bahawa timbul keraguan apakah sebenarnya judul-judul filem yang perayu dipertuduhkan sebagai memilikinya apabila identiti VCD dan DVD yang dirampas gagal dibuktikan tanpa keraguan oleh pihak pendakwaan.

65.       SP7 telah dipanggil untuk pemeriksaan utama oleh Timbalan Pendakwaraya menyatakan Perayu/Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian.

66.       Ada anggota polis lain yang memasuki premis tersebut pada masa material tetapi tidak dipanggil kerana berdasarkan keterangan SP5 semasa pemeriksaan utama:

“Kemudian kami masuk ke dalam rumah untuk buat pemeriksaan setelah menerangkan tujuan kehadiran kami bersama saya Insp. Siti Mazira dan seorang anggota perempuan iaitu Koperal Nora.”

(mukasurat 46 Nota Keterangan)

67.       Oleh itu, Pihak Perayu memohon Mahkamah menggunapakai Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 di mana saksi ini sekiranya dipanggil akan memudaratkan kes pendakwaan walaupun beliau perlu dipanggil untuk pengesahan perbezaan Borang Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009 dan Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010.

68.       Bagi membuktikan elemen milikan, pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi-saksi SP1, SP2, SP4 dan SP6.

69.       Di dalam kes ini Perayu/Tertuduh masih lagi membangkitkan bantahan terhadap setiap dokumen lain yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1 dan dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’ (Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21”, “P-22, “ P-23”, “P-24” P-25”, “P-26”, “P-27”, “P-28”, “P-29”, “P-30”, “P-31”, “P-32” dan “P-33” mukasurat 16,17 Nota Keterangan) yang tiada kaitan langsung dengan pertuduhan dan tidak termasuk di dalam lingkungan definisi “filem” sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002.

70.       Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil semula SP1 untuk membuktikan fakta bahawa komputer yang digunakan oleh SP1 untuk mencetak salinan dokumen-dokumen cetakan komputer adalah di dalam kawalan dan jagaan beliau. Walaubagaimanapun, ianya tetap memudaratkan kes pendakwaan kerana semasa pemeriksaan balas SP1 memberi keterangan bahawa tiada buku log (buku daftar akitiviti seliaan peralatan komputer forensik) dan tiada sijil mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 dikemukakan untuk menunjukkan aktiviti-aktiviti yang dilakukan oleh SP1 melalui penggunaan komputer di pejabat beliau. Ini menyebabkan terputusnya rantaian bukti dan rantaian kawalan barang bukti.

Mengikut Buku “Guide To Computer Forensics and Investigations”, Third edition, oleh Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillips, Frank Enfinnger and Christopher Steuart, di mukasurat 276 :

Reporting

 

To complete a forensics disk analysis and examination, you need to create a report. Before Windows-based forensics tools were available, this process required copying data from a suspect drive and extracting the digital evidence manually. The investigation then copied the evidence to a separate program, such as a word processor, to create a report. File data that couldn’t be read in a word processor – datbases, spreadsheets, and graphics, for example-made it difficult to insert nonprintable characters, such as binary data into a report. Typically, these reports weren’t stored electronically because investigators had to collect printouts from several different applications to consolidate everything into one large paper report.

 

Newer Windows-based forensics tools can produce electronic reports in a variety of formats, such as word processing documents, HTML Web pages, or Acrobat PDF files. These are the subfunctions of the reporting functions :

 

  • Log Reports
  • Report generator

 

As part of the validation process, often you need to document what steps you took to acquire data from a suspect drive. Many forensics tools, such as FTK, ILook and X-Ways Forensics, can produce a log report that records activities in a variety of formats. The following tools are some that offer report generators that display bookmarked evidence :

 

  • EnCase
  • FTK
  • ILook
  • X-Ways Forensics
  • ProDiscover

 

The log report can be added to your final report as additional documentation for the steps you took during the examination, which can be useful if repeating the examination is necessary. For a case that requires peer review, log reports confirm what activities were performed and what results were obtained from the original analysis and investigation.”

71.       Pihak Perayu bersandarkan kepada kes Pendakwa Raya v. Goh Hoe Cheong [2006] MLJU 0468 kes Mahkamah Tinggi (di mukasurat 0474 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana K N Segara J membuat keputusan seperti berikut:

There was no witness from MAS and/or the authority managing KLIA called by the prosecution to prove the aspect of physical checking-in of the bags of passengers on flight MH020, particularly, the purported check-in of bags P6 and P23 by the 1st and 2nd accused, as well as the bag of Seok Hann(SP10). Therefore, the computer generated documents, namely, the baggage tags P6A, P23A and the respective baggage claim tags P16A and P31A, cannot be admitted in evidence unless S 90A Evidence Act, 1950 is complied with by the prosecution. No certificate was tendered to the Court signed by a person who either before or after the production of the documents by the computer was responsible for the management of the operation of that computer, or for the conduct of the activities for which that computer was used. In the circumstances I hold that P6A, P23A, P16A and P31A are inadmissible in evidence.”

 

72.       Di dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 6 MLJ 678, kes Mahkamah Tinggi (di mukasurat 694,695 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu), Vincent Ng J telah memutuskan bahawa sijil diperlukan untuk pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer.

73.       Di dalam kes ini pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil SP2 yang mengemukakan satu salinan dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan (Ekshibit “P-9mukasurat 34 dan 35 Nota Keterangan). Pihak Perayu telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap pengemukaan salinan dokumen tersebut kerana tiada kaitan dengan pertuduhan dan mengikut keterangan SP2 semasa pemeriksaan balas, dokumen asal telah dimusnahkan kerana polisi syarikat. Mustahil jika arahan ketua syarikat tersebut untuk melupuskan semua dokumen dan salinan yang berkaitan tetapi masih terdapat satu salinan yang tersimpan yang boleh digunakan untuk perbicaraan ini. Pihak  Timbalan Pendakwaraya hanya bergantung kepada Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 sebagai peruntukkan untuk penerimaan keterangan sekunder sebagai bukti tanpa membuktikan elemen-elemen kritikal yang dengan berkaitan pemusnahan dokumen asal dan tidak memanggil ketua SP2 yang mempunyai kuasa mengeluarkan arahan pemusnahan untuk memusnahkan dokumen asal dan tiada keterangan mengenai kaedah yang digunakan untuk memusnahkan dokumen asal tersebut. Saksi-saksi yang berkaitan dengan proses pemusnahan juga tidak dipanggil beserta dengan mesin yang digunakan untuk memusnahkan dokumen tersebut tidak dibawa ke mahkamah. Di samping itu SP2 tidak mempunyai kepakaran tulisan tangan dan tandatangan yang digazzettekan oleh kerajaan dan sudah pastinya bukan seorang pakar tandatangan untuk mengenalpasti tandatangan yang terdapat di atas salinan dokumen tersebut. Sekiranya perbandingan dibuat dengan dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan di Mahkamah melalui SP1 terdapat perbezaan yang ketara di mana dokumen yang ditender di Mahkamah tiada tandatangan mana-mana pihak dan kandungan juga berbeza. SP2 juga mendakwa salinan yang dikemukakan juga merupakan dokumen asal yang dikemukakan oleh Perayu. (Mohon Mahkamah yang mulia ini melihat rakaman CRT masa SP2 di mana pendakwaraya menyatakan berkenaan Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 dengan jelas tetapi sengaja tidak direkodkan oleh Majistret di dalam Nota keterangan.)

74.       Di dalam kes Kum Wah Sdn Bhd v. RHB Bank Bhd [2009] 9 MLJ 490 kes Mahkamah Tinggi (di mukasurat 498 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu), di mana Azian J memutuskan bahawa keterangan seorang pakar tandatangan yang tidak digazettekan mengikut undang-undang tidak boleh diterima:

“Based on their qualifications and experiences, I am more inclined to accept that PW4 is more qualified to give evidence in respect of whether the signatures on Exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and ‘D6’ are forgery. DW6 may have been the director general of the Malaysian Chemistry Department but he was never gazette as a document examiner in the government service. He said ‘I am not a document examiner. I have never produced a technical report. Yes, a technical report can only be produced by a gazetted document examiner. As such I am of the considered opinion that PW4 is more qualified and experienced to give testimony in respect of signatures on the three documents mentioned.”

   

75.       Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 perlu dibaca bersama dengan Seksyen 45 Akta yang sama untuk keterangan pakar diambil untuk pengesahan tandatangan di atas dokumen tersebut.

76.       Dengan ini adalah dihujahkan bahawa salinan Ekshibit “P-9” yang ditender melalui SP2 tidak boleh diterima masuk sebagai dokumen ekshibit pendakwaan kerana tidak dibawa masuk melalui pembuatnya.

77.       Ini jelas bertentangan dengan Seksyen 90 dibaca bersama Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memperuntukkan bahawa apabila pembuat dokumen tidak dipanggil, satu sijil pengesahan perlu dikeluarkan dan tiada sebarang tindakan diambil oleh pihak pendakwaan untuk mematuhi kehendak-kehendak peruntukan-peruntukan undang-undang di atas.

           

78.       Untuk kes-kes jenayah, undang-undang keterangan terbaik (‘the best evidence rule’) adalah keterangan primer dan tiada Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 digunapakai bagi kes-kes jenayah. Oleh sebab itu Perayu ingin menyokong hujahan dengan prinsip yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes  Wong Choon Mei & Anor V. Dr. Kuldeep Singh & Anor [1985] 2 MLJ 373 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 376 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan sekiranya Seksyen 65 (1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 hendak digunapakai oleh mana-mana pihak, pihak tersebut telah mengambil semua langkah untuk mencari dokumen asal dan sekiranya dokumen asal telah musnah atau hilang, orang yang bertanggungjawab menjaga dokumen asal tersebut perlu mengesahkan fakta mengenai kemusnahan atau kehilangan dokumen asal tersebut. Pohon Mahkamah yang Mulia ini merujuk rakaman video perbicaraan bagi pengesahan hujahan pihak pendakwaan berkenaan Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950.

 

Seah SCJ memutuskan seperti berikut:

“In short, before secondary evidence could be received the condition laid down in section 65(1)(c) viz. the original (the 4 X-rays) has been destroyed or lost, must be satisfactorily proved by admissible evidence, like calling the officer in charge of the X-ray Record Office. If the officer was not available then his absence should be properly accounted for. In my opinion, it is highly undesirable to allow the 1st respondent, who was being sued by the appellant and who might be regarded as an interested party, to give hearsay, evidence that the 4 X-Rays had been lost or misplaced. His testimony might be treated as tainted. A fortitiori, it might even be rejected on the ground of hearsay. This strict rule was reiterated by Lord Tenterden in Vincent v Cole 173 ER 1151:

 

“I have always acted (perhaps more so than other judges) most strictly on the rule; that what is in writing shall only be proved by the writing itself. My experience has taught me the extreme danger of relying on the recollection of witnesses, however, honest, as to the contents of a written instrument; they may be so easily mistaken that I think the purposes of justice require the strict enforcement of the rule”. 

79.       Ekshibit “P-9” yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan melalui SP2 hanya salinan fotostat, bukan cetakan komputer dan SP2 bukan pembuat dokumen tersebut yang begitu diragui kebolehterimaannya sebagai ekshibit. Walaubagaimanapun salinan Ekshibit “P-9” tersebut diterima sebagai eksibit oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

80.       Salinan Ekshibit “P-9” yang dikemukakan oleh SP2 tidak boleh diterima sebagai keterangan dokumentar oleh Mahkamah berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang tersebut di atas.

81.       Di dalam kes ini juga pihak Perayu telah berjaya mengemukakan dokumen untuk membuktikan bahawa ekshibit “P-9” yang ditender melalui  SP2 tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan (Ekshibit “P-9mukasurat 34 dan 35 Nota Keterangan). Pihak Perayu telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap pengemukaan salinan dokumen tersebut kerana tiada kaitan dengan pertuduhan dan mengikut keterangan SP2 semasa pemeriksaan balas, dokumen asal telah dimusnahkan kerana polisi syarikat.

82.    Tiada definisi untuk ‘milikan’ di dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC di dalam kes Pendakwaraya lawan Sim, Odita, Muhammad Architects Sdn Bhd [2008] 3 CLJ 623 (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah perlu merujuk kepada definisi untuk milikan di dalam kes-kes yang telah diputuskan. Di dalam kes ini responden telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan milikan secara fizikal perisian yang melanggar hakcipta oleh responden.

Di dalam kes tersebut Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC memutuskan seperti berikut:

The word “possession’ is not defined in the Copyrights Act 1987 and therefore it is pertinent to refer to judicial decisions involving criminal charges to guide us to define the word “possession’. Thus, it was the contention of the defence that prosecution has to establish physical possession of the alleged infringing programs by the accused. The prosecution failed to prove actual physical possession of the alleged infringing copies of computer programs, as evidence was before the court that the premises of the accused was not for the sole usage of the accused company but also shared among the other companies mentioned above. This by itself, in my view, is sufficient to sustain the order of acquittal.           

 

83.       Pihak Perayu berhujah lanjut mengenai isu ini di mana daripada Nota Keterangan tersebut, amat jelas saksi awam SP4 mengesahkan tiada surat-surat yang ditunjuk oleh pihak pendakwaan diterima oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Pulau Pinang (Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18, P19 dan muka surat 42, 43, 44 dan 45 Nota Keterangan) untuk membuktikan surat-surat yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1.

84.       Fakta ini seterusnya telah disahkan oleh saksi pendakwaan ketujuh iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7) bahawa Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18 dan P19 (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010) tiada di dalam rekod Mahkamah Syariah. Oleh yang demikian Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18 dan P19 tidak seharusnya diterima sebagai ekshibit kerana tiada fakta mengesahkan kewujudan ekshibit-ekshibit tersebut.

85.       Perayu semasa memberi keterangan semasa pemeriksaan utama kes pembelaan telah mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen daripada Mahkamah Syari’ah untuk menunjukkan percanggahan yang wujud bagi ekshibit “P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14”, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18” dan “P-19” tetapi Mahkamah tidak menanda setiap satu dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Perayu sebagai ekshibit sebagaimana mengikut peruntukkan Seksyen 173(j)(iii) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

86.       Tambahan lagi di dalam Kes Tangkap Tersebut, Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur telah menerima sebagai bukti setiap dokumen lain yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1 dan dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’ (Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21”, “P-22, “ P-23”, “P-24” P-25”, “P-26”, “P-27”, “P-28”, “P-29”, “P-30”, “P-31”, “P-32” dan “P-33” mukasurat 16,17 Nota Keterangan) yang tiada kaitan langsung dengan pertuduhan dan tidak termasuk di dalam lingkungan definisi “filem” sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002. Walaubagaimanapun bantahan telah dibangkitkan oleh Perayu.

87.       Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21”, “P-22, “ P-23”, “P-24” P-25”, “P-26”, “P-27”, “P-28”, “P-29”, “P-30”, “P-31”, “P-32” dan “P-33” mukasurat 16,17 Nota Keterangan yang berbentuk e-mail dikemukakan kepada Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur melalui SP1 tidak mengikut kaedah forensik analisa e-mail kerana tiada keterangan bagaimana  analisa e-mail tersebut dibuat dan tidak berdasarkan piawaian “Daubert” yang  dihujahkan dengan lebih lanjut berkenaan kaedah forensik yang dilakukan oleh SP1 untuk membuktikan milikan cakera keras ekshibit “P-2”.

SP1 ketika pemeriksaan utama memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

“Keputusan analisa, saya dapati beberapa document, email, gambar dan beberapa video yang terdapat di dalam P2(a) atas nama OKT, gambar keluarga dan video clip lucah…”

 

(mukasurat 3 Nota Keterangan)

Mengikut “Guide To Computer Forensics and Investigations, 3rd Edition oleh Bill Nelson, Amelia Philips, Frank Enfinger, dan Christopher Steuart di mukasurat 468 :  

“E-mail evidence has become an important part of many computing investigations, so computer forensics investigators must know how e-mail is processed to collect this essential evidence. In addition, with the increase in e-mail scams and fraud attempts with phishing or spoofing, investigators need to know how to examine and interpret the unique content of e-mail messages.

 

            As a computing investigator, you might be called on to examine a phishing e-mail to see whether it’s authentic.”

      

88.       Berkenaan isu bahawa pengemukaan dokumen-dokumen tersebut tidak relevan kepada pertuduhan dan memprejudiskan Perayu, Pihak Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia ini kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh VT Singham J di dalam kes Ah Poon & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 CLJ 521 (di mukasurat 10-11 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana VT Sigham J menyatakan seperti berikut:

 

“Irrelevant and Prejudicial Facts Or Evidence

 

[17] As for the police report which contains serious allegation that the accuseds are suspected to be involved in the activity of prostitution, it cannot be denied that this is highly prejudical, inadmissible or is otherwise objectionable and the accuseds have every right to know and understand the contents and they should be given the opportunity of raising any objection to the contents of the police report which is against them. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to show whether the contents of the police report which has been marked as exh. P 3 was read and explained to the accuseds and what was their response.

 

[18] It is paramount importance that all documentary evidence which are tendered as evidence by the prosecution and marked as exhibits in proceedings where the accused has pleaded guilty to a charge if possible should be shown, read and explained to the accuseds and understood by him or her so that in the event the contents of the documents which contains some incriminating facts which implicates the accuseds are disputed or not admitted, the document will have to be rejected without having it marked as an exhibit…..Be that as it may, a document or an exhibit is not to be admitted unless it is relevant to the charge.”

89.       Pihak Perayu ingin berhujah bahawa pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P20” hingga “P33” amat jelas telah mencabul hak (dengan izin) ‘privacy’ dan (dengan izin) ‘privillege’ Perayu dan keluarga sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Artikel 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P20” hingga “P33” adalah tanpa sebarang kebenaran daripada pembuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut dan tidak relevan kepada pertuduhan terhadap Perayu.

90.       Pihak Pendakwaan turut memanggil SP6 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai ekshibit “P20 hingga “P33” yang kononnya mengikut pihak Pendakwaan diekstrak dari cakera keras tersebut. Walaubagaimanapun SP6 menggunapakai peruntukkan undang-undang Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 kerana beliau mempunyai ‘privilege’ ke atas gambar-gambar berbentuk perlakuan tersebut yang merupakan satu bentuk komunikasi di antara Perayu dan SP6. Mahkamah sendiri telah turut memutuskan bahawa ekshibit “P-20” hingga “P-33” adalah dokumen-dokumen yang dilindungi di bawah privilege di bawah Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan oleh yang demikian tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti di Mahkamah (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010). Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

 

S122. No person who is or has been married shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has been married; nor shall he be permitted to disclose any such communication unless the person who made it or his representative in interest consents, except in suits between married persons or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.”

91.       Mahkamah sendiri telah turut memutuskan bahawa ekshibit “P-20” hingga “P-33” adalah dokumen-dokumen yang dilindungi di bawah privilege di bawah Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan juga telah membuat keputusan bahawa SP6 adalah (dengan izin) ‘hostile witness’.

 

92.       Pihak Perayu bersandarkan satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Mustapha Hussain J di dalam Palldas a/l Arumugam v Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 CLJ 661, 665 (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) menyatakan bahawa perlakuan juga satu bentuk komunikasi di antara isteri dan Tertuduh.

 

“From the record of appeal, the appellant’s wife Gudi Kaur (PW3) had, in examination-in-chief, given quite a lengthy evidence of all communications between herself and her husband. Though some of the evidence relates between purely to acts, as distinct from words spoken, ie, what she saw appellant was doing, it is so inextricably interwoven with what appellant had said to her, that to separate each act from words spoken by the appellant to her would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Even if extricable and rejecting the words spoken, one would have their prejudicial effect still lingering.

 

Even though objection was not taken by the defence, this silence cannot convert what the law says is inadmissible evidence to be admissible. One would expect the wife’s evidence to be led in such a way as to confine such evidence to what she saw the appellant doing. The wife should have been stopped the moment she started uttering what her husband said to her. From the record it would seem that nobody ever bothered about this section 122. 

 

93.       Di dalam kes Public Prosecutor lawan Abdul Majid [1994] 3 MLJ 457 (di mukasurat 6 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) James Foong J telah memutuskan bahawa isteri tertuduh boleh dipaksa memberi keterangan kecuali komunikasi yang dibuat oleh tertuduh kepada beliau melainkan jika keizinan tertuduh diperolehi seperti yang diperlukan di bawah S122 Akta Keterangan 1950.

94.       Pihak Perayu juga ingin menyatakan bahawa pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P20” hingga “P33” adalah tanpa sebarang kebenaran daripada pembuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut, memprejudiskan Perayu, tidak relevan kepada pertuduhan terhadap Perayu dan tidak termasuk di dalam lingkungan definisi “filem” sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002.

Definisi “filem’ di bawah Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 adalah seperti berikut:

“filem” termasuklah keseluruhan atau apa-apa bahagian-

 

            (a) sesuatu filem sinematografi: dan

 

(b) Sesuatu pita video, disket, cakera laser, cakera padat, cakera keras dan rekod lain,

 

yang asal atau pendua bagi suatu urutan imej gambar tampak, yang merupakan suatu rekod yang dapat digunakan sebagai suatu cara untuk menunjukkan urutan itu sebagai suatu gambar bergerak, sama ada atau tidak diiringi oleh bunyi;”

 

95.       Adalah dihujahkan bahawa Ekshibit “P-20” hingga “P-33” adalah dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar yang yang TIDAK berurutan dan TIDAK bergerak.

96.       Perayu berhujah bahawa milikan tidak boleh dibuktikan melalui keterangan persekitaran (‘circumstantial evidence’) iaitu dengan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, “P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20” hingga “P33” yang merupakan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan hanya kerana dokumen-dokumen tersebut didakwa terdapat di dalam cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut (dinafikan oleh Perayu).

97.       Kesimpulannya pihak Pendakwaan gagal membuktikan elemen ‘milikan’ cakera keras tersebut terhadap Perayu.

98.       Keputusan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan isu milikan ekshibit “P-2” dan bilangan klip video lucah yang dikatakan terkandung di dalam ekshibit “P-2” (dipertikaikan oleh Perayu/Tertuduh) berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan SP1, SP2, SP3, SP5, SP6 dan SP7 adalah longgar dan tidak berasaskan prinsip-prinsip undang-undang yang mantap.

Isu Kaedah Analisis Forensik Komputer (SP1) yang berkaitan dengan elemen ‘milikan’

 

99.       Saksi pakar SP1 dipertikaikan oleh pihak Perayu berdasarkan sebab-sebab berikut:

a.               Pertuduhan terhadap Perayu/Tertuduh telah dibuat berdasarkan laporan polis SP1 Dang Wangi Report No. 029694/09 (Ekshibit “P-34mukasurat 18 Nota Keterangan) apabila SP1 membuat pemeriksaan analisa pada 23.7.2009. Walaubagaimanapun di dalam salinan laporan polis tersebut ada jelas tercatit bahawa laporan polis tersebut tidak boleh digunakan untuk tuntutan atau perbicaraan di Mahkamah dan hanya untuk kegunaan dalaman PDRM sahaja.  Oleh yang demikian pertuduhan di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah cacat, defektif dan tidak sah di sisi undang-undang kerana berasaskan laporan polis yang tidak boleh digunakan untuk pendakwaan dan perbicaraan di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. Walaubagaimanapun di akhir kes pendakwaan pada 19.10.2010, Mahkamah ada menyatakan bahawa laporan polis SP1 sekarang adalah ‘First Information Report’ (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).

b.         Di dalam kes ini terdapat konflik kepentingan (‘conflict of interest’) dan melanggar etika seorang pakar (‘Breach of Expert Duties’) di pihak SP1 yang bertindak sebagai pakar dan pengadu pada masa yang sama dan telah memprejudiskan secara material pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh dan ini sangat bertentangan dengan kod etika dan amalan saksi pakar yang diterimapakai oleh mahkamah-mahkamah di seluruh dunia. Setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan-perbicaraan yang dijalankan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 29.7.2010, memang ketara bahawa terdapat konflik kepentingan (‘conflict of interest’) dan ‘Breach of Expert Duties’ di mana saksi pendakwaan pertama (SP1) bukan hanya bertindak sebagai pengadu dan pakar tetapi juga sebagai pegawai penyiasat pada masa yang sama kerana semua barang kes diterima melalui beliau dan catatan di atas Ekshibit “P-20” hingga Eksihbit “P-33” ditanda oleh beliau mengikut keterangan SP7(rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010). Keterangan SP1 bersifat keterangan dengar cakap (‘hearsay’).

Mengikut kaedah yang diterimapakai oleh mahkamah-mahkamah ‘commonwealth’ dan antarabangsa, saksi yang lain perlu dipanggil bagi menyokong keterangan saksi pakar apabila berlaku konflik kepentingan (‘conflict of interest’) dan melanggar etika seorang pakar (‘Breach of Expert Duties’), prinsip yang dikenali sebagai “Moorov Doctrine” berdasarkan Buku ‘Electronic Evidence’ Chapter 13 Scotland, Scots Law of Evidence, Corroboration mukasurat 388, pada para 13.15:

“13.15 At common law, the facts which, in a criminal case, establish the guilt of the accused or, in a civil case, establish the defender liability, are required to be proved by corroborated evidence, which is to say either

            (a)       the direct evidence of two witnesses; or

            (b)       two or more evidential facts spoken to separate witnesses; or

(c)        a combination of direct evidence of one witness and one or             more evidential facts spoken to by other witnesses[i].

 

A specialty of the law relating to corroboration is so-called Moorov Doctrine[ii], which was developed to combat one of the intrinsic problems raised by the requirement for corroboration in the case of crimes commited in private. The doctrine allows similar alleged offences to corroborate each other if one witness speaks to each.”

Di dalam kes Alcontara A/L Ambross v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 MLJ 209 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 211 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

 

“(5)   Although no objection had been raised to the admission of one of the statement made by ASP Abdul Wahab which was clearly based on hearsay and therefore inadmissible, the judge was nevertheless under an automatic duty to stop it from being adduced, for inadmissible evidence does not become admissible by reason of failure to object.”.

c.         Adalah menjadi hujah Pihak Perayu bahawa saksi pendakwaan SP1 hanya merupakan saksi pakar dan adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas bahawa keterangan seorang saksi pakar hanya bersifat sokongan (‘corroborative’), boleh diambilkira tetapi tidak semestinya perlu diterima dan Mahkamah sendiri yang perlu menentukan isu kebolehterimaan sesuatu bukti.

Pihak Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah kepada kes Public Prosecutor v. Lin Lian Chen [1992] 2 MLJ 561 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 317 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Agung telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bila memanggil keterangan pakar, pihak pendakwaan mesti mendirikan kepakaran saksi tersebut.

d.         Selain daripada itu, Pihak Perayu turut berhujah bahawa kaedah yang betul perlu digunapakai apabila melibatkan saksi pakar sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Hashim J di dalam kes Wong Chop Saow v. Public Prosecutor [1965] 1 MLJ 247 (di mukasurat 2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) seperti berikut:

 

“To avoid confusion the expert witness should give his evidence as follows: He should first state his qualifications as an expert. He should then state that he has given evidence as an expert in such cases and that his evidence has been accepted by the courts.”

e.         Daripada Nota Keterangan tersebut, tiada keterangan daripada SP1 yang menunjukkan kelayakan beliau dan samada beliau pernah memberi keterangan di mahkamah dan mahkamah menerima keterangan beliau.

f.          Setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan tersebut, banyak tokok tambah, percanggahan keterangan yang direkodkan dan juga fakta-fakta penting tidak direkodkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur. Di antara percanggahan keterangan tersebut SP1 telah menyatakan bahawa beliau tiada sijil ENCase tetapi mengikut Nota Keterangan tersebut SP1 menyatakan bahawa beliau ada sijil dari satu syarikat dan identiti syarikat tersebut tidak dinyatakan (mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan tersebut). Seperti yang dijelaskan di dalam buku “Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations3rd Edition muka surat 81, Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillps, Frank Enfiger, and Christopher Steuart:

EnCase Certified Examiner (EnCE) Certification

Guidance Software, the creator of EnCase, sponsors the EnCE certification program. EnCE certification is open to the public and private sectors and is specific to the use and mastery of EnCase computer forensics analysis. Requirements for taking the EnCE certification exam don’t depend on taking the Guidance Software EnCase training courses. Candidates for this certificate are required to have a licensed copy of EnCase.”

Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia ini kepada kes Foo Fio Na v. Hospital Assunta & Anor [1999] 6 MLJ 738 (di mukasurat 758 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) yang merujuk kepada kes Whitehouse v Jordan & Anor [1981] 1 All ER pada mukasurat 276:

“While some degree of consultation between experts and legal advisers is entirely proper, it is necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to be the independent product of the expert, uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation. To the extent that it is not, the evidence is likely to be not only incorrect but self defeating.”  

Perayu ingin juga merujuk kepada kes R v Harris [2006] 1 Cr App Rep 55 (di mukasurat 65 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) seperti berikut:

“[271] It may be helpful for judges, practitioners and experts to be reminded of the obligations of an expert witness summarised by Cresswell J in National Justice Cia Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd, The Ikarian Reefer [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 at 81. Cresswell J pointed out amongst other factors the following,which we summarise as follows:

(1) Expert evidence presented to the court should be and seen to be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation.

(2) An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of advocate.

(3) An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions on which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which detract from his concluded opinions.

(4) An expert should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise.

(5) If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers that insufficient data is available then this must be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one.

(6) If after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on material matters, such change of view should be communicated to the other side without delay and when appropriate to the court.”

Perayu ingin juga merujuk kepada Australian Medical Association di dalam buku “Expert Evidence” muka surat 326 seperti berikut:

Expert Medical Witness – Policy Statement (March 1998)

            2. Conflict of Interest

 

That the AMA believes that, when requested to provide an expert opinion and faced with conflict of interest, a practitioner should declare this or decline to offer an opinion.

  1. SP1 tidak memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini kelulusan akademik berkaitan dengan kepakaran di dalam bidang komputer dan tidak pernah menduduki peperiksaan (EnCE) yang diiktiraf oleh syarikat EnCase Software bagi melayakkan beliau mengendalikan perisian Encase dengan betul dan tepat berdasarkan piawaian persijilan ISO kawalan mutu forensik komputer antarabangsa. Ini amat memudaratkan kes Pendakwaan kerana kelayakan dan kepakaran SP1 tidak dibuktikan.

SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

C         :           “Qualified untuk handle Encase?

:           Saya berkursus untuk belajar Encase dan jalankan analisa, tak ingat nama company tapi ada sijil”

(mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan)

Ini disokong dengan satu kes Pendakwaraya lawan Kit Chee Wan [1999] 1 MLJ 16 (di mukasurat 6 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa saksi pakar mesti membuktikan latarbelakang kelayakan akademik dan keupayaan kepakaran beliau.

h.         Analisis terhadap barang rampasan yang dijalankan oleh SP1 tidak mengikut piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa. SP1 di dalam keterangannya semasa pemeriksaan balas mengaku bahawa beliau tidak melakukan analisa forensik yang ditetapkan oleh piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa malah SP1 juga mengaku tidak melakukan proses ‘acquisition’, ‘forensic imaging’, dan pengesahan kesahihan kandungan hard disk tersebut (mukasurat 2, 3, 4, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).

Bagi isu ini pihak Perayu memohon agar Mahkamah yang Mulia ini menggunapakai peruntukkan Seksyen 5 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan dibaca bersama Seksyen 56 dan Seksyen 57 Akta Keterangan 1950 untuk mengambilkira kes-kes yang telah diputuskan mengikut Common Law  atau undang-undang yang berkuatkuasa di England mengenai kaedah pembuktian forensik komputer memandangkan tiada kes berkaitan pembuktian cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang diputuskan dengan piawaian forensik antarabangsa di Malaysia pada masa ini.

Piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa untuk penggunaan perisian Encase, peralatan pengimejan forensik ImagerSolo III, dan beberapa perisian yang lain yang diiktiraf oleh piawaian forensik antarabangsa dan persijilan ISO kawalan mutu forensik komputer antarabangsa, kaedah ‘acquisition’ yang betul dan tepat di samping kaedah pengimejan menggunakan format pengimejan forensik komputer yang diterima oleh piawaian forensik antarabangsa tetapi tidak ditunjukkan dan dilakukan oleh SP1. Kaedah pengiraan ‘hash value’ bagi setiap klip video dengan menggunakan proses ‘one-way hash functions’ yang akan menghasilkan ‘digital fingerprint’ (‘hash value’) yang unik bagi setiap maklumat yang diproses dengan algorithma ‘digital signature’ atau ‘DNA signature’ tertentu yang peka terhadap Kesan Avalanche (Avalanche Effect) (di mukasurat 1-2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu). Kaedah ‘forensic imaging’ yang betul dan tepat juga memainkan peranan yang sangat penting untuk mengawal rapi ketepatan dan bahan bukti di dalam bentuk yang asal dan tidak tercemar atau ‘tampered’. Penggunaan dan pemilihan algorithma-algorithma yang betul dan tepat amat bersesuaian untuk tujuan pengesahan, kesahihan, integriti dan kebolehterimaan kandungan cakera keras (‘harddisk’) untuk perbicaraan di mahkamah di mana kaedah pengekstrakan bahan bukti secara imej-imej forensik yang disalin dari cakera keras satu persatu bit (bit per bit) dan kesemua proses tersebut tidak dilakukan oleh SP1 (mukasurat 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).

i.          SP1 juga tidak tahu apa itu yang dimaksudkan sebagai ‘hash value‘, ‘hash functions’ dan ‘algorithms‘ yang digunakan untuk tujuan pengesahan, integriti, kebolehterimaan dan kebolehpercayaan data di dalam harddisk tersebut. Malah SP1 juga telah memberi keterangan bahawa dia tidak tahu kegunaan ‘hash functions’, ‘hash value’, ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘forensic tools’ yang sepatutnya digunakan semasa melakukan analisa forensik terhadap ‘harddisk’ seperti yang telah dibangkitkan oleh Perayu semasa pemeriksaan balas (mukasurat 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).

Bagi rujukan Mahkamah yang Mulia ini, ‘Hash functions’ mengikut buku manual PGP, Version 7.0 yang dikeluarkan oleh Network Associates, Inc., di mukasurat 20-21, dimaksudkan seperti berikut:

“PGP uses a cryptographically strong hash function on the plaintiext the user is signing. This generates a fixed-length data item known as a message digest. (Again, any change to the information results in a totally different digest).

 

Then PGP uses the digest and the private key to create the “signature”. PGP transmits the signature and the plaintext together. Upon receipt of the message, the recipient uses PGP to recompute the digest, thus verifying the signature. PGP can ecrypt the plaintext or not; signing plaintext is useful if some of the recipients are not interested in or capable of verifying the signature.

 

As long as a secure hash function is used, there is no way to take someone’s signature from one document and attach it to another, or to alter a signed message in any way. The slightest change to a signed document will cause the digital signature verification process to fail.”

 

Selain daripada itu, mengikut buku Applied Cryptography, oleh Bruce Schneier, 1996, 2nd Edition,1996, di mukasurat 429 :

 

A one-way hash function, H(M), operates on an arbitrary-length pre-image message, M. It returns a fixed-length hash value, h.

 

Many functions can take an arbitrary-length input and return an output of fixed length, but one-way hash functions have additional characteristics that make them one-way [1065]:

 

Given M, it is easy to compute h.

Given h, it is hard to compute M such that H(m)= h.

Given M, it is hard to find another message, M’, sich that H(M) =H(M’).

 

If Mallory could do the hard things, he would undermine the security of every protocol that uses one-way hash function. The whole point of the one-way hash function is to provide a “fingerprint” of M that is unique. If Alice sgned M by using a digital signature algorithm on H(M), and Bob could produce M’, another message different from M where H(M)=H(M’), then Bob could claim that Alice signed M’.

 

Mengikut buku Cryptography Decrypted oleh H.X Mel dan Doris Baker, 2001, di mukasurat 142, ‘hash function berkaitan dengan ‘non-keyed message’:

“Non-keyed message digests are made without a secret key and are called message integrity codes (MICs) or modification detections (MDCs). MIC is more commonly used, but MDC seems to be a more straightforward description of how a non-keyed message digest works. Most public key digital signatures use non-keyed message digests.

 

Keyed message digests, known as message authentication codes (MACs), combine a message and a secret key. This chapter reviews and extends the discussion of MACs presented in Chapter 7, where you saw the shared secret key used in conjunction with a secret key encryption method, such as DES or Rijndael (the new AES standard).

 

Note that although the term hash function is usually reserved for non-keyed message digests, it is sometimes used to refer to both keyed and non-keyed digest functions.”

 

Di dalam buku Cyber Forensics : A Field Manual for Collecting, examining, and Preserving Evidence of Computer Crimes oleh Albert J. Marcella, Jr dan Doug Menendez, 2nd Edition, 2008, di mukasurat 56, ‘hash functions’ didefinisikan seperti berikut :

Hash Functions

 

Hash functions, also called message digests and one-way encryption, are algorithms that, in some sense, use no key. Instead, a fixed-length hash value is computed based upon the plaintext that makes it impossible for either the contents or length of the plaintext to be recovered. Hash algorithms are typically used to provide a digital fingerprint of a file’s contents, often used to ensure that the file has not been altered by an intruder or virus. Hash functions are also commonly employed by many operating systems to encrypt passwords. Hash functions, then, provide a measure of the integrity of a file.”

 

Tujuan untuk mengumpul ‘hash value’ dinyatakan di dalam buku Guide to Computer Forensics and investigations”, 3rd Edition,  2008, oleh Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillips, Frank Enfinger dan Christopher Steuart di mukasurat 289:

“NIST also created the National Software Reference Library (NSRL) project (www.nsrl.nist.gov) with the goal of collecting all known hash values for commercial software and OS files. The primary hash NSRL uses is SHA-1, which generates a known set of digital signatures called the Reference Data Set (RDS). SHA-1 provides better accuracy than other hashing methods, such as MD5 or CRC-32.

 

The purpose of collecting known hash values is to reduce the number of known files included in a forensics examination of a drive, leaving only the unknown files. Identifying known good files, such as Os files or programs, means you can reduce the number of files you need to inspect as possible evidence. You can also use the RDS to locate and identify known bad files, such as illegal images and computer viruses, on a suspect drive.” 

 

Di dalam buku Electronic Evidence Disclosure, Discovery & Admisssibility oleh Stephen Mason, 2007 di mukasurat 50-51 telah dinyatakan kepentingan memelihara bukti berbentuk digital:

Preserving digital evidence

 

Validating digital evidence

 

3.16    Digital evidence in particular needs to be validated if it is to have any probative value. A digital evidence specialist will invariably copy the contents of a number of disks or storage devices, in both criminal and civil matters. To prove the digital evidence has not been altered, it is necessary to put in place checks and balances to prove the duplicate evidence in digital format has not been altered since it was copied. An electronic fingerprint is used to prove the integrity of data at the time the evidence was collected. The electronic fingerprint uses a cryptograpih technique that is capable of being associated with a single file, a floppy disk or the entire contents of a hard drive. As digital evidence is copied, a digital evidence specialist will use software tools that are relevant to the task. The software tool used will invariably incorporate a program that causes a checksum operation, called a ‘hash function’ to be applied to the file or disk that is being copied. The result of applying a hash function to digital data is called a ‘hash value’. The hash value has been calculated against the content of the data. This is a one-way function, containing the mathematical equivalent of a secret trapdoor. For the purposes of understanding the concept, this algorithm is easy to compute in one direction and difficult to compute in the opposite direction, unless you known the secret. 1 The has function is sued to verify that a file, or the copy of a file, has not changed. If the file has been altered in any way, the hash value will not be the same and the investigator will be alerted to the discrepancy. A digital signature can also be used in this way, by combining the hash value against some additional information, such as the time.

 

1It has yet to be proven that a mathematical function can have aone-way fundtion, see Fred Piper, Sion Balke-Wilson and John Mitchell Digital Signatures Secuirty & Controls (1999) p. 16.”    

 

Buku Cryptography and Secure Communications oleh Man Young Rhee, 1994, di mukasurat 364 ada dihuraikan berkenaan hash value seperti berikut:

 

“Thus, a systolic array circuit for computing the transform error can be shown as in Fig. 8.22.

 

Referring to Eq. 8.87, the inverse transform of the error pattern E, is

 

(8.111)

 

In order to develop a systolic array for computing e Eq. 8.111 can also be rewritten in recursive form as

(8.112)

 

A systolic cell structure for computing Eq. 8.112 is shown in Fig. 8.23. Using this figure, we obtain so that the error pattern becomes as expected. The number of basic cells needed to compute Eq. 8.112. Finally the decoding process is accomplished by c”

 

Di dalam buku Godel’s Theorem : An incomplete Guide To Its Use and Abuse oleh Torkel Franzen di mukasurat 63 dan 64 menunjukkan bahawa computer adalah satu alatan yang ada batasan :

 

“It was Alan Turing who, in 1936, introduced a thereotical model of a general–purpose digital computer with unlimited working memory (the universal Turing machine) and made it plausible that everything that can be mechanically computed can be computed by such a machine. Today,Turing computability is one of the several equivalent definitions of computability used in logic and mathematics, and we are used to thinking of ordinary computers as physical realizations of the universal Turing machine, except that actual computers have limited memory. In a mathematical treatment of the theory of computability, the Truing machine or some other model of computation is used to give formal definitions of the basic concepts of the theory. In this book we will make do with informal definitions of these basic concepts, which still allow us to understand and appreciate several important results of the theory. All we need to know about the workings of a computer is that executing a program can be described as consisting in a series of steps, so that it is possible to carry out a certain number of steps in a computation, do something else for a while, and then return to carry out the next step in the computation.”      

 

Pihak Perayu merujuk kepada kes R v. Trapp [2009] S.J. No. 64; 2009 SKPC 109; 2009 S.K.C. LEXIS 686 (di mukasurat 2-10 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana pakar telah menunjukkan kepada mahkamah penggunaan ‘hash function’ atau ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘hash value’ merupakan proses yang sangat kritikal dan penting di samping pengimejan forensik dilakukan sebelumnya. Di dalam kes tersebut, pakar telah menggunakan SHA-1 sebagai ‘hash function’, ‘hash value’ penggiraan ‘hash value’ ditunjukkan dan dibandingkan dengan salinan imej forensik semasa perbicaraan. Berdasarkan keterangan saksi SP1, amat jelas bahawa saksi SP1 tidak melakukan analisa yang betul dan tepat untuk memenuhi piawaian forensik antarabangsa yang ditetapkan berdasarkan Piawaian Daubert, di dalam kes Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (mukasurat 13 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu), Cyber Forensics – A Field Manual for Collecting, Examining, and Preserving Evidence of Computer Crimes’, 2nd Edition oleh Albert J. Marcella, Jr. dan Doug Menendez di mukasurat 276, yang merupakan satu piawaian yang diterimapakai oleh semua badan forensik di seluruh dunia,seperti di bawah:

 

Daubert Test for Reliability

 

Witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:

 

-The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data

-The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods

-The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case

 

The key for the Court in determining whether an expert may testify before a jury is therefore primarily one of “reliability of method”. The court will not look at the actual opinion held by an expert, but merely examines his or her methodology to determine whether the procedures used or his methodology is not reliable, then his entire opinion is likewise unreliable and should be excluded from the jury.

 

Daubert Factors

 

The U.S Supreme Court set out several specific factors that should be used by the courts in evaluating any proposed expert testimony. These factors are not exclusive and some or all may not apply in any given case, but they are always the place to start the reliability analysis. The factors are as follows:

 

1. Whether the theory or technique has been scientifically tested.

2. Whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review or publication.

3. The (expected) error rate of the technique used.

4. Acceptance of the theory or technique in the relevant scientific community.

 

            (muka surat 277)

  • Are the underlying premises upon which a technique or method empirically validated?
  • Is there a professional literature that describes the purposes to be achieved and the methods whereby the aims of the field can be reliably realized?
  • Are there professional associations or societies offering contuining education to which members with established credentials are eligible to belong?
  • Does there exist a rigorous training program whereby one can achieve basic proficiency in the discipline under the supervision of persons with established credential who can impart knowledge and experience to trainees seeking to qualify as examiners?
  • Is there a meaningful certification program that attests to the competence and proficiency of workers in the discipline?
  • Has an examination protocol been developed whereby investigations can be reliably carried out and which will yield reasonably consistent results when followed by properly credentialed examiners [18]?”

   

SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas menyatakan bahawa beliau tidak membuat pengimejan bahan bukti di dalam bentuk salinan imej-imej forensik bagi keseluruhan kandungan cakera keras (‘harddisk’) (mukasurat 26 Nota Keterangan) seperti yang ditetapkan oleh piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa (Piawaian Daubert). Oleh yang demikian SP1 tidak mengikut kaedah yang diiktiraf oleh piawaian komputer forensik antarabangsa dan bahan bukti tidak disahkan kesahihan dan integritinya. Perayu juga telah menerima 13 keping DVD salinan klip video yang disalin dengan menggunakan format DVD yang bukan mengikuti piawaian format pengimejan forensik antarabangsa yang ditetapkan di mana apabila diperiksa oleh Perayu telah mendapati metadata setiap fail klip video tidak sama dengan metadata yang diterangkan oleh SP1 dan bilangan klip video juga berbeza bilangan yang diberi dengan keterangan SP1 semasa perbicaraan. Terdapat juga kandungan yang sama dikira berulang-ulang semasa perbicaraan.

 

Fakta ini dinyatakan semasa pemeriksaan utama SP1:

Selepas analisa/kenalpasti video2 lucah yang terkandung tindakan seterusnya adalah masukan video2 ini ke dalam DVD. Tidak ingat berapa keping. Saya masih boleh cam.

(Pohon Mahkamah yang Mulia ini merujuk DVD dalam sampul putih-di dalam ada 13 keping tanda X1-X13. Dicamkan SP1. Ditanda sebagai “P3a-m”) (mukasurat 13 Nota Keterangan).

Mengikut The Oxford Companion To Philosophy, disunting oleh Ted Honderich, 2005, pada mukasurat 145 dan mukasurat 857 :

Cognition. Traditionally this has been regarded as the domain of thought and inference, marking the contrast with perpetual experiences and other metal phenomena such as pains and itches. Sensations, perceptions, and feelings are all distinguished from episodes of cognition since they provide input to the domain of thinking and reasoning but are not thoughts themselves.

 

More recently, cognition has been conceived as the domain of representational states and processes studied in cognitive psychology and * cognitive science. These are phemomena involved in thinking about the world, using a language, guiding and controlling behavior. The new definition embraces some aspects of sensory perception where this involves representations of a spatial world and the intelligent processing of sensory input..”  

scientific method. Although the question of scientific method is generally thought to resolve itself into two parts-the problem of discovery and the problem of justification-it seems fair to say that philosophers have let significantly more comfortable with the latter than the former. Indeed there are those (like Karl Popper) who have argued that philosophy can say nothing of value about discovery and that the whole topic is best left to the historian or psychologist…”

 

Mengikut The Oxford Companion To Philosophy, disunting oleh Ted Honderich, 2005, pada mukasurat 45:

a priori and a posteriori. These are terms primarily used to describe two species of propositional knowledge but also, derivatively, two classes of *propositions or *truths, namely, those that are knowable a priori and a posteriori respectively. Knowledge is said to be priori when it does not depend for its authority upon the evidence of experience, ad a posteriori when it does so depend.

 

Whether knowledge is a priori is quite a different question from whether it is * innate. Mathematics provides the most often cited examples of a priori knowledge, but most of our mathematical knowledge is no doubt acquired through experience even though it is justifiable independently of experience. Kant and others have held that a priori knowledge concerns only necessary truths while a posteriori knowledge concerns only contigent truths, but Kripke has challenged this assumption.”

 

Di dalam buku The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy disunting oleh Thomas Mautner di mukasurat 33:

“a priori ; a posteriori 1. The pair of terms marks a dinstiction between reasoning from ground to consequence and reasoning from consequence to ground which goes back to Aristotle, and was adopted by medieval Arabic and Christian philosophers, including Thomas Aquinas. Albert of Saxony is often mentioned as the originator of this pair of terms. This usage can also be found in Samuel Clarke (1675-1729): the ontological argument for God’s existence is a priori, whilst the argument (in Descartes’s Third Meditation) from my idea of God to his existence is a posteriori.

 

2. The pair of terms was later applied not to two kinds of reasoning, but two kinds of knowledge, of propositions and of concepts. Knowledge a posteriori is based on experience, knowledge a priori is independent of experience. The two kinds of knowledge were assigned to different faculties of the mind (sensibility v. intellect). “

 

    

Di dalam buku 101 Key Ideas Philosophy di mukasurat 1:

 

“Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the study of knowledge as a subject in its own right. In particular, epistemology involves examining the grounds on which we claim to know that something is true or false. In this sense a priori knowledge is described as knowledge which is not based on observations of the world around us. The latter kind of knowledge is often termed empirical knowledge, or perhaps less commonly, a posteriori knowledge.

 

Common sense suggests that most of our knowledge comes from either observations of the world, or perhaps from our senses of touch and hearing. If we observe a chair which has been painted blue, we know it is a blue chair because of our interpretation of a particular wavelength of light received by our eyes. In addition, we understand the concept ‘blue’ beucase as we grew up we learned that objects with this clolour were described as blue. If on the other hand someone says to us that there is a chair in the next room, we have no way of knowing in advance what colour the chair might be. There is nothing in the concept ‘chair’ which helps us to predict its colour.

 

Now some philosophers argue that all knowledge must of necessity be based upon empirical observation. Such philosophers can generally be described as empiricists. Others suggest, however, that a priori knowledge, i.e. derived prior to experience, is perfectly possible. Philosophers who hold this position can be broadly described as rationalists. As an example of knowledge which some might argue is a priori, we could take the idea that every event in the universe must have a cause. An advocate of the existence of a priori knowledge would say that if we were told a ball had been rolling down the road, we would know that something had caused the ball to start rolling. It might have been a gust of wind, or someone kicking it, or that the road was sloping. A rationalist would argue that there would be no need to investigate the ball-rolling incident any further in order to determine that something had caused the event.”

Buku The Oxford Companion To Philosophy, disunting oleh Ted Honderich, 2005, pada mukasurat 199:

 

Deontic Logic. The study of principles of reasoning pertaining to obligation, permission, prohibition, moral commitment, and other normative matters. Although often described as a branch of logic, deontic logic lacks the ‘topic- neutrality’ characteristics of logic proper.”

Buku The Oxford Companion To Philosophy, disunting oleh Ted Honderich, 2005, pada mukasurat 529:

Logic, history of. Aristotle was the first thinker to devise a logical system. He drew upon the emphasis on universal deifintion found in Socrates, the use of *reduction add absurdum in Zeno of Elea, claims about propositional structure and *negation in Parmenides and Plato, and the body of argumentative techniques found in legal reasoning and geometrical proof…”

Buku The Oxford Companion To Philosophy, disunting oleh Ted Honderich, 2005, pada mukasurat 590:

 

Metaphysics, history of. Metaphysics is the most abstract and in some views ‘high-falutin’ part of philosophy, having to do with the features of ultimate reality, what really exists and what it is that distinguishes that and makes it possible. Nevertheless, the exact nature of the subject has been constantly disputed, as indeed has its validity and usefulness.

 

Philosophy at its very beginnings with the Pre-Socratics was metaphysical in character, although it was initially presented in a dress which made it sound more like physics, as witness Thales’ claim that everything is made of water. Subsequent Pre-Socratics were concerned with other attempts to understand nature and the possibility of change within it, although Parmenides argued (for the first time by means of a formal argument, even if that was given a poetical dress) that coming to be, ceasing to be, and change in general were impossible, so that his successors had to counter his claim, even if they did not fully understand his arguments. By the time of Plato, with his theory that the true realities were Forms (or Ideas), abstract exemplars or paradigms, of which sensible things were only imperfect copies, the distinction of metaphysics from physics became clear, since these realities were quite distinct from the world with which physics has its concern. Since the Forms were also universal in character his theory also initiated metaphysical arguments concerning the status of * universals, something that has gone on ever since…”

 

Pihak Perayu berhujah secara lanjut bahawa setiap bukti saintifik memerlukan suatu persembahan ilmu yang lengkap dan bersifat ‘empirical’ bukan semata-mata ‘intuition’ yang hanya dilakukan secara rambang dan melulu. Malah pihak pendakwaan juga cuba mengalihkan fakta berkenaan kaedah analisis dan kandungan sebenar cakera keras (“hard disk”) semasa perbicaraan.

Buku The Oxford Companion To Philosophy, disunting oleh Ted Honderich, 2005, pada mukasurat 242:

Empirical. Based on experience..”

 

Empiricism. Any view which bases our knowledge, or the materials from which it is construed, on experience through the traditional five senses. ..”

Immanuel Kant di dalam bukunya yang bertajuk, “Critique of Pure Reason” – The Cambridge Edition of The Work of Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Elements, Pt II. Div. I Bk. I. Ch. II. (B128) muka surat 226:

The empirical derivation, however, to which both of them resorted, cannot be reconciled with reality of the scientific cognition a priori that we posses, that namely of pure mathematics and general natural science, and is therefore refutted by the facta.”

a das Factum

SP1 seharusnya membuat analisis forensik mengikut kaedah saintifik yang betul dan tepat serta perlu melibatkan penghujahan dan penelitian berdasarkan teori yang telah diterima oleh komuniti antarabangsa dan telah diterbitkan dan ini melibatkan pemerhatian yang berbentuk dan bercirikan “empiricism” semasa ujian forensik ke atas barang bukti berbentuk elektronik di mana “empiricism” merupakan keperluan saintifik yang membawa kebenaran yang boleh diulang ujikajinya pada bila-bila masa malah menghasilkan suatu keputusan analisa berangka yang memberi sokongan (‘corroboration’) terhadap keterangan saksi pakar yang kebolehterimaan yang tinggi di mahkamah dan dibuktikan bahawa ini tidak dilakukan oleh SP1 semasa perbicaraan, tiada ‘hash function’ dan ‘hash value’ yang dinyatakan bagi membezakan ‘metadata’ setiap fail yang telah dikemukan oleh beliau. Di mana perbezaan di antara undang-undang dan keterangan saintifik yang selalunya dinyatakan di dalam bentuk binary: sains mencari kebenaran, undang-undang melaksanakan keadilan; sains bersifat deskriptif, manakala undang-undang bersifat preskriptif; sains menekankan perkembangannya, manakala undang-undang menekankan prosesnya.

Persamaan di antara sains dan undang-undang yang selalunya mereka meraikan suatu keunikan komitmen sains terhadap ujian bersistematik bagi setiap pemerhatian dan kebolehterimaan terhadap hujahan yang menjuruskan kepada pemeriksaan saintifik secara fizikal yang kritikal, terhadap pemalsuan dan pembuktian keterangan mengenai sesuatu data. Maka, Intelek, Alasan yang munasabah dan Hukum sebagai kesimpulan dan penghakiman fakulti minda yang kognitif di mana undang-undang dipreskripsikan sebagai a priori dan sains dideskripsikan sebagai a priori yang kognitif tertakluk di dalam lingkungan kebenaran a posteriori.

Di dalam kertas penyelidikan yang dibentangkan oleh Renico Koen dari ICSA, University of Pretoria, South Africa dan Martin S. Oliver, ICSA, University of Pretoria, South Africa yang bertajuk The Use of File Timestamps in Digital Forensics(mukasurat 8 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) menyatakan:

“Event data is generated when a significant digital event occurs. Although the generated event data is of little value when viewed independently, collectively event data can produce information that can help investigators to deduce relationships between events to produce abstract views of the evidence at hand.”

Dan mereka juga telah membuat kesimpulan bahawa:

“A principle was introduced based on the concept of synergy claiming that insignificant pieces of event datum may collectively be of significant forensic importance.”

Diikuti juga di dalam kertas penyelidikan oleh Svein Yngvar Willassen yang bertajuk “Hypothesis Based Investigation of Digital Timestamps” (mukasurat 1 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) dengan jelas menerangkan di dalam abstract bahawa:

Timestamps stored on digital media play an important role in digital investigations. Unfortunately, timestamps may be manipulated, and also refer to a clock that can be erroneous, failing or maladjusted. This reduces the evidentiary value of timestamps. This paper takes the approach that historical adjustments to a clock can be hypothesized in a clock hypothesis. Clock hypotheses can then be tested for consistency with stored timestamps. A formalism for the definition and testing of a clock hypothesis is developed, and test methods for clock hypothesis consistency are demonstrated. With the number of timestamps found in typical digital investigations, the methods presented in this paper can justify clock hypotheses without having to rely on timestamps from external sources. This increases the evidentiary value of timestamps, even when the originating clock has been erroneous, failing or maladjusted.”    

 

Di dalam kes Regina v. Shipman (Harold Frederick) (1999, unreported) (mukasurat 62 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) terdapat persoalan modifikasi dan manipulasi ‘timestamps’ di mana semasa perbicaraan didapati bahawa ‘timestamp’ boleh diubah yang boleh membawa kepada penipuan metadata yang akan memberi impak besar dan nilai signifikan yang tinggi kepada analisis forensik terhadap kebolehterimaan probative evidence, kebolehpercayaan di dalam perbicaraan mahkamah.

j.          Persijilan ISO – Analisis SP1 gagal mengikut piawaian kawalan kualiti dan standard forensik komputer antarabangsa bagi ‘error’ dan ralat saintifik yang berkaitan dengan perisian dan peralatan untuk tujuan penganalisa forensik kerana SP1 telah memberi keterangan semasa pemeriksaan balas bahawa makmal beliau tidak dipersijilkan dengan standard ISO 9000 (Quality Management System in Production Environment), ISO 9001 (Quality Management), ISO 9069 (Software Quality Model), ISO 9241 (Ergonomic requirements for office work with visual display), ISO 17025 (General requirements for competence of test and calibration laboratories), ISO 27001 (Information technology-Security Techniques-Information Security Management Systems) dan ISO 15489/1:2001 (mukasurat 26 Nota Keterangan) untuk pengurusan kualiti untuk prosedur, proses, perisian, peralatan forensik computer yang digunakan dan yang berkaitan dengannya. Ini merupakan satu syarat yang sangat kritikal dan penting bagi sesuatu analisis forensik komputer dapat dijalankan dengan betul dan tepat.

Semasa pemeriksaan balas SP1 telah mengesahkan ada ‘error’ semasa ujitayang dibuat dengan menggunakan ‘software Encase’. (Mukasurat 20 Nota Keterangan).

Perayu telah mengemukakan bantahan terhadap Laporan Forensik SP1 yang mana Laporan Forensik yang cuba ditender di Mahkamah bertarikh 28.7.2009 yang amat ketara berlainan dengan Laporan Forensik bertarikh 27.7.2009 yang diberikan oleh pihak pendakwaan di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 51A Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Pihak Perayu/Tertuduh terpaksa membangkitkan bantahan apabila pihak pendakwaan sendiri tidak mematuhi prosedur-prosedur di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 51A dan Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah di mana apabila pihak Pendakwaan gagal memberikan salinan di dalam tempoh waktu yang ditetapkan dan penerimaan Laporan Forensik tersebut sebagai ekshibit adalah bertentangan dengan kes-kes yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah di mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal mematuhi tempoh penyerahan laporan yang ditetapkan di bawah Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, ianya ‘fatal‘ kepada kes pendakwaan dan laporan forensik tersebut tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti.

Berkenaan isu ini, pihak Perayu ingin merujuk kepada satu kes Ooi Lean Chai v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 1 MLJ 337 (Rep) (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Agung telah memutuskan bahawa Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah bukan hanya bersifat prosedural tetapi mengandungi peraturan untuk kebolehterimaan laporan pakar sebagai bukti di mana sekiranya ‘proviso’ kepada Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah tidak dipatuhi, laporan pakar tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti.

100.    SP1 juga gagal memberi sebarang keterangan bagaimana beliau menjaga ‘hard disk’ tersebut selepas menerimanya dari Pegawai Penyiasat dari tarikh 13.7.2009 ke 26.7.2009 dan dari tarikh analisa ke tarikh pertama sebutan kes. Adalah dihujahkan di sini bahawa rantaian kawalan dan rantaian bukti telah terputus (“break in the chain of custody and break in the chain of evidence’). SP1 di dalam pemeriksaan semula hanya memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

     

“J         :           Ianya ada dalam kawalan saya. Disimpan dalam makmal

forensic disimpan dalam peti khas untuk hard disc yang mana kunci dipegang oleh saya sendiri.”

 

 (mukasurat 34 Nota Keterangan)

 

101.    Kes ini perlu dibezakan dengan kes-kes Mahkamah yang telah diputuskan berkenaan ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD) kerana cakera keras mempunyai kapasiti penyimpanan data yang lebih besar dan dibandingkan dengan ‘compact disc‘, malah tiada material yang boleh dimasukkan semula ke dalam ‘compact disc’ melainkan hanya berlaku pada cakera keras – (data yang terdahulu akan terbatal (dengan izin ‘fast overwrite‘)).

102.    Apabila cakera keras tersebut dimainkan dengan set komputer yang bukan dirampas dari tempat kejadian, ianya tidak terdiri daripada satu sistem yang lengkap dan sekiranya ianya dimainkan dengan bukan sistem komputer yang asal dan komputer yang lain cakera keras tersebut telah dicemari (‘tampering with evidence‘) dan ini tidak seharusnya dibenarkan berlaku oleh Mahkamah. Dirujuk kepada buku bertajuk ‘Cyber Forensics – A Field Manual for Collecting, Examining, and Preserving Evidence of Computer Crimes’, 2nd Edition oleh Albert J. Marcella, Jr. dan Doug Menendez ms 288, 289, 276 – 281 menyatakan keperluan buku log bagi merekod setiap aktiviti siasatan dan analisis forensik wajib dinyatakan semasa perbicaraan di mahkamah.

103.    Setakat ini kes yang telah diputuskan di mahkamah Negara-negara Komanwel yang melibatkan pertuduhan mengenai cakera keras (‘hard disk’) adalah kes R v. Trapp (supra) di mana pakar telah menunjukkan kepada mahkamah penggunaan ‘hash function’ atau ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘hash value’ merupakan proses yang sangat kritikal dan penting di samping pengimejan forensik cakera keras dilakukan sebelumnya. Di dalam kes tersebut, pakar forensik komputer telah menggunakan SHA-1 sebagai ‘hash function’, ‘hash value’ pengiraan ‘hash value’ ditunjukkan dan dibandingkan dengan salinan imej forensik bagi cakera keras semasa perbicaraan.

Pihak Perayu merujuk kepada ”Cyber Forensics : A Manual For Collecting, Examining, and Preserving Evidence of Computer Crimes, 2nd Edition, 2008, Albert J. Marcella, Jr. dan Doug Menendez di mukasurat 56 :

Hash Functions

“Hash functions, also called message digests and one-way encryption, are algorithms that, in some sense, use no key. Instead, a fixed-length hash value is computed based upon the plain text that makes it impossible for either the contents or length of the plaintext to be recovered. Hash algorithms are typically used to provide a digital fingerprint of a file’s contents, often used to ensure that the file has not been altered by an intruder or virus.  Hash functions are also commonly employed by many operating systems to encrypt passwords. Hash functions, then provide a measure of the integrity of a file.”

 

Hash Collisions

 

In its basic form, hashing is the process (typically via complex mathematically algorithms) of taking “digital fingerprints” of data to validate authenticity. The production of “hash value” is generated to ensure that duplicated data derived from original, source data is protected against tampering. A hash value is created using a specific formula that can be used at a later time (for e.g, by an independent third party) to ensure that the duplicated data is the same when the hash value was created form the source, original data. One of the advantage of utilizing hashing is in the ability to detect data tampering.”

 

104.    Pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa integriti cakera keras ekshibit “P-2” bergantung kepada rantaian bukti samada dipelihara atau tidak. Mengikut  Cyber Forensics : A Manual For Collecting, Examining, and Preserving Evidence of Computer Crimes, 2nd Edition, 2008, Albert J. Marcella, Jr. dan Doug Menendez di mukasurat 288 :

 

Chain of Evidence

 

“The investigator has several tasks ahead of him or her and must follow certain procedures to ensure that the evidence is solid and will hold up in court. The basic criterions, which must exist in order for this to occur, are as follows:

 

1.         No possible evidence is damages, destroyed, or otherwise compromised by the procedures used to investigate the computer.

 

2.         Extracted and possibly relevant evidence is properly handled and protected form later mechanical or electromagnetic damages

 

3.         A continuing chain of custody is established and maintained

 

4.         All procedures and findings are thoroughly documented.”

 

105.    Pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa peruntukkan Seksyen 36(1) dan (2) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 perlu diaplikasi di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. Begitu juga prinsip yang diputuskan di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 :

(b) tiada sebarang keraguan tentang identiti barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah

106.    Pihak Perayu merujuk kepada kaedah mendapatkan imej seperti di dalam buku “Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations, 3rd edition, 2008, oleh Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillips, Frank Enfinger dan Christopher Steuart di Mukasurat 52 hingga 53 :

“Acquiring an Image of Evidence Media

After you retrieve and secure the evidence, you’re ready to copy the evidence media and analyze data. The first rule of computer forensics is to preserve the original evidence.Then conduct your analysis only on a copy of the data-the image of the original medium. Several vendors MS-DOS, Linux and Windows-based acquisition tools. Windows tools, however, require a write-blocking device when acquiring data from FAT or NTFS file systems (Write-blockers are discussed in Chapter 4.)”

Buku “Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations, 3rd edition, 2008, oleh Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillips, Frank Enfinger dan Christopher Steuart di Mukasurat 103 :

“Data Acquisition

“Data acquisition is the process of copiying data. For computer forensics, it’s the task of collecting digital evidence form electronic media. There are two types of data acquisition: Static acquisition and live acquisition…”

 

Buku “Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations, 3rd edition, 2008, oleh Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillips, Frank Enfinger dan Christopher Steuart di Mukasurat 131 :

Validating Data Acquisitions

Probably the most critical aspect of computer forensics is validating digital evidence. The weakest point of any digital investigation is the integrity ofd the data you collect, so validation is essential…”

Mengikut keterangan SP1 beliau menggunakan perisian EnCase dan mendakwa menggunakan Solo Imager 3 tetapi tidak dibawa semasa perbicaraan. Kedua-dua perisian dan peralatan tersebut menggunakan algorithm MD5 sebagai algorithm utama pengesahan kandungan data cakera keras (“hard disk”) di mana MD5 merupakan satu algorithm yang sudah tidak diteirmapakai mengikut kaedah forensik komputer kerana terdapat “hash collision” yang ketara. Tambahan lagi imej tidak dibawa untuk pembuktian kes di Mahkamah.

Keterangan SP1 :

“Hard disc itu, saya ada jalankan analisis untuk dapatkan bukti ujian Perisian ENCASE. Saya guna imager yang dipanggil SOLO 3 untuk imager hard disc itu ke imager ke hard disc lain. Hard disc yang satu lagi saya akan tandakan hard disc Desk Tar berkenaan. Kemudian saya serahkan fast block untuk baca hard disc tersebut supaya data tidak berubah dalam hard disc tersebut. Disambung dengan system unit yang sama kita kenali ENCASE digunakan untuk analisa hard disc tersebut.

 

(mukasurat 31 Rekod Rayuan)

 

“C        :           Semasa proses itu Inspektor tidak date data dengan

membuat imej?

 

  J        :           Saya buat image

 

C         :           Mana imej itu?

 

J          :           Saya tidak bawa.”

Buku “Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations, 3rd edition, 2008, oleh Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillips, Frank Enfinger dan Christopher Steuart di Mukasurat 185 :

Obtaining A Digital Hash

 

To verify data integrity, different methods of obtaining a unique identity for file data have been developedOne of the first methods, the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is a mathematical algorithm that determines whether a file’s contents have changed. The mosy recent verison is CRC-32. CRC, however, is not considered a forensic hash algorithm. The first algorithm for computer forensics use was Message Digest 5 (MD5). Like CRC, MD5 is a mathematical formula that translate a file into a hexadecimal code value, or a hash value. If a bit or byte in the file changes, it alters the digital hash, a unique hexadecimal value that identifies a file ro drive. (Before you process or analyze a file, you can use a software tool to calculate its digital hash.)After you process the file, you produce another digital hash.If it’s the same as the original one, you can verify the integrity of your digital evidence with mathematical proof that the file didn’t change.

 

According to work done by Wang Xiaoyun and her associates from Beijing’s Tsinghua University and Shandong University of Technology, there are three rules for forensic hashes :

 

  • You can’t predict the hash value of a file or device.
  • No two hash values can be the same. (Note: Collisions have occurred in research unsing supercomputers)
  • If anything changes in the file or deivce, the hash value must change.   

 

A newer hashing algorithm is Secure Hash Algorithm version 1 (SHA-1), developed by the National of Standards and Technology (NIST). SHA-1 is slowly replacing MD5 and CRC-32, although MD5 is still widely used.”

 

Buku “Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations, 3rd edition, 2008, oleh Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillips, Frank Enfinger dan Christopher Steuart di Mukasurat  369 :

“Using Hash Values to Discriminate Data

“In chapter 7, you learned using the discrimination function to sort known good files from suspicious files. The discrimination function is useful in limiting the amount of data you have examine, and many current computer forensics tools offer this function.

 

AccessData has a separate database, the Known File Filter (KFF), which is available only with FTK, KFF filters known program files from views, such as MSWOrd.exe, and identifies known illegal files, such as child pornography. KFF compares known file hash values to files on your evidence dirve or image files to see whether they contain suspicious data. Periodically, AccessData updates these known file hash values and posts an updated KFF. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the National Software reference Library (NSRL;www.nsrl.nist.gov) also maintains a national database of updated file hash values for a variety of Oss, applications, and  images.”

Cyber Forensics : A Manual For Collecting, Examining, and Preserving Evidence of Computer Crimes, 2nd Edition, 2008, Albert J. Marcella, Jr. dan Doug Menendez di mukasurat 279 :

Chain of Custody

The chain of custody begins when an item of evidence is collected, and the chain is maintained until the evidence is disposed of. The chain of custody assures continuous accountability. This accountability is important because, if not properly maintained, an item (of evidence) may be inadmissible in court.”

     

Buku “Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations, 3rd edition, 2008, oleh Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillips, Frank Enfinger dan Christopher Steuart di Mukasurat 158 :

Understanding Rules of Evidence

…Computer records are usually divided into computer generated records and computer-stored records. Computer-generated records are data the system maintains, such as system log files and proxy server logs. They are output generated from a computer process or algorithm, not usually data a person creates. Computer-stored records, however, are electronic data that a person creates and saves on a computer, such as a spreadsheet or word processing document. Some records combine computer-generated and computer-stored evidence, such as spreadsheet containing mathematical operations (computer generate drecords) generated from a perosn’s input (computer-stored records).” 

107.    Oleh itu jelas terdapat ‘lacunae’di dalam undang-undang di Malaysia berkenaan pembuktian kes melibatkan cakera keras dan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 seharusnya menggunapakai peruntukkan Seksyen 5 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah di mana undang-undang di England digunapakai untuk prosedur pembuktian kes melibatkan cakera keras.

108.    Hujahan-hujahan Perayu berkenaan cara analisis SP1 tidak dicabar langsung oleh Pihak Pendakwaan samada pada peringkat di akhir kes pendakwaan dan di peringkat kes pembelaan. Sehingga rayuan ini pihak Pendakwaan gagal mengemukakan sebarang otoriti untuk menunjukkan bahawa SP1 telah melakukan analisa mengikut kaedah piawaian forensik antarabangsa untuk cakera keras.

109.    Oleh yang demikian, pihak Pendakwaan gagal membuktikan melampaui keraguan munasabah bahawa kaedah analisa SP1 mengikut kaedah piawaian forensik antarabangsa.

Isu 106 Klip Video Tersebut Mestilah Lucah di Sisi Undang-undang

 

110.    Di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li (supra), di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“2nd Ground

 

Under the 2nd ground the prosecution submitted that the learned Magistrate had erred in law and in fact when he came to his finding that the prosecution has failed to prove that all of exh. P1, ie, the remaining 14 VCD (video cakera padat) seized are obscene films and disregarded PW5’s evidence that the result of a screen test conducted on the seized items has shown that all these items are obscene films.

 

Under the 2nd ground, in my view, it would be unsafe for the court to solely rely on PW5’s evidence that he had conducted a screen test on all the 18 VCD’s and that they were all obscene films because I find that exh. P5 which was prepared by him in respect of the 18 VCDs handed to him lacked evidential value and besides there was a material contradiction as from whom he received the 18 VCDs (discussed earlier).

 

Therefore, the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCDs is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films becomes critical. Here as per the finding of the learned Magistrate not only were only four VCDs screened but unfortunately the titles of the four VCDs were not even identified. Hence, there is no evidence before the court of which of the four VCDs out of the 18 VCDs exh. P1 (A-R) were of obscene material and neither was there proof whether the remaining 14 VCDs were of obscene material or otherwise.

 

I agree with the defence that the learned Magistrate should not be faulted just because he had allowed the prosecution’s application to conduct random screening. In my opinion the permission granted by the learned Magistrate is not tantamount to a waiver of the burden emplaced on the prosecution to prove each and every essential ingredient of the charge for purposes of establishing a prima facie case. It is the duty of the prosecution throughout to establish a prima facie case and it is not for the learned Magistrate, as pointed out by the defence, to tell them as to the correct procedure to be adopted.

111.    Di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing (supra), di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“Intipati (b)

 

[9] Berdasarkan keterangan, SP1 ada membuat rampasan terhadap barang-barang kes. Namun begitu, adalah didapati tiada sebarang penandaan dibuat pada mana-mana bahagian pada VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas. Setelah barang-barang kes diserahkan kepada SP3 (C/Insp. Saifulnizam bin Mohamed Jais), SP3 juga tidak membuat apa-apa tanda pada barang-barang kes yang diterima dan menyimpan barang-barang kes tersebut di bilik stor barang kes. Penjaga stor pula tidak dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan di mahkamah. Kemungkinan bahawa barang-barang kes ini telah bercampur-aduk dengan barang kes untuk kes yang lain tidak dapat diketepikan.

 

[10] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan keputusan Majistret apabila beliau mendapati senarai bongkar (eks. P3) yang merujuk kepada senarai VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas adalah tidak lengkap. Terdapat sepuluh keping VCD dan DVD lucah dalam bahasa Cina tidak dinyatakan tajuk (“title”) dan begitu juga dengan empat keping DVD dalam bahasa Cina yang tidak dinyatakan tajuk. Dalam eksh. P3 cuma dinyatakan seperti berikut: “pelbagai tajuk VCD/DVD lucah dalam bahasa Cina”. Dalam perkara ini, saya bersetuju dengan penghakiman dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501, di mana Hakim Lau Bee Lan memutuskan:

 

… the principle to be gleaned is the effect of non-compliance of the provision governing a search list merely cast doubt on the bona fides of the parties conducting the search and then becomes incumbent on the trial judge to scrutinize the evidence further whether a prima facie has made out.

 

In the context of the present case, the identity of the 18 VCDs is central to proving that the accused had possession of them and the absence of the listing of each of the titles of the 18 VCDs greatly weakens the case for the prosecution.

 

Intipati (c)

 

[11] Timbalan pendakwa raya terpelajar menghujahkan bahawa kesemua VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas telah dibuktikan mengandungi adegan lucah. Dengan hormat, mahkamah ini tidak bersetuju. Walaupun pihak pendakwaan telah mendapat kebenaran dari mahkamah Majistret untuk menjalankan uji tayang secara rawak terhadap barang-barang kes, namun begitu, adalah menjadi tugas pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan kes mereka sepanjang perbicaraan. Hanya sepuluh keping dari VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas dibuat uji tayang di mahkamah Majistret dan sepuluh keping VCD/DVD yang dibuat uji tayang itu juga tidak dinyatakan tajuk-tajuknya. Tidak terdapat mana-mana peruntukan dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang menyatakan bahawa penayangan sejumlah VCD/DVD yang dirampas yang dipercayai mengandungi adegan lucah akan dianggap sebagai telah membuktikan bahawa keseluruhan VCD/DVD tersebut mengandungi adegan lucah. Oleh yang demikian, setiap satu VCD/DVD yang dirampas itu perlu dibuat uji tayang. Keadaan ini adalah berbeza, misalnya, dengan peruntukan yang jelas dibawah s. 37(j) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang menyatakan bahawa adalah mencukupi jika sampel dadah diambil tidak kurang dari 10% bekas (receptacles) yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya (lihat kes-kes Gunalan Ramachandran & Ors v. PP[2004] 4 CLJ 551; Chu Tak Fai v. PP [2006] 4 CLJ 931 dan PP v. Seow Wei Hoong[2008] 4 CLJ 453).

 

[12] Dalam perkara ini, saya juga bersetuju dengan penghakiman dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Chung Wan Li (supra) apabila hakim dipetik berkata:

 

Therefore, the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCDs is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films becomes critical. Here as per the finding of the learned magistrate not only were only four VCDs screened but unfortunately the titles of the four VCDs were not even identified. Hence, there is no evidence before the court of which the four VCDs out of the 18 VCDs Exh P1 (A-R) were of obscene material and neither was there proof whether the remaining 14 VCDs were of obscene material or otherwise.

 

I agree with the defence that the learned magistrate should not be faulted just because he had allowed the prosecution’s application to conduct random screening. In my opinion, the permission granted by the learned magistrate is not tantamount to a waiver of the burden emplaced on the prosecution to prove each and every essential ingredient of the charge for purposes of establishing a prima facie case. It is the duty of the prosecution throughout to establish a prima facie case and it is not for the learned magistrate, as pointed out by the defence, to tell them as to the correct procedure to be adopted.

 

[13] Keputusan bahawa terdapat keraguan yang munasabah sama ada barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian adalah sama dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah dan sama ada kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas itu mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”) adalah penemuan fakta yang dibuat oleh Puan Majistret berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan beliau di mana beliau mempunyai kelebihan untuk melihat dan mendengar saksi-saksi berkenaan. Penemuan fakta adalah merupakan fungsi eksklusif mahkamah bicara (lihat PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457). Perkara ini telah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap. Dalam kes Herchun Singh & Ors v. PP [1969] 1 LNS 52, Ong Hock Thye, KH berkata:

 

An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding on fact arrived at by the judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding: see Sheo Swarup v. King- Emperor AIR [1934] PC 227.

 

[14] Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa tidak terdapat apa-apa alasan untuk memutuskan bahawa Puan Majistret telah “mishandling the fact” dalam kes ini. Keputusan selainnya oleh Puan Majistret akan bertentangan dengan keberatan keterangan (“weight of evidence”) yang ada di hadapan mahkamah.

 

[15] Kesan terkumpul undang-undang terhadap keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan dalam kes ini telah menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pihak pendakwaan. Terdapat jurang yang tidak dipenuhi oleh pihak pendakwaan terutama yang berhubung dengan identiti ekshibit dan adegan lucah. Perkara ini memudaratkan kes pihak pendakwaan. Dalam kes Mohan Singh Lachman Singh v. PP [2002] 3 CLJ 293, Mahkamah Rayuan membuat pemerhatian:

 

The burden of proving its case at every stage lies on the prosecution. The only task of the accused is to raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecution’s case. If there are gaps in the case for the prosecution, these cannot be filled by resorting to a purported failure on the part of the defence to put specific questions relevant to its case. Such gaps must be filled by the prosecution itself: Abdullah Zawawi v. PP [1985] CLJ 19 (Rep); [1985] 2 CLJ 2; [1985] 2 MLJ 16. That has always been the law. It is still the law.

 

[16] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan di atas, mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa rayuan timbalan pendakwa raya tidak mempunyai merit. Dengan itu, rayuan ditolak dan keputusan Puan Majistret yang melepas dan membebaskan responden di akhir kes pendakwaan bagi pertuduhan kedua dikekalkan.”

112.    Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon (supra), di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah di sisi undang-undang, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“Screen Testing For Obscenity

 

[15] However, I find that the second vital ingredient in this case, ie, that the 65 DVDs are obscene was not proved.

 

15.1. There is no evidence at all that the 65 DVDs were subject to a screen test (uji tayang) for the court to make a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene.

 

15.2. SP1 merely testified that he was satisfied that the 65 DVDs were obscene by looking at the covers of the DVDs.

 

15.3. SP4, the I.O. of the case, said he had screen tested them at random in his office and found them to be obscene.

 

15.4. Although at one point of the proceedings the learned APP applied to reserve screen-testing of the DVDs, the learned defence counsel had responded that there was no need for screen-testing (p. 29 of Appeal Record). Unfortunately the court appeared to have agreed with learned defence counsel because nowhere in the notes of evidence does it appear that screen testing was done.

 

[16] In the case of PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 HC, the learned High Court judge held that “the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCD’s is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films”. In Chung’s case (supra), the learned High Court judge did not approve of the random testing that was conducted during the trial.

 

[17] His Lordship Mohd. Zawawi Salleh, JC, concurred with the learned High Court judge in the case of PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 HC. His Lordship held in Lee Swee Sing’s case that there is no provision in the Film Censorship Act 2002 which allows for random testing. A comparison was drawn with the provision of s. 37(j) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which allowed for a 10% of the sample of the drugs to be tested.

 

[18] In this case, there was no screen testing at all carried out during the trial. How then can the court arrive at a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene? It is patently clear that the prosecution had failed to prove that the 65 DVDs were obscene and the learned magistrate should have so found.

 

[19] For the reasons as adumbrated above the acquittal and discharge of the respondent is hereby affirmed as the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case against the respondent as per the charge.

 

[20] The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

113.    Apa yang boleh difahamkan daripada ketiga-tiga kes di atas, kesemua jumlah bahan yang tercatat di dalam kertas pertuduhan mestilah dibuktikan lucah di sisi undang-undang. Sekiranya satu bahan tidak lucah, maka si tertuduh mestilah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan tersebut kerana tidak terdapat mana-mana peruntukan dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002yang menyatakan bahawa penayangan sejumlah VCD/DVD yang dirampas yang dipercayai mengandungi adegan lucah akan dianggap sebagai telah membuktikan bahawa keseluruhan VCD/DVD tersebut mengandungi adegan lucah.

114.    Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil SP1 untuk memberi keterangan bahawa 106 klip video tersebut adalah lucah. SP1 telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 4 – 11 Nota Keterangan) bahawa:

Ada 150 video. Dalam senarai, ada 106 yang lucah. Saya ada list saya buat dalam list laporan forensic saya.

SP1 seterusnya telah diberi keterangan bahawa di antara klip video tersebut adalah lucah, tidak lucah, tidak dapat dimainkan, ada gambar lucah, tiada video lucah, tiada bahan lucah, tidak boleh dimainkan, mohon delete temporary file.

115.    Oleh itu, melalui keterangan SP1 dan Ekshibit P35 (Laporan Analisa), jumlah klip video yang dikatakan lucah tidak sampai 106. Maka, pihak Pendakwaan tidak berjaya membuktikan intipati ini menurut undang-undang.

116.    Bilangan klip video lucah sebanyak 106 klip tersebut sebenarnya tidak dapat dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan kerana terdapat klip video yang berulang-ulang dan mempunyai kandungan yang sama tetapi nama fail yang berbeza (mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan). Terdapat klip-klip video yang tidak dapat dimainkan seperti dancewater.avi, dcmonument.avi dan moonrise.avi, ROSEBLOOM.avi, video001.avi, V10raw.mpg dan V137raw.mpg (mukasurat 5, 6 dan 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip-klip video yang tidak keluar (mukasurat 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada yang tiada kandungan lucah (mukasurat 5,6,7 dan 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip yang tidak dapat dibaca seperti V10.raw.mpg (mukasurat 7 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip video yang tidak lucah tetapi ditandakan sebagai bahan lucah seperti Sato1.mpg dan sato2.mpg (mukasurat 6 Nota Keterangan).

117.    Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7) juga tidak menyediakan senarai klip video lucah tersebut kerana tiada senarai diberikan mengikut Seksyen 51A Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Sekiranya pihak Pendakwaan mendakwa senarai klip video yang dilampirkan bersama Laporan Forensik (ekshibit “P35”) maka senarai tersebut tidak boleh diambilkira kerana Laporan Forensik tersebut telah dicabar kesahihannya dengan jumlah uji tayang yang dibuat di Mahkamah dan penerimaan Laporan Forensik tersebut sebagai ekshibit tidak mengikut lunas undang-undang.

118.    Pihak Perayu turut berhujah bahawa setiap satu daripada 106 klip video yang berlainan tajuk dan menjadi asas pertuduhan tidak ditanda sebagai ekshibit. Ini dapat dibuktikan dengan tiada keterangan direkodkan di dalam Nota-nota Keterangan sehingga 6.1.2011.

119.    Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang apabila memutuskan bahawa setiap satu video klip yang menjadi asas pertuduhan telah dibuktikan dengan ujitayang dan dikira sebagai kandungan ekshibit “P-2” dan oleh yang demikian telah ditanda dengan teratur.

120.    Adalah dihujahkan bahawa mengikut Nota Keterangan ekshibit “P-2” adalah satu cakera keras (‘hard disk’) dan kandungan di dalam “P-2” adalah berlainan sifat dan bentuk yang perlu ditanda satu persatu. Adalah tidak munasabah membuat keputusan memandangkan bahawa klip-klip video tersebut berada di dalam “P-2” maka ianya adalah “P-2”.

121.    Perayu  bersandarkan kepada satu kes Mahkamah Rayuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (mukasurat 10 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) di dalam kes Malayan Banking Berhad lawan Boh Wee Siah (Rayuan Sivil 2010) di mana pihak Plaintif telah gagal mengemukakan dokumen Perjanjian Jualbeli Lot 55 dalam Ikatan Dokumen. Semasa perbicaraan dijalankan di hadapan Hakim Dato’ Haji Azhar bin Ma’ah, Plaintif cuba memasukkan dokumen tersebut tetapi telah tidak dibenarkan. Oleh itu Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa Plaintif tidak boleh merujuk dokumen Perjanjian Jualbeli Lot 55 yang tidak terdapat dalam Ikatan Dokumen selain daripada dokumen-dokumen yang sedia ada sahaja. Mahkamah turut merujuk kepada kes Chong Khee Sang v. Pang Ah Chee [1984] 1 MLJ 377 di muka surat 381 memutuskan:

In the first place it is the duty of counsel engaged in a case to see that the documentary evidence upon which he relies is properly tendered in court and proved. After they have been proved he should also see that when admitted into evidence the documents are properly marked as required by law. Reference may be made in this connection to Immam-Ud-Din v. Sri Ram Perbhu Dial.

122.    Perayu juga turut merujuk kepada kes Pendakwa Raya v Rozaimi Bin Omar & Ors [2009] MLJU 1362 (mukasurat 13 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) di mana  Yaacob Bin Haji Md. Sam, JC telah merujuk kepada kes Chong Khee Sang v Pang Ah Chee [1984] 1 MLJ 337 isu berkaitan beban pembuktian ke atas dokumen yang hendak dikemukakan oleh plaintif sebagai eksibit bagi menyokong tuntutan plaintif dalam kes tersebut telah dibincangkan dan Y.A. Shankar J. yang memutuskan seperti berikut:

a document cannot be admitted into evidence and marked as such until  it has been properly proved.

123.    Bagi intipati kedua pertuduhan, Pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa tiada definisi yang khusus bagi ‘lucah’ di dalam undang-undang.

124.    Tiada definisi bagi perkataan ‘lucah’ berdasarkan perundangan yang boleh digunapakai di dalam rumah samada di dalam Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967, Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan Kanun Kesiksaan.

125.    Mengikut Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Volume 1, 24th Edition di mukasurat 1115 dengan jelas menerangkan bahawa:

“The word “obscene” has not been defined in the Code.”

 

126.    Definisi Lucah (‘Obscene’) atau Kelucahan (‘Obscenity’) bergantung kepada keadaan, tempat dan konteks semasa ianya berlaku. Apabila seseorang tanpa seurat benang di tubuh berada di rumahnya tanpa kehadiran orang luar tiada sesiapa boleh mengatakan bahawa beliau berkelakuan lucah. Keadaan yang sama juga jika sesuatu rakaman dibuat di dalam rumah dengan diri sendiri tanpa kehadiran orang lain atau dengan kehadiran pasangan yang sah di sisi undang-undang sahaja berada di rumah di mana di dalam konteks tersebut perlakuan tidak dikira bersifat lucah. Kesopanan awam hanya meliputi luar premis persendirian dan lucah tidak didefinisikan secara khusus di dalam perundangan.

127.    Di dalam kes-kes ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD), ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD) tersebut diedar, dijual  dan disebarkan untuk orang awam yang sudah tentu akan memberi kesan kepada orang awam terutamanya golongan muda yang memilikinya. Ini berbeza dengan kes ini di mana pihak polis telah memasuki premis tanpa waran geledah yang sah di sisi undang-undang dan rampasan harta peribadi dibuat yang jelas bukan untuk tatapan umum.

128.    Perayu/Tertuduh selanjutnya berhujah bahawa definisi ‘lucah’ yang diterima oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur berdasarkan keterangan SP1 dan SP2 adalah amat dangkal dan tidak berasaskan pinsip-prinsip undang-undang sebagaimana prinsip-prinsip undang-undang yang dirujuk oleh Perayu/Tertuduh mengikut Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Volume 1, 24th Edition.

 

129.    Oleh yang demikian, kesimpulan yang tidak dapat dielakkan ialah Perayu di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tidak mempunyai kandungan lucah di sisi undang-undang pada setiap masa yang material, bahan yang dikatakan lucah tersebut.

130.    Bagi isu ‘breach of privacy’, Pihak Perayu ingin merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Chong Chieng Jen lawan Mohd Irwan Hafiz bin Md Radzi & Anor  [2009] 8 MLJ 364 (di mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti  Perayu) di mana komputer riba pemohon telah dirampas apabila satu waran geledah dikeluarkan oleh Majistret apabila pemohon disyaki menyimpan bahan berunsur hasutan. Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk mengetepikan waran geledah dan memerintahkan komputer riba dikembalikan kepada Pemohon. Di dalam kes ini Rhodzariah Bujang JC menyatakan seperti berikut:

The requirement for ‘information’ and ‘reason to believe’ is mandatory because the execution of the warrant willl definitely result in the invasion of the privacy and property of the owner of the premises so named and may even result in the consfication of his property. A person’s privacy and the right to his property are very basic rights of a man and that to his property is even enshrined under Article 13(1) of the Federal Constitution.”

131.    Pihak Perayu ingin merujuk kepada kes Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu):

[ Footnote 7 ] The Supreme Court of Ohio considered the issue in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N. E. 2d 387 (1960). Four of the seven judges of that court felt that criminal prosecution for mere private possession of obscene materials was prohibited by the Constitution. However, Ohio law required the concurrence of “all but one of the judges” to declare a state law unconstitutional. The view of the “dissenting” judges was expressed by Judge Herbert:

“I cannot agree that mere private possession of . . . [obscene] literature by an adult should constitute a crime. The right of the individual to read, to believe or disbelieve, and to think without governmental supervision is one of our basic liberties, but to dictate to the mature adult what books he may have in his own private library seems to the writer to be a clear infringement of his constitutional rights as an individual.” 170 Ohio St., at 437, 166 N. E. 2d, at 393.

132.    Adalah mustahil sesuatu tempat itu digeledah terlebih dahulu sebelum adanya ‘First Information Report’ atau sesuatu tempat itu digeledah mendahului ‘First Information Report’. Tambahan lagi Laporan Analisa oleh SP1 adalah berkenaan dengan Dang Wang Rpt 29694/09 bersabit Jalan Patani Rpt 5070/2009.

133.    Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 sebagai ‘First Information Report’ adalah amat penting di dalam kes ini memandangkan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani tersebut. Perayu/Tertuduh semasa memberi keterangan di dalam pemeriksaan utama telah memohon agar Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report No. 5070/09 tersebut ditanda sebagai “ID” tetapi disebabkan Pengadu Norina Zainol Abidin tidak dapat dipanggil kerana ditolak oleh Mahkamah, salinan laporan polis tersebut ditender mengikut Seksyen 173(j)(iii) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

134.    SP-5 memberi keterangan bahawa tiada waran untuk melakukan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan tersebut. Bagi situasi ini, pihak pendakwaan mestilah mematuhi Seksyen.62 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan segala intipati Seksyen 62 tersebut mestilah dipenuhi terlebih dahulu sebelum membuat pemeriksaan atau penggeledahan tanpa waran. Tiada apa-apa keterangan mengenai situasi ini maka penggeledahan atau pemeriksaan pada Tarikh tersebut di Bangunan tersebut adalah tidak sah di sisi undang-undang.

135.    Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi pendakwaan pertama (SP1) sebagai saksi pakar. Pengadu asal tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi. Maklumat pertama (“First Information Report’) adalah dari seorang bernama Norina Zainol Abidin yang tidak dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai saksi pertama kerana berdasarkan laporan beliau, polis telah datang ke premis tersebut pada 13.7.2009 tanpa waran geledah dan alasan yang munasabah untuk memasuki premis tersebut. Laman web yang dikatakan lucah http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com merupakan laman blog yang kosong. Oleh itu tidak wujud isu kelucahan atau isu yang melanggar kesopanan awam pada laman blog tersebut. Amat ketara bahawa laporan pertama tersebut tidak benar dan merupakan laporan yang palsu yang sengaja direka-reka oleh Pengadu asal untuk menceroboh hak persendirian Perayu/Tertuduh. Oleh yang demikian cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang ditender sebagai ekshibit tidak sepatutnya dirampas pada hakikat sebenarnya kerana tiada peralatan atau peranti atau modem atau talian rangkaian yang dilanggani pada tarikh 13hb. Julai, 2009 yang dijumpai di tempat kejadian mengikut seksyen 248 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998.

136.    Pihak Perayu ingin merujuk kepada buku “Guide To Computer Forensics and Investigations, 3rd Edition, 2008 oleh Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillips, Frank Enfinger dan Christopher Steuart, di mukasurat 442, ‘Network Forensics” dimaksudkan bagi siasatan mengenai rangkaian adalah seperti berikut:

“Network Forensics is the process of collecting and analyzing raw network data and systematically tracking network traffic to ascertain how an attack was carried out or how an event occurred on a network. Because network attacks are on rise, there’s more focus on this field ans increasing demand for skilled technician. Labor forecasts predict a shortfall of 50,000 network forensic specialists in law enforcement, legal firms, corporations, and universities.

 

When intruders break into a network they leave a trail behind. Being able to spot variations in network traffic can help you track intrusions, so knowing your network’s typical traffic patterns is important. For example, the primary IPS in Windhoek, Namibia has peak hours of use between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. because most people in that city have internet access only at work. If a usage spike occurred durignt he night, the network administrator on duty would recognize it as unusual activity and could take steps to investigate it…

 

Network forensics examiners must establish standard procedures for how to acquire data after an attack or intrusion incident. Typically, network administrator want to find compromised machines, get them offline, and restore them as quickly as possible to minimize downtime. However, taking the time to follow standard procedures is essential to ensure that all compromised machines have been found and to ascertain attack methods in an effort to prevent them from happening again… ”  

137.    Tiada sebarang keterangan daripada SP1 dan SP7 yang menerangkan bagaimana laman web tersebut dikesan daripada ‘internet protocol’ dari ‘service provider’ kepada internet yang terdapat dari premis tempat kejadian. SP5 dan SP7 mengesahkan di dalam keterangan masing-masing bahawa tiada modem atau peranti dijumpai. Apa yang boleh digarapkan daripada keterangan-keterangan ini bahawa tiada bukti kukuh mengaitkan tempat kejadian dengan laporan pengadu “First Information Report”. SP5 memberi keterangan bahawa set komputer tidak disambung ke sumber kuasa dan tidak berfungsi. Beliau menyatakan bahawa komputer di tempat kejadian rosak. Oleh yang demikian bagaimana cakera keras (‘hard disk’) boleh dirampas sedangkan untuk akses kepada internet memerlukan peranti modem, talian internet yang pada masa material membawa satu internet protocol (IP) yang unik yang boleh dikesan dan dikaitkan dengan “MAC address” (Networking Card) pada komputer yang disyaki tersebut. Tiada keterangan mengenai analisis forensik rangkaian dan analisis forensik Facebook yang dibuat oleh SP1 untuk membuktikan bahawa Perayu/Tertuduh boleh dikaitkan dengan laman web yang dinyatakan sebelum ini. Nama Domain (‘domain name’) http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com tidak dibuktikan siapa tuanpunya atau pemiliknya atau siapa yang mendaftar ‘domain name’ tersebut  :

“Q        : Apa alasan kamu untuk masuk ke rumah itu pada 13.07.2009?

A         : SP1 telah membuat laporan polis dan m.o adalah sama. Berdasarkan maklumat dan laporan SP1 saya pergi ke situ.”

 

(Mukasurat 73 Nota Keterangan)

Mengikut Buku TCP/IP dan Networking oleh Abdul Latiff bin Esa, Cetakan Pertama 2006 di mukasurat 30, IP address yang sah dimaksudkan seperti berikut:

 

IP address yang valid

 

Terdapat beberapa nilai yang perlu dipatuhi bagi memastikan penggunaan IP address yang sesuai digunakan pada sesuatu host. Berikut ini adalah beberapa ketetapan yang perlu dituruti.

 

  • IP address tidak sepatutnya bermula dengan angka 0,127 atau 255. Sebagai contoh, IP address 127.x.y.z, 0.x.y.z atau 255x.y.z sememangnya tidak valid.

 

  • IP address bagi suatu komputer tidak boleh diakhiri dengan 0 atau 255 pada octet keempat. Misalnya IP address w.x.y.255 adalah tidak valid, kerana ia dikategorikan sebagai broadcast. IP address w.x.y.0 juga tidak boleh digunakan kerana ia dikategorikan pula sebagai network Id.

 

  • IP address mestilah unik bagi penggunaan setiap komputer di dalam sesuatu network. Sebagai contoh, kedua-dua komputer A dan komputer B tidak boleh menggunakan IP address 10.1.1.1 dengan nilai subnet mask yang sama iaitu 255.255.0.0.”   

138.    Pihak Perayu turut merujuk kepada mukasurat 235 hingga 239 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2 di mana tiada carian atau semakan dibuat berkenaan pemilik laman web http://www.all4sure.com.

139.    Di samping itu tiada keterangan daripada SP1 dan SP7 bahawa Perayu adalah ‘friend’ yang diterima oleh Pengadu asal untuk akaun ‘Facebook’ Pengadu asal. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang menunjukkan bahawa Perayu ada akses kepada maklumat akaun ‘Facebook’ Pengadu asal.

Pihak Perayu merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi berkaitan internet dan ‘domain name’ Petroliam Nasional Bhd v. Khoo Nee Kiong [2003] 4 MLJ 216 (mukasurat 230-231 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu):

[35] I also reproduce below the following excerpt from the judgment of Aldous LJ in British Telecommunications plc and another v One In A Million Ltd and others and other actions [1998] 4 All ER 476 at p480-481 which explains in very simple terms what is internet and which also adopts the explanation by the learned trial judge, Jonathan Sumption QC sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court on what is domain name:

At its simplest the internet is a collection of computers which are connected through the telephone network to communicate with each other.

As explained by the judge [1998] FSR 265 at p 267:

 

The internet is increasingly used by commercial organizations to promote themselves and their products and in some cases to buy and sell. For these purposes they need a domain name identifying the computer which they are using. A domain name comprises groups of alphanumeric characters separated by dots. A first group commonly comprises the name of the enterprise or a brand name or trading name associated with it, followed by a ‘top level’ name identifying the nature and sometimes the location of the organization….

 

Members of the public would not ordinarily have a domain name. They would subscribe to a service provider and have an e-mail address. That enables a subscriber to send a message to another computer through the service provider, which forwards the message requested to the appropriate computer. The subscriber can also browse around the world wide web and seek web pages associated with a particular domain name. Thus if he transmits a domain name and the web pages sought and provide the information obtained.”    

140.    Pihak Perayu bersandarkan kepada satu kes Frangione v. Vandadongen [2010] O. J. No. 2337 (mukasurat 8 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Agung Ontario memutuskan seperti berikut:

[33] Counsel have referred to several cases in Ontario that have dealt with the relatively new issue of production of the contents of Facebook sites given the proliferation of social networking sites. Our courts have observed and accepted that “Facebook” is a social networking sites used by members to communicate information about one’s personal life to other members of the Facebook community. When a person registers with Facebook, at http://www.facebook.com website, he creates his own profile and privacy settings. Profile information is displayed to people in the networks specified by the user in his privacy settings e.g a user may choose to make his private profile information available to others within his school, geographic area, employment network, or to “friends” of “friends”. A user can set privacy options that limit access to his profile only to those to whom he grants permission the so called “friends” of the user (Murphy v. Perger, [2007] O.J. No. 5511 (S.C.J.); Leduc, supra[19] Wicev. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co.[2009] O.J. No. 2946 (S.C.J.); Kourtesis v. Joris [2007] O.J. No. 5539 (S.C.J).   

 

141.    Siasatan SP7 tidak lengkap dan oleh itu lebih menjurus kepada bersifat prejudis terhadap Perayu. Mengikut keterangan SP7 beliau terus ke Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara dan mengambil rekod mengenai Perayu walaupun tidak dibuktikan bahawa Perayu adalah suspek berdasarkan analisa forensik yang betul dan diterimapakai oleh ‘common law’. Tiada keterangan SP7 mengenai isteri pertama dan isteri pertama tidak dikenalpasti. Kemudian SP7 menyatakan kes telah ditutup.

SP7 semasa pemeriksaan balas memberi keterangan seperti berikut :

“ Q       : Siapakah yang menanda “isteri pertama” dan “isteri kedua” pada dokumen?

 

            A         :           Saya telah pergi ke JPN dan menurut rekod OKT ada dua orang                   isteri.

 

Q         :           Rekod di JPN; gambar isteri kedua ada keluar?

 

A         :           Saya buat permohonan untuk lihat gambar semasa permohonan

pendaftaran ic untuk Ainy Suhaila dan OKT.

 

            Q         :           Kamu tahu siapa dalam gambar itu?

 

            A         :           Saya rasa itu adalah isteri kepada OKT.

           

            Q         :           Pasti?

 

            A         :           Ya

 

            Q         :           Pernah jumpa dengan isteri saya?

 

            A         :           Tidak”

 

(mukasurat 74 Nota Keterangan)

 

“…Saya masuk ke rumah OKT untuk menyiasat berkaitan report Jalan Patani 5070/09. Kes itu telah ditutup.”

 

(mukasurat 79 Nota Keterangan)

 

141.    Pihak Perayu merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Chan King Yu v Public Prosecutor [2009] 1 MLJ 457 (di mukasurat 23 dan 25 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) :

“ [70]   It was argued for the appellant that the learned judge and the Court of Appeal judges had misdirected themselves in admitting hearsay evidence and other inadmissible evidence which was highly prejudicial to the appellant. It was submitted that in respect of some of the admitted evidence there were elements of higher prejudice than probative value and the court ought to have exercised its discretion to exclude them. …

 

[75]     I am of the view from the above quoted findings in the judgment of the courts it can be said both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had acted on statements which were clearly hearsay and prejudicial to the appellant and therefore inadmissible.”

             

142.    Adalah amat jelas bahawa penyitaan barang kes pada 13.7.2009 dibuat tanpa sebab yang munasabah dan berlawanan dengan kehendak Seksyen 42 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan juga prinsip yang telah diputuskan di dalam kes Chong Chieng Jen lawan Mohd Irwan Hafiz bin Md Radzi & Anor (supra) dan Tertuduh berhak kepada gantirugi kerana penyitaan tanpa sebab yang munasabah bersandarkan peruntukkan Seksyen 42 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 seperti berikut:

Tiada kos atau gantirugi yang berbangkit daripada penyitaan boleh didapatkan

 

            42.       Tiada seorang pun boleh, dalam apa-apa prosiding di hadapan mana-mana mahkamah berkenaan dengan penyitaan apa-apa filem, bahan publisit filem, buku, dokumen atau benda lain yang disita pada menjalankan atau berupa sebagai penjalanan mana-mana kuasa yang diberikan di bawah Akta ini, berhak mendapat kos prosiding itu atau apa-apa gantirugi atau relief lain melainkan jika penyitaan itu dibuat tanpa sebab yang munasabah.”

143.    Pihak Perayu menyatakan bahawa memandangkan kedua-dua intipati penting tidak dapat dibuktikan maka sabitan terhadap Perayu perlu diakas atau dibatalkan dan Perayu dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan tersebut.

Isu-isu yang melibatkan ketidakadilan berlaku semasa perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut

144.    Pada 29.7.2010 Perayu tidak dapat mengutarakan soalan-soalan dengan sepenuhnya terhadap saksi pendakwaan pertama (SP1) semasa pemeriksaan balas kerana dihalang oleh Mahkamah.

145.    Pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa hak Perayu telah dinafikan untuk melantik peguambela dan mendapat satu perbicaraan yang adil dan telus menurut Artikel 5 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Artikel 5 Perlembagaan Persekutuan memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

5. Liberty of the person.

 

(1) No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.

(2) Where complaint is made to a High Court or any judge thereof that a person is being unlawfully detained the court shall inquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order him to be produced before the court and release him.

 

(3) Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult by a legal practitioner of his choice.

146.    Tiada direkodkan di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi sambung perbicaraan pada 29.7.2010 mengenai permohonan penangguhan untuk melantik peguambela.

147.    Oleh itu hak Perayu untuk mendapat satu perbicaraan yang adil mengikut prinsip , dengan izin, ‘natural justice’ yang merangkumi ‘right to a fair hearing’ telah dikompromi.

148.    Bagi menyokong alasan ini pihak Perayu bersandarkan kepada satu kes

Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) di dalam kes Jaginder Singh & Ors v. Attorney-General [1983] 1 MLJ 71 (mukasurat 1 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) di mana Raja Azlan Shah AG LP, Abdul Hamid FJ dan AbdoolCader J membenarkan rayuan perayu di dalam kes tersebut dan memutuskan seperti berikut:

What also vitiated the committal for contempt of court in this case was the learned judge’s failure to make plain to the appellants the specific nature of the charges and the opportunity to give them a fair hearing.”

149.    Pihak Perayu juga turut merujuk kepada kes Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] AC 322, PC, (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (mukasurat 1 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) Lord Denning telah memutuskan bahawa:

“… The rule against bias is one thing. The right to be heard is another. Those two rules are the essential characteristics of what is called natural justice. They are the twin pillars supporting it. The Romans put them in the two maxims: Nemo judex in causa sua, and Audi alteram partem. They have recently been put in the two words, Impartiality and Fairness. But they are separate concepts and are governed by separate considerations. In the present case inspector Kanda complained of a breach of the second. He said that his constitutional right had been infringed. He had been dismissed without being given a reasonable hearing”.

150.    Adalah dihujahkan oleh Perayu bahawa hak untuk mendapat perbicaraan yang adil bukan setakat Mahkamah menyediakan pen dan notepad untuk catat nota prosiding (mukasurat 12 Nota Keterangan).

151.    Menurut Nota Keterangan, terdapat ruang (‘gap’) di antara ekshibit-ekshibit yang dikemukakan di mahkamah yang menyebabkan pihak Perayu tidak dapat berhujah sepenuhnya dan ini telah memprejudiskan Perayu. Pihak Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia bahawa di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 17.8.2010 tiada keterangan mengenai ekshibit-ekshibit “P4” “P5”, “P6”, ”P7, “P8’ dan “P10”. Di sini pihak Perayu telah menunjukkan bahawa Nota-nota Keterangan yang dibekalkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur adalah tidak sempurna dan ini boleh memprejudiskan Kes Tangkap tersebut.

152.    Selain daripada itu, setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan tersebut, banyak tokok tambah, percanggahan keterangan yang direkodkan dan juga fakta-fakta penting tidak direkodkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur. Di antara percanggahan keterangan tersebut SP1 telah menyatakan bahawa beliau tiada sijil ENCase tetapi mengikut Nota Keterangan tersebut SP1 menyatakan bahawa beliau ada sijil dari satu syarikat dan identiti syarikat tersebut tidak dinyatakan (mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan tersebut).

153.    Pihak Perayu juga berhujah bahawa terdapat tokok tambah di dalam Nota Keterangan pada 20.9.2010 apabila Kes Tangkap tersebut ditetapkan untuk Sebutan waran tangkap kerana Perayu tiada memaklumkan kepada Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur bahawa Perayu dilepaskan pada waktu pagi 6.9.2010 tetapi ianya direkodkan di dalam Nota Keterangan (mukasurat 58 Nota Keterangan).Ini amat memprejudiskan Perayu kerana lain alasan diberikan lain yang direkodkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

154.    Perayu juga turut menyatakan bahawa Perayu tidak berpeluang untuk mengemukakan laporan polis Pengadu asal semasa pemeriksaan balas saksi pendakwaan kelima dan semasa Perayu memberi keterangan (rakaman video perbicaraan pada tarikh 13.12.2010) kerana Mahkamah sendiri tidak membenarkannya walaupun laporan polis Pengadu asal amat material di dalam Kes Tangkap Tersebut (mukasurat 47 dan 48 Nota Keterangan).

155.    Adalah turut dihujahkan bahawa Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur seharusnya memastikan Mahkamah berlaku adil kepada Perayu tambahan pula Perayu tidak diwakili peguam dan perlu mengemukakan soalan-soalan semasa pemeriksaan balas setiap saksi pendakwaan sendiri.

 

156.    NH Chan J di dalam bukunya “How To Judge the Judges” pada mukasurat 21 telah merujuk kepada Lord Devlin di dalam bukunya, The Judge, mukasurat 3 (mukasurat 21 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) seperti berikut:

 

“What is the function of the judge? Professor Jaffe has a phrase for it – “the disinterested application of known law” (Professor Jaffe in his book English and American Judges as Lawmakers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969, p 13}… It is at any rate what 90% or more of English judges-and I dare say also of all judges of all nationalities – are engaged in for 90% of their working lives. The social service which the judge.renders to the community is the removal of a sense of injustice. To perform this service the essential quality which he needs is impartiality and next after that the appearance of impartiality. I put impartiality before the appearance of it simply because without the reality the appearance would not endure. In truth, within the context of service to the community the appearance is the more important of the two. The judge who gives the right judgment while appearing not to do so may be thrice blessed in heaven, but on earth he is no use at all”.

 

157.    Selanjutnya, NH Chan J di dalam bukunya “How To Judge the Judges” pada mukasurat 22 telah merujuk kepada Pannick di dalam bukunya “Judges”, mukasurat  41 (mukasurat 22 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) seperti berikut:

Occasionally a litigant objects to the involvement of a particular judge on the ground that previous judgments cause the litigant to doubt whether the judge would decide the case impartially. In 1978 Lord Denning acceded to such an application: Ex parte Church of Scientology of California, The Times, February 21,1978. He said that “if the Church of Scientology felt that its case would be a little disturbed by his sitting on it, that was the last thing he would wish to do and he would see that it came before a court in which his Lordship was not sitting”. In 1984 (The Times, November 16,1984) Lord Chief Justice Lane stood down from the court of three judges assigned to hear a case concerning the use of road blocks by the police to prevent striking miners reaching picket lines. Counsel for the miners had argued that Lord Lane would be influenced by comments he had made, adverse to the miners’ legal claim to conduct such activities, in a previous case. Lord Lane said that he could see no reason why he should not hear the case, but that he was willing to step down. The case was heard and decided, in favour of the police, by the other two judges: Moss v Mclachlnn [1985] IRLR 76.

 

Lord Denning and Lord Lane were over-generous in their response to these applications. Judges are there to decide cases, not to excuse themselves whenever a litigant doubts, without cause, the judicial qualities of those assigned to sit in judgment. Litigants should not be encouraged to treat judges like members of a jury whom they can challenge off the case, with or without cause.”

158.    Perayu turut berhujah bahawa di bawah Artikel 126 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, kuasa berkaitan penghinaan Mahkamah (‘contempt of court’) terletak kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan, Mahkamah Rayuan dan Mahkamah Tinggi.  Oleh yang demikian terdapat percanggahan di antara peruntukkan undang-undang di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Akta Mahkamah Rendah.

Artikel 126 Perlembagaan Persekutuan memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

 

“126.  Power to punish for contempt

The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself.”

159.    Perayu ingin bersandarkan kepada kes Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118 (mukasurat 26 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Lord Justice Buckley pada mukasurat 141 menyatakan seperti berikut:

“… It is perhaps arguable that a judge, though acting within his powers, might be shown to have acted so perversely or so irrationally that what he did should not be treated as a judicial act at all. In such a case the remedy for his removal from office would be available.”

160.    Rayuan Perayu agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap Tersebut telah ditolak tanpa mengambilkira merit yang melibatkan bantahan Perayu terhadap Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan oleh deponen, seorang Pembantu Undang-Undang yang lebih rendah grednya yang bukan Timbalan Pendakwaraya iaitu Nurul Ashiqin dan Siti Hajar yang mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

161.    Oleh yang demikian Perayu berhujah bahawa Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut tidak boleh digunapakai untuk pendengaran permohonan agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar perbicaraan Kes Tangkap No: 2-83-7119-2009 kerana  deponen tiada pengetahuan tentang prosiding perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

162.    Pihak Perayu ingin merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Agung (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Wee Choo Keong v MBf Holdings Berhad & Anor And Another Appeal [1995] 3 MLJ 549 (mukasurat 26 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah dan Sarawak) memutuskan bahawa afidavit tidak boleh digunakan apabila tidak dapat membuktikan fakta-fakta yang diikrarkan di dalam afidavit tersebut:

 

“It is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only that Wee at the material time on 10 February 1993 at about 4.25pm was in his office, but also that the alleged acts and/or omissions by Ivan Wong were done on the instructions of Wee and were sufficient to constitute evasion of service of the court order on the part of Wee. After careful deliberation of submissions by counsel for both sides and detailed examination and analysis of all relevant evidence adduced in the form of affidavits and exhibits, I was of the view that the evidence, taken in totality, was insufficient to prove or fell short of proving to the criminal standard, ie beyond reasonable doubt the charge of contempt by evasion of service of the court order dated 9 February 1993 as alleged.”

163.    Pihak Perayu juga turut merujuk kepada kes Zamrud Properties Sdn Bhd v Pang Mooi Gaid & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 180 (mukasurat 12 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) Faiza Thamby Chik J telah memutuskan bahawa afidavit yang diikrarkan oleh deponen yang tiada pengetahuan tentang fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit berkenaan maka afidavit berkenaan tidak boleh digunapakai:

 

The deponent in encl 2 has clearly stated that he was informed by his counsel of the happenings at the full trial in the sessions court. The deponent clearly has no personal knowledge of the happenings or the course of the trial at the sessions court and therefore is unable on his own to prove the facts as alleged in his affidavit. This is clearly hearsay evidence.”

164.    Merit rayuan yang lain adalah bahawa pertuduhan yang dihadapkan terhadap Perayu mengenai cakera keras (‘hard disk’) memang merupakan kes pertama seumpamanya di Malaysia maka adalah lebih wajar Majistret yang lebih kanan dan berpengalaman mendengar kes ini kerana melibatkan isu-isu teknikal dan undang-undang yang lebih kompleks dan mencabar.

165.    Setakat ini kes yang telah diputuskan di mahkamah Negara-negara Komanwel yang melibatkan pertuduhan mengenai cakera keras (‘hard disk’) adalah kes R v. Trapp (supra) di mana pakar telah menunjukkan kepada mahkamah penggunaan ‘hash function’ atau ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘hash value’ merupakan proses yang sangat kritikal dan penting di samping pengimejan forensik cakera keras dilakukan sebelumnya. Di dalam kes tersebut, pakar forensik komputer telah menggunakan SHA-1 sebagai ‘hash function’, ‘hash value’ pengiraan ‘hash value’ ditunjukkan dan dibandingkan dengan salinan imej forensik bagi cakera keras semasa perbicaraan.

166.    Keputusan telah diberikan pada 4.12.2010 di mana terdapat kes prima facie walaupun tiada keterangan dan bukti yang ‘credible’ daripada setiap saksi-saksi pendakwaan.

167.    Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia ini bahawa Perayu telah memohon Alasan Penghakiman bahawa terdapat satu kes prima facie terhadap Perayu agar Perayu dapat menyediakan kes pembelaan dan juga memanggil saksi-saksi bagi pembelaan. Walaubagaimanapun sehingga ke hari ini Alasan Penghakiman tersebut tidak diperolehi.

168.    Pada 24.12.2010 apabila kes ditetapkan untuk sambung bicara bagi kes Pembelaan dan sepina kepada saksi turut dicatitkan tarikh yang sama, waran tangkap dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah kerana dikatakan tarikh sambung bicara sebenarnya pada 23.12.2010.

169.    Pada 6.1.2011 tarikh yang ditetapkan untuk Sebutan waran tangkap, waran tangkap telah dibatalkan dan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menolak permohonan pihak Pembelaan untuk memanggil 2 orang saksi pembelaan dan menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 18.1.2011.

170.    Bagi membalas alasan ini Perayu dengan sesungguhnya memohon agar Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dapat melihat sendiri rakaman video sepanjang perbicaraan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 6.11.2011 supaya Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dapat menilai sendiri samada Perayu telah dibenarkan mengemukakan soalan-soalan dengan sepenuhnya semasa pemeriksaan balas.

171.    Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 seharusnya membuat arahan yang jelas.

172.    Pada 29.7.2010 sehingga 19.10.2010 Perayu tidak dapat mengutarakan soalan-soalan dengan sepenuhnya terhadap semua saksi-saksi pendakwaan semasa pemeriksaan balas kerana dihalang oleh Mahkamah.

173.    Tiada direkodkan di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi sambung perbicaraan pada 29.7.2010 mengenai permohonan penangguhan untuk melantik peguambela.

174.    Perintah Waran Tangkap yang dibuat pada 6.9.2010 oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur ketika Perayu masih menjalani hukuman menghina Mahkamah dan berada di Penjara Kajang tanpa sebarang “Order To Produce’ dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah.

175.    Pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang yang meneruskan prosiding perbicaraan dengan prosiding ‘hostile witness’ walaupun perintah ‘contempt of court’ telah dibuat terhadap Saksi Pendakwaan Ke-enam (SP6) pada hari yang sama, iaitu pada 19.10.2010 bagi Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

176.    Pihak Perayu turut berhujah bahawa Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila gagal mengambilkira bahawa saksi pendakwaan ke-enam (SP6) telah ditahan selama lebihkurang 2 jam di lokap Mahkamah berikutan perintah pengkomitan yang dibuat oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur pada 19.10.2010 walaupun tanpa prosedur Penghinaan Mahkamah (‘contempt of court’) yang sempurna dan mengikut peruntukan undang-undang.

177.    SP6 yang telah disekat dan bercanggah dengan peruntukan Artikel 8 dan Artikel 9 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Artikel 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

8.         Equality

(1) All persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection of the law.”

Artikel 9 Perlembagaan Persekutuan pula memperuntukkan undang-undang berkenaan kebebasan untuk bergerak seperti berikut:

 

9.         Prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement

“(1) No citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Federation.

 

(2) Subject to Clause (3) and to any law relating to the security of the Federation or any part thereof, public order, public health, or the punishment of offenders, every citizen has the right to move freely throughout the Federation and to reside in any part thereof.”

 

178.    Pihak Perayu berhujah lanjut bahawa penahanan saksi pendakwaan ke-enam (SP6) pada 19.10.2010 adalah satu penahanan salah dan tidak mengikut prosedur undang-undang.

179.    Selain daripada itu, saksi pendakwaan ke-enam (SP6) tidak diberi peluang untuk mendapatkan khidmat seorang peguambela dan menyediakan pembelaan  apabila perintah menghina Mahkamah dibuat oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret 2, Kuala Lumpur pada 19.10.2010 yang bertentangan dengan peruntukan Artikel 5 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

180.    Bagi menyokong alasan ini pihak Perayu bersandarkan kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) di dalam kes Zainur Zakaria v. Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 MLJ 604 (di mukasurat 617 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan membuat keputusan seperti berikut:

“(1) …The charge of contempt of court against the appellant had not been

     proved beyond reasonable doubt. The phrase ‘an oppurtunity answering the charge’ must necessarily include that a reasonable oppurtunity be given to the alleged contemnor to prepare his case. That the conduct of the hearing must be fair is a reflection of the deeper principle that the alleged contemnor is entitled to present his case fully. The learned High Court judge should have allowed the appellant the adjournment he requested so that he could prepare his defence fully, fairly and effectively. By refusing to grant the adjournment, the appellant had been deprived of the oppurtunity of answering the chage against him; Jaginder Singh & Ors v Attorney General [1983] 1 MLJ 71 followed.

  

181.    Selain daripada itu pihak Perayu turut bersandarkan kepada satu lagi kes Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) di dalam kes Karam Singh v. Public Prosecutor [1975] 1 MLJ 229 di mana Azlan Shah FJ (di mukasurat 1 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) menyatakan seperti berikut:

“(1) A magistrate’s summary power to proceed of his own motion must never be invoked unless the ends of justice required such drastic means. The magistrate should not be both the prosecutor and the judge.”

182.    Pihak Perayu turut bergantung kepada satu kes Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) di dalam kes Jaginder Singh & Ors v. Attorney-General [1983] 1 MLJ 71 (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Raja Azlan Shah AG LP, Abdul Hamid FJ dan AbdoolCader J membenarkan rayuan perayu di dalam kes tersebut dan memutuskan seperti berikut:

What also vitiated the committal for contempt of court in this case was the learned judge’s failure to make plain to the appellants the specific nature of the charges and the opportunity to give them a fair hearing.”

183.    Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur telah membuat perintah Penghinaan Mahkamah terhadap saksi pendakwaan ke-enam (SP6) apabila SP6 menggunapakai keistimewaan atau ‘privilege’ di bawah Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 untuk kesemua Ekshibit  “P-20” hingga “P-33” bagi Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

184.    Pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa perintah penghinaan Mahkamah yang dibuat oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur tidak boleh diubah mengikut peruntukkan Seksyen 278 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah seperti berikut:

278. Penghakiman tidak boleh diubah

            Mahkamah yang lain daripada Mahkamah Tinggi, apabila telah merekodkan penghakimannya tidak boleh mengubah atau mengkaji semula di atas perkara itu:

 

            Dengan syarat bahawa kesilapan hanya berlaku kerana tersalah tulis di mana boleh diperbetulkan pada bila-bila masa juga pun, dan kesilapan yang lain hendaklah diperbetulkan pada bila-bila masa sebelum Mahkamah menamatkan perbicaraan untuk hari itu.”

 

185.    Perayu ingin mengemukakan satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes  Azizan bin Saad v Public Prosecutor [2000] 6 MLJ 134 (mukasurat 138 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) di mana Nik Hashim J (pada masa itu) memutuskan bahawa apabila seorang Hakim Sesyen telah menambah berkenaan tempoh bermulanya hukuman yang dijatuhkan terhadap tertuduh yang tiada dicatatkan di dalam Nota Keterangan dan tidak  diumumkan di dalam Mahkamah terbuka tetapi terdapat di dalam Waran Komitmen maka Hakim Sesyen tersebut telah mengubah perintahnya yang berlawanan dengan Kanun Prosedur Jenayah :

“…the learned judge became functus officio after the sentence was passed and could not add, alter the judgment or make the order on the Warrant of Commitment(WC) directing the accused serve the present term of imprisonment consecutive to the one he had been previously sentenced. Though the Warrant of Commitment was signed by the judge, the direction on the WC was not part of her judgment when she passed the sentence in court; (4) the failure of the judge to state the direction in the judgment notes amounts to ommission; it is not mere irregularity but an ommission which occassions a failure of justice to the detriment of the accused and is not curable under s 422 of the CPC.”

   

186.    Sebagai perbandingan dengan kes di hadapan Mahkamah yang Mulia pada hari ini, tiada Nota Keterangan pada 19.10.2010 apabila Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur membuat perintah penghinaan Mahkamah dan ini bukan satu luar aturan yang boleh dibaiki di bawah Seksyen 422 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah tetapi satu ketidakadilan yang memrejudiskan Perayu.

187.    Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur telah tidak menggunakan budi bicara beliau dengan baik di dalam memutuskan untuk tidak meneruskan dengar prosiding menghina Mahkamah tersebut dan perkara-perkara berikut tidak disempurnakan:

a)         Tiada Nota Keterangan berkenaan pada mulanya perintah menghina

Mahkamah dan kemudian prosiding ‘hostile witness’ pada 19.10.2010;

b)         Rakaman video ketika perintah menghina Mahkamah dibuat pada 19.10.2010 telah dipadam; dan

c)         Tiada sebarang Alasan Penghakiman disediakan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur bagi menunjukkan alasan-alasan beliau di dalam menggunakan budi bicara yang dikatakan digunakan dengan baik.

188.    Tambahan lagi Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur  telah tidak mematuhi peruntukkan undang-undang berkaitan prosiding kes jenayah sebagaimana yang termaktub di bawah Seksyen-seksyen 265, 266, 267, 268 dan 433 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah (Akta 593).

189.    Di dalam Nota Keterangan pada 17.8.2010 dan 19.10.2010 tiada catatan tentang permohonan pihak pendakwaan untuk prosiding ‘hostile witness’ terhadap SP6 dan tiada prosiding ‘hostile witness’ itu sendiri dijalankan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur.

190.    Menurut perenggan 7 Alasan Penghakiman Tersebut, pernyataan di bawah Seksyen 112 SP6 telah dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan tetapi tiada keternagan di dalam Nota Keterangan samada ianya ditanda sebagai ekshibit.

191.    Oleh yang demikian timbul persoalan bagaimana SP6 boleh diputuskan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur sebagai ‘hostile witness’ berdasarkan tiga (3) kes yang dirujuk oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur sedangkan tiada sebarang keterangan di dalam Nota Keterangan yang sudah tentu menimbulkan keraguan samada prosiding ‘hostile witness’ dijalankan mengikut lunas undang-undang. Ini menunjukkan bahawa keputusan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur tidak konsisten dengan Nota Keterangan sepanjang prosiding perbicaraan yang dijalankan oleh beliau.

192.    Prosedur ‘hostile witness’ yang dijalankan ke atas SP6 tidak mengikut prosedur undang-undang di mana Salleh Abas FJ di dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Krishnan v. PP [1981] 2 MLJ 121, 123 (mukasurat 1 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) telah mengesahkan prosedur ‘hostile witness’ di dalam kes Muthusamy v. lawan Public Prosecutor [1948] 1 MLJ 57 (mukasurat 8 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) seperti berikut:

“The proper way to apply the sections is this. On the request of either side, the Court reads the former statement. If there is no serious discrepancy the Court so rules and no time is wasted. The first necessity is to read it with the confident expectation that it will be different from the evidence but looking judicially to see whether the difference really is so serious as to suggest that the witness is unreliable.

Differences may be divided into four classes:–
(a)   Minor differences, not amounting to discrepancies;
(b)   Apparent discrepancies;
(c)   Serious discrepancies;
(d)   Material contradictions.

Minor differences are attributable mainly to differences in interpretation and the way in which the statement was taken and sometimes to differences in recollection. A perfectly truthful witness may mention a detail on one occasion and not remember it on another. A mere omission is hardly ever a discrepancy. The police statement is usually much briefer than the evidence. Both the statement and the evidence are usually narratives reduced from question and answer. The witness is not responsible for the actual expressions used in either, and all the less so where he does not speak English.

If the police statement gives an outline of substantially the same story there being no apparently irreconcilable conflict between the two on any point material to the issue, the Magistrate should say at once  [*59]  “The difference is not such as to affect his credit” and hand the statement back.

If, however, the difference is so material as probably to amount to a discrepancy affecting the credit of the witness, the Court may permit the witness to be asked whether he made the alleged statement. If he denies having made it, then either the matter must be dropped or the document must be formally proved, by calling the writer or, if he is not available, by proving in some other way that the witness did make the statement.

If the witness admits making the former statement, or is proved to have made it, then the two conflicting versions must be carefully explained to him, preferably by the Court, and he must have a fair and full opportunity to explain the difference. If he can, then his credit is saved, though there may still be doubt as to the accuracy of his memory. This procedure is cumbersome and slow and therefore should not be used unless the apparent discrepancy is material to the issue.

In this trial the witness Usop said:–
“All the present witnesses were there but I did not notice Mansoor …
there were many people there”.

In his investigation statement he had said:–
“I saw A,B,C. and one Mansoor there”.

The general tenor of his statement accorded with his evidence. Now A, B and C, and also Mansoor, had all given evidence and it was not disputed that Mansoor had in fact been present at the incident. Clearly, therefore, this difference was at the most only a difference in recollection as to one of a number of persons and no further explanation was necessary. The police prosecutor ought not to have referred to it. When he did, the Magistrate should not have allowed him to cross-examine on it. Counsel for the defence, of course, further cross-examined on it and he elicited that Mansoor had been mentioned in answer to a leading question. This was a reasonable explanation. But the point is that the Court elaborately investigated a point of no significance. If Mansoor had been one of the accused persons, the case would have been different because then the question whether or not Mansoor was present would have been in issue.

193.    Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur juga tidak membacakan pernyataan yang dikatakan bercanggah kepada SP6 yang mengunapakai ‘privilege’ di bawah Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan SP6 tidak diberi peluang memberi penjelasan mengenai pernyataan yang dikatakan ada percanggahan itu.

194.    Pihak Perayu juga ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia ini bahawa terdapat tokok-tambah di dalam keterangan SP6 semasa pemeriksaan utama pada 17.8.2010. Nota Keterangan bagi SP6 di akhir kes pembelaan, rakaman CRT dan Nota Keterangan mukasurat 88 Rekod Rayuan adalah berbeza :

Mahkamah : Bacakan No. Siri pada hard disk itu untuk tujuan perbandingan dengan yang ada dalam senarai geledah.

 

No. Siri adalah SNR 32559XK.

 

Pada para 2 borang senarai geledah tempat geledah adalah ************** ******** **********  ********, KL.

 

Ada satu thumbdrive, ada 12 VCD and DVD.

 

(Saksi dirujuk beberapa keping gambar yang dijumpai dalam hard disc).

(Saksi diminta baca alamat pada borang geledah-dibaca oleh saksi).”

195.    Pihak Perayu juga ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia ini bahawa Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 tidak merekodkan Timbalan Pendakwaraya yang hadir pada hari hukuman dan sabitan pada 25.2.2011 di mana Timbalan Pendakwaraya yang hadir bukan Nurul Ashiqin sebagaimana direkodkan di mukasurat 114 Rekod Rayuan.

196.    Mahkamah Majistret sewajarnya mengendalikan penilaian maksimum ke atas keterangan semua saksi dan kegagalan untuk mengendalikan penilaian maksimum ke atas keterangan saksi-saksi mengakibatkan salah laksana keadilan.

Di dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Lee Kwan Woh v Public Prosecutor [2009] 5 MLJ 301, (mukasurat 16 Ikatan Otoriti Perayu) Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“[27] It is plain from what we have said when discussing the evidence that a reasonable tribunal properly directing itself on the applicable law and judicially appreciating the evidence would have acquitted the appellant at the close of prosecution case. The failure of the learned judge to undertake a maximum or positive evaluation of the evidence of PW3, PW4 and PW8 has in the present case resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice.” 

      

197.    Adalah menjadi hujahan pihak Perayu bahawa ekshibit-ekshibit “P2(b)” hingga “P2(n)” adalah tidak berkaitan dengan pendakwaan Kes Tangkap tersebut dan dikategorikan sebagai material yang tidak digunakan (dengan izin, “unused materials”) dan dipohon agar dilepaskan mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 40(8) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002.

198.    Pihak Perayu dengan rendah diri memohon agar ekshibit-ekshibit “P2(a) hingga “P2(n)” diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini agar dikembalikan kepada pihak Perayu sekiranya sabitan diakas dan Perayu dilepaskan berasaskan peruntukan Seksyen 406A (2) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

199.    Kesimpulannya berdasarkan hujahan-hujahan yang dikemukakan di atas, Perayu memohon agar rayuan ini dibenarkan kerana pihak Perayu telah berjaya menunjukkan terdapat kecacatan yang material dan amat memudaratkan serta memprejudiskan Perayu yang dihadapkan dengan pertuduhan Kes Tangkap Tersebut. Oleh itu Perayu memohon rayuan ini dibenarkan dan hukuman dan sabitan terhadap Perayu bagi Kes Tangkap Tersebut dibatalkan (dengan izin ‘the conviction is quashed’) kerana setiap elemen pertuduhan tidak dibuktikan melampaui keraguan yang munasabah dan terdapat ‘miscarriage of justice’ bagi prosiding perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

……………………………..

Mohamad Izaham bin Mohamed Yatim

Perayu


[i]  Walker & Walker The Law of Evidence in Scotland (2000) para 5.3.2.

[ii] Moorov (Samuel) v HM Advocate 1930 JC 68

************************************************************************

JURISDICTION, Practice. A power constitutionally conferred upon a judge or magistrate, to take cognizance of, and decide causes according to law, and to carry his sentence into execution. 6 Pet. 591; 9 John. 239. The tract of land or district within which a judge or magistrate has jurisdiction, is called his territory, and his power in relation to his territory is called his territorial jurisdiction.
2. Every act of jurisdiction exercised by a judge without his territory, either by pronouncing sentence or carrying it into execution, is null. An inferior court has no jurisdiction beyond what is expressly delegated. 1 Salk. 404, n.; Gilb. C. P. 188; 1 Saund. 73; 2 Lord Raym. 1311; and see Bac. Ab. Courts, &c., C, et seq; Bac. Ab. Pleas, E 2.
3. Jurisdiction is original, when it is conferred on the court in the first instance, which is called original jurisdiction; (q.v.) or it is appellate, which is when an appeal is given from the judgment of another court. Jurisdiction is also civil, where the subject-matter to be tried is not of a criminal nature; or criminal, where the court is to punish crimes. Some courts and magistrates have both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is also concurrent, exclusive, or assistant. Concurrent jurisdiction is that which may be entertained by several courts. It is a rule that in cases of concurrent jurisdictions, that which is first seized of the case shall try it to the exclusion of the other. Exclusive jurisdiction is that which has alone the power to try or determine the Suit, action, or matter in dispute. assistant jurisdiction is that which is afforded by a court of chancery, in aid of a court of law; as, for example, by a bill of discovery, by the examination of witnesses de bene esse, or out of the jurisdiction of the court; by the perpetuation of the testimony of witnesses, and the like.
4. It is the law which gives jurisdiction; the consent of, parties, cannot, therefore, confer it, in a matter which the law excludes. 1 N. & M. 192; 3 M’Cord, 280; 1 Call. 55; 1 J. S. Marsh. 476; 1 Bibb, 263; Cooke, 27; Minor, 65; 3 Litt. 332; 6 Litt. 303; Kirby, 111; 1 Breese, 32; 2 Yerg. 441; 1 Const. R. 478. But where the court has jurisdiction of the matter, and the defendant has some privilege which exempts him from the jurisdiction, he may wave the privilege. 5 Cranch, 288; 1 Pet. 449; 8 Wheat. 699; 4 W. C. C. R. 84; 4 M’Cord, 79; 4 Mass. 593; Wright, 484. See Hardin, 448; 2 Wash. 213.
5. Courts of inferior jurisdiction must act within their jurisdiction, and so it must appear upon the record. 5 Cranch, 172 Pet. C. C. R. 36; 4 Dall. 11; 2 Mass. 213; 4 Mass. 122; 8 Mass. 86; 11 Mass. 513; Pr. Dec. 380; 2 Verm. 329; 3 Verm. 114; 10 Conn. 514; 4 John. 292; 3 Yerg. 355; Walker, 75; 9 Cowen, 227; 5 Har. & John. 36; 1 Bailey, 459; 2 Bailey, 267. But the legislature may, by a general or special law, provide otherwise. Pet. C. C. R. 36. Vide 1 Salk. 414; Bac. Ab. Courts, &c., C. D; Id. Prerogative, E 6; Merlin, Rep. h.t.; Ayl. Pat. 317, and the art. Competency. As to the force of municipal law beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the state, see Wheat. Intern. Law, part a, c. 2, Sec. 7, et seq.; Story, Confl. of Laws, c. 2; Huberus, lib. 1, t. 3; 13 Mass. R. 4 Pard. Dr. Com. part. 6, t. 7, c. 2, Sec. 1; and the articles Conflict of Laws; Courts of the United States. See generally, Bouv. Inst. Index, h.t.

A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. By John Bouvier. Published 1856.

http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/jurisdiction

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When Malice Defeats Immunity: Judicial Immunity Is NOT Absolute!

Judicial Immunity Is NOT Absolute!

 

Also see article on How To Sue A Judge and always remember, case law is ALWAYS changing. Here is a selection of case/reference citations regarding judicial immunity when personally suing a Judge for money damages, from the collection of former Phoenix, AZ Attorney Robert A. Hirschfeld, JD. (Warning: Look up and read the cited case for consistency with your situation, before citing it in your own brief.)

When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. Rankin v. Howard, (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert den. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326.

In Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an Arizona District Court dismissal based upon absolute judicial immunity, finding that both necessary immunity prongs were absent; later, in Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (1986), the Ninth Circuit, en banc , criticized the “judicial nature” analysis it had published in Rankin as unnecessarily restrictive. But Rankin’s ultimate result was not changed, because Judge Howard had been independently divested of absolute judicial immunity by his complete lack of jurisdiction.

Some Defendants urge that any act “of a judicial nature” entitles the Judge to absolute judicial immunity. But in a jurisdictional vacuum, (that is, absence of all jurisdiction) the second prong necessary to absolute judicial immunity is missing. Stump v. Sparkman, id., 435 U.S. 349.

“Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.” Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)

A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts. Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938)

Generally, judges are immune from suit for judicial acts within or in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts have been done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception being for acts done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F2d 59 (C.A. Ariz. 1974)

There is a general rule that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign. Cooper v. O’Conner, 99 F.2d 133

When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction. State use of Little v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697.

“… the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

“No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it betond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence.” Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859).

“The courts are not bound by an officer’s interpretation of the law under which he presumes to act.” Hoffsomer v. Hayes, 92 Okla 32, 227 F 417.

> Journal: Cato Journal Vol 8, No. 1 – 1988
> Author : Bruce Benson
> Title : An Institutional Explanation for Corruption of Criminal Justice Officals

> Journal: Cato Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1987
> Author : Robert Craig Waters
> Title : Judicial Immunity versus Due Process: When Should a Judge Be Subject to Suit?

Justice Field in Bradley v. Fisher. (13 Wall) 353 (1871) stated: “…judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction.”

“The doctrine of judicial immunity originated in early seventeenth-century England in the jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke. In two decisions, Floyd & Barker and the Case of the Marshalsea, Lord Coke laid the foundation for the doctrine of judicial immunity.” Floyd & Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1607; The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (1612) were both cases right out of the Star Chamber.

Coke’s reasoning for judicial immunity was presented in four public policy grounds:
1. Finality of judgment;
2. Maintenance of judicial independence;
3. Freedom from continual calumniations; and,
4. Respect and confidence in the judiciary.

The Marshalsea presents a case where Coke denied a judge immunity for presiding over a case in assumpsit. Assumpsit is a common-law action for recovery of damages for breach of contract. Coke then explained the operation of jurisdiction requirement for immunity:

. “[W]hen a Court has (a) jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds iverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But (b) when the Court has not jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is [before a person who is not a judge], and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process…”

Although narrowing the availability of judicial immunity, especially in courts of limited jurisdiction, Coke suggested that there was a presumption of jurisdiction and that the judge must have been aware that jurisdiction was lacking.

Thus, questions of personam, rem and res jurisdiction are always a proper issue before the court to obviate the defense that the court had no way to know they lacked jurisdiction.

“Stump v Sparkman Revisited” continues to show it was Chief Justice Kent (circa 1810) that was instrumental in establishing the “doctrine” of JI in America, in Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns 282. Thereafter Justice incorporated the “doctrine” in two cases: Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, and Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). Both Yates and Randall dealt with officers of the court.

“The belief that Bradley narrowed the scope of the doctrine respresents a serious misunderstanding of the decision. First, Bradley provides no authority for the belief that a judge of general jurisdiction may be liable for acts taken in absence of subject matter jurisdiction. The distinction between excess of jurisdiction and absence of jurisdiction in the opinion is simply explanatory. Because a court of general jurisdiction has jurisdiction over all causes of action, a judge of such a court will always be immune for his judicial acts, even if he exceeds his authority. See Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351-52.”

CASE NOTE: “Federal tort law: judges cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that violate litigants civil rights; Robert Craig Waters. Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Spr. 1986 21 n3, p509-516″

A Superior Court Judge is broadly vested with “general jurisdiction.” Evidently, this means that even if a case involving a particular attorney is not assigned to him, he may reach out into the hallway, having his deputy use “excessive force” to haul the attorney into the courtroom for chastisement or even incarceration. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 at 288 (1991). Arguably, anything goes, in a Superior Court Judge’s exercise of his “general jurisdiction”, with the judge enjoying “absolute judicial immunity” against tort consequences. Provide he is not divested of all jurisdiction.

A Judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at 227-229, 108 S.Ct. at 544-545; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 380, 98 S.Ct. at 1106. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 at 288 (1991).

Administrative-capacity torts by a judge do not involve the “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights,” and therefore do not have the judicial immunity of judicial acts. See: Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 98 L.Ed.2d 555, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988); Atkinson-Baker & Assoc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d 1452 at 1454, (9th Cir. 1993). A Judge as a State Actor is not vested with the sovereign immunity granted to the State itself . See: Rolfe v. State of Arizona, 578 F.Supp. 987 (D.C. Ariz. 1983); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, (9th Cir, 1981) cert. granted Kush v. Rutledge, 458 U.S. 1120, 102 S.Ct. 3508,73 L.Ed.2d 1382, affirmed 460 U.S. 719, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d. 413, appeal after remand 859 F.2d 732, Ziegler v. Kirschner, 781 P.2d 54, 162 Ariz. 77 (Ariz. App., 1989).

It is said that absolute judicial immunity is favored as public policy, so that judges may fearlessly, and safe from retribution, adjudicate matters before them. True. But equally important, is the public expectation that judicial authority will only be wielded by those lawfully vested with such authority.

The history of Arizona’s admission to the Union reveals at least one reason why historic public policy in Arizona would favor ARCP Rule 42(f)(1)’s complete and expeditious divestiture of jurisdiction, and its concurrent divestiture of absolute judicial immunity in the event a renegade judge persists in wielding the tools of his office after having been affirmatively stripped of them.

In 1912, the U.S. Congress refused to admit Arizona to the Union for the stated reason that Arizona’s proposed Constitution provided the public with a mechanism for removing sitting judges from office. Joint Res. No. 8, 8/21/11, 37 U.S. Stat. 39, cited in Vol. 1, Ariz. Rev. Stats., p.130. To facilitate admission to the Union, the judge-removal mechanism was excised from the State Constitution, allowing Arizona to become a State on 2/14/12. Soon afterward, on 11/5/12, Arizona voters restored the mechanism by amendment. Ariz. Constitution, Art. VIII “Removal from Office”, section 1; A.R.S. Vol. 1, p. 178. So strong was the citizens’ distrust of sitting State Court Judges in Arizona, that after Arizona copied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it added the present Rule 42(f)(1) to provide a mechanism for a litigant to permanently remove the assigned judge from the case.

The difference between selectively disabling a judge in various aspects of adjudication (such as during the appellate period) and the permanent extinguishment of his jurisdiction in a given case, has a logical relevance to a Judge’s expectation of enjoying absolute judicial immunity in that case.

In examining entitlement to immunity, the U.S. Supreme Court focused upon the nature of the act: is it an act ordinarily performed by a Judge? Unfortunately, judges sometimes exceed their jurisdiction in a particular case. But an act done in complete absence of all jurisdiction cannot be a judicial act. Piper v. Pearson, id., 2 Gray 120. It is no more than the act of a private citizen, pretending to have judicial power which does not exist at all. In such circumstances, to grant absolute judicial immunity is contrary to the public policy expectation that there shall be a Rule of Law.

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We are preparing our Civil Suit against a malicious magistrate for the act of malicious during the court proceeding. The Best in the History of Malaya Courts EVER!

Evidence Tendered in Court But Not Marked As Exhibit Caselaw 1: PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v DATO’ BALWANT SINGH (NO 2) [2003] 3 MLJ 395 CRIMINAL TRIAL NO 45–33 OF 2002 HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) DECIDED-DATE-1: 23 JULY 2003 AUGUSTINE PAUL J

3 MLJ 395, *; [2003] 3 MLJ 395

The Malayan Law Journal

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v DATO’ BALWANT SINGH (NO 2)

[2003] 3 MLJ 395

CRIMINAL TRIAL NO 45–33 OF 2002

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)

DECIDED-DATE-1: 23 JULY 2003

AUGUSTINE PAUL J

CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law – Penal Code (Malaysia) – ss 96, 97, 99, 100, 102 – Defences – Private defence – Reasonable apprehension of danger to body or life – Test applicable – Whether reasonable apprehension of danger to body or life existed

Evidence – Corroboration – Prior statement of witnesses – Corroboration by former statements – Whether former statement proved – Evidence Act 1950 s 157

Evidence – Witness – Impeachment of – Impeachment of witness by former inconsistent statement – Whether contradictory part of statement shown to witness – Evidence Act 1950 ss 145, 146, 155

HEADNOTES:
The accused was charged with an offence under s 302 of the Penal Code. He claimed trial to the charge. In support of its case, the prosecution called a total of 12 witnesses. According to the facts, there was an argument between the accused and the deceased while the former was in his car and the latter was riding his motorcycle. The accused was pulled out of his car by the deceased who had then attacked him with a stick as a result of which the accused had sustained injuries. The accused then fired two shots, the second of which killed the deceased. The judge having found that there was a prima facie case called for the defence. The defence was essentially that of private defence. A preliminary issue for consideration was whether one exh D43 (a statement recorded from the accused under s 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code) was admissible, and if it were, who was entitled to rely on it.

Held, acquitting the accused:
(1)   Former statements under s 157 of the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the EA’) must
be proved by anyone to whom they were made. In this case exh D43 was
inadmissible because it had not been properly proved by the defence as
PW12, one of the police personnel, was not recalled to formally tender
it in evidence after the accused had given evidence on it (see pp 428G,
429B –C).
(2)   Even if it was properly tendered before the court, there were parts of
exh D43 that contradicted the evidence of the accused. It therefore
remained inadmissible under s 157 of the EA (see 427C, 430D –E).
(3)   The prosecution on the other hand, could not make use of exh D43 to
affect the credit and credibility of the accused under ss 145 and
155(c) of the EA as they had failed to refer the accused to the
contradictory part of such statement (see p 432G –H).
(4)   The right of private defence commences as soon as there is reasonable
apprehension of danger to the body of a person and  [*396]  this
right continues for so long as such apprehension of danger to his body
or life exists. If a person either has time to have recourse to seek
protection of a public authority or inflicts more harm than is
necessary for the purpose of defending his life and limb then such a
right will no longer be available (see pp 444H –445A).
(5)   Although no man can be expected to assess with scientific accuracy the
precise amount of force that is necessary to defend himself from an
attack, any retaliation in the exercise of private defence should not
exceed what is reasonably necessary to avert the assailant’s attack
(see p 445B).
(6)   A man who is about to be attacked does not have to wait for his
assailant to strike the first blow. He need not wait till he is
actually attacked or inflicted with injury in order to react. He is not
obliged to run away; the law does not require a citizen to behave like
a coward. If he is unable to escape, he may turn round and attack (see
p 445C –D).
(7)   The test of a reasonable cause of apprehension of death or of
grievousness is an objective test and the burden of proving the defence
of private defence is upon the accused on a balance of probabilities
(see p 446D).
(8)   Based on the facts of the case, the apprehension of danger that the
accused had to his body and life was reasonable as the deceased was
armed with a stick that was a thick branch, big enough to cause a person
’s skull or bones to crack if hit with it. Thus, the accused was
entitled to exercise his right of private defence (see p 448D –E, G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary
Tertuduh telah dituduh kerana satu kesalahan di bawah s 302 Kanun Keseksaan. Beliau menuntut perbicaraan terhadap pertuduhan tersebut. Bagi menyokong kesnya pihak pendakwa telah memanggil 12 orang saksi. Menurut fakta-fakta, terjadi satu perbalahan antara tertuduh dan si mati semasa tertuduh berada dalam kereta beliau dan si mati sedang menunggang motorsikal. Tertuduh telah ditarik keluar dari kereta beliau oleh si mati yang kemudian telah menyerang beliau dengan sebatang kayu akibat daripada itu tertuduh mengalami kecederaan. Tertuduh kemudian telah melepaskan dua das tembakan, di mana yang kedua telah membunuh si mati. Hakim setelah mendapati terdapat satu kes prima facie memanggil untuk pembelaan. Pembelaan tersebut pada dasarnya adalah pembelaan ikhlas. Satu persoalan yang dibangkitkan untuk pertimbangan adalah sama ada eksh D43 (satu pernyataan yang direkodkan daripada tertuduh di bawah s 112 Kanun Acara Jenayah) boleh diterima, dan jika boleh, siapa yang berhak untuk bergantung kepadanya.

Diputuskan, membebaskan tertuduh:
(1)   Pernyataan-pernyataan sebelumnya (former statements) di bawah s 157
Akta Keterangan 1950 (‘AK tersebut’) perlu  [*397]  dibuktikan oleh
sesiapa yang ianya ditujukan kepada. Dalam kes ini, eksh D43 tidak
boleh diterima kerana ia tidak dibuktikan dengan betul oleh pihak
pembela sebagai PW12, salah seorang daripada pegawai polis, yang tidak
dipanggil untuk menenderkan secara rasminya keterangan selepas tertuduh
memberi keterangan ke atasnya (lihat ms 428G, 429B –C).
(2)   Kemungkinan ia telah ditenderkan dengan betul di hadapan mahkamah,
terdapat bahagian-bahagian kepada eksh D43 yang menyangkal keterangan
tertuduh. Ia oleh demikian masih tidak boleh diterima di bawah s 157 AK
tersebut (lihat ms 427C, 430D –E).
(3)   Pihak pendakwa sebaliknya tidak boleh menggunakan eksh D43 untuk
membuktikan kepercayaan dan kebolehpercayaan tertuduh di bawah ss 145
dan 155(c) AK tersebut kerana mereka telah gagal untuk merujuk tertuduh
kepada bahagian yang bercanggah kepada pernyataan tersebut (lihat ms
432G –H).
(4)   Hak kepada pembelaan ikhlas bermula sejurus selepas terdapat
kemungkinan munasabah akan bahaya terhadap diri seseorang dan hak ini
berterusan sehingga kemungkinan bahaya terhadap diri atau nyawa beliau
wujud. Jika seseorang mempunyai masa untuk meminta bantuan satu pihak
berkuasa atau menyebabkan kecederaan yang lebih teruk daripada yang
dijangkakan untuk tujuan menyelamatkan diri dan nyawa beliau maka hak
tersebut tiada (lihat ms 444H –445A).
(5)   Walaupun tiada sesiapa yang boleh dijangka untuk menilai dengan
ketepatan saintifik, ketepatan jumlah kekuatan yang perlu untuk membela
diri beliau dari satu serangan, apa-apa tindakan balasa dalam
menggunakan pembelaan ikhlas tidak boleh melebihi apa yang secara
munasabah perlu untuk mengelak diri daripada serangan penyerang (lihat
ms 445B).
(6)   Seseorang yang akan diserang tidak perlu menunggu penyerangnya membuat
pukulan pertama. Beliau tidak perlu menunggu sehingga beliau
sememangnya diserang atau dicederakan untuk bertindak. Beliau tidak
diwajibkan melarikan diri; undang-undang tidak menghendaki seseorang
warga berkelakuan seperti seorang pengecut. Jika beliau tidak dapat
melarikan diri, beliau boleh berpusing dan menyerang (lihat ms 445C –D).
(7)   Ujian sebab munasabah akan kemungkinan berlaku kematian atau kecederaan
adalan satu ujian objektif dan beban membuktikan pembelaan satu
pembelaan ikhlas adalah atas tertuduh atas imbangan kebarangkalian
(lihat ms 446D).
(8)   Berdasarkan fakta-fakta kes, kemungkinan akan bahaya yang dialami oleh
tertuduh terhadap diri dan nyawa beliau adalah munasabah kerana si mati
bersenjatakan sebatang kayu yang merupakan dahan yang besar, cukup
besar untuk menyebabkan kepala atau tulang seseorang retak jika dipukul
dengannya. Oleh itu, tertuduh berhak untuk menggunakan hak pembelaan
ikhlas beliau (lihat ms 448D –E, G).]  [*398]

Notes
For cases on impeachment of witnesses, see 7(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 2599–2611.
For cases on Penal Code (Malaysia) ss 96, 97, 99, 100 and 102, see 4 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1044–1055.
For cases on prior statements of witnesses, see 7(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 922–923.

Cases referred to
AlliedBank (Malaysia) Bhd v Yau Jiok Hua [1998] 6 MLJ 1
Amnu Pujary, Re (1942) 43 Cri LJ 753
Amrit v Sadashiv AIR 1944 Bom 233
Bal Gangadhar Tilak v Shrinivas AIR 1915 PC 7
Beckford v R [1987] 3 All ER 425
Bharat Singh v Bhagirati AIR 1966 SC 405
Bhagwan Singh v The State of Punjab (1952) SCR 812
Bhagwan Swarop v State of MP (1992) Cri LJ 777
Bharat Singh v Bhagirathi AIR 1966 SC 405
Bhojraj v Sitaram AIR 1936 PC 60
Binay Kumar Singh v State of Bihar (1997) 1 SCC 283
Charandesi Debi v Kanai Lal AIR 1955 Cal 206
Chong Khee Sang v Pang Ah Chee [1984] 1 MLJ 377
Chua Beow Huat v PP [1970] 2 MLJ 29
De Silva v PP [1964] MLJ 81
Emperor v Ajit Kumar Ghosh AIR 1945 Cal 159
Emperor v Rasul Bux AIR 1942 Sind 122
Goh Beng Seng v Dol bin Dolah [1970] 2 MLJ 95
Govindan v State of Kerala (1960) 47 AIR 258
Grandhe Venkatasubbiah, In re (1925) 86 IC 209 9
Harkishen v Pratap AIR 1938 PC 189
Heymerdinguer v R 58 IC 344
Iman Din v Emperor (1925) AIR Lahor 514
Jai Dev v State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 612
Karthiyayani & Anor v Lee Leong Sin & Anor [1975] 1 MLJ 119
Kesha v State of Rajasthan (1993) Cri LJ 3674
Khoon Chye Hin v PP [1961] MLJ 105
Kwang Boon Keong Peter v PP [1998] 2 SLR 592
Lee Thian Beng v PP [1972] 1 MLJ 248
Lim Heng Soon & Anor v PP [1970] 1 MLJ 166
MM Chetti v C Coomaraswamy AIR 1980 Mad 212
Mangru v Shivanand AIR 1923 All 575
Misri v Emperor AIR 1934 S 100
Miyana Hasan Abdulla v State of Gujarat AIR 1962 Guj 214
Mohd Khan v State of Madhiya Pradesh (1972) Cri LJ 661 of 662
Mohd Ramzani v State of Delhi (1980) Cri LJ 1010
Moreton v Moreton [1937] 1 All ER 470
Mt Hakima v Mt Jiandi AIR 1927 Sind 209
Muharram Ali v Barkat Ali AIR 1930 Lah 695
[*399]
Muniandy & Ors v PP [1966] 1 MLJ 257
Munia v Manohar AIR 1941 Or 429
Musa bin Yusof v PP [1953] MLJ 70
Muthusamy v PP [1948] MLJ 57
Muthu Goundan v Chinniah AIR 1937 M 86
Nahar Singh v Pang Hon Chin [1986] 2 MLJ 141
Nistran v Nando Lal 5 CWN xvi
Noliana bte Sulaiman v PP [2000] 4 MLJ 752
PP v Abang Abdul Rahman [1982] 1 MLJ 346
PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1
PP v Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris [1977] 1 MLJ 14
PP v Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15
PP v Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1977] 1 MLJ 180
PP v Lee Poh Chye & Anor [1997] 4 MLJ 578
PP v Lee Twe Jeat [1994] 3 SLR 219
PP v Lin Lian Chen [1992] 2 MLJ 561
PP v Mohamed Ali [1962] MLJ 257
PP v Ngoi Ming Sean [1982] 1 MLJ 24
PP v Teo Eng Chen & Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 156
PP v Yeo Kim Bok [1971] 1 MLJ 204
Palmer v R [1971] 1 All ER 1077 of 1085
Panji v S AIR 1965 Or 205
Paul v State of Tripura (1993) 2 Gau LR 395
R v Collin Chisom (1963) 47 Cri App 130
R v Conlon (1993) 69 Crim R 92
R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363
R v Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172
R v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729
R v Mc Innes [1971] 3 All ER 295
R v Turner [1975] 1 All ER 70
Raghuraj v R AIR 1934 All 956
Ramratan v State AIR 1962 SC 424
Ram Pratap v S AIR 1963 Pat 153
Rutherford v Richardson (1923) AC 1
Saludin bin Surif v PP [1997] 3 MLJ 317
Samuel v R AIR 1935 All 935
Sita Ram v Ramchandra (1977) SC 1712
Sitaram v Emperor (1925) 26 Cri LJ 587 At 589
Sris Chandra Nandy v Rakhlananda AIR 1941 PC 16
Soosay v PP [1993] 3 SLR 272
State of UP v Ram Swarup (1974) Cri LJ 1035
Tan Chow Soo v Ratna Ammal [1969] 2 MLJ 49
Taylor v Williams 3 B & Ad 845
Tham Kai Yau & Ors v PP [1977] 1 MLJ 174
Tham Kishun v Kausal Kishore AIR 1958 Pat 294
Tony ak Beliang v PP [2003] 1 CLJ 482
Tsia Development Enterprise Sdn Bhd v Awang Dewa [1984] 1 MLJ 301
Ugar v State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277
[*400]
Upendra v Phupendra 21 CWN 280
Venkatapathiraju v Venkatanarasimha AIR 1936 PC 264
Von Starck v The Queen [2000] 1 WLR 1270
Wan Nafi bin Wan Ismail v Hajjah Lijah bte Omar & Ors [1996] 5 MLJ 534
Wassan Singh v State Punjab (1996) Cri LJ 878
Willis v Bernard (1932) 8 Bing 376
Wong Swee Chin v PP [1981] 1 MLJ 212
Ya bin Daud v PP [1997] 4 MLJ 322
Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645

Legislation referred to
Emergency Ordinance
Evidence Act ss 17, 145, 146, 155, 157, 165
Penal Code ss 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 302
Criminal Procedure Code ss 112, 113

Appeal from
Arrest Case No B81–25 of 2002 (Magistrates’ Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Zauyah Bee bte Loth Khan ( Ahmad bin Bache with her) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the prosecution.
K Kumaraendran ( Dato’ Muhammad Shafee Abdullah, Rabinder Singh and Leena Ghosh with him) ( Shafee & Co) for the accused.
Selvam Shanmugam ( RS Seelan with him) ( Selvam Shanmugam & Partners) in watching brief for the family of the deceased.

AUGUSTINE PAUL J::

[1] The accused was charged with an offence under s 302 of the Penal Code in the following terms:

Bahawa kamu pada 7 June 2002 jam lebih kurang 4.30 petang, bertempat di
Jalan Maarof, Bangsar di dalam daerah Brickfields, di dalam Wilayah
Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur telah melakukan satu pembunuhan dengan
menyebabkan kematian ke atas Gobala Krishnan a/l Rajamugundan, (No Kad
Pengenalan: 690311-07-5247), dan oleh yang demikian kamu telah
melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah s 302 Kanun
Keseksaan.

[2] He claimed trial to the charge. In support of its case the prosecution called a total of 12 witnesses. They are the police personnel involved in the investigation of this case, namely, Amran bin Idris (‘PW1 ’), Tai Boon Hoo (‘PW2 ’), Shamsudin bin Satar (‘PW3 ’), Abdul Mujib bin Hj Mohd Ali (‘PW6 ’), Ahmad Fadil bin Mohd Pakeh (‘PW7 ’), Isa bin Mohd Azahari (‘PW8 ’), Razimi bin Ahmad (PW11), Thomas Woon Wei Chiow (‘PW12 ’); the two eye witnesses to the incident Syed Nasir bin Syed Husin Affandi (‘PW9 ’), Amran bin Shariff (‘PW10 ’); the medical assistant who went to the scene of the incident Abdul Razak bin Sulaiman (‘PW4 ’) and James Andrew a/l Anthony (‘PW5 ’), the brother-in-law of the deceased.

[3] On 7 June 2002, PW9 worked as a salesman in Syarikat Citroen which is at 45, Jalan Maarof, Jalan Bangsar, Kuala Lumpur. At about 4.30pm on that day, he was in the show room of the shop. As he said:

[*401]

Di tangan saya ada trade plate kenderaan dan semasa saya meletakkan
trade plate itu di bawah rak TV saya memandang ke jalan raya dan semasa
itu saya terlihat sebuah kereta berwarna emas sedang berhenti di
seberang jalan menghala ke Bangsar di persimpangan Jalan Tempinis di
lorong kedua. Saya terlihat di kereta itu di bahagian penumpang hadapan
seorang lelaki berhelmet berada di sisi kereta tersebut dan kelihatan
yang memakai helmet itu sedang bertengkar. Kemudian saya lihat seorang
lelaki berjambang keluar dari kereta tersebut. Di tangan kanannya
terdapat pistol. Semasa itulah saya menjerit pada kawan-kawan saya ‘
Ooi. Pistol. Pistol.’ Kemudian saya ke depan pintu showroom dan
kelihatan lelaki berjambang itu mengambil langkah ke belakang dan
melepaskan satu das tembakan ke udara. Kemudian lelaki yang berhelmet
itu berlari ke arah Jalan Tempinis dan kembali semula ke arah kereta
tersebut dan berhenti dalam jarak lebih kurang 5 kaki dari bonnet
hadapan kereta itu. Semasa itu saya terlihat lelaki berhelmet itu
memegang sebatang kayu dan mengikut pergerakan mereka pada masa itu.
Pertengkaran masih berlaku. Tiba-tiba lelaki berjambang itu melepas
tembakan ke arah lelaki berhelmet. Kemudian saya pun melintas jalan dan
saya melihat lelaki yang berhelmet itu kembali ke motosikalnya. Dia
duduk di sisi motornya. Kemudian dia mengeluarkan helmetnya dan
terbaring di situ. Selepas itu saya lihat itu adalah seorang lelaki
India. Kemudian saya pun balik semula ke showroom saya.

[4] In further describing the circumstances in which the second shot was fired, he said:

Semasa lelaki berhelmet datang memegang kayu, lelaki berjambang itu
memegang pistol di hadapan dadanya. Kemudian dia letak tangan yang
berpistol itu di atas pintu kereta yang terbuka pada masa itu. Keadaan
lelaki berjambang bila dia lepaskan tembakan kedua ialah lurus menghala
ke lelaki berhelmet itu. Sebelum tembakan kedua lelaki berhelmet itu
datang ke arah kereta dan berhenti di hadapan kereta dengan sebatang
kayu di tangan. Dia memegang kayu di bawah bahagian tengah kayu. Dia
tidak menggunakan kayu untuk memukul lelaki berjambang. Semasa tembakan
kedua saya lihat lelaki berhelmet itu sedang memegang kayu ke bawah dan
semasa itulah tembakan kedua dilepaskan. Pada masa itu yang memisahkan
mereka adalah pintu kereta. Cermin pintu itu dalam keadaan tutup. Masa
di antara tembakan pertama dan kedua ialah lebih kurang 10–15 saat.
Semasa tembakan kedua dilepaskan lelaki berhelmet sudah berhenti di
hadapan kereta. Di sebelah kiri bonnet hadapan. Pada bila-bila masa
saya tidak melihat kayu yang dipegang oleh lelaki berhelmet mengena
badan lelaki berjambang.

[5] As he said further:

Masa tembakan kedua jarak di antara lelaki berjambang dan lelaki
berhelmet ialah lebih kurang 10–12 kaki. OKT terus keluar sendiri dari
kereta. …… Masa bertengkar kayu was moving up and down. At the time of
the shooting he was holding the stick down. Sebelum tembakan kedua dan
semasa tembakan kedua dilepaskan OKT berada di belakang pintu hadapan
kereta. … … … Pada mula-mula saya nampak pistol tangan OKT ke atas
menghala ke udara. Saya tengok tangan keluar dahulu dengan pistol.
Selepas itu sahaja saya nampak badannya keluar dari kereta. Lelaki itu
pakai helmet warna putih.

[6] In his cross-examination, PW9 said that he saw the car coming to a halt. He saw the person in helmet first. That person was standing beside the front passenger seat door of the car. The door was closed. PW9 then said:

[*402]

Kalau seseorang seperti orang yang bertopi keledar berdiri betul-betul
di tepi pintu penumpang hadapan boleh nampak bahu ke atas (shoulder ke
atas). Bahu ke bawah saya tidak boleh nampak. Kalau orang bertopi
keledar membuka pintu penumpang hadapan saya setuju saya tidak boleh
nampak.

[7] In answer to further questions, he said:

Saya pasti saya nampak tangan keluar dahulu. Yang pakai topi keledar
betul-betul di tepi pintu hadapan penumpang. Semasa tangan keluar dari
kereta orang yang pakai topi keledar berundur sedikit. Saya setuju
bahawa jika OKT ditarik keluar dari kereta saya tidak boleh nampak.

Si mati balik dengan sebatang kayu. Pada masa itu, saya nampak OKT dan
si mati bertengkar bersungguh. Bertengkar mulut sahaja. Apabila pistol
keluar, masa itu pun masih bertengkar. Sebelum keluar pistol, saya tak
lihat pertengkaran. Pertama kali saya nampak saya nampak pistol keluar
dari pintu kereta, si mati ada di tepi pintu. Visor helmet buka dan
boleh nampak muka. Saya nampak muka si mati dalam keadaan marah. Dia
berkata-kata sesuatu. Selepas tembak OKT tunjuk pistol ke arah si mati.
Si mati lari ke arah motornya. Saya nampak dia kembali. Di tangannya
ada sebatang kayu. Saya tak nampak di mana dia ambil kayu tersebut.
Saya berterusan melihat si mati. Saya boleh nampak motosikal. Saya
tidak setuju keterangan saya karut.

Di antara tembakan satu dan dua beberapa saat sahaja. Saya tidak tahu
dari mana kayu didapati oleh si mati. Saya tak setuju kali pertama saya
sedar apa yang berlaku apabila saya dengar bunyi tembakan. Kali pertama
saya tak nampak apa-apa di tangan si mati.

Semasa itu semua lihat World Cup di TV. Masa saya depan TV saya nampak
pistol sudah keluar dari pintu Mercedes. Kemudian saya lari ke arah
pintu.

[8] PW9 was questioned on what he had told the police. The questions and answers run as follows:

Saya ada beri statement kepada polis kurang dari seminggu dari hari
kejadian. Saya tak ingat.

s: Adakah kamu beritahu polis bahawa, saya menjerit ‘Pistol.
Pistol’ hanya selepas mendengar dan melihat tembakan pertama?

j: Tidak.

s: Awak mahu check statement sama ada beritahu polis macam itu?

(DPP rujuk statement kepada saksi)

(Saksi baca statementnya)

j: Saya memberitahu polis macam itu.

s: Saya cadangkan bahawa En Nasir telahpun menceritakan kepada
polis bahawa lelaki yang berjambang keluar tembak kali pertama
dan selepas itu kamu menjerit ‘Pistol. Pistol’.

j: Tidak.

s: Benar atau tidak En Nasir mengatakan kepada polis bahawa dalam
episod pertama tidak lihat pistol langsung. Hanya baru nampak
pistol apabila si mati kembali dengan kayu.

j: Tidak.

s: Apa yang saya kata adalah apa En Nasir sebut kepada polis.

j: Tidak benar.

[*403]

[9] And further on the same issue:

Jarak di antara OKT dan si mati lebih kurang 10 kaki. Dari jarak itu
tembakan kedua dibuat.

s: Adakah En Nasir pernah mengatakan jarak kedua-nya semasa
tembakan kedua 4–5 kaki?

j: (Witness wishes to check his police statement) Benar, saya ada
kata jarak keduanya ialah 4–5 kaki. (Witness asked to demonstrate
how deceased was holding stick) Saya tak pasti dia pegang dari
hujung mana. Kayu ini lebih kurang 4 kaki. si mati pegang dengan
satu tangan. The reaching distance of the stick is about 5 feet.
The reaching distance is not close to the face of accused. Dari
posisi itu si mati tidak boleh pukul OKT. Saya tak pasti sama ada
saya ada beritahu polis si mati acukan kayu ke arah muka OKT.
(Witness refers to his statement on this point) (D/C told that
this line of questioning is irregular.)

s: En Nasir ada beritahu polis bahawa si mati ada mengacukan kayu
itu ke muka OKT.

j: Ada.

s: Kenapa tidak beritahu sebegitu semasa di mahkamah?

j: Kerana walaupun dia acu ke arah OKT jaraknya masih ada jarak.

s: En Nasir saya cadangkan sejurus sebelum tembakan kedua berlaku
jarak diantara keduanya membolehkan si mati memukul tertuduh
dengan kayu.

j: Saya tak setuju.

s: Masa tembakan kedua cerita keadaan badan si mati.

j: Dia berdiri tegak sambil memegang kayu yang dihalakan ke
bawah. The right hand holding the stick was completely down. Arah
tembakan ialah direct. Saya pasti dia berdiri tegak. He was
squarely facing the accused.

s: Itu bukan position si mati sebelum tembak. He was holding the
stick with both hands and was bent a little and was aiming with
the stick.

j: Saya tidak setuju.

s: Bullet masuk dari kanan ke kiri. Oleh kerana itu position
cannot be challenged.

j: Saya tak setuju.

Dari segi showroom si mati lebih hadapan di Jalan Bangsar. Showroom is
not directly facing the junction. (Saksi dirujuk kepada ID22)

Saya boleh nampak terus dari showroom. Saya tak pasti sama ada pada
satu ketika ada gaya-gaya dari OKT yang menunjukkan beliau cuba
mententeramkan keadaan pertengkaran tersebut. Saya tak pasti mungkin
tak nampak. Selepas tembakan pertama saya tak pasti jika ada gaya-gaya
dari si mati yang menunjukkan dia mencabar OKT untuk tembak. Sungguh
pun OKT telahpun menembak sekali ke atas si mati tidak langsung nampak
gentar. Simpulan saya ialah tembakan pertama ialah tembakan amaran.

Saya tidak nampak masa pertengkaran si mati menjolok-jolokkan kayu ke
dada OKT. Saya tidak nampak si mati pukul OKT dengan kayu. Saya setuju
P11 boleh membawa cedera parah jika dihentam di kepala dan mungkin
boleh bawa mati.

Saya rasa cemas pada masa itu. Saya nampak kedua orang pun nampak macam
cakap. Kemarahan nampaknya macam tidak boleh dikawal.

[*404]

[10] In answer to the position of the helmet and the motorcycle after the shooting incident, he said:

(Saksi dirujuk kepada P4)

Saya setuju di P4A si mati terbaring di belakang motosikal. Helmet
tidak di sekitar badannya. Di P4C dan D helmet itu nampak tergantung di
cermin belakang motosikal. Saya lihat helmet dan motosikal ditolak ke
hadapan oleh seorang lain. Saya tidak cerita ini kepada polis. Motor
ditolak ke hadapan dari tepi persimpangan. (Saksi diminta tanda X
kedudukan motosikal pada asalnya di P4C) Di X adalah bahagian tayar
hadapan. Saya tidak tahu kenapa motosikal ditolak. Saya tak tahu siapa
tolak motosikal. Saya setuju tempat baru motosikal lebih menghalang
kenderaan dari tempat asal. Badan si mati tidak diubah. Saya tak pasti.
Setakat yang saya ingat badan itu macam itu.

s: Saya cadangkan helmet dan motosikal seperti di P4C sebelum
pertengkaran bermula dekat kereta Mercedes.

j: Tidak.

Selepas kejadian kereta jalan sedikit ke hadapan. Dia keluar dari
kereta dan lihat badan si mati. Saya tidak cerita ini kepada polis.
Benar, saya tidak ceritakan kepada polis bahawa selepas dia masuk dalam
kereta dia tidak berhenti sekali lagi dekat dengan badan si mati. Saya
tak pasti sama ada OKT ada kata ‘Panggil ambulans’.

s: Ada satu ketika si mati memegang kayu itu di mana hujung kayu
dekat dengan muka OKT.

j: Tidak. Boleh ulang soalan?

Peguam ulangi soalan.

j: Tidak. Keadaan kayu tidak dekat dengan muka OKT.

s: Berapa dekat?

j: Dia berdiri. Jarak kurang dari 10 kaki. si mati berada 4–5
kaki sebelum bonnet kereta. OKT di belakang pintu. Pada setiap
masa OKT berada di belakang pintu. Itu yang paling dekat di
antara kedua orang itu.

[11] In answer to further questions, he said:

s: En Nasir saya cadangkan sejurus sebelum tembakan kedua berlaku
jarak diantara keduanya membolehkan si mati memukul tertuduh
dengan kayu.

j: Saya tak setuju.

s: Masa tembakan kedua cerita keadaan badan si mati.

j: Dia berdiri tegak sambil memegang kayu yang dihalakan ke
bawah. The right hand holding the stick was completely down. Arah
tembakan ialah direct. Saya pasti dia berdiri tegak. He was
squarely facing the accused.

s: Itu bukan position si mati sebelum tembak. He was holding the
stick with both hands and was bent a little and was aiming with
the stick.

j: Saya tidak setuju.

s: Bullet masuk dari kanan ke kiri. Oleh kerana itu position
cannot be challenged.

j: Saya tak setuju.

Dari segi showroom si mati lebih hadapan di Jalan Bangsar. Showroom is
not directly facing the junction. (Saksi dirujuk kepada ID22)

Saya boleh nampak terus dari showroom. Saya tak pasti sama ada pada
satu ketika ada gaya-gaya dari OKT yang menunjukkan beliau cuba
[*405]  mententeramkan keadaan pertengkaran tersebut. Saya tak
pasti mungkin tak nampak. Selepas tembakan pertama saya tak pasti jika
ada gaya-gaya dari si mati yang menunjukkan dia mencabar OKT untuk
tembak. Sungguh pun OKT telahpun menembak sekali ke atas si mati tidak
langsung nampak gentar. Simpulan saya ialah tembakan pertama ialah
tembakan amaran.

Saya tidak nampak masa pertengkaran si mati menjolok-jolokkan kayu ke
dada OKT. Saya tidak nampak si mati pukul OKT dengan kayu. Saya setuju
P11 boleh membawa cedera parah jika dihentam di kepala dan mungkin
boleh bawa mati.

Saya rasa cemas pada masa itu. Saya nampak kedua orang pun nampak macam
cakap. Kemarahan nampaknya macam tidak boleh dikawal.

[12] In his re-examination, PW9 said:

Semasa pertengkaran keadaan OKT ialah dia marah juga. Saya tidak nampak
kayu yang dipegang oleh si mati kena sipi-sipi pada muka tertuduh.
Kedai Citroen bertentang dengan jalan raya dan tinggi sedikit daripada
jalan raya. Dari dalam kedai saya boleh nampak dengan jelas apa yang
berlaku di tempat kejadian. Cermin kereta Mercedes itu cerah dan tidak
gelap sangat. Saya boleh nampak pemandu kereta. Semasa OKT kata ‘Balai
cerita’ keadaannya ialah biasa sahaja. Semasa tembakan kedua dilepaskan
jarak di antara si mati dan tertuduh ialah lebih kurang 10 kaki. Saya
tidak kenal OKT sebelum kejadian ini.

[13] PW10 was employed in the same place as PW9 at the material time. In his evidence, he said:

Pada waktu itu, seorang teman saya, Syed Nasir masuk ke dalam bilik
pameran membawa trade plate untuk diletakkan di bawah meja TV. Selepas
itu, saya dengar Syed Nasir menjerit, ‘Pistol Hoi Pistol’. Dan saya
memandang ke luar bilik pameran dan nampak seorang lelaki sedang
memegang pistol mengarah ke langit. Dan seorang lelaki India menuju ke
arah lelaki yang memegang pistol. Bila saya nampak lelaki pegang pistol
saya berada di luar bilik pameran di tepi jalan. Selepas saya dengar
Syed Nasir menjerit, ‘Pistol Hoi Pistol’ saya terus meluru keluar dari
bilik pameran. Saya nampak seorang lelaki sedang memegang pistol.
Sedang acukan pistol ke arah langit dan seorang lelaki India sedang
memegang kayu menuju ke arah lelaki yang memegang pistol. Semasa saya
meluru ke luar dari bilik pameran saya dengar satu das tembakan.
Selepas saya mendengar satu das tembakan itu saya masih lagi berlari
menuju ke arah lelaki yang melepaskan tembakan. Lelaki itu berada di
sebelah kiri kereta berwarna emas. Kereta itu berada di Jalan Maarof
berhadapan bilik pameran. Saya berlari menuju ke arah kereta. Ketika
saya berada di atas pembahagi jalan saya nampak lelaki yang memegang
pistol melepaskan tembakan ke arah lelaki India.

Waktu saya menuju ke kereta itu selepas tembakan pertama saya nampak
lelaki yang memegang pistol itu mengacukan pistol ke arah lelaki India
sambil bertengkar. Tetapi saya tidak dengar pertengkaran itu. Sebelum
tembakan kedua lelaki India itu sambil bertengkar kayu itu diangkat ke
atas dan ke bawah. Lelaki yang memegang pistol itu berdiri tepi pintu
kereta di sebelah kiri. Pintu kereta itu terbuka. Cermin pintu kereta
tutup. Sebelah tangan kanan lelaki sedang mengacukan pistol ke arah
lelaki India. Tangan lelaki (yang pegang pistol) berada di atas pintu
kereta. Lelaki India yang memegang kayu berada di sebelah kiri kereta
di bahagian bonnet kereta.

Saya tahu mereka bertengkar kerana saya nampak mimik muka mereka dalam
keadaan marah. Mereka bertengkar dengan kuat. Tetapi saya tidak
dengar.  [*406]  Dalam beberapa saat sewaktu pertengkaran, saya
nampak lelaki yang memegang pistol melepaskan tembakan ke arah lelaki
yang memegang kayu. Semasa tembakan kedua dilepaskan lelaki India
berada di hujung hadapan kereta sebelah kiri. Semasa tembakan kedua
lelaki India itu berundur. Just before the second shot, mereka masih
bertengkar. Kayu yang dipegang oleh lelaki India itu berada di bawah.
Selepas itu, baru saya dengar tembakan. Semasa tembakan kedua
dilepaskan lelaki India berada di hujung kereta sebelah kiri bahagian
hadapan. Badannya tegak memandang hadapan ke arah lelaki yang memegang
pistol. Semasa saya berada di atas divider itu, saya tidak nampak
lelaki India memukul lelaki yang memegang pistol pada bila-bila masa.
Pada masa saya melihat lelaki India memegang kayu ke atas dan ke bawah,
saya lihat kayu itu tidak kena pada badan lelaki yang memegang pistol.
Semasa tembakan kedua dilepaskan jarak di antara mereka saya tidak
berapa pasti. Saya boleh tunjuk. (Witness points to a distance of about
10ft) Selepas tembakan kedua dilepaskan, lelaki India itu berundur,
berpusing dan berjalan menuju ke arah motosikal yang diletakkan di tepi
jalan di persimpangan Jalan Tempinis dan Jalan Maarof. Dia duduk sambil
berlunjur dan membuka topi keledar dan terus rebah. Selepas itu, lelaki
yang melepaskan tembakan berjalan menuju ke arah lelaki India itu
sambil berkata ‘Biar biar balai cerita’. Pada masa itu, saya berada
betul-betul di hadapan kereta berwarna emas sambil memegang telefon dan
cuba menghubungi 999. Selepas itu, lelaki yang memegang pistol masuk ke
dalam kereta. Kereta itu terus berlalu menuju ke Bangsar. Lelaki India
terus terbaring di situ. Saya nampak kesan luka di sebelah bawah bahu
sebelah kanan. Saya berlari ke pejabat Directional cuba menghubungi 999
dengan menggunakan telefon pejabat. Panggilan saya telah diterima oleh
Balai Polis Travers. Saya memberitahu pegawai ada seorang lelaki India
kena tembak dan perlukan bantuan. Pegawai itu telah mengambil
butir-butir diri saya dan mengatakan bantuan akan tiba sebentar lagi.
Saya ada maklumkan bahawa ada seorang lelaki berbangsa Sikh menembak
seorang lelaki India.

Pada masa itu, keadaan jalan raya ke Bangsar menuju ke Pusat Bandar
lengang. Tiada kereta. Manakala jalan di tempat kejadian berlaku jam.
Ada dua lorong di sana. Kereta emas ada di lorong kedua berhadpan
dengan simpang Jalan Tempinis. Kereta di lorong pertama boleh jalan.
Kereta di lorong kedua berhenti. Masa itu telah ada orang ramai di
Jalan Tempinis dan juga di Stesyen Minyak. Terdapat orang di tempat
lelaki India berada. Orang-orang itu ada melihat kejadian.

[14] With regard to the point of time at which the accused was holding the stick, he said further:

Saya nampak seorang lelaki India sedang menuju ke arah lelaki yang
memegang pistol. Lelaki India sedang memegang kayu. Ini adalah selepas
tembakan pertama dilepaskan.

[15] He said that the deceased was wearing the helmet from the time he was arguing with the accused. In further commenting on the stick that the deceased was holding, he said:

Semasa bertengkar dan sepanjang masa sehingga tembakan kedua si mati
memegang kayu somewhere at a point three-quarters from the front. He
was moving it up and down. Hujung kayu yang bergerak atas dan bawah
adalah jauh dari muka tertuduh. This was just before the second shot.
Pada masa itu tertuduh dan si mati dipisahkan oleh pintu kereta
berwarna emas.

[16] In his cross-examination as to the point of time when the deceased was holding the stick, PW10 said:

[*407]

Saya ada dengar bunyi tembakan pertama. Bunyi itu bukan terlalu kuat
tetapi boleh dengar. Apabila saya dengar bunyi tembakan pertama saya
berada di luar showroom. Saya sudah menghampiri tepi jalan. Saya ada
nampak si mati menuju ke arah OKT dengan memegang kayu. Saya beritahu
mahkamah semalam ini adalah selepas tembakan pertama. Pada kali pertama
saya nampak si mati ialah pada masa dia berjalan menuju kepada OKT.
Pada masa itu, jarak di antara si mati dan OKT ialah 15–16 kaki
(Witness demonstrates the distance). Pada masa itu, OKT sedang
mengacukan pistol ke arah si mati.

[17] He then said:

Semalam awak kata, ‘Selepas itu saya dengar Syed Nasir menjerit, ‘
Pistol, Hoi, Pistol’ dan saya memandang ke arah luar bilik pameran dan
nampak seorang lelaki sedang memegang pistol mengarah ke langit dan
seorang lelaki India menuju ke arah lelaki yang memegang pistol.’ Saya
setuju itu benar berlaku. Bila saya nampak lelaki India itu dia masih
pegang kayu itu ke arah bawah. Saya nampak lelaki India angkat kayu
atas dan bawah semasa mereka bertengkar. Pada masa itu, jarak di antara
OKT dan saya ialah jarak tiga kereta. Saya tidak boleh dengar
pertengkaran. Sedekat-dekat yang saya berada kepada OKT ialah 4 kaki.
When I was at the divider the distance between me and the accused was
the distance of one car sideways. Masa itu pun saya tidak dengar
pertengkaran. Pada masa itu si mati lebih jauh daripada OKT dengan
jarak OKT dan saya.

[18] In further commenting on the movement of the stick that the deceased was holding, he said:

The deceased was not really raising the stick up and down vigorously. I
am not sure whether there were times the deceased took positions as
though he was going to strike.

q: I have reason to believe that you stated to the police that
the deceased took a position as though he was going to strike.

a: Tiada.

He was quarrelling with the stick up and down. I did not say that he
held the stick as though he was going to strike.

The police took statements from me twice. The second statement was
taken 2–3 weeks from the incident. I could be wrong. After that no
other statements were taken. Each time I gave a statement I came back
and told my friends what I said.

q: Did you not tell the police that the stick was lifted by the
deceased to the face of the accused?

a: I said that.

Even at the distance between the two of them it can be described as the
deceased lifting the stick to the face. I still deny that the deceased
had taken a position as if he was going to hit accused.

[19] He did not agree that the deceased was not wearing his helmet during the incident. He also said that he does not agree that the deceased pulled out the accused from the car. In his re-examination, PW10 said:

Semasa pertengkaran di antara OKT dan si mati, tangan OKT yang memegang
pistol berada di atas pintu kereta sebelah kiri. Semasa tembakan kedua
dilepaskan, tangan OKT yang memegang pistol masih di atas pintu kereta
di sebelah kiri.

[*408]

[20] PW1 received information from PW10 about the incident at 4.40pm. He notified the Bilik Gerakan and made a police report (‘exh P3’). PW5 was then informed of the incident. He went to the scene with a team of police officers including PW12. PW5 took possession of various exhibits including a stick (‘exh P11’), a helmet (‘exh P12’) and a motorcycle (exh P13). The body of the deceased was sent to the University Hospital for a post-mortem by PW8. PW2 was instructed to take photographs (exh P4 A–G) at the scene by PW12. PW3 took photographs (‘exh P5 A–V’) of the deceased at the Univesity Hospital on the instructions of PW12. PW5 identified the deceased in the mortuary of the University Hospital as his brother-in-law by the name of Gobala Krishnan a/l Rajamugundan. PW7, a corporal, was on duty at the Balai Polis Pantai. The accused went there at about 5.15 pm to lodge a report and handed his pistol (‘exh P15’) to PW7. As PW7 said in his evidence:

Kemudian lelaki Singh itu beritahu saya di mana dia telah lepaskan dua
das tembakan terhadap satu lelaki India di pam minyak Petronas, Jalan
Maarof, Bangsar kerana lelaki India tersebut telah memukulnya dengan
kayu cuba hendak menyamunnya.

[21] He had made a record of this in the station diary (‘exh P14’). When cross-examined on the entries he had made in exh P14, PW7 said:

Saya buat catatan selepas saya serahkan pistol dan dokumen kepada Sjn
Isa. Apa yang saya tulis adalah apa yang saya ingat. Tertuduh beritahu
apa yang berlaku. Saya tulis apa yang saya ingat. Setakat apa saya
ingat saya tulis.

[22] PW12 said in his evidence:

Pada jam 4.57 petang saya bersama-sama ASP Mujib, K/Insp Azahar dan
jurugambar L/Kpl Tai menghala ke tempat kejadian. ASP Mujib ialah SP6.
L/Kpl Tai ialah SP2. Kami sampai di tempat kejadian jam lebih kurang 5.
05 petang. Tempat kejadian adalah di simpang Jalan Tempinis dan Jalan
Maarof, Bangsar. Saya dapati ada satu lelaki India dalam keadaan
terbaring di atas jalan, Jalan Tempinis berdekatan dengan simpang Jalan
Maarof. Di hujung kakinya ada sebatang kayu dan berdekatan dengan si
mati sebuah motosikal no WFY 6157 jenis Honda EX5. Saya terus
menjalankan siasatan dengan memeriksa lelaki India itu di mana saya
dapati dia berpakaian baju T-berkolar warna putih, seluar panjang warna
putih, berkasut dan pemeriksaan lanjut didapati ada kesan luka tembakan
di bahu kanan dekat dengan armpit. Saya juga dapati baju dekat bahu
kanan yang mana terdapat kesan luka ada kesan lubang dan kesan darah.
Saya seterusnya memeriksa untuk mendapatkan dokumen kenal diri lelaki
tersebut dan dapati tiada memiliki kad pengenalan ataupun lesen
memandu. Lelaki itu didapati tidak bernafas dan dipercayai telah
meninggal dunia. Lelaki itu tidak memakai topi keledar. Topi keledar
itu ada tersangkut di rear mirror motosikal. Oleh kerana masa itu tiada
terdapat maklumat yang apa jenis senjata yang digunakan kita telah buat
pemeriksaan di sekitar kawasan untuk mencari jika ada casing peluru.
Kita juga buat pemeriksaan di sekitar kawasan dan mendapati di dua
belah tepi Jalan Tempinis terdapat pokok-pokok yang mana juga didapati
di bawah pokok-pokok ada kayu-kayu dahan yang dipotong. Oleh kerana
pada masa itu kita tidak dapat tahu butir si mati, telah buat semakan
dengan motosikal didapati motosikal dilapor hilang bersabit Setapak
Report 1986/02.

[23] With regard to injuries on the accused, he said:

[*409]

Dato Balwant Singh ada mengadu yang dia ada sakit kerana kena pukul.
Saya buat pemeriksaan dan didapati ada sedikit kemerahan di lengan atas
tangan kiri (upper arm). Dan juga ada sedikit kemerahan di dada. Oleh
kerana OKT telah mengadu saya telah arahkan Insp Arshad untuk bawa OKT
untuk diperiksa dan di samping itu untuk mengambil contoh darah.

[24] PW12 served a copy of the post-mortem report of the deceased on the accused on 29 November 2002 (‘exh P33’). In his cross-examination, PW12 said that he found branches similar to exh P11 below the trees in Jalan Tempinis. They were on the ground. They had been pruned and cut. The nearest place where he found them was about 40ft from the motorcycle. He recorded a statement from the accused under s 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The defence then applied for the statement to be tendered in evidence. The prosecution objected on the ground that it is privileged. The defence said that it is required to show consistency as it is contemporaneous to the incident and contended that it is admissible under s 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code as it refers to ‘any statement’ made by a person and referred to Public Prosecutor v Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris [1977] 1 MLJ 14 in support. I overruled the objection raised by the prosecution and duly admitted the statement in evidence (‘exh D43’). PW12 then said that from the beginning when he met the accused he claimed that what he did was in self-defence. He also said that he was aware that the deceased was detained in Simpang Rengam under the Emergency Ordinance in 1993, 1995 and 1997 for being involved in secret society activities. After his release in 1997, he was restricted to Pasir Putih for two years. His body had tattoos which are significant to secret societies. The motorcycle that the deceased was riding had been reported stolen on 8 March 2002. He then said:

The distance from the front bonnet of the car to the motorcycle is
about 10 metres. The distance from the bonnet to the nearest tree where
the branches were found is less than 40ft.

[25] In his re-examination upon being referred to exh P4D, he said:

Dalam gambar ada daun-daun. Daun-daun ini dari pokok. There is a tree
near the leaves. There were branches under that tree. That was the
nearest tree to the deceased and the motorcycle. The distance between
the deceased and the tree is about 10ft. To the motorcycle, it is extra
another foot or two. si mati tiada sabitan lampau. Saya tidak tahu
siapa yang curi motosikal itu. Tiada mana-mana bahagian kereta Mercedes
yang dented.

[26] The prosecution then closed its case. The defence elected not to make a submission of no case. The evidence of PW9 and PW10 show that the accused shot at the deceased at close range with his pistol, after having fired a warning shot, as a result of which the deceased died. This is not challenged by the defence. What is in some dispute is the sequence of events that happened prior to the firing of the fatal shot which I shall consider now.

The point of time at which PW9 and PW10 were first attracted to the incident

[27] PW9 started off his examination-in-chief by saying that he saw the Mercedes Benz stop; a male person in helmet was at the front passenger seat arguing;  [*410]  the accused alighted from the car with a pistol in his right hand; and he shouted ‘Ooi. Pistol. Pistol’. However, in his cross-examination, he said that he did not see anything in the accused’s hand the first time. This inconsistency was not clarified by the prosecution during the re-examination of PW9. This makes it difficult to determine when exactly PW9 first saw the accused, and consequently, the point of time at which he shouted. PW10 was alerted to the incident by the shouting of PW9 which, following my earlier ruling, does not assist in making a determination this issue.

[28] Thus, it is my finding that it is difficult to determine the precise point of time at which PW9 shouted and thereby the time when PW9 and PW10 were first attracted to the incident. This means that the prosecution has not led prima facie evidence to identify the point of time at which PW9 and PW10 were first attracted to the incident. However, I must observe that PW9 admitted in cross-examination that he had stated in his statement to the police, after having perused it in court, that he first noticed what was happening after he had heard the first shot. I shall revert to this part of his evidence in a later part of the judgment.

Whether the accused was pulled out from the car

[29] PW9 said in the beginning of his examination-in-chief that he saw the accused coming out of the car with a pistol in his hand. Later on, he said that the accused came out on his own. However, in his cross-examination he agreed that he could not see whether the person in helmet opened the door of the front passenger seat and whether the accused was pulled out from the car. He was not re-examined on this point. PW10, in his cross-examination, did not agree that the deceased pulled out the accused from the car. This is inconsistent with what he had said in his examination-in-chief that when he heard PW9 shouting he saw the accused holding a pistol. At that time, the accused was outside the car. If that was the first point of time at which he saw the accused he could not have seen how the accused came out of the car.

[30] It is therefore my finding that PW9 and PW10 did not know whether the accused was pulled out from the car.

The point of time at which the accused took out the pistol

[31] In the light of my previous two findings, the logical inference is that PW9 and PW10 did not know the point of time at which the accused took out the pistol.

[32] Whether the deceased had the stick with him before the first shot was fired by the accused

[33] PW9 was firm in his evidence at all stages of his examination that the deceased took the stick only after the first shot was fired by the accused. The evidence of PW10 on this issue is different. In the beginning of his examination-in-chief he said:

Sedang acukan pistol ke arah langit dan seorang lelaki India sedang
memegang kayu menuju ke arah lelaki yang memegang pistol.

[*411]

[34] However, towards the end of the examination-in-chief, he said:

Saya nampak seorang lelaki India sedang menuju ke arah lelaki yang
memegang pistol. Lelaki India sedang memegang kayu. Ini adalah selepas
tembakan pertama di lepaskan.

[35] In his cross-examination on the following day, he said:

Apabila saya dengar bunyi tembakan pertama saya berada di luar
showroom. Saya sudah menghampiri tepi jalan. Saya ada nampak si mati
menuju ke arah OKT dengan memegang kayu. Saya beritahu mahkamah semalam
ini adalah selepas tembakan pertama.

[36] PW10 has therefore clarified what he had said the previous day to confirm that the deceased had the stick with him before the firing of the first shot. PW10 was not re-examined on his clarification. It is therefore my finding that the evidence of PW10 is that the deceased had the stick before the firing of the first shot.

[37] It follows that the prosecution evidence on this issue is contradictory.

The manner in which the deceased used the stick before the two shots were fired

[38] PW9 said that when the deceased and the accused were arguing seriously the stick was moving up and down. He did not at any time see the stick come into contact with the accused. At the time of the second shot, the deceased was holding the stick down. In his cross-examination, he said that there was no occasion when the stick was near the accused’s face. He admitted having stated in his statement to the police that the deceased pointed the stick at the accused’s face. When asked why he did not say that in court PW9 said that even though the stick was so pointed the accused was still a distance away.

[39] PW10 said that the deceased was holding the stick and going towards the accused. He was moving it up and down. They were arguing loudly. He did not at anytime see the deceased hitting the accused with the stick. In fact, the stick did not touch the body of the accused at all. Initially, he said that at the point of time of the second shot, the deceased was holding the stick downwards. However, at the end of his examination-in-chief, he said:

Semasa bertengkar dan sepanjang masa sehingga tembakan kedua si mati
memegang kayu somewhere at a point three-quarters from the front. He
was moving it up and down. Hujung kayu yang bergerak atas dan bawah
adalah jauh dari muka tertuduh. This was just before the second shot.

[40] He admitted in cross-examination that he told the police that the stick was lifted by the deceased to the face of the accused. But he denied that the deceased had taken a position as if he was going to hit the accused.

[41] From an assessment of the evidence of PW9 and PW10, it is clear that the stick held by the deceased did not at any time touch the accused. But the deceased was moving the stick up and down and was pointing it towards the face of the accused. It follows that the stick was in various positions at different points of time, and obviously, was moving from one position to another. Thus, it is not possible to place much emphasis on the evidence  [*412]  given that at the time of the second shot the stick was pointed downwards. My evaluation will be different if the evidence discloses that for a considerable length of time the stick was in that position before the firing of the second shot. That, however, was not the case.

Whether the deceased was wearing his helmet at the time of the incident

[42] Both PW9 and PW10 were firm in their evidence that the deceased was wearing his helmet at the time of the incident. I accept their evidence on this issue but I must observe that no evidence was led by the prosecution to explain how the helmet was found hanging on the rear view mirror of the motorcycle when the evidence adduced reveals that the accused collapsed near it. The nearest explanation came from PW9 who said that he saw someone pushing the helmet and the motorcycle to the front.

Events preceding the shooting incident at the junction of Jalan Maarof/Jalan Tempinis

[43] The evidence of PW9 and PW10 is confined to only what transpired at the Jalan Maarof/Jalan Tempinis junction. Thus, there is no evidence on record at this stage to show what occurred prior to this.

[44] Even though there are discrepancies in the evidence of PW9 and PW10 they are not material enough to adversely affect their credibility. What is significant is that their evidence clearly shows that the accused shot at the deceased deliberately at close range with his pistol. The deliberate use of a dangerous weapon at another leads to the irresistible inference that it was done with the intention to cause death (see Tham Kai Yau & Ors v PP [1977] 1 MLJ 174). Accordingly, I was satisfied that the prosecution had made out a prima case and called upon the accused to enter his defence.

[45] The accused elected to give evidence on oath. He called five witnesses. They are Sukhinderjit Singh (‘DW2 ’) whom the accused telephoned on that day; Dr Myo Khine (‘DW3 ’) who examined the accused on that day; Abdul Rahman bin Ismail (‘DW4 ’) who witnessed the incident; Ranjit Kaur d/o Channan Singh (‘DW5 ’), the daughter-in-law of the accused who was driving the car on that day and Norzilah bte Ismail (‘DW6 ’), the sister of DW4.

[46] The accused said that on 7 June 2002, he left his office at 4.20 pm in his Mercedes Benz bearing registration number WD5. It was driven by DW5. As they were travelling towards Bangsar after having passed the KTM roundabout, the deceased who was riding a motorcycle overtook them on the left. DW5 sounded the horn when a motor car came close to them. They then stopped a few cars behind the traffic lights near the Syariah Court as the traffic light was showing red. The deceased who was about 30ft ahead of them turned and came to the driver’s side of their car. DW5 brought the window screen down. As the accused said:

Before we could say anything he started abusing by using vulgar words.
He said, ‘Bengali busuk, Bengali bitch, pukima’. Ranjit Kaur tried to
explain that the hooting was not directed at him but at the car on our
left. I too also told him the same thing. He just refused to listen. He
kept on shouting vulgarities. I told him ‘Pergilah’.

[*413]

[47] The light then turned green and they moved on. The accused then saw the deceased waiting at the bus stop near the museum. The deceased waved with his hand many times asking them to stop their car. They ignored him and carried on driving. Then they heard some sound from behind the car. The accused noticed the deceased near the rear mudguard of the car. The deceased then overtook them. The accused thought that he had gone off. At the junction of Jalan Travers and Brickfields, the traffic light was showing red. As the accused said:

We were then about 5–6 cars behind the traffic light. Again I saw that
he had already reached the traffic lights. He then turned back and came
towards my car. He came to the left hand side window. I then opened the
window. He again started abusing. He said, ‘Bloody Bengali, busuk
Bengali, pukima, mari lawan.’ I told him again that the horn was not
directed at him. I told him, ‘Pergi police station, boleh lawan.’ He
looked very angry and threatening.

[48] When the traffic light turned green, they started driving towards Bangsar. The deceased disappeared from their view. The accused thought that the deceased had gone. When they arrived at the junction of Jalan Bangsar and Jalan Maarof, the traffic light was again showing red. At that time, the accused and DW5 were about six to seven cars behind the traffic lights. When the light turned green, they started moving. When they arrived at the junction of Jalan Bangsar and Jalan Maarof, the light turned red again. Their car was the first car at the junction. The deceased was waiting at the junction on the left. When the light turned green, they could not move as the deceased was in front of them. He was shouting and using abusing language. When somebody from behind hooted, the deceased began to move away. When they were about 30ft away from the Petronas Petrol Station, DW5 gave a signal to turn left into Jalan Tempinis. The traffic was slow as the road was congested. The deceased had reached the junction of Jalan Tempinis and was looking behind every now and then. The accused then said:

I believed that when he saw our signal, he also went up Jalan Tempinis.
I told Ranjit Kaur not to turn into Jalan Tempinis but to go straight
towards the mosque as I was afraid that if I turn into Jalan Tempinis
and go to my house he would follow me there. As our car was slowly
moving, I saw the motorcyclist had gone up Jalan Tempinis and picked up
a piece of wood. He picked it up from the left hand side of the road
nearer the petrol station. The place from where he picked up the wood
could be about 30–40ft from the junction. The motorcyclist, after
picking up the wood, did a U-turn and came round to the right hand side
of the junction. He parked his motorcycle at the junction. (Saksi
dirujuk kepada P4C and D) The motorcycle is the one nearest to the
person lying down in P4C. By that time, we came almost to the centre of
the junction. (Witness referred to P22) (Witness asked to mark position
of his car) I was at position marked Y.

Then I saw the motorcyclist walking towards my car. The distance from
the motorcycle to the car could be about 15ft. When he was walking
towards me he looked very angry and aggressive and was waving the stick
as he was walking. At that time, he was not wearing his helmet. Then he
came to the left hand side of the window of the car and gave a hard
knock on the window with his left hand. I then brought the window
screen down. He again started shouting and yelling abusive words. I
tried to tell him again that the horn was not directed at him. He just
refused to listen. He was again abusive using filthy
[*414]
language. He then got hold of the handle of the car door and opened it.
With his left hand, he caught hold of the collar of my shirt and
dragged me out forcefully for about 4–5ft towards Jalan Tempinis. When
he dragged me out, I resisted a little. But he was too strong for me.
When he pulled me out, he was angry, intimidating, shouting and
threatening. He used foul language used earlier. I saw his face. He
looked very angry like a mad man as if he was possessed by a demon. I
was trying to calm him down by using my hands. I tried to explain to
him. But it was of no use. He used the stick to poke against my chest.
(Witness shown P11) The stick was very similar to this.

When he pulled me out I thought that he was serious and that he may
cause me injury or kill me.

After poking me with the stick, he moved the stick towards my face. I
warded off the stick with my hand and it landed on my upper arm. When
he was poking me with the stick I retreated. He poked again. I kept on
retreating. I retreated as he was pushing and also because I thought he
will further assault me. The impression that I got was that he was
going to cause me grievous harm or even kill me. When he was doing that
I told him that I had a gun. All the time, he was waving the stick. He
was always aiming at my face. When I told him I had a gun he said, ‘
Buatlah apa you suka.’

When he jabbed, me it was hurting because it landed on the incision
that I have for two by-pass operations. I was fearful that if he kept
on assaulting me I might even die if the stick was to hit my head. He
also mentioned, ‘Kasilah mati-lu’ when I showed him the gun. My purpose
in showing him the gun was to frighten him so that he will stop
assaulting me. He did not come to his senses when I showed him the gun.
He became even more aggressive and angry. His behaviour was
threatening, shouting and intimidating to kill me. He said, ‘Kasilah,
mati-lu’ and ‘Lu-mati’ a number of times. At that time, I genuinely
believed that he was either going to cause me grievous hurt or even
kill me. I feared for my life and felt that my life was in danger. I
lifted my shirt and showed him the gun which was tucked at my waist
near the belt.

When I showed him the gun, he became more aggressive and swung the
stick at me again. I raised my arm, and it landed on my upper arm
again. He said, ‘Lu-mati.’ By that time my back was almost touching the
rear door and bumper of my car. Then I was really frightened for my
life. I took out my gun and fired a warning shot with my gun pointed at
the sky. He did not retreat despite the warning shot. Instead he lunged
the stick forcefully at my chest. It was at that stage that I genuinely
feared that my life was in danger and that he was determined to kill
me. He repeated, ‘Kasi mati-lu.’ He also kept on using vulgar words.

I fired the warning shot thinking that he might go away. He was not
frightened at all.

Then various thoughts came to my mind at that time. He was definitely
going to kill me. I must take some action to stop him from further
assaulting me. I genuinely believed that he would kill me. It also came
to my mind that he might dislodge the gun from my hand by hitting my
hand and might use the gun to shoot me. I had this fear as he was
taking another swing. At that stage, I thought that I had to disarm
him. So I brought my hand down and fired the second shot. It was
directed towards his right hand so that he will drop the stick and stop
assaulting me. I wanted to incapacitate or maim him. When the second
shot was fired, he was in the position of taking a swing at me.

After the second shot, he was still standing there. I thought the
second shot had also gone wide and did not hit the deceased. I then saw
the deceased  [*415]  turned around and walked towards his
motorcycle. He then fell on the ground. At the time of the second shot,
I genuinely believed in my mind that if I did not disarm him, he would
assault me and my life would be in danger. I wanted to save my own
life. He was behaving really like a mad man as if he was possessed. He
was shouting and yelling, intimidating and threatening to kill me. I
fired the shot in good faith with no intention of killing him.

I started fearing for my life right from the time he pulled me out from
the car. This fear constrained in my mind as he continued to assault
me. He was not afraid when I first showed him the gun and fired in the
air. All these did not deter the deceased from assaulting me. My fear
continued till I fired the second shot. If he was not holding a stick,
I would not have shot. I never aimed and shot. I fired in the direction
of his shoulder without aiming. Just before the second shot, he was
about 4–6ft from me. The door of my car was ajar.

When he fell, I walked up to him. It was then only I saw a gun shot
wound on his right shoulder. By that time, there were a few people. I
told the people there to take him to the hospital and that I was going
to the hospital in Malay. I called the deceased but there was no
response. I then went back to the car and asked Ranjit Kaur to drive to
the police station. (Witness shown P4) This is the person who was
harassing me and whom I shot.

[49] The accused then went to the Pantai Police Station. He arrived there at about 4.50pm. It took him about five to seven minutes to reach there. The accused then said:

I went straight to the officer at the inquiry. I told him that an
Indian had assaulted me and that two shots were fired. I handed him the
gun and the bullets. I told him the Indian was injured. I told him that
I was injured in my arm and chest. He told me to wait till he had
finished with the others. At that time, I was feeling upset at what had
happened. Then I asked for a white paper to draft out a report. I told
my daughter-in-law to write what I dictated. While waiting, I rang up
my nephew, SS Muker and told him that an Indian had assaulted me and
that I fired a shot in self-defence; that I am hurt in my arm and
chest. I asked him to come to the police station. I could not write as
I was more or less shivering. At that time, I did not know he had died.

While drafting the report two police officers called me to the room.
They were ACP Kamaruddin Desa and OCPD Koh Hong San. I told them what
happened and showed them my injuries on the shoulder and chest.
Kamaruddin asked me whether I had taken drinks. I said no. He said he
would send me to the hospital and take my blood for examination. I told
him that what I have told him is what I had told him. I asked him to do
his duty. After hearing my story, he told me that he would take me to
the hospital. He said that I have to give a statement and go back.

Eventually, I made the report. SS Muker came to the police station
after we had almost completed the report. The report was written by
Ranjit Kaur and I had signed it. The IO Thomas Woon then met up with me
after 6.00pm. He took off my shirt and took photographs. (Witness shown
IDD41) These are the photographs. At about 10.00pm, I was taken to the
University Hospital. The doctor examined my injuries and gave me an
injection. Dr Myo Khine identified. I was then brought back to the
Pantai Police Station. I was told to go to the Brickfields Police
Station. There my statement was recorded under s 112 of the CPC. (D43
shown to witness) This is the statement. It is signed by me. My
evidence in court is similar to what I have stated there. When I gave
the statement I was quite unstable. I inquired from Thomas Woon the
[*416]  condition of the deceased. He told me he had died. On
hearing that, I was completely shaken up. It took me about 10 minutes
to recover. At that time, I was still suffering from the pain. I told
Thomas Woon. The statement was recorded from 2.00am to 2.30am to 3.
00am. It took about an hour. After I gave the statement, Thomas Woon
told me that he had received instructions to allow me to go home and
that he would call me if I am required.

At the junction of Jalan Maarof/Jalan Tempinis, he kicked the car
before coming to the window. At the scene, I had no opportunity to turn
anywhere to seek protection. The cars were not moving and I could not
run anywhere. I had two open heart surgeries. In 1986 and 1992. I also
have high blood pressure. I have severe diabetes. Now I am on insulin.

The person I called is SS Muker (identified).

At the junction, he jabbed me with the stick. The thicker part of the
stick came into contact with me. It was a dangerous stick. It was a big
stick. If this stick were to land on my head, it would kill me. The
aggressive manner in which he was using it also frightened me. Even
though I had a revolver with me, I was still afraid because of the
manner he assaulted me with this big stick. I used the gun as a last
resort. I could not do anything else. He used the stick as a weapon of
violence. I have never seen the deceased prior to this.

[50] In his cross-examination, the accused said that at the Balai Polis Pantai he dictated the report and DW5 wrote it. When exh D43 was referred to him, he said:

The time it was taken was at 0002 hours. It is not correct that it was
recorded at 12.02am. When the statement was recorded, the facts were
fresh in my mind but I was a bit confused.

[51] As he said further in his cross-examination:

When the deceased shouted using vulgar words I did not take it
seriously. When Ranjit Kaur explained to him first I took over and
explained. The deceased never listened to us. He then disappeared. I
thought he had gone. At one stage I told him let us go to the police
station. This was at the junction of Jalan Travers and Brickfields.
Here, I am not sure whether he hit the car. He abused me again using
the same words. He challenged me to a fight. I told him if he wanted to
fight let us go to the police station. The use of the term ‘Bengali’ is
normal.

q: You did not mention the use of abusive words at this junction.

a: I do not know.

At that time, there was a jam at Jalan Maarof always. The distance from
the Jalan Tempinis junction to the traffic lights near the mosque is
about 100 yards. Earlier, there was a jam bumper to bumper. When I was
near the petrol station I was at the inner lane. Both lanes were
jammed. There was no jam at Jalan Tempinis.

He parked his motorcycle at the other side and was coming towards me
with the stick. My car was at position Y. If I had wanted to go to
Jalan Tempinis I could have gone. I went straight to avoid him.

I saw him coming towards me with a stick. I was in the car.

q: If you thought he was going to attack you what was your
reaction?

a: At that time I did not think he would assault me.

q: Could you have locked the door?

a: I could have.

[*417]

(Witness referred to P4 C and D)

The motorcycle nearer to the deceased is his. In that position the
motorcycle would cause obstruction to other road users. I resisted when
he dragged me out of the car. He was holding on to my collar. I held on
to the seat. Despite that he dragged me out. I did not have my safety
belt on at that time. He pulled me out by holding my collar. In the
course of resisting I did not knock against the car.

I warded off the stick with my hand. (Witness demonstrates) The stick
did not touch my face at any time. The deceased told me many times ‘
Kasi mati-lu’.

q: You did not mention this in your s 112 statement or police
statement?

a: No.

q: Before the first shot he could have hit you if he wanted to?

a: He hit me twice.

q: After that did he hit you?

a: He attempted to do so. At that time the traffic was jammed.
Before the first shot there was nobody else on the road. When
these things were happening Ranjit Kaur was seated in the car. I
had a handphone on that day. The duration of time from the time I
was pulled out till the firing of the first shot was a few
seconds. The deceased was swinging the stick towards me.

After the first shot when the deceased was waving the stick at me he
was about 4–6ft away. After the first shot he was jabbing me. When I
discharged the second shot the deceased was standing in front of me
slightly to the left. I was nearer the rear door and the rear mudguard.
Just before the second shot he was shouting at me. I cannot recollect
the words. I kept on telling him to stop it. I kept telling him ‘Ini
bukan lu punya pasal.’ At that stage I was quite calm. I was upset but
not angry. After the second shot, I went to see him. I was very upset
at what had happened. There were people then. I was at the place where
the deceased was lying for a few seconds. I went into my car and went
to the police station. I told the people there to take him to the
hospital. There were too many Indians there and I was afraid. The
duration of time between the first shot and second shot was 10–12
seconds.

I deny that I did not tell the police at the first instance that I
suffered injuries. I deny that there were no other people at the
counter of the Balai when I went there. Somebody took IDD41. May be on
the instructions of Thomas Woon. ACP Kamaruddin did not send me to the
hospital. I reached the hospital at 10.30pm to 11.00pm. We had to wait
for quite some time before the doctor came. We had to wait for about
half an hour. I deny that I was in fear of my life and that was why I
fired the second shot is not true. I deny that I was in no fear of
danger when I fired the second shot. What the prosecution witnesses
said is not true as their attention would have been drawn only after
the first shot. The stick is a dangerous weapon. I only used the gun as
a last resort. When I fired the shot he was in the course of taking
another swing at the hand. So I fired in that direction. I deny that
whatever I have said is a fabrication. When I fired the shot, I only
wanted to incapacitate the deceased and not to to kill him.

[52] In his re-examination, the accused said that it took only a few seconds from the time he was dragged out of the car till he fired the first shot. He said that the deceased kept coming towards him and he was not the aggressor at any point of time.

[*418]

[53] DW4 is a second-hand car salesman attached to the NZ Wawasan Sdn Bhd. On 7 June 2002 at about 4pm, he was driving a Mitsubishi Lancer motor car bearing registration number CS 3028 with a passenger named Yusof from the direction of Jalan Kuching towards Bangsar. He stopped in front of the Railway Station as there was a traffic congestion there. He then said:

Apabila kereta mula bergerak, saya ternampak seorang India menunggang
motosikal jenis Honda EX5. Lelaki tersebut sedang memarahi dan memaki
hamun terhadap sebuah kereta Mercedes berwarna keemasan. Masa itu,
penunggang motosikal dan kereta Mercedes berada di lorong sebelah kanan
menghala ke Bangsar. Ini di selepas traffic light di hadapan Mahkamah
Syariah. Penunggang motosikal berada di sebelah kiri kereta Mercedes.
Saya tak dapat dengar maki hamun kerana dia angkat tangan ke arah
kereta Mercedes. Mulut penunggang motosikal tidak berhenti
mengkumat-kamit. Kemudian saya nampak penunggang motosikal cuba
menanggalkan topi keledarnya. Dia mengayunkan topi keledarnya ke arah
kereta Merdedes itu. Dia guna tangan kanan. Dia masih di sebelah kiri
kereta dan dua kenderaan sedang jalan. Penunggang motosikal melakukan
perkara yang sama beberapa kali. Saya tak pasti sama ada kena kereta.
Saya nampak dia menendang bahagian tengah kereta Mercedes sebelah kiri.
Dia gunakan kakinya sebelah kanan. Reaksinya seperti dalam keadaan
marah dan mulutnya tidak berhenti seperti berkata sesuatu. Seterusnya
saya nampak selepas flyover di hadapan Muzium Negara penunggang
motosikal itu sekali lagi mengayunkan topi keledarnya ke arah Mercedes
tersebut. Dia cuba menendang sekali lagi pada kereta Mercedes tersebut.
Seterusnya apabila sampai di persimpangan Jalan Travers dan Brickfields
kereta Mercedes berhenti di sebabkan traffic light merah di hadapan
lebihkurang belakang lima kereta dari traffic light. Di lorong yang
paling kanan. Kereta saya berada lebihkurang 2–3 biji kereta dari
kereta Mercedes di lorong yang sama. Di sini saya nampak penunggang
motosikal menghampiri pintu hadapan kiri kereta Mercedes. Saya nampak
penunggang motosikal seperti berkata sesuatu dalam keadaan marah.
Apabila kereta mula bergerak penunggang motosikal itu tidak kelihatan
lagi.

[54] DW4 then saw the Mercedes car proceeding towards Jalan Maarof. The car stopped at the junction of Jalan Maarof and Jalan Tempinis on the extreme right lane to turn to the right. The Mercedes car was directly in front of his car at that time. As he said:

Di situ saya dapat melihat dengan jelas no Mercedes iaitu WD5. Saya
lihat ada dua orang dalam kereta Mercedes itu. Pemandu adalah seorang
perempuan dan penumpang seorang lelaki. Apabila kereta mula bergerak
saya nampak semula penunggang motosikal tadi sedang menunggu di
bahagian kiri jalan pada selekoh untuk belok ke kanan. Dia kelihatan
seperti menunggu kehadiran kereta Mercedes itu. Apabila kereta Mercedes
menghampiri penunggang motosikal itu dia mengekori kereta Mercedes itu
di sebelah kiri. Dia kelihatan marah kepada kereta tersebut dengan
mulutnya yang tidak berhenti berkata-kata ke arah kereta Mercedes.
Kemarahan nampaknya lebih meningkat. Pada masa itu kereta Mercedes
berjalan perlahan-lahan kerana berlaku kesesakan di kedua-dua lorong
untuk memasuki ke Jalan Maarof. Kesesakan berlaku sebelah Stesen Minyak
Petronas lebih kurang 10m dari petrol station. Pada masa itu penunggang
motosikal tidak kelihatan. Pada masa itu saya masih betul-betul di
belakang kereta Mercedes. Saya ambil lorong yang di paling kiri.

[*419]

Apabila kereta saya berada di antara persimpangan Jalan Maarof dan
Jalan Tempinis kereta Mercedes itu berhenti. Saya pun terpaksa
berhenti. Mungkin disebabkan traffic light di hadapan. Pada ketika itu,
saya nampak penunggang motosikal tadi sedang mematahkan dahan-dahan
pokok dari longgokan dahan-dahan pokok yang ada di sebelah kiri Jalan
Tempinis. Dia telah meletakkan motosikalnya di tepi jalan berhampiran
dengan longgokan kayu. Dia turun dari motosikal untuk ambil kayu itu.
Kemudian dia menaiki motosikal semula dengan memegang kayu itu di
tangan kirinya. Dia memusingkan motosikalnya menuju ke arah
persimpangan Jalan Maarof dan Jalan Tempinis. Dia buat macam U-turn.
Dia letakkan motosikalnya berhampiran dengan papan tanda berhenti. Dia
menanggalkan topi keledarnya. Dia masih di atas motosikalnya. Dia letak
topi keledar di atas motosikal. Seterusnya dia berjalan menuju ke pintu
sebelah kiri kereta Mercedes. Pada ketika itu saya nampak seorang
lelaki tua keluar dari kereta itu. Penunggang motosikal ada berhampiran
pintu Mercedes sebelah penumpang depan. Orang itu keluar seperti dia
didesak. Maksud saya dia keluar dengan cara yang tidak bersedia untuk
keluar. Saya rasa dia seperti ditarik. Dari pemandangan saya masa itu
tidak begitu jelas. Kemudian berlaku pertengkaran di antara lelaki tua
itu dengan penunggang motosikal tadi. Penunggang motosikal itu
kelihatan sangat marah. Mukanya sangat bengis. Saya boleh nampak
mukanya tetapi dari sebelah tepi sahaja. Penunggang motosikal itu cuba
mengayun kayu yang dipegangnya. Positionnya seperti mahu pukul ke arah
orang tua itu. Ia berlaku beberapa kali. Saya nampak penunggang
motosikal menjolokkan kayu itu ke arah dada orang tua itu. Orang tua
itu kelihatan berundur ke belakang ke arah keretanya. Saya rasa cemas
pada masa itu. Sebab saya takut mungkin penunggang motosikal itu akan
mengapa-apakan orang tua itu. Kemudian saya lihat orang tua itu dalam
keadaan takut dan cemas. Dia cuba menenangkan penunggang motosikal itu.
Dia menunjuk tangannya dan bercakap. Saya tak dapat dengar.

Kemudian saya terdengar satu das tembakan. Saya nampak orang tua itu
tembak ke arah atas. Seterusnya penunggang motosikal itu tidak
berganjak dari situ. Dia kelihatan sangat marah. Dia ada juga menjerit
dengan kata, ‘Tembaklah, Tembaklah.’ Saya boleh dengar kerana dia
menjerit. Tingkap kereta buka separuh di sebelah kiri. Lepas beberapa
ketika saya terdengar satu lagi das tembakan di lepaskan oleh orang tua
itu. Masa di antara tembakan pertama dan kedua 6–7 saat. Sebelum
tembakan kedua dilepaskan oleh orang tua itu penunggang motosikal itu
mengayunkan kayu yang dipegangnya dalam posisi hendak pukul orang tua
itu. Ini berlaku satu saat sahaja. Kemudian saya lihat penunggang
motosikal itu berjalan ke arah motosikalnya dan dia rebah dekat dengan
motosikalnya. Terusnya orang tua itu terpinga-pinga. Dengan cara dia
memandang kiri dan kanan.

[55] In narrating the circumstances in which what he had witnessed was communicated to the accused, he said:

Saya sebenarnya terbaca surat khabar Utusan yang muka hadapanya
menceritakan tentang kes Dato Balwant di tuduh membunuh. Jadi saya rasa
Dato Balwant tidak bersalah kerana dia membunuh bukannya dengan niatnya
dari apa yang saya lihat. Saya telah menceritakan perkara ini kepada
kakak saya bernama Norzilah bte Ismail bagaimana perkara ini berlaku
dan dia bersependapat dengan saya. Kakak saya telah hubungi pihak Dato
Balwant melalui telefon. Saya tak pasti macam mana dia tahu no telefon
Dato Balwant. Semasa dia telefon saya tidak ada. Dia berkerja satu
syarikat dengan syarikat saya. Saya tak ingat bulan apa saya beritahu
kakak saya tetapi dalam tahun 2002. Beberapa hari selepas kakak saya
hubungi Dato Balwant saya dihubungi  [*420]  di tempat kerja saya
oleh Dato Shafee, En Nimal dan En Rabinder Singh. Saya dan kakak saya
tak pernah jumpa dengan Dato Balwant. Sebelum ini saya dan kakak saya
tak kenal dengan Dato Balwant. Selepas saya ditemuduga oleh peguam saya
tidak ditemuduga oleh peguam lain. En Yusof dalam kereta saya adalah
pelanggan saya. Saya kenali dia hanya pada hari itu. Saya tak kenal
nama penuhnya. En Yusof hendak ke Brickfields. Saya hendak pergi ke
Bangsar. Kita ke bank dahulu di Bangsar.

[56] In his cross-examination, DW4 said that Syarikat NZ belongs to his brother-in-law and that his sister (DW6) works with him. In testifying on his meetings with defence counsel, he said:

Saya tahu tentang kejadian ini selepas saya baca akhbar dan OKT dituduh
di mahkamah. Peguam jumpa saya beberapa hari selepas keluar akhbar.
Saya jumpa Dato Shafee beberapa kali. Saya ditemuduga oleh Dato Shafee.
Lepas itu statement saya diambil oleh pihak polis. Saya tidak laporkan
kepada polis pada masa kejadian sebab saya rasa kes ini dapat
diselesaikan dengan bahawasanya Dato Balwant tidak disabitkan dengan
kesalahan. Saya belum cukup bersedia untuk memberitahu pihak polis.
Maksud saya ialah untuk mengingati semula peristiwa. Sekurang-kurangnya
saya bersedia untuk memberi keterangan kepada peguam. Saya bersedia
apabila saya berjumpa dengan peguam. Selepas itu saya pun bersedia
untuk memberi statement kepada polis. Saya rasa statement yang saya
beri kepada polis adalah sama dengan keterangan yang saya beri kepada
peguam. Sebelum perbicaraan peguam ada berjumpa dengan saya. Tujuannya
ialah supaya saya lebih bersedia. Maksud saya ialah kemungkinan saya
gugup di mahkamah. Peguam ada mencerita kepada saya berulang kali.

[57] He was then cross-examined on what transpired from the Railway Station onwards. He disagreed that this part of his evidence is fabricated. In answer to questions as to what happened at the scene of the incident, he said:

Apabila lampu isyarat tukar ke warna hijau dan kereta mula bergerak
saya nampak penunggang motosikal itu disebelah kiri selekoh untuk masuk
ke Jalan Maarof. Penunggang motosikal itu seperti sedang menunggu
kereta Mercedes itu. Dia menoleh ke belakang. Kemudian kereta Mercedes
bergerak. Penunggang motosikal itu mengekori kereta itu. Dalam keadaan
marah sebab dia mengayun tangannya dan mulutnya tak berhenti
berkata-kata ke arah Mercedes. Pada masa itu saya di sebelah kanan.
Motosikal di sebelah kiri belakang motosikal. Visor helmet itu tidak
terlalu gelap. Saya tak dengar apa dia cakap. Di situ berlaku kesesakan
jalan. Kereta bergerak perlahan.

Kemudian penunggang motosikal itu tidak kelihatan. Apabila sampai di
persimpangan Jalan Tempinis/Jalan Maarof kereta Mercedes dan kereta
saya telah berhenti. Saya ada sama lorong dengan kereta Mercedes itu.
Saya ternampak penunggang motosikal tadi sedang mematahkan dahan pokok
di Jalan Tempinis sebelah kiri dari longgokan dahan-dahan pokok yang
telah dipotong. Kemudian saya nampak penunggang motosikal menunggang
motosikal dan pusing balik ke arah Jalan Maarof dan berhenti di sebelah
kanan Jalan Tempinis. Saya nampak dia menanggalkan topi keledarnya lalu
berjalan menghampiri kereta Mercedes tersebut dengan memegang sebatang
kayu di tangannya. Kemudian penunggang motosikal berada rapat dengan
kereta Mercedes tersebut di sebelah kiri. Seterusnya saya nampak
seorang tua keluar dari kereta Mercedes itu. Kemudian berlaku
pertengkaran di situ di antara penunggang motosikal dengan orang tua.
Penunggang motosikal itu dalam keadaan sangat marah. Dia mengangkat
atau mengayunkan kayu yang  [*421]  dipegangnya dalam posisi hendak
mahu memukul. Kemudian saya nampak orang tua itu seperti cuba
menenangkan penunggang motosikal tersebut. Penunggang motosikal itu
dalam keadaan sangat marah. Selepas itu saya dengar satu tembakan dari
orang tua itu. Dia telah menembak ke arah atas. Saya fikir dia berbuat
demikian untuk memberi amaran kepada penunggang motosikal itu. Kemudian
penunggang motosikal itu tidak bergerak dari tempatnya dan berkeadaan
lebih marah serta bengis. Saya ada dengar dia menjerit dengan berkata, ‘
Tembaklah, tembaklah.’ Selepas orang tua itu keluar dari kereta berlaku
pertengkaran. Saya ada nampak penunggang motosikal menjolokkan kayu
yang dipegangnya ke arah badan orang tua itu.

Selepas beberapa ketika itu saya nampak penunggang motosikal cuba
mengayunkan kayu yang dipegangnya seperti posisi yang hendak memukul.
Selepas itu saya dengar satu lagi das tembakan. Penunggang motosikal
itu berkeadaan lemah menuju ke arah motosikalnya dan dia rebah
berhampiran motosikalnya. Pada ketika itu saya nampak orang tua dalam
keadaan terpinga-pinga.

[58] In the concluding part of his cross-examination, he said:

Saya tidak setuju bahawa saya datang ke mahkamah untuk memberi
keterangan yang tidak benar. Saya tak setuju selepas tembakan pertama
si mati pergi untuk mengambil kayu. Saya langsung tak setuju bahawa
selepas itulah si mati ditembak apabila dia berada 10 kaki jauh dari
OKT dan kayu pada masa itu berada di bawah. Saya kata saya tak pasti
sama ada kayu mencecah badan OKT. Pada masa itu si mati tidak pakai
helmet.

[59] In his re-examination, DW4 said:

Saya tahu tentang kejadian selepas kejadian OKT dituduh di mahkamah.
Selepas saya tahu OKT dituduh kakak saya yang menggalakkan saya menjadi
saksi. Saya membaca balik surat akuan kenyataan saya dengan peguam
supaya saya tidak gugup di mahkamah. Itu sahaja. Surat akuan dibuat di
hadapan Pesuruhjaya Sumpah dan seorang peguam. Peguam itu bukan dari
firma Dato Shafee.

Selepas kejadian pada hari itu saya masih sempat berurusan di Arab
Malaysian Finance. Saya sampai sana di counters 4.30–5.00 petang.
Pejabat dalam buka. Bank di luar tutup. Saya boleh masuk. Ini kali
pertama saya lihat kejadian macam ini. Saya ada menunggang motosikal
lama. Motosikal EX5 ada gear 5 dan 4. Kalau accelerator ditinggalkan
motosikal masih lagi berjalan. Saya tahu ada accelerator yang tidak
lari balik.

Orang tua keluar dari kereta. Dia keluar seperti keadaan yang terdesak
dan tak kemas. Macam ditarik keluar. Sebab kedudukan motosikal rapat
dengan kereta Mercedes di sebelah pintu depan. Cara OKT keluar
seolah-olah dia didesak. Apa yang saya nampak saya cerita di mahkamah.
Saya tidak lihat kejadian dari Mahkamah Syariah secara berterusan.
(Kakak saksi Norsilah bte Ismail – dicamkan)

[60] DW5 said that on 7 June 2002, she was driving Mercedes car bearing registration number WD5 along Jalan Raja towards the Railway Station. The accused was in the car. When they were in front of the Railway Station the deceased who was riding a motorcycle overtook them on the left. Then a motor car came into her lane. She hooted. The car went back to its lane. When she stopped at the traffic light the deceased came towards her on his motorcycle against the flow of traffic. He was angry and abusive. He uttered  [*422]  the words, ‘Bengali busuk, Bengali bitch, Bengali pukima’ at her. When the traffic turned green he sped off and was waiting at the bus stop at the Sulaiman Building. He signalled to her to pull up to the left. She did not stop. She then said:

As I was driving slowly, he was on my left at the back. I could see
from the rear view mirror he was not wearing the helmet. I heard some
knocking sounds. Not too loud. He did that for a while. I kept moving
slowly. As we were nearing the Museum, he knocked the car and sped off.
Then he was out of sight again. I thought he had gone and was relieved.

[61] DW5 said that she stopped at the Jalan Travers/Jalan Brickfields junction as the traffic light was showing red. As she said:

I was about seven cars away. The motorcyclist came back again. He made
a U-turn at the back of the car and came to the passenger side of the
car. He knocked hard at the window with his hand. The accused put the
window down and said that the horn was not meant for him. He said, ‘
Mari turun lawan. Mari turun lawan.’ The accused said, ‘I tak mahu
lawan. Kalau mahu lawan mari ke polis station.’ At the mention of the
word police, he got more angry. He was abusive. The light turned green.
He sped away. He was out of sight.

[62] DW5 then stopped at the junction of Jalan Bangsar/Jalan Maarof as the traffic light was red. As she said:

We were on the left lane. There I saw the motorcyclist waiting on the
left side of the road. He had not crossed the road yet. He was almost
in front of me. The light was red. He was abusing and asked accused to
put the window down. The accused did not. He was very angry. When the
light turned green he was in front of me. So I could not move till
someone hooted from the back. Then he moved.

[63] When DW5 was driving along Jalan Maarof on the left the deceased was in front. He looked angry and was looking back at their car. At the Petronas Petrol Station, she signalled to turn into Jalan Tempinis. The deceased then turned into Jalan Tempinis before them. The accused told her to put off the indicator and go straight to prevent the deceased from following them to their house. In relating what transpired at the scene of the incident, she said:

I saw him picking up a stick from the left side of Jalan Tempinis. My
car was half way on the Jalan Tempinis junction. I had to stop as the
traffic had stopped. He picked the stick, made a U-turn there and went
to the right side of Jalan Tempinis. He had the stick. He came back to
the junction. He got down from the motorcycle. He took his helmet off
and left it on the motorcycle. With the stick in his right hand he came
towards my car. He looked angry. He came to the accused’s side. He
kicked the tyre. He came to the left window and knocked hard with the
hand. Dato put the window down. Again he said, ‘You bloody Bengali.
Mari turun lawan.’ Dato said, ‘Saya tak mahu lawan. Mahu lawan pergi
polis station.’ It was at this stage he became angry and violent. He
opened the door suddenly and dragged him out of the car. He pulled him
about 4ft away from the car up Jalan Tempinis. I saw him swung the
stick and was trying to hit Dato’s hand or face. Dato tried to ward off
the blow but it landed on the upper left arm. I did not do anything. I
next saw him jabbing Dato’s chest with the stick. I could see Dato
retreating as he was being jabbed. Dato tried to tell him something to
calm him down. He kept  [*423]  on jabbing him. Dato kept
retreating till he came closer to the car. I saw the deceased very
violent and Dato was shaken up. He was against the car. He could not
move anymore. I saw Dato lifted his shirt. I assume he was showing the
gun. When he lifted the shirt he came more aggressive and jabbed again.
I could hear the words, ‘Tembaklah, tembaklah.’ He was jabbing Dato
harder. I saw Dato pull the gun and heard a shot. Next he became more
violent and aggressive. He did not retreat. Dato was saying something
and was begging him not to hit him. It was a faint voice. The deceased
kept on jabbing Dato and heard another shot.

When I heard the second shot the deceased was 4–5ft from the accused.
Just before the second shot the deceased was about to swing the stick
at accused. When all this was happening I was frightened. I thought I
was going to lose my dad. The deceased was behaving like a mad man.

The deceased stood for a while. Reaching his motorcycle he fell.
(Witness referred to P4) This is where he fell. P4 C and D shows the
motorcycle nearest to him. That was where he parked it.

I then drove the accused to the Pantai Police Station where he lodged a
report. (P11 shown to witness) This is the kind of stick the deceased
was using. The accused was shivering and was in a state of shock. I
have never seen him in that condition before. He showed me the upper
left arm and said it was painful. He complained of pain on the chest.

[64] In her cross-examination, DW5 said that the deceased had confronted them from the Railway Station to Jalan Tempinis at least four times. As she said:

We managed to avoid him. At Jalan Travers/Brickfields junction he said,
‘Mari lawan.’ The accused said, ‘Kalau mahu lawan pergi ke polis
station.’ This was the third time he confronted us. We did not go to
the police station. The fourth time was when we were at the Jalan
Maarof junction. We ignored him and proceeded. The traffic along Jalan
Maarof was moving but very slow. There is a traffic light at the
mosque. The jam was caused by the traffc light.

[65] DW5 said that she saw the deceased going into Jalan Tempinis and coming back. She could not turn into Jalan Tempinis to avoid him as she had passed the junction and the traffic was heavy. On being questioned on the events that led to the shooting, she said:

I knew that the accused had a gun. I did not give the accused any
assistance. The accused was standing outside the car. I could see his
whole body. He was dragged about five feet away from the car. I could
see him from his waist upwards. From below it was blocked by the car.
The accused lifted the shirt and I heard the shot. When he fired the
first shot there was nobody else there. Only the cars. The time between
the first shot and the second shot was about 10 seconds. Just before
the second shot the deceased was on the left of the car at an angle.
The accused was against the car on the left-hand side. They were almost
facing each other. After the first shot and before the second shot the
deceased was very aggressive and angry. The accused was pleading with
him not to hurt him. The accused was not facing me at that time. At
this point of time, my car was holding up the traffic. I do not
remember whether there was a car in front of me. When we reached the
junction the traffic was not moving. Before reaching that place, the
traffic was moving slowly.

The stick was on the chest of the accused. He could not have got back
into the car. It all happened very fast. I was scared I would lose
accused. I was too frightened to do anything.

[*424]

After the first shot I did not really notice whether there were people
there. I deny that I did not assist accused as he was in a better
position with a gun. I deny that accused came out of the car by himself
holding the gun. I deny that he purposely came out of the car to
confront the deceased. I did not see the firing of the second shot. The
accused went to the place where the deceased was lying. After that we
went to Balai Polis Pantai. I carry the handphone of the accused. I did
not make any calls to the police. I did not call for the amblance. I
deny that after the first shot the deceased ran to the other side of
the road and came back with the stick. I deny that the deceased did
that to protect himself.

[66] She then continued:

I was worried about the chest pain of accused as he is a heart patient.
He instructed me to go to the police station. Just before the second
shot I saw deceased swinging the stick. I did not see it touching
accused. The left front door of the car was open. The deceased was
standing against the back door of the car. The deceased was in front of
the car at an angle. I deny that distance between accused and deceased
at that time was about 10 feet. I deny that deceased was swinging the
stick up and down. I deny that when his hand was down the second shot
was fired.

[67] In her re-examination DW5 said that from the time the accused was pulled out till the firing of the second shot he was within striking distance by the deceased.

[68] DW6 said that in the late afternoon of 7 June 2002, her husband instructed DW5, her younger brother, to send some documents to Arab Finance at Bangsar. He left at about 4pm with Yusof. She then said:

DW5 pulang ke pejabat lebih kurang 6.00. Dia menceritakan tentang
kejadian yang dia lihat berlakunya tembakan di Bangsar.

Sebulan atau dua selepas itu saya ada terbaca di surat khabar tentang
seorang Dato Balwant Singh. Dato Balwant didakwa membunuh dalam kes
tembak di Bangsar yang mana DW5 ada cerita pada saya. Kalau berpandu
pada cerita adik saya saya rasa Dato Balwant tidak bersalah. Jadi saya
nasihatkan adik saya untuk memberi keterangan yang benar mengenai
kejadian itu. Pada mulanya adik saya takut untuk menjadi saksi. Atas
nasihat saya saya hendak dia menunjukkan keadilan dalam kes Dato
Balwant. Lepas itu dia bersetuju menjadi saksi. Saya cuba mencari no
telefon Dato Balwant sendiri melalui buku panduan telefon. Saya sekali
dial dan saya dapat pejabatnya. Mula-mula telefon saya dijawab oleh
seorang perempuan. Kemudiannya disambungkan kepada seorang lelaki. Saya
tidak tahu nama kedua-dua orang itu. Saya beritahu kepada lelaki itu
bahawa adik saya boleh menjadi saksi kerana dia melihat kejadian itu.
Saya ada memberi nombor telefon office saya.

Beberapa hari kemudian saya dihubungi oleh Dato Shafee sendiri dan En
Rabinder Singh. Saya tak ingat nama seorang lain. Mereka datang ke
pejabat saya untuk mendapat keterangan dari adik saya sendiri. Selepas
itu saya serahkan perkara itu kepada peguam dan adik saya. Saya atau
adik saya tak buat laporan polis. Saya tahu beberapa bulan kemudian
polis ada ambil statement dari adik saya. Saya pergi bersama-sama
dengan adik saya. ASP Thomas Woon yang ambil statement.

[69] In her cross-examination, DW6 said that DW4 told her of the incident after he returned to the office. As she further said:

[*425]

Saya setuju saya tidak tahu apa yang diceritakan oleh adik saya benar
atau tidak sebab saya tidak ada di tempat kejadian. Apa yang
diceritakan oleh adik saya adalah lebih kasihan kepada OKT. Oleh sebab
itu saya rasa simpati kepada OKT. Saya tidak telefon polis kerana Dato
Balwant telah didakwa. Saya tidak tahu jika Dato Balwant telah didakwa
saya masih boleh memberitahu polis. Saya tidak tahu prosedur itu. Ini
adalah kali pertama pengalaman saya. I took the initiative untuk
memberitahu Dato Balwant.

Peguam datang ke pejabat saya. Selepas itu saya dipanggil oleh ASP
Thomas. Memang benar adik saya tidak mahu datang ke mahkamah untuk
memberi keterangan bagi pihak pembela. Saya yang menyuruhnya datang ke
mahkamah.

Saya tak kenal OKT. Saya beria-ia menyuruh adik saya datang sebab saya
kasihan kepada OKT. Kalau ikut cerita tertuduh tidak salah. Saya tidak
kenal si mati.

Dalam urusan saya saya ada buat agreement. Saya tiada urusan dengan
firma peguam. Hanya dengan bank.

Tujuan saya tampil ke hadapan bukan untuk mengharap sesuatu.

[70] In her re-examination, she said:

Saya percaya dengan cerita adik saya sebab saya percaya adik saya. Bila
dia balik dia nampak tidak biasa. Dalam keadaan terkejut. Saya
nasihatinya datang ke mahkamah. Saya tidak paksa dia.

[71] DW2 said that he received a telephone call from the accused at about 4.45pm to 4.50pm. As he said:

Over the phone he told that he had been assaulted by a male Indian and
was injured on his left upper arm and chest. He then informed me that
he had no alternative but to shoot the assailant. He said that he was
at the Pantai Police Station. He asked me to go there. He informed me
that the Indian man assaulted him with a stick.

I arrived at the Pantai Police Station at about 6.15pm. When I arrived
at the police station, I saw Dato Balwant and Ranjit Kaur at the
Inquiry Office of the police station. Dato Balwant informed me that he
had lodged a police report. He showed me the injuries on the left upper
arm and the chest. When I first saw him he appeared to be flustered and
concerned. He appeared worried and was almost in a state of shock. He
then explained to me what had occurred that evening. He said that he
was on his way home. (DPP objects as this is hearsay) D/C says he has
no further questions.

[72] In his cross-examination, he said that what he had told the court is what DW1 had told him.

[73] DW3, a doctor attached to the University Hospital, examined the accused at about 11pm on 7 June 2002. As he said:

He told me he was assaulted by a man with a wooden stick. He said that
the man poked him on his chest and hit him on the left arm. I examined
the patient. On his left arm I found redness on the outer side of the
arm. It is approximately 5 cm in diameter. It did not have a distinct
margin. (P11 shown to witness) The injury could have been caused by any
blunt object. It is also consistent with having been caused by this
stick. He had an abrasion wound on his chest. (P41 shown to witness) It
was at the centre of the chest over the sternum and over a scar. It was
a by-pass scar. The abrasion was a breach of the skin. It could have
[*426]  been caused by a blunt object. It was 1cm in diameter.
(Witness shows the abrasion in P41) It could have been caused by being
poked with P11.

[74] In his cross-examination, he said that the accused had redness on the arm which is not consistent with two hard blows. In his re-examination he said:

The two injuries were consistent with the complaint made by the
accused. I do not know the amount of force used on accused. If the two
blows landed on the same spot then the injuries found will be
consistent with the two blows. If the arm is moving the injury will not
conform to the shape of the stick. If the arm is not moving it will
take the full blow. If the arm is moving it may not take the full blow.
Not all serious injuries will have an open wound.

In the course of my duties, I have seen many assault cases. The accused’
s injuries are consistent with an assault case. The accused was
disturbed and very anxious.

[75] The defence then closed its case. Both parties made their submissions. As the submission of the prosecution focussed principally on the credibility of some of the defence witnesses I consider it necessary to highlight the law relating to the manner of assessing the veracity of a witness. As I said in Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1, the Privy Council has stated that the real tests for either accepting or rejecting the evidence of a witness are how consistent the story is with itself, how it stands the test of cross-examination, and how far it fits in with the rest of the evidence and the circumstances of the case (see Bhojraj v Sitaram AIR 1936 PC 60). It must, however, be observed that being unshaken in cross-examination is not per se an all-sufficient acid test of credibility. The inherent probability or improbability of a fact in issue must be the prime consideration (see Muniandy & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 MLJ 257). It has been held that if a witness demonstrably tells lies, his evidence must be looked upon with suspicion and treated with caution, but to say that it should be entirely rejected would be to go too far (see Khoon Chye Hin v Public Prosecutor [1961] MLJ 105). It has also been held that discrepancies and contradictions there will always be in a case. In considering them, what the court has to decide is whether they are of such a nature as to discredit the witness entirely and render the whole of his evidence worthless and untrustworthy (see De Silva v Public Prosecutor [1964] MLJ 81). The Indian Supreme Court has pointed out that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments (see Ugar v State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277). It is useful to refer to Public Prosecutor v Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15 where Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as His Highness then was) said at p 19:

… In my opinion, discrepancies there will always be, because in the
circumstances in which the events happened, every witness does not
remember the same thing and he does not remember accurately every
single thing that happened …. The question is whether the existence of
certain discrepancies is sufficient to destroy their credibility. There
is no rule of law that the testimony of a witness must either be
believed in its entirety or not at all. A court is fully competent, for
good and cogent reasons, to accept one part of the testimony of a
witness and to reject the other.

[*427]

[76] In the absence of any contradiction, however, and in the absence of any element of inherent improbability, the evidence of any witness, whether a police witness or not, who gives evidence on affirmation, should normally be accepted (see Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Ali [1962] MLJ 257).

[77] As the prosecution submission was mainly centred on the credibility of the accused and DW5, I shall now consider the main aspects of their submission and other significant features later.

(i) The accused

[78]

The effect of exhibit D43

[79] The defence tendered exh D43 for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of the accused through PW12 in the course of the case for the prosecution. It is his statement to the police. It reveals that it does not in fact corroborate but instead certain parts of it contradict the evidence of DW1. The relevant part of it reads as follows:

Lepas tembakan dilepaskan, lelaki itu lagi tolak saya dengan kuat
dengan kayu itu dan tangan saya pun turun dan saya percaya saya telah
tertekan picu senjatapi yang menyebabkan satu das tembakan dilepaskan.
Masa itu saya masih ingat bahawa tembakan kedua juga dilepaskan ke arah
langit kerana saya tidak nampak lelaki itu dan beraksi macam kena
tembak dan dia telah berjalan balik ke motosikalnya.

[80] The prosecution made an issue of the contradictory part and said that it shows that the accused is not a truthful and credible witness and therefore his evidence should not be relied upon. It was argued that since the accused has admitted making the statement there was no necessity to comply further with s 145 (‘s 145’) of the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the Act’) to explain the contradiction. In support the prosecution referred to Bhagwan Singh v The State of Punjab (1952) SCR 812 where Bose J said at pp 819-820:

Resort to s 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that he
made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to
prove that he did, and if the former statement was reduced to writing,
then s 145 requires that his attention must be drawn to those parts
which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not
arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case all
that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no
further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.

[81] It was also argued that exh D43 amounts to an admission under s 17 of the Act and thereby amounts to substantive evidence. In support reference was made to Bharat Singh v Bhagirathi AIR 1966 SC 405 where it was held that where the previous inconsistent statement amounts to an admission duly proved it can be used without being put to the witness for an explanation. The prosecution further argued that the fact that the accused had admitted making exh D43 makes it evidence against him. In support reference was made to R v Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172 where Winn LJ said at p 177:

As it seems to this court, if a document is produced to a witness and
the witness is asked: ‘Do you see what that document purports to record?
’ the  [*428]  witness may say: ‘I see it, I accept it as true,’ in
which case the contents of the document became evidence against him: or
he may say: ‘I see what is there written, I do not accept that as true,
whereupon that which is purported to be recorded in the document is not
evidence against that person who has rejected the contents; it becomes
what one might call non-evidence, the document itself being nothing but
hearsay.

[82] A preliminary matter that must be resolved is whether exh D43 is admissible. In order to decide the question whether certain evidence is admissible, it is necessary to look to the object for which it is produced and the point it is intended to establish for it may be admissible for one purpose and not for another (see Taylor v Williams 3 B & Ad 845). Exhibit D43 was  tendered to corroborate the evidence of the accused and it must therefore satisfy the requirements of s 157 of the Act (‘s 157’) which reads as follows:

In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former
statement made by him whether written or verbal, on oath, or in
ordinary conversation, relating to the same fact at or about the time
when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to
investigate the fact, may be proved.

[83] In considering the admissibility of a former statement under s 157, it is significant to realize the stage of the trial at which it should be tendered and the manner of adducing it in evidence. In dealing with the proper stage at which evidence in corroboration can be admitted under s 157, Sarkar on Evidence (15th Ed) Vol 2 says at p 2282:

It is doubtful whether s 136 gives the court discretion to allow
evidence to corroborate witnesses to be given under s 157 before the
witness himself is examined. But, in any case, such evidence can be
admitted only very rarely and for special reasons to be recorded by the
judge ( Ml Myin vR, 5 LBR 4:9 Cri LJ 576). Although ordinarily,
before corroborative evidence is admissible the evidence sought to be
corroborated must have been given, yet the court has no doubt a
discretion to allow evidence under s 157 to be given out of order. Such
discretion should be rarely used. The course is not only inconvenient
but likely to cause the judge or jury to give undue weight to the
hearsay evidence of corroborating witnesses ( Shwe Kin v R , 3 LBR
240:5 Cri Lj 411; Nistarini v Nando Lal , 5 CWN xvi).

[84] Thus the proper stage of the trial at which a former statement must be proved is ordinarily after the witness whom it is intended to corroborate has given evidence. Exhibit D43 was referred to the accused at the close of his examination-in-chief. That is appropriate. But it does not amount to proof of exh D43. Former statements under s 157 must be proved by anyone to whom it was made (see Heymerdinguer v R 58 IC 344). The Law of Evidence by Monir (10th Ed) Vol 2 in referring to this case says at p 1496:

If the statement was reduced into writing, it must be proved by the
production of the record and by evidence of the person who recorded it.
A deposition as well as a first information report is a matter required
by law to be reduced into writing. Therefore where the statement was
made in the form of a deposition or a first information report to the
police, oral evidence will be inadmissible and the statement must be
proved under s 91 by the production of the record.

[*429]

[85] Similarly Field’s Law of Evidence (12th Ed) Vol 5 says at p 4924:

It is settled law that a person cannot corroborate himself. But if, in
support of a person’s evidence, it is proved from another source that
he did make statement of a kind similar to his evidence then the fact
thus proved may be taken as corroborative of such person’s statement (
King v Nga Myo AIR 1938 Rang 177).

[86] If necessary, a witness will be allowed to be recalled to give evidence under s 157 after the person sought to be corroborated has given his evidence (see Nistarini v Nando Lal 5 CWN xvi). In Muthu Goundan v Chinniah AIR 1937 M 86, corroborative evidence given before the giving of evidence sought to be corroborated, was ruled out. PW12 was not recalled to formally tender it in evidence after the accused had given evidence on it. The fact that the accused admitted having made exh D43 and said that it is similar to his evidence does not thereby make it admissible. It only adds weight to the evidence of the person who gives evidence in corroboration (see Ramratan v State AIR 1962 SC 424; Misri v Emperor AIR 1934 S 100). Thus, exh D43 has not been properly proved by the defence and is therefore inadmissible. It follows that the prosecution submission on the effect of the defence having adduced contradictory evidence must collapse. I pause to refer to Public Prosecutor v Lin Lian Chen [1992] 2 MLJ 561 where Edgar Joseph Jr SCJ in dealing with the admissibility of a cautioned statement which is exculpatory in nature in the course of the case for the prosecution said at p 569:

In this, we consider, the trial judge was entirely correct for even
though the recording officer had not been called for the prosecution,
the statement was that of the respondent who had personal knowledge of
the facts stated therein and who had authenticated it by signing it. In
other words, it was the respondent who was the author thereof and who
had himself wished it to be admitted, it being acknowleged by him in
the cautioned statement itself, that it was made voluntarily after due
administration of the statutory caution.

[87] This proposition of law cannot be disputed. However, it must be observed that in that case the statement was not introduced in evidence under s 157 but for different purposes. Any such extension of the rule to proof of a previous statement under s 157 would amount to the witness corroborating himself. It is for that reason that the person to whom the statement was made must be called to tender it. I interpolate to add that at the close of the case for the prosecution I had informed parties that exh D43, tendered in evidence through PW12, was inappropriately proved at that stage as it ought to have been done so only after the witness it is meant to corroborate has given evidence. Accordingly, I had ruled that exh D43 could not be admitted at that stage and that it can be used by the defence only at the appropriate stage.

[88] Notwithstanding my primary finding I shall now consider the legal status of exh D43 if it can be argued that proof of it by PW12 in the course of the case for the prosecution is sufficient. It is of critical importance to remember that s 157 renders the former statement of a witness admissible only to corroborate the evidence given by him in court. The word ‘corroborate’ is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as:

[*430]

To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional
and confirming facts or evidence. The testimony of a witness is said to
be corroborated when it is shown to correspond with the representation
of some other witnesses, or to comport with some facts otherwise known
or established.

[89] It is therefore clear that s 157 permits the former statement of a witness to be admitted for the purpose of strengthening or confirming his evidence in court and certainly not to contradict such evidence. In Karthiyayani & Anor v Lee Leong Sin & Anor [1975] 1 MLJ 119, it was held that a former statement of a witness is admissible to corroborate him if it is consistent with the evidence given by him in court. Where, therefore, there is nothing in a witness’ evidence in court which may be corroborated by his former statement, the statement is not admissible (see Misri v Emperor AIR 1934 S 100). Accordingly, it was held in In re Grandhe Venkatasubbiah (1925) 86 IC 209 that a former statement is not admissible under s 157 of the Indian Evidence Act (similar to our s 157) when it does not corroborate any evidence given by the witness in court. It must also be noted that it is only those parts of a statement which are necessary to corroborate a witness that can be admitted under s 157 (see Mt Hakima v Mt Jiandi AIR 1927 Sind 209). Where therefore a former statement is contained in a lengthy document it would be prudent to mark those parts that are to be used as corroborative evidence. If this practice had been followed in this case, the contradictory part of exh D43 would certainly have opened the eyes of the defence. The corollary is that since the relevant part of exh D43 contradicts the evidence of the accused it is not admissible in evidence under s 157. It follows that even on the alternative approach exh D43 is not admissible with the same result as I have explained earlier.

[90] When I drew the attention of the prosecution to the line of argument, I have adopted the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor contended that exh D43 is also admissible under s 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘s 113’) and must therefore be considered. Section 113 provides for the admissibility of a statement made to the police by an accused and for its use for the purpose of impeaching his credit. The first part deals with the admissibility of a statement to the police. Evidence is described as admissible if, in addition to being relevant, it is not disqualified by some exclusionary rule (see Evidence: Proof and Practice by Graham Roberts at p 73). Relevance, however, does not result in evidence being admissible: it is a condition precedent to admissibility (see R v Turner [1975] 1 All ER 70). Not all admissible evidence is universally relevant (see R v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729). That is not the end of the matter. Evidence which is relevant and admissible must be proved before it can be considered by the court. In further elaboration on the relationship between admissibility and proof, I refer to Sarkar on Evidence (15th Ed) Vol I p 87:

The distinction between ‘proof’ and ‘relevancy’ should have to be borne
in mind. In a trial the first question that presents itself is — What
facts will a party be allowed to lay before the court. This is a matter
of relevancy and is determined by the pleadings or the facts in issue.
The next question is — How will the court allow the party to prove
those admissible facts? This is a matter of proof. Part I of the Act
containing ss 6–55 deals with the relevancy of facts and Part II deals
with their proof.

[*431]

[91] In commenting on the improper proof of a fact, Field’s Law of Evidence (12th Ed) Vol I says at p 421:

Facts which are not properly proved cannot be considered by the judge
and cannot form the basis of a judgment.

[92] And at p 423:

If the Evidence Act prescribes a particular manner in which evidence is
to be given, evidence must be given in that manner and in no other
manner.

[93] Thus, s 165 of the Act provides that it is only those facts which are declared to be relevant and duly proved which can be the basis of a judgment (see Miyana Hasan Abdulla v State of Gujarat AIR 1962 Guj 214; Sris Chandra Nandy v Rakhlananda AIR 1941 PC 16). It is therefore clear that a fact which is relevant and admissible must be proved in the manner prescribed in the Act, if any. In the case of a previous statement, like a statement to the police, specific provisions have been prescribed in the Act for its manner of proof like, for instance, ss 145 and 157. These provisions must be followed before a previous statement can be used in evidence. The corollary is that a police statement under s 113 is admissible only if it satisfies the requirements of proof of, inter alia, ss 145 and 157. It follows that the argument of the learned deputy public prosecutor cannot be sustained.

[94] The resultant matter for determination is whether the prosecution can make use of exh D43 since it is inadmissible for the purpose in respect of which it was tendered by the defence. This raises the broader issue of whether evidence which is inadmissible can be used for another purpose. In order to resolve this issue, I find it necessary to refer to Cross on Evidence (6th Ed) where it says at p 54:

If evidence is admissible for one purpose, it cannot be rejected on the
ground that it is inadmissible for some other purposes. It is desirable
that in such circumstances the two purposes are kept clearly
distinguished in the mind of the trier of fact.

[95] Wigmore described the principle involved as one of multiple admissibility. As this may indicate that evidence may be admissible for more than one purpose, Ormiston JA has suggested ‘multiple relevance and limited admissibility’ as sounder; the evidence is relevant for several purposes but it is admissible for only one purpose or for a limited number of purposes (see R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363). Thus if a wife petitions for divorce on the ground of her husband’s adultery with a named woman, and she calls a witness to prove an admission of adultery by the respondent the evidence is admissible in order to establish the husband’s guilt because admissions may always be proved against their maker under an exception to the rule against hearsay, and the evidence is admissible although the rule prevents it from being used against the named woman. Accordingly, a court may find that A’s adultery with B is established although B’s adultery with A is not proved (see Rutherford v Richardson (1923) AC 1; Moreton v Moreton (1937) 1 All ER 470). It is a rule that is fraught with danger. As Tindall CJ said in Willis v Bernard (1932) 8 Bing 376 at p 383:

[*432]

No doubt it renders the administration of justice more difficult when
evidence which is offered for one purpose or person, may incidentally
apply to another; but that is an infirmity to which all evidence is
subject, and exclusion on such a ground would manifestly occasion
greater mischief than the reception of the evidence.

[96] I must point out that the rule of multiple admissibility that I have discussed thus far refers only to evidence which is properly on record for one purpose for which it is admissible and which is inadmissible for another purpose. However, in the case at bar exh D43 has been ruled as inadmissible for the purpose in respect of which it was tendered and marked as an exhibit and is sought to be used for another purpose. Evidence that is inadmissible remains inadmissible (see Goh Beng Seng v Dol bin Dolah [1970] 2 MLJ 95; Saludin bin Surif v PP (1997) 3 MLJ 317; Noliana bte Sulaiman v PP [2000] 4 MLJ 752). That, to my mind, does not mean that it cannot be used for another purpose. If it is desired to be so used it must, however, satisfy the rules of admissibility of the other purpose in respect of which it is intended to be used. It is only then that it can be brought back on record in accordance with law in view of the earlier ruling on its inadmissibility. This is logical following the established rules relating to the admissibility of documentary evidence. It falls upon the party seeking to produce a document to show that it is admissible (see Tsia Development Enterprise Sdn Bhd v Awang Dewa [1984] 1 MLJ 301). It is the responsibility of the party relying on a document to ensure that it is properly tendered, proved and thereafter marked (see Chong Khee Sang v Pang Ah Chee [1984] 1 MLJ 377; Wan Nafi bin Wan Ismail v Hajjah Lijah bte Omar & Ors [1996] 5 MLJ 534). Documents which have not been properly proved and admitted as such will have to be disregarded (see Public Prosecutor v Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1977] 1 MLJ 180; AlliedBank (Malaysia) Bhd v Yau Jiok Hua [1998] 6 MLJ 1). However, in Lim Heng Soon & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1970] 1 MLJ 166, it was held that there was no substantial miscarriage of justice when an exhibit produced in court but not taken into custody by the court and marked as an exhibit was used as evidence. Ideally, therefore, the prosecution ought to have ensured that exh D43 was marked as a prosecution exhibit. Failure to do so does not deprive it of its evidential effect provided, of course, that its rules of admissibility with respect to the purpose for which it is intended to be used have been complied with. It is only then that exh D43 can be used by the prosecution.

[97] What therefore warrants consideration is whether the prosecution has fulfilled the rules of admissibility of exh D43 in order to use it. The first submission of the prosecution in its use relates to its effect on the credit and credibility of the accused. Credit is governed by s 145 read with s 155(c) of the Act while credibility is governed by s 146 of the Act. Both the concepts are inter-related. As Yong Pung How CJ said in Kwang Boon Keong Peter v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 SLR 592 at p 602:

Nokes, in the fourth edition of An Introduction to Evidence at pp
407–408, sought to define and distinguish between credit and
credibility. The learned author stated that credit involves ‘
antecedents, associates, character, impartiality and consistency’ while
credibility concerns the ‘opportunities for  [*433]  a power of
observation of the witness, his accuracy for recollection, and capacity
to explain what he remembers.’ It can thus be deduced that the credit
of a witness refers to his character and moral reliability whereas the
credibility of a witness refers to his mental capacity and power to be
a witness of veracity.

There is a close relationship between the credit and credibility of a
witness. The credit or discredit relates to his credibility.

[98] His Lordship further said (at p 602) that if a witness’ testimony is inconsistent with a previous statement made by him that statement may be put to him in cross-examination to challenge his credit if the inconsistency will affect his credibility and likely standing with the trier of fact. That is the nexus between credit and credibility. In Nahar Singh v Pang Hon Chin [1986] 2 MLJ 141, it was held that where the credibility or character of a witness is impugned he should be given an opportunity of exculpating himself a breach of which is a violation of the elementary demands of natural justice. It is therefore clear that where the credibility of a witness is challenged on the basis of a previous inconsistent statement made by him he must be confronted with it. This would require compliance with s 145. In this regard, Sarkar on Evidence (15th Ed) Vol 2 says at p 2226:

Former contradictory or inconsistent statements of a witness can be
used under s 146 to shake his credit or test his veracity ( Bhagwan
Singh v S
, A 1952 SC 214). With regard to previous inconsistent
statement, the law expressly requires that the witness’s attention must
first be drawn to such statements for the purpose of contradiction (ss
145 and 155 cl (3)).

[99] As exh D43, a previous statement of the accused, is in writing the relevant part of s 145 that is applicable is its sub-s (1) which reads as follows:

A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him
in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question
in the suit or proceeding in which he is cross-examined, without the
writing being shown to him or being proved; but if it is intended to
contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing
can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for
the purpose of contradicting him.

[100] It becomes immediately apparent that the sub-section contemplates two limbs. They are:

(a)   cross-examination of witness on the previous statement without it being
shown to him or being proved;

(b)   attention being drawn to witness to those parts of the previous
statement which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him
before the writing can be proved.

[101] In commenting on the two limbs of the subsection, Thomas J said in Binay Kumar Singh v State of Bihar (1997) 1 SCC 283 at pp 290-291:

It is provided in the first limb of s 145 that a witness may be
cross-examined as to the previous statement made by him without such
writing being shown to him. But the second limb provides that ‘if it is
intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must, before
the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to
be used for the purpose for contradicting him’. There is thus a
distinction between the two vivid limbs, though subtle it may
[*434]  be. The first limb does not envisage impeaching the credit
of a witness, but it merely enables the opposite party to cross-examine
the witness with reference to the previous statements made by him. He
may at that stage succeed in eliciting materials to his benefit through
such cross-examination even without resorting to the procedure laid
sown in the second limb. But if the witness disowns having made any
statement which is inconsistent with his present stand, his testimony
in court on that score would not be vitiated until the
cross-examination proceeds to comply with the procedure prescribed in
the second limb of s 145.

[102] It would appear from the passage that I have reproduced above that the need to comply with the second limb arises only if the witness disowns having made the previous statement. With respect, I am unable to agree with that view. Nowhere does the second limb say that it is activated only if the witness disowns having made the previous statement. All that it says is that if it is intended to contradict the witness by his writing his attention must be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him before the writing can be proved. The writing can be proved by an admission from the witness or calling persons to whom the statement was made. In both events the witness must be given an opportunity of explaining the inconsistency. In support, I refer to the celebrated case of Muthusamy v Public Prosecutor [1948] MLJ 57 where Taylor J said at p 59:

If the witness admits making the former statement, or is proved to have
made it, then the two conflicting versions must be carefully explained
to him, preferably by the court, and he must have a fair and full
opportunity to explain the difference.

[103] This becomes clear if it is appreciated that it is an elementary principle of law that if previous statements made by a witness are to be used for the purpose of contradiction he must be confronted with those statements and be given an opportunity of explaining any discrepancy. If a previous statement is to be allowed to be put in evidence against a witness in order to contradict him without giving him an opportunity to tender his explanation or to clear up the particular point of ambiguity or dispute it will be acting contrary to general principles of law (see Charandesi Debi v Kanai Lal AIR 1955 Cal 206). As the Privy Council said in Bal Gangadhar Tilak v Shrinivas AIR 1915 PC 7:

On general principles it would appear to be sound that if a witness is
under cross-examination on oath, he should be given the opportunity, if
documents are to be used against him, to tender his explanation and to
clear up the particular point of ambiguity or dispute. This is a
general, salutary and intelligible rule, and where a witness’
reputation and character are at stake, the duty of enforcing this rule
would appear to be significantly clear.

[104] Thus, in Ram Pratap v S AIR 1963 Pat 153, it was held that when the writer of a letter marked as an exhibit gives evidence, any endorsement on its back making a statement contradictory to the one made in court, cannot be used unless the witness’ attention is drawn to it. The manner of bringing the previous statement to the attention of the witness is important. As Bose J said in Bhagwan Singh v The State of Punjab (1952) SCR 812 at p 822:

[*435]

There can be no hard and fast rule. All that is required is that the
witness must be treated fairly and be afforded a reasonable opportunity
of explaining the contradictions after his attention has been drawn to
them in a fair and reasonable manner.

[105] It is not enough to say whether a particular exhibit is his previous statement (see Samuel v R AIR 1935 All 935; Raghuraj v R AIR 1934 All 956). Unless the particular matter or point in the previous statement is placed before the witness sought to be contradicted for explanation, the previous statement cannot be used in evidence for the purpose of contradiction (see Upendra v Phupendra 21 CWN 280; Muharram Ali v Barkat Ali AIR 1930 Lah 695; Panji v S AIR 1965 Or 205). In the circumstances, I am unable to agree that the case of Bhagwan Singh v The State of Punjab (1952) SCR 812 advocates the proposition, as argued by the prosecution, that when a witness admits making the previous statement there was no necessity to comply further with s 145. What that case says is that if the previous statement is admitted ‘… all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.’ This simply means that the admission of the statement only makes further proof of it unnecessary. In support I refer to the The Law of Evidence by ERSR Coomaraswamy Vol II Book 2 where, in commenting on that case, it says at p 750:

If the witness admits the statement, no further proof is necessary.

[106] That does not mean that the witness is not entitled to an opportunity to explain the discrepancy as contemplated by s 145(1). As ERSR Coomaraswamy further says at p 752:

It is not sufficient to ask a witness whether he did or did not make a
certain statement to the sub-inspector unless the witness in answer to
the question admits that he made such a statement. In that case, if the
statement is contradictory of something else which the witness has
said, it is the duty of the cross-examiner to give the witness an
opportunity of reconciling his statement.

[107] In this case the contradictory part of exh D43 was not referred to the accused for an explanation. All that he said in cross-examination in answer to questions is:

When the statement was recorded the facts were fresh in my mind but I
was a bit confused.

[108] The failure by the prosecution to refer the specific contradictory part of exh D43 to the accused means that s 145(1) has not been complied with. It is a grave irregularity and renders the contradictory part of exh D43 inadmissible (see Tham Kishun v Kausal Kishore AIR 1958 Pat 294; Emperor v Ajit Kumar Ghosh AIR 1945 Cal 159; Emperor v Rasul Bux AIR 1942 Sind 122; Paul v State of Tripura (1993) 2 Gau LR 395). It cannot therefore be used for the purpose of contradicting the accused. On similar ground, the submission of the prosecution that exh D43 amounts to an admission and that it can be used without being put to the accused for explanation cannot be sustained. This is particularly important in view of the fact that the contradictory part is not similar to the evidence of the accused as claimed by him. The case of Bharat Singh v Bhagirati AIR 1966 SC 405, relied on  [*436]  by the prosecution, did not find favour with Ray CJ who said in Sita Ram v Ramchandra (1977) SC 1712 at p 1715:

Second, even if the admission is proved in accordance with the
provisions of the Evidence Act and if it is to be used against the
party who has made it ‘it is sound that if a witness is under
cross-examination on oath, he should be given an opportunity, if the
documents are to be used against him, to tender his explanation and to
clear up the point of ambiguity or dispute. This is a general salutary
and intelligible rule.’ (see Bal Gangadhar Tilak v Shrinivas
Pandit
42 Ind App 135 at p 147; AIR 1915 PC 7 at p 11). ……
Therefore, a mere proof of admission, after the person whose admission
it is alleged to be has concluded his evidence, will be of no avail and
cannot be utilized against him.

[109] In Muharram Ali v Barkat Ali AIR 1930 Lah 695, it was held that where an admission is not put to the party making it and the party making it is not examined on it under s 145 the admission is not legal evidence and cannot be used against the party making it. It follows that exh D43 cannot be used against the accused even as an admission in the absence of having afforded him an opportunity to explain the contradiction. In any event, the contradictory part of exh D43 is not an admission as it is exculpatory in nature.

[110] That leaves for consideration the prosecution’s reliance on R v Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172 to argue that exh D43 is evidence against the accused. It must be pointed out that the proposition of law enunciated in that case is applicable, as stated in the passage from that case referred to earlier, only when the witness sees what the document purports to record and accepts it as true. In that event it can be said that the witness is adopting it as part of his testimony and accordingly, it becomes evidence against him. In this case the accused said that his evidence in court is similar to what he had stated in exh D43 when it was shown to him. This, in my opinion, does not convert exh D43 into evidence against the accused for two reasons. Firstly, it must be remembered that in order to draw an inference on the basis of what a party is said to have admitted the admission must be unequivocal, comprehensive and cover the point in issue (see M M Chetti v C Coomaraswamy AIR 1980 Mad 212). It sometimes happens that persons make statements which serve their purpose or proceed upon ignorance of the true position; and it is not their statements but the true position which should be taken into consideration in determining the issue (see Venkatapathiraju v Venkatanarasimha AIR 1936 PC 264; Harkishen v Pratap AIR 1938 PC 189). An erroneous admission does not bind the person making it (see Mangru v Shivanand AIR 1923 All 575). Just as a wrong admission made in ignorance of legal rights has no binding effect (see Munia v Manohar AIR 1941 Or 429; Amrit v Sadashiv AIR 1944 Bom 233), a wrong statement made in ignorance of the true facts ought to have no effect. The evidence of the accused that exh D43 is similar to his evidence is an incorrect, blind and ignorant assertion which is apparent on the face of the record. It is simply not similar. The admission of the accused cannot therefore amount to an acceptance of exh D43 as the truth as it is equivocal. Thus it cannot be said that the accused has adopted exh D43 as part of his evidence. Secondly, as I said earlier, even in the case of an admission the  [*437]  witness must be given an opportunity to explain the admission if it is to be used against him. The opportunity to explain the contradiction in exh D43 is greater as it is not an admission and the evidence of the accused that it is similar to his evidence is not correct. If in fact the contradictory part of exh D43 had been referred to the accused and he had accepted it as true then the need for an explanation may not arise as it would then fall outside the ambit of s 145. In the circumstances, the prosecution ought to have followed the procedure prescribed in s 145 which was not done. Accordingly, I am unable to consider the contradictory part in exh D43 as evidence against the accused. I had said in an earlier part of the judgment that PW9 had admitted that in his statement to the police he had stated that he first noticed what was happening after he had heard the first shot. This admission by PW9 is on the same footing as the admission of exh D43 by the accused. If, therefore, I were to agree with the vigorous submission of the prosecution on this issue it would mean that I have to discredit PW9 as well. However, following my ruling on the contradictory part of exh D43 the admission by PW9 does not affect his credit.

[111] In the final analysis, it is my primary finding that exh D43 is inadmissible as PW12 was not recalled to tender it in evidence. My alternative finding is that even if it is properly before the court the contradictory part in exh D43 is inadmissible under s 157. Similarly, it is inadmissible under s 145 as the prosecution has failed to comply with the requirements of the section. Exhibit D43 therefore does not affect the credibility of the accused. This finding makes it unnecessary for me to analyse the advice of the Privy Council in Von Starck v The Queen [2000] 1 WLR 1270 where it was held that even if a defendant’s evidence is inconsistent with his previous statement the contents of the previous statement must be given due consideration. Neither is it necessary for me to ascertain the veracity of the accused’s oral evidence as opposed to what he had stated in exh D43 as authorized by Tan Chow Soo v Ratna Ammal [1969] 2 MLJ 49).

[112] Whether the deceased uttered the words ‘ Kasilah mati-lu’ and ‘Lu-mati

[113] The accused said in his evidence that the deceased said, ‘Kasilah mati-lu’ and ‘Lu-mati’ a number of times before the first shot was fired. On the other hand, DW4 and DW5 said that they heard the words, ‘Tembaklah, tembaklah.’ The defence did not address any questions to DW4 and DW5 to ascertain whether there were other words uttered by the deceased which they could not hear. Neither was the accused asked whether the deceased could have uttered other words. In the circumstances, it is my view that the words uttered by the deceased were as testified by DW4 and DW5. This part of the evidence of the accused is therefore an embellishment designed to enhance the impact of his plea of self-defence. However, it is my view that this is insufficient on its own to discredit the accused entirely.

The evidence of PW7 that the accused told him that the deceased had tried to rob him

[114] PW7, a corporal, said that the accused told him that:

[*438]

Lelaki India tersebut telah memukulnya dengan kayu cuba hendak
menyamunnya.

[115] It was not put in cross-examination to PW7 that the accused did not utter those words to him. Neither did the accused deny saying it to PW7 when he gave evidence. It follows that the accused did in fact make such a statement to him. It is, however, not in line with the evidence adduced by the defence. If, therefore, what the accused told PW7 is admissible it would mean that it is yet another attempt by the accused to embellish his defence and may have the effect of impairing his credibility. The admissibility of the statement is governed by s 113 pursuant to which it is only admissible if made to a police officer of the rank of inspector and above. As PW7 is a corporal the evidence is inadmissible. I am therefore precluded from considering this evidence in assessing the credibility of the accused.

[116] I pause to add that I find what is stated in the last part of the submission of the learned deputy public prosecutor on exh D43 stimulating and provocative. In referring to exh D43, she said:

This is an unprecedented, novel and to a certain extent a mysterious
way of defending an accused person ie by showing consistency through
inconsistencies. By doing this they unwittingly had set their own trap
of which they themselves were the victim.

[117] I myself am unable to comprehend the mystery behind the tendering of exh D43 in evidence. Perhaps the accused and his advisers will know the answer. But I do agree that by tendering the document in evidence the defence had certainly set its own trap. Unfortunately, the prosecution did not take the proper and prudent steps to close the trap door. It was left wide open. It would appear that the defence was not sufficiently energenized to walk out of the open door. Where the victim of a trap ought not to be unlawfully trapped, it is the duty of the court to pull it out with all its might in order to set it free. After all, the function and responsibility of the court in a criminal trial is greater and more onerous than that of the prosecuting and defence counsel (see Von Starck v The Queen [2000] 1 WLR 1270).

DW4

[118] The prosecution submitted that the evidence of DW4 contradicted that of DW6 as to the point of time he told her of the incident. The evidence of DW6 makes it very clear that DW4 informed her of the incident upon his return to their office on the same day. In this regard, DW4 said in his examination-in-chief:

Saya sebenarnya terbaca suratkhabar Utusan yang muka hadapannya
menceritakan tentang kes Dato Balwant dituduh membunuh. Jadi saya rasa
Dato Balwant tidak bersalah kerana dia membunuh bukannya dengan niatnya
dari apa yang saya lihat. Saya telah menceritakan perkara ini kepada
kakak saya bernama Norzilah binti Ismail bagaimana perkara ini berlaku
dan dia bersependapat dengan saya ……… . Saya tak ingat bulan apa saya
beritahu kakak saya tetapi dalam tahun 2002.

[119] This does not show in clear terms that DW4 did not tell DW6 of the incident on the same day. The prosecution ought to have cross-examined  [*439]  DW4 on this issue which was not done. In the circumstances, I am unable to place much emphasis on the contradiction complained of, if any.

[120] It was also submitted by the prosecution that:

DW4 in his evidence stated that it was his sister who encouraged him to
give evidence for the defence. He has met the defence counsel many
times and was interviewed by Dato’ Shafee before his statement was
recorded by the police. He said that he was not ready to inform the
police (at p 99), ‘Saya belum cukup bersedia untuk memberitahu pihak
polis, maksud saya ialah untuk mengingati semula peristiwa.
Sekurang-kurangnya saya bersedia untuk memberi keterangan kepada
peguam. Saya bersedia apabila saya berjumpa dengan peguam. Selepas itu
saya pun bersedia untuk memberi statement kepada polis. Sebelum
perbicaraan peguam ada berjumpa dengan saya, peguam ada mencerita
kepada saya berulang kali.’ His evidence must be scrutinized carefully
bearing in mind the fact as stated above.

[121] If the implication of this submission is that the evidence of DW4 must be scrutinized with care as he had been interviewed by Dato’ Shafee, one of the counsel for the accused, I am unable to accept it. I do not see anything wrong with counsel interviewing potential witnesses. It is a necessary process to enable them to conduct the defence effectively. If the objection is to be carried to its logical conclusion it would mean that all prosecution witnesses must be similarly treated as they, too, would have been interviewed earlier when statements were recorded from them. I must add that the situation would be different if there is evidence of perversion of justice by counsel of which there is none in this case. In the circumstances I am unable to agree that the objection I have referred to affects the credit of DW4.

[122] I will now assess the salient features of the facts of the case as identified by me at the close of the case for the prosecution on the basis of the whole of the evidence adduced.

The point of time at which PW9 and PW10 were first attracted to the incident

[123] No evidence was adduced by the defence to alter my earlier finding that it is difficult to determine the point of time at which PW9 and PW10 were first attracted to the incident. That finding therefore remains.

Whether the accused was pulled out from the car

[124] It was my earlier finding that PW9 and PW10 did not know whether the accused was pulled out from the car. A finding on this issue therefore requires a consideration of the evidence adduced by the defence. The accused said that the deceased opened the car door and dragged him out forcefully by catching hold of the collar of his shirt. It was not put to the accused by the prosecution that he was not pulled out from the car. Instead, the cross-examination proceeded on the basis that he was pulled out. In this regard, the accused said in answer to questions:

I resisted when he dragged me out of the car. He was holding on to my
collar. I held on to the seat. Despite that he dragged me out. I did
not have my safety belt on at that time. He pulled me out by holding my
collar. In the course of resisting I did not knock against the car.

[*440]

[125] DW5 said that the deceased opened the door of the car suddenly and dragged the accused out. Unlike in the case of the accused, it was put to DW5 that the accused came out of the car by himself holding the gun. She denied this suggestion. DW4, on the other hand, said that as his view was not very clear at that time his impression was that it was as if the accused was pulled out from the car. In cross-examination, he said that he saw the accused coming out of the car. However, in his re-examination he said that the accused was forced to come out as if he was pulled out. The vague evidence of DW4 on this issue is an indication that his evidence is not a fabrication as suggested by the prosecution. If in fact he was lying his evidence would have been more emphatic. I have no reason to disregard the evidence of the accused and DW5 on this issue. The accused was not effectively cross-examined and DW5 denied the suggestion put to her.

[126] It is therefore my finding that the accused was pulled out of the car by the deceased.

The point of time at which the accused took out the pistol

[127] It was my earlier finding that PW9 and PW10 would not have known the point of time at which the accused took out the pistol. The accused said in his evidence that when the deceased kept assaulting him he showed the deceased his gun which was tucked at his waist. The deceased continued to assault him with the stick and it landed on his upper arm. The accused said that he was frightened for his life and took out his gun and fired a warning shot. There was no cross-examination of the accused by the prosecution as to the point of time he took out his pistol. His evidence on this issue must therefore be accepted. DW5 said that the accused lifted up his shirt, presumably to show his pistol, when the deceased was assaulting him. When the deceased became more aggressive the accused pulled out the gun and fired a shot. Unlike in the case of the accused, it was put to DW5 that the accused came out of the car by himself holding the gun. She denied this suggestion. DW4 did not, neither in his examination-in-chief nor cross-examination, advert to the point of time at which the accused took out his pistol. This again shows that he is a witness of truth because if he is lying he would have corroborated the evidence of the accused and DW5 on this issue.

[128] It is therefore my finding that the accused took out his pistol as explained by him.

Whether the deceased had the stick with him before the first shot was fired by the accused

[129] It was my earlier finding that the prosecution evidence on this issue is contradictory. While PW9 said that the deceased took the stick only after the first shot was fired by the accused PW10 said that the deceased had the stick with him before the first shot was fired. The accused said that as his car was slowly moving near the junction of Jalan Maarof/Jalan Tempinis he saw the deceased going up Jalan Tempinis and picking up a stick. His cross-examination proceeded on the basis that the deceased had the stick with  [*441]  him before the first shot was fired. It was not suggested to him that the deceased did not have the stick at that time. Therefore, I am compelled to accept what he said in his examination-in-chief. The evidence of DW5 in her examination-in-chief is similar to that of the accused. However, it was put to her in cross-examination that after the first shot was fired the deceased ran to the other side of the road and came back with the stick. She denied the suggestion. DW4 said that the deceased picked up the stick before going to the Mercedes Benz car. It was put to DW4 that the deceased picked up the stick after the first shot. He denied it. In view of the evidence of PW10 on this issue, the manner of cross-examination of the accused and the reliability of the evidence of DW4 and DW5 I accept their evidence.

[130] It is therefore my finding that the deceased had the stick with him before the first shot was fired.

The manner in which the deceased used the stick before the two shots were fired

[131] It was my earlier finding that the stick held by the deceased did not touch the accused and as it was moving up and down very fast it was not possible to place much emphasis on the prosecution evidence that at the time of the second shot it was pointed downwards. DW5 said that she saw the deceased swinging the stick and was trying to hit the accused’s hand or face who tried to ward off the blow. It landed on his upper left arm. She also saw the deceased jabbing the accused’s chest with the stick. He kept on doing so. It was after that the first shot was fired. She said that the accused begged the deceased not to hit him. It was a faint voice. The deceased kept on jabbing the accused and she heard the second shot. Just before the second shot was fired the deceased was about to swing the stick at the accused. In her cross-examination she said that after the first shot the deceased was very aggressive and angry. The accused was pleading with him not to hurt him. The stick was on the chest of the accused. She said that before the second shot was fired she saw the deceased swinging the stick but did not see it touching the accused. She denied that when the second shot was fired the deceased’s hand was down. She also denied that the deceased was swinging the stick up and down. DW4 said that the deceased swung the stick at the accused several times. The deceased jabbed the stick at the accused’s chest. Prior to the second shot, the deceased was holding the stick in a position of hitting the accused. It was not put to him in cross-examination that the stick did not touch the accused. The accused said that the deceased poked his chest with the stick. When the stick moved towards his face he warded off the stick. It landed on his upper arm. The deceased poked the accused with the stick and kept aiming at his face. The deceased then jabbed the accused’s chest with the stick. When the accused showed the gun to the deceased he swung the stick at him again. It landed on his upper arm again. After the first shot was fired, the deceased lunged the stick forcefully at the accused’s chest. The accused said that as a result of the assault he was injured in his arm and chest. It must be observed that the prosecution version of the use of the stick, that is to say, that it did not touch the accused and that prior to the second shot the deceased was holding the stick down was not put to the accused. Neither was it suggested to him that the injuries  [*442]  he had sustained were not caused by the deceased. DW3 said that the two injuries on the accused are consistent with his complaint of having been assaulted with a wooden stick. In the circumstances, I accept the accused’s evidence that he was hit with the stick by the deceased and that as a result thereof he sustained the two injuries.

[132] It is therefore my finding that the stick held by the deceased did in fact touch the accused.

Whether the deceased was wearing his helmet at the time of the incident

[133] It was my earlier finding based on the evidence of PW9 and PW10 that the deceased was wearing his helmet at the time of the incident though I observed that no evidence was led by the prosecution to explain how the helmet was found hanging on the rear view mirror of the motorcycle. The accused said that at the time of the incident the deceased was not wearing his helmet. He was not cross-examined on this part of his evidence. DW5 said that the deceased took off his helmet and left it on the motorcycle before coming towards them. She was not cross-examined on this part of her evidence. DW4 also said that the deceased removed his helmet and placed it on his motorcycle before going towards the car. It was not put to him that the deceased was wearing the helmet at the time of the incident. In the absence of the defence witnesses being cross-examined on this issue I accept their evidence.

[134] It is therefore my finding that the deceased was not wearing his helmet at the time of the incident contrary to the evidence of PW9 and PW10. This finding explains the position of the helmet after the incident.

[135] Events preceding the shooting incident at the junction of Jalan Maarof/Jalan Tempinis

[136] The prosecution evidence is silent on this issue. The accused, DW4 and DW5 gave a detailed account as to what transpired from the Railway Station at Jalan Raja till the shooting incident at the Jalan Maarof/Jalan Tempinis junction. According to the accused it started with the sounding of the horn of the car that DW5 was driving when another car came close to them. When they stopped at the traffic light near the Syariah Court the deceased who was ahead of them on his motorcycle turned round and came to the driver’s side of their car against the flow of traffic. The deceased abused them. When the traffic light turned green they moved on. The deceased was waiting for them at the bus stop near the museum. He asked them to stop but they proceeded. Then they heard some sound from behind. The deceased was near the rear mudguard of the car. At the junction of Jalan Travers and Brickfields, the deceased was ahead of them. The deceased turned back and came towards them. He abused them and looked very angry and threatening. When the traffic light turned green, the deceased disappeared and they proceeded. At the junction of Jalan Bangsar/Jalan Maarof, the traffic light was showing red. The deceased was waiting at the junction on the left. He abused them again. When the traffic light turned green, they moved off. When they were about 30ft away from the  [*443]  Petronas Petrol Station, DW5 gave a signal to turn left into Jalan Tempinis. When the accused noticed the deceased at the junction of Jalan Tempinis, he asked DW5 to proceed straight. It was never suggested to the accused in cross-examination that the sequence of events as described by him did not take place. It was put to DW4 that parts of his evidence on this issue were fabricated. He denied the suggestion. I accept the defence evidence on this issue as all three witnesses are generally consistent with each other coupled with the fact that they were not effectively cross-examined.

[137] I must reiterate that in making the above findings I did not overlook the fact that the accused had laced certain parts of his evidence with embroidery. Accordingly, I subjected the assessment of his credibility to the highest levels of stringency. I took anxious steps to verify whether his evidence is consistent with itself and the whole of the evidence against the background of his demeanour while testifying. My assessment on his credibility was facilitated to a large extent by a lack of cross-examination on vital parts of his evidence as demonstrated by me earlier. It is a general rule that failure to cross-examine a witness on a crucial part of the case will amount to an acceptance of the witness’ testimony (see Wong Swee Chin v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 212; Public Prosecutor v Abang Abdul Rahman [1982] 1 MLJ 346; Chua Beow Huat v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 29). With regard to DW4, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of his evidence as it is neutral in many aspects. If, in fact, he was fabricating evidence as suggested by the prosecution he would have confirmed the evidence in more ways than what he did. His demeanour while giving evidence did not project him as a false witness. DW5 cannot be treated as an interested witness merely because she is the daughter-in-law of the accused.

[138] The accused’s case is one of private defence. The law on the right of private defence, on the facts of this case, is contained in ss 96, 97, 99, 100 and 102 of the Penal Code. They read as follows:

Section 96

Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of
private defence.

Section 97

Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in s
99, to defend —

(a) his own body, and the body of any other person, against any
offence affecting the human body;

(b) the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of
any other person, against any act which is an offence falling
under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal
trespass, of which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery,
mischief or criminal trespass.

Section 99

(1) There is no right of private defence against an act which
does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of
grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public
servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though
that act may not be strictly justifiable by law.

[*444]

(2) There is no right of private defence against an act which
does not reasonably cause the aprehension of death or of grievous
hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a
public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office,
though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law.

(3) There is no right of private defence in cases in which there
is time to have recourse to the protection of the public
authorities.

(4) The right of private defence in no case extends to the
inficting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the
purpose of defence.

Explanation 1 – A person is not deprived of the right
of private defence against an act done or attempted to be
done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows, or has
reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such
public servant.

Explanation 1 – A person is not deprived of the right
of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be
done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he
knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the
act is acting by such direction; or unless such person
states the authority under which he acts, or, if he has
authority in writing, unless he produces such authority, if
demanded.

Section 100

The right of private defence of the body extends, under the
restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary
causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence
which occasions the exercise of the right is of any of the following
descriptions:

(a) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that
death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

(b) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that
grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

(c) an assault with the intention of committing rape;

(d) an assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;

(e) an assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;

(f) an assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a
person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to
apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public
authorities for his release.

Section 102

The right of privare defence of the body commences as soon as a
reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or
threat to commit the offence, though the offence may not have been
committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to
the body continues.

[139] The provisions of law that I have referred to must be read together. In Malaysian law, the right of private defence under the Penal Code is much wider than that under English law (see Musa bin Yusof v Public Prosecutor [1953] MLJ 70). The right of private defence commences as soon as there is reasonable apprehension of danger to the body of a person and this right continues for so long as such apprehension of danger to his body or life exists (see Public Prosecutor v Ngoi Ming Sean [1982] 1 MLJ 24; Ya bin Daud v Public Prosecutor [1997] 4 MLJ 322). It must, however, be noted that the  [*445]  right has a limitation (see Public Prosecutor v Lee Poh Chye & Anor [1997] 4 MLJ 578). If a person either has time to have recourse to seek the protection of a public authority (see Public Prosecutor v Ngoi Ming Sean ) or inflicts more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defending his life and limb then such a right will no longer be available (see Lee Thian Beng v Public Prosecutor [1972] 1 MLJ 248). In this regard, it must be noted that whilst it is true that no man can be expected to assess with scientific accuracy the precise amount of force that is necessary to defend himself from an attack, any retaliation in the exercise of private defence should not exceed what is reasonably necessary to avert the assailant’s attack (see Mallal’s Penal Law, p 134). Thus, an accused person should not be allowed to put his superiority to such use so as to beat up the assailant (see Public Prosecutor v Lee Twe Jeat [1994] 3 SLR 219) but merely to defend himself. However, it must be noted that a man who is about to be attacked does not have to wait for his assailant to strike the first blow (see Beckford v R (1987) 3 All ER 425). He need not wait till he is actually attacked or inflicted with injury in order to react (see Govindan v State of Kerala (1960) 47 AIR 258). He is not obliged to run away; the law does not require a citizen to behave like a coward (see Mohd Khan v State of Madhiya Pradesh (1972) Cri LJ 661 of 662). If he is unable to escape, he may turn round and attack (see Public Prosecutor v Yeo Kim Bok [1971] 1 MLJ 204). He need not cooly reflect on his right or measure his blows before defending himself. Thus when a person is attacked by a stick it is impossible to calculate the force of the blow before he can act (see Iman Din v Emperor (1925) AIR Lahor 514). The law does not require that the person should have exercised a calm and cool judgment and that he should weigh his acts in golden scales (see State of UP v Ram Swarup (1974) Cri LJ 1035; Jai Dev v State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 612; Wassan Singh v State Punjab (1996) Cri LJ 878). The person does not have to be inflicted with serious injury before the exercise of the right of private defence can begin (see Ya bin Daud v Public Prosecutor ; Beckford v R [1987] 3 All ER 425). A person is not bound to modulate his defence step by step before the right to defend himself can begin (see Sitaram v Emperor (1925) 26 Cri LJ 587 At 589). He can make sure that his defence is effective. Thus, a person having reasonable grounds to believe the existence of imminent danger can use a gun in self-defence (see R v Collin Chisom (1963) 47 Cr App R 130; Bhagwan Swarop v State of MP (1992) Cri LJ 777). He may inflict injuries on his aggressor for the purpose of defence as well as for preventing further aggression. Therefore, if there is an apprehension of further violence the right of private defence comes in (see Re Amnu Pujary (1942) 43 Cri LJ 753). It is not only the injuries already inflicted but the injuries the attacker might inflict if the defender does not exercise his right of self-defence that must be taken into consideration (see Public Prosecutor v Yeo Kim Bok [1971] 1 MLJ 204). Thus, a person is not obliged to wait until the attack upon him is repeated (see R v Conlon (1993) 69 Crim R 92). Even if the aggressor is disarmed but there is a possibility of him wrestling the weapon from the defender the latter has a right to use violence. The fact that the aggressor was unarmed while the accused was armed with a revolver cannot affect the right of private defence (see Public Prosecutor v Ngoi Ming Sean ). When an injury is inflicted upon a person by a stick he can use his gun to defend himself (see Bhagwan Swarop v State of MP (1992) Cri LJ 777). In Public Prosecutor v Yeo Kim Bok [1971] 1 MLJ 204, it was held that a reasonable apprehension of danger and the right of private defence in relation to that fear extended to even the killing of the aggressor. The person who is facing a reasonable apprehension of danger to his body or life is not obliged to retreat but may pursue his adversary till he finds himself out of danger, and if in a conflict between them, he happens to kill, such killing is justifiable (see R v Mc Innes [1971] 3 All ER 295; Musa bin Yusof v Public Prosecutor ; Ya bin Daud v Public Prosecutor ). In any case where a plea of self-defence has been raised, the prosecution has to show beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in self-defence and even if the prosecution succeed the other possible issues will remain, including whether there was the necessary intent to constitute the crime of murder (see Palmer v R [1971] 1 All ER 1077 of 1085; Tony ak Beliang v Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 CLJ 482; Kesha v State of Rajasthan (1993) Cri LJ 3674). This means that even if the court is left in reasonable doubt about the existence of the right of private defence there must be an order of acquittal (see Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645).

[140] The test of a reasonable cause of apprehension of death or of grievousness is an objective test (see Ya bin Daud v Public Prosecutor ; Soosay v Public Prosecutor [1993] 3 SLR 272). The burden of proving the defence of private defence is upon the accused on a balance of probabilities a (see Public  [*446]  Prosecutor v Teo Eng Chen & Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 156; Ya bin Daud v Public Prosecutor ; Mohd Ramzani v State of Delhi (1980) Cri LJ 1010; State of UP v Ram Swarup (1974) Cri LJ 1035; Lee Thian Beng v Public Prosecutor ).

[141] I will now consider whether the accused was confronted with a reasonable apprehension of danger to his body. The train of events that resulted in him being charged with an offence of murder commenced with the mere hooting of a car horn while DW5 was driving his car near the Railway Station at Jalan Raja with him in the front passenger seat. The deceased, riding a motorcycle, overtook them on the left. Then a car came into DW5 ’s lane. She hooted in order to warn the driver of the car who then moved on to his lane. When they stopped at the traffic light near the Syariah Court the deceased who was about 30ft ahead of them turned round and came towards the driver’s side of their car against the flow of traffic. He started abusing them in vulgar language. He would not listen to their explanation that the hooting was not directed at him. Later when they passed the bus stop near the museum, he asked them to stop. They ignored him and carried on driving. Suddenly they heard a sound from behind the car and noticed the deceased near the rear mudguard. DW4 saw the deceased removing his helmet and swinging it towards the car. The deceased then overtook them. At the junction of Jalan Travers and Brickfields, the traffic light was showing red. The deceased was in front of them. When they stopped, he turned back once again and came towards them. He was very abusive and looked angry and threatening. He challenged the accused to a fight. When the traffic light turned green, they  [*447]  started moving. The deceased disappeared from their view. When they arrived at the junction of Jalan Bangsar and Jalan Maarof, the traffic light was showing red again. When the light turned green, they could not move as the deceased was in front of them. He was shouting and abusing them. When somebody from behind hooted, the deceased moved away. When they were near the Petronas Petrol Station, DW5 gave a signal to turn left into Jalan Tempinis. The deceased had already reached the junction of Jalan Tempinis and was looking behind every now and then. Fearing that the deceased might follow them, the accused told DW5 to drive straight ahead. They could not do so as the traffic had stopped. PW10 confirmed that there was a traffic jam at that time. The deceased went up Jalan Tempinis and picked up a stick. He then did a U-turn and came back to the right hand side of the junction. He parked his motorcycle at the junction. He placed his helmet on the motorcycle. By that time, the accused’s car had stopped at the centre of the junction.

[142] The deceased then walked towards the car. He was waving the stick and looked very angry and aggressive. He came to the passenger side of the car and was shouting and yelling abusive words. He then kicked the car and opened the door and dragged the accused out of the car by his collar. The deceased was angry, intimidating and threatening. He looked as if he was possessed by a demon. The accused’s efforts to explain matters to the deceased were fruitless. The deceased then poked the accused with the stick he was holding and moved it towards his face. When the accused warded off the stick with his hand, it landed on his upper arm. The deceased kept on poking and jabbing the accused’s chest. The accused got the impression that the deceased was going to cause him grievous harm or even kill him. The accused then showed his gun to the deceased hoping that it would frighten him so that he will stop assaulting him. But the deceased became even more aggressive and angry at that point of time and swung the stick again to hit the accused. When the accused raised his arm, it landed on his upper left arm. The accused became really frightened for his life and took out his gun and fired a warning shot in the air. The deceased did not retreat but instead lunged the stick forcefully at the accused’s chest. The accused sustained injuries on his hand and chest as a result of the assault. Then the accused genuinely feared for his life and felt that the deceased was either going to cause him grievous hurt or even kill him. The accused also feared that the deceased might dislodge the gun from his hand by hitting his hand and use it to shoot him. The accused had this fear as the deceased was taking another swing. The deceased was behaving like a mad man as if he was possessed. He was shouting, threatening and intimidating. At that stage, the accused thought that he had to disarm the deceased. He felt that if he did not disarm the deceased he would assault him further and his life would be in danger. The accused then fired the second shot towards the right of the deceased hoping that he would drop the stick and stop assaulting him. His intention was to incapacitate or maim the deceased. Unfortunately, the shot killed the deceased.

[143] It is my view that the accused did everything possible to pacify the aggression of the deceased. He tried to explain matters to the deceased who  [*448]  was not bothered; he showed his gun to the deceased who became even more aggressive. He then fired a warning shot which did not deter the deceased. Even PW9 said that the deceased was not scared at all by the first shot which, in his opinion, was a warning shot. The action and behav­iour of the deceased was not only aggressive but was that of a road bully who had no regard or respect for the law from the very beginning at the traffic light near the Syariah Court. His conduct is comprehensible in the light of his earlier detention for being involved with secret society activities followed by a period of restricted residence. Even the motorcycle that he was riding on that day had been reported as stolen. In the situation that the accused was in, there was no way in which he could have sought the protec­tion of a public authority, or for that matter, of anybody else. As a matter of fact, the accused made an attempt to avoid going to Jalan Tempinis by proceeding straight ahead along Jalan Maarof but he could not do so. It is therefore unreasonable to expect the accused to have avoided Jalan Maarof completely because at that point of time he was not faced with a similar danger and the deceased had also disappeared after each confrontaion. In the circumstances, it is my firm finding that the apprehension of danger that the accused had to his body and life was reasonable. Thus, he was enti­tled to exercise his right of private defence. But it must be observed that the deceased was armed only with a stick while the accused was armed with a gun which is a lethal weapon and that the injuries that he had sus­tained were of a superficial nature. However, the stick was not an ordinary twig. It was a thick branch and more than four feet in length. It is big enough to cause a person’s skull or bones to crack if hit with it. The accused said in his cross-examination that it is a dangerous weapon while PW9 said that it could cause grievous hurt and possible death if hit on the head. I would thus describe it as a weapon of offence. The law that I have discussed earlier shows that it makes no difference that the deceased was armed with a stick and the accused with a gun; that serious injuries need not be inflicted before the right of private defence can begin; that it is not the injuries already inflicted but the injury that may be inflicted if the right is not exercised that must be considered; that there is no obligation on the accused to run away in the face of the danger that he was facing; that the accused may turn round and attack in the face of the danger; that a gun may be used in private defence and that the right extended even to the kill­ing of the aggressor. I would therefore hold that the accused has proved on a balance of probabilities that he acted in the exercise of the right of private defence. He has therefore not committed any offence. Accordingly, I acquit and discharge him.

ORDER:
Accused acquitted and discharged.

My Civil Suit Against The Malicious Magistrate and Prosecutions: To Be Represented By Prominent Lawyers – Limitation of Immunity for Lower Courts if Found Malicious and Mala Fide

Categories: Abuse of Process of Court, Art of Counter-CyberForensics, Blog, Breach of Expert Duties, Breach of Natural Justice, Breach of Prosecution's Duties, Case Law Studies, Chain of Custody, Chain of Evidence, Conspiracy Theory, Control, Credibility of Expert Witness, Criminal & Civil Liability of Expert Witness, Criminal Behavioral Studies, Criminal Justice, Criminal Procedures Code (Act 593) - Malayan Law, Criminology, Custody, Cyber Forensics & Investigations, Damages, Definition of Possession in Law, Domain Names, E-mail, Electronic Evidence, Evidence Act 1950 (Malayan Law), Expert At Crime Scene, Expert Evidence, Expert Witness, Federal Constitutions, First Information Report (FIR), FOREX THEORY, Freedom and Privacy, Freedom of Thought, Fundamental Human Rights, Gazetted Expert Witness, Geological Forensics Science, Human Rights, Marriage & Privacy, Illegally Obtained Evidence, Information, Intellectual Properties & Copyrights, Invasion of Privacy, Knowledge, Law of Tort, Limitation of Immunity of Judge in Lower Court, Limitations to The Immunity Rule, Malicious Prosecution, Manner in which lack of competency may rise, Marriage Rights, Meteorological Sciences and Analyses, Natural Justice, Networking and Internet, Penal Codes, Power and Privacy, Private Property, Private Spaces, Prosecution, Retrospective of Privacy, S 120 Parties to Civil Suits and Wives and Husbands, S1 Evidence Act 1950, S10 Evidence Act 1950, S11 Evidence Act 1950, S12 Evidence Act 1950, S122 Evidence Act (Communication During Marriage), S13 Evidence Act 1950, S14 Evidence Act 1950, S15 Evidence Act 1950, S16 Evidence Act 1950, S17 Evidence Act 1950, S2 Evidence Act 1950, S3 Evidence Act 1950, S4 Evidence Act 1950, S44 Fraud or Collusion in Obtaining Judgement or Incompetency of Court May Be Rise, S45 Evidence Act 1950, S5 Evidence Act 1950, S56 Fact Judicially Noticeable Need To Be Proved, S57 Facts of Which Court Must Take Judicial Notice, S6 Evidence Act 1950, S65 Evidence Act 1950, S65(1)(c) Evidence Act 1950, S7 Evidence Act 1950, S8 Evidence Act 1950, S9 Evidence Act 1950, S93 Exclusion of Evidence To Explain or Amend Ambigious Document, Scientific Evidence and Law, Secret of The Bodies, Solar and Lunar Calculations, Territories of Selfness, The Theory of Pure Democracy, Trial Within Trial, True Definition of Natural Justice, Vicarious Liability, Websites, Without Search Warrant

My Written Submission at the Close of Defence Case On 7th of February 2011: The First Magistrate in Malaya Courts Had Been Proved To Be “The Greatest Liar of All Times”, and Of Course The Malicious Deputy Public Prosecutor

Serious Malicious at:

15.       Pihak Pembelaan menyediakan hujahan bertulis ini tanpa memprejudiskan hak pihak Pembelaan untuk membangkitkan isu bahawa tiada Nota-nota Keterangan untuk prosiding pada 19.10.2010, 13.12.2010, 23.12.2010, 6.1.2011 dan 18.1.2011 dibekalkan oleh Mahkamah dan ini jelas tidak mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 265,268, 272 dan 433 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah (Akta 593).

24.       Adalah dihujahkan juga bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan premis tempat kejadian kerana tiada gambar-gambar tempat kejadian dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan. Di samping itu, tiada rajah kasar disediakan oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7). Walaupun pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil SP3 untuk memberi keterangan tetapi gagal memberi lokasi tempat kejadian yang tepat dan tempat kejadian tidak dikenalpasti (mukasurat 40 Nota Keterangan). Selain itu premis tempat kejadian adalah rumah sewa yang turut berada di dalam kawalan SP3 yang sudah tentu mempunyai akses kepada premis tersebut. Oleh yang demikian bukan Tertuduh sahaja ada akses kepada premis tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh). Oleh yang demikian tempat kejadian tidak dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan.

and etc.

Below is The Most Seriousness of Malicious Acts and Material Evidence by a Malicious Magistrate Kuala Lumpur:

68.       Tiada senarai klip video yang disediakan oleh Saksi Pendakwaan ke-7 (SP7) selaku Pegawai Penyiasat dan setiap satu daripada 106 klip video yang berlainan tajuk dan menjadi asas pertuduhan tidak ditanda sebagai ekshibit. Ini dapat dibuktikan dengan tiada keterangan direkodkan di dalam Nota-nota Keterangan sehingga 6.1.2011.

****************************************************************************************************

DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR

DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA

KES TANGKAP NO:  2-83-7119-2009

ANTARA

PENDAKWA RAYA

DAN

MOHAMAD IZAHAM BIN MOHAMED YATIM

HUJAHAN BERTULIS PIHAK PEMBELAAN

Dengan izin Majistret,

1.                  Ini adalah hujahan bertulis pihak pembelaan di akhir kes pembelaan.

LATARBELAKANG KES:

2.                  Tertuduh dihadapkan dengan pertuduhan seperti berikut:

Bahawa kamu pada 13/07/09 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat *** **** *** *** ** **********, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah didapati memiliki sebanyak 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK yang di bawah milikan kamu. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 5(2) akta yang sama”.

3.                  Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil 7 orang saksi untuk membuktikan kes pendakwaan iaitu:

3.1             SP-1 iaitu Insp. Mohd Razif b. Mohd Zaid I/16542

3.2             SP-2 iaitu Zanariah binti Ibrahim

3.3             SP-3 iaitu Mohanaraj Naidi Subbiah

3.4             SP-4 iaitu Mohamad Zamri bin Roslan

3.5             SP-5 iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah I/17525

3.6             SP-6 iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus

3.7             SP-7 iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira binti Zakaria

4.                  Ekshibit-ekshibit yang telah ditanda adalah seperti berikut:-

4.1             P-1 – Borang Serah Menyerah (Borang D6)

4.2             P2(a), (b), (c), (d) – (n) – 7 DVC, 3 VCD, 2 Cd, 1 thumb drive dan hard disc

4.3             P3(a – m) – 13 keping DVD

4.4             P9 – Copy SP2

4.5             P11 – Quotation Baru

4.6             P12 – Surat Lawyer 1 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

4.7             P13 – Surat Lawyer 3 mohon hak penjagaan anak

4.8             P14 – Surat Lawyer 7

4.9             P15 – Surat Lawyer 7A2 contoh isteri derhaka yang nyata

4.10         P16-(dalam softcopy)Surat lawyer 7A2 dokumen

4.11         P17-(softcopy) surat lawyer 8 dokumen

4.12         P18 – Surat Lawyer 8 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

4.13         P19 – yearfocal – terdapat nama Saliza binti Ramli

4.14         P20 – S6301428.jpg

4.15         P21-S6301429.jpg

4.16         P22-S6301430.jpg

4.17         P23-S6301431.jpg

4.18         P24-S6301432.jpg

4.19         P25-S6301433.jpg

4.20         P26-S6301434.jpg

4.21         P27-S6301435.jpg

4.22         P28-S6301436.jpg

4.23         P29-S6301437.jpg

4.24         P30-S6301438.jpg

4.25         P31- S6301439.jpg

4.26         P32- S6301440.jpg

4.27         P33- S6301441.jpg

4.28         P34 – Dang Wangi Report D29694/2009

4.29         P35 – Laporan Analisa

4.30         P36 – Copy SP2

4.31         P37-Borang Senarai Geledah

5.         Pihak Pembelaan telah memohon untuk memanggil 3 orang saksi untuk membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah tetapi telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah sebanyak 2 kali dan hanya Tertuduh memberi keterangan secara bersumpah.

6.         Pihak Pembelaan juga telah turut mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen berikut untuk membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan iaitu:

6.1       Salinan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report No.5070/09

6.2       Salinan Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan

Kes Mal No. 07004-014.199/03

Mahkamah Rendah Syariah Balik Pulau,

Pulau Pinang

6.3       Salinan Sijil Kelahiran Abu Muhammad Abdullah No. AN 95545

6.4       Salinan Laporan Polis Bayan Lepas Report:3010/03

6.5       Salinan Wakalah Peguam Syarie bertarikh 19.5.03;

6.6       Penyata Tuntutan Kes Mal No. 07004-055-0036/04;

6.7       Surat daripada Mahkamah Rendah Syariah Balik Pulau bertarikh 11.1.2005 beserta Nota Prosiding bertarikh 8.3.2004;

6.8       Perintah Perceraian bertarikh 9.3.2004;

6.9       Surat Perakuan Perceraian bertarikh 23.9.2004.

6.10    Surat Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Negeri Pulau Pinang bertarikh 16.4.2004;

6.11    Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Pulau Pinang bertarikh 31.3.2004;

6.12    Certificate of Incorporation of Code Genius Limited bertarikh 7.12.2001;

6.13    Laporan Analisa bertarikh 27.7.2009 ditanda sebagai “ID-D1”; dan

6.14    Salinan karbon Senarai Geledah (tiada catatan masa) bertarikh 13.7.2009.

7.         Salinan dokumen-dokumen dikemukakan tanpa memprejudiskan hak Tertuduh yang telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11” hingga “P-19” yang telah dibuat semasa kes pendakwaan.

8.         Pada 13.12.2010 apabila Tertuduh membuat permohonan agar kes ditangguhkan dengan mengemukakan otoriti bahawa rayuan ini perlu didengar terlebih dahulu, permohonan telah ditolak tanpa mengambilkira kes yang telah diputuskan dan dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Majistret yang mengikat Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

9.         Pihak Pembelaan telah mengemukakan kes Mahkamah Rayuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) kes Rowstead Systems Sdn Bhd v. Bumicrystal Technology (M) Sdn Bhd [2005] 2 CLJ 471 (di mukasurat 471 Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa penangguhan prosiding perlu dibenarkan apabila terdapat rayuan berkenaan keputusan Hakim yang menolak permohonan daripada menarik diri daripada mendengar kes tersebut.

Di muka surat 471, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“As mentioned above, this case comes under the category of non-automatic disqualification. Hence the need to prove whether the element of bias exists. It has to be objectively decided, based on all the facts and circumstances of the case. But more important question to be asked is whether it is proper for such decision to be made by presiding judge against whom bias has been alleged? In other words, when a party alleges that a presiding judge is biased, and if the presiding judge himself decides he is not, would such decision not infringe the rule of natural justice in that “one should not be a judge in one’s own cause”. This, we think, is the crux of the instant case, even more so when the learned JC would have to decide the degree of bias that would be sufficient to affect his impartiality. In our judgment, this situation would come within the meaning of special circumstances.

We have taken into consideration the fact that in the event that a stay a proceedings was not granted and the learned JC be allowed to proceed with the hearing of this case, it would result in a waste of time and effort by all persons involved since if the Court of Appeal allows the appeal the whole proceedings conducted by the learned JC would have to be completely expunged. In the circumstances it would be more expedient to allow a stay of the proceedings until the hearing of the appeal has been completed.”

10.       Pada 13.12.2010 Tertuduh di dalam akuan bersumpah telah memberi keterangan-keterangan seperti berikut:

10.1    Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Tertuduh berada di Johor Bahru, Johor.

10.2    Tertuduh tidak menandatangani Senarai Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009. Salinan Senarai Geledah tersebut tiada catatan masa.

10.3    Pada 4.11.2009 Tertuduh telah dipanggil oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7) untuk hadir memberi keterangan di Balai Polis Ampang, Selangor.

10.4    Tiada ekshibit ditunjukkan oleh SP7. Tertuduh dipaksa menandatangani kertas kosong.

10.5    Hard disk (“P-2”) bukan kepunyaan Tertuduh. Tertuduh tidak pernah membeli cakera keras (“hard disk”) di Malaysia.

10.6    Tertuduh tidak tahu apa yang dirampas oleh SP7 pada 13.7.2009.

10.7    Tertuduh mempertikaikan analisa dan Laporan Analisa yang disediakan oleh Saksi Pendakwaan pertama (SP1) kerana analisa tidak betul dan tidak mengikut piawaian antarabangsa yang diiktiraf oleh mahkamah-mahkamah lain di dunia. SP1 juga menyatakan beliau tidak buat analisis. Tiada imej forensik (‘forensic image’) dibuat oleh SP1. Integriti fail yang diekstrak oleh SP1 amat diragui. ‘Time stamp’ yang penting untuk pengesahan tarikh kewujudan fail tidak mengikut hukum alam. Masa tidak boleh berpatah balik.

10.8    Tertuduh tidak dipanggil untuk melihat kandungan P2.

10.9    DVD (ekshibit “P3a-P3m”) telah dibawa oleh Tertuduh ke Balai Polis Kepong dan seorang anggota polis bernama Kopral Azmi  telah mengira klip video yang berada di dalam ekshibit ” P3a-P3m” hanya berjumlah 82 klip video sahaja.

10.10  Cara penyimpanan ekshbit “P-2” tidak mengikut prosedur untuk (dengan izin) ‘electronic evidence’. Tiada (dengan izin) ‘casing’ disediakan oleh SP1.

10.11  Perkara yang menjadi perbincangan di antara Tertuduh dan SP2 mengenai ‘property’ berbeza dengan ekshibit “P-9”

10.12  Tertuduh hanya penah bertemu dengan SP3 pada tahun 2007.

10.13  Tertuduh turut mempertikaikan setiap salinan dokumen cetakan komputer yang dikemukakan iaitu ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11” hingga “P-19” (ditender di Mahkamah dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’)   dengan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan di perenggan 6.2 hingga 6.11 Hujahan Bertulis Pihak Pembelaan.

10.14  Tiada gambar tempat kejadian dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah.

10.15  Laporan Forensik yang diterima hanya bertarikh 27.7.2009 dan bukan seperti Ekshibit “P-35” bertarikh 28.7.2009.

10.16 Pengadu asal bagi salinan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report No. 5070/09 dikenali oleh Saksi Pendakwaan ke-enam (SP6) dan laporan polis dibuat untuk menganiaya SP6.

11.       Semasa pemeriksaan balas Tertuduh telah menafikan kesemua isu yang telah dibangkitkan oleh Pendakwaraya. Semasa pemeriksaan semula Tertuduh mengulangi fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan semasa pemeriksaan utama.

12        Pada 24.12.2010 apabila kes ditetapkan untuk sambung bicara bagi kes Pembelaan dan sepina kepada saksi turut dicatitkan tarikh yang sama, waran tangkap dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah kerana dikatakan tarikh sambung bicara sebenarnya pada 23.12.2010.

13.       Pada 6.1.2011 tarikh yang ditetapkan untuk Sebutan waran tangkap, waran tangkap telah dibatalkan dan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menolak permohonan pihak Pembelaan untuk memanggil 2 orang saksi pembelaan dan menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 18.1.2011.

14.       Pada 17.1.2011 Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 1 telah menolak rayuan Tertuduh dan kes ditetapkan untuk sebutan di hadapan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 untuk Tertuduh melantik peguambela dan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 7.2.2011.

15.       Pihak Pembelaan menyediakan hujahan bertulis ini tanpa memprejudiskan hak pihak Pembelaan untuk membangkitkan isu bahawa tiada Nota-nota Keterangan untuk prosiding pada 19.10.2010, 13.12.2010, 23.12.2010, 6.1.2011 dan 18.1.2011 dibekalkan oleh Mahkamah dan ini jelas tidak mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 265,268, 272 dan 433 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah (Akta 593).

HUJAHAN PIHAK PEMBELAAN

16.       Di dalam kes ini pihak Pendakwaan perlu membuktikan setiap intipati (‘ingredients’) pertuduhan berkaitan seksyen 5(1) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh iaitu; (1) bahawa Tertuduh mempunyai milikan ekslusif pada setiap masa yang material iaitu pada 13-7-2009 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat 7-3-5 Jalan 2/38B, Taman SPPK Segambut, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK; dan (2) 106 klip video tersebut adalah lucah.

17.       Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 bahawa (di mukasurat 504 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

“I am of the view that the submission of the learned DPP in respect of the 1st ground comprising the 1st to the 3rd points is without merit. The charge preferred against the accused under s. 5(1) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 (“the Act”) requires proof of two essential ingredients:

(a) the accused was in exclusive possession at the material time, ie, 3p.m. on 18 November 2002 of the 18 obscene film’s in the form of VCD; and

(b) that the 18 film’s are of obscene material.

Pihak Pembelaan juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 bahawa (di mukasurat 324 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

“[5] Bagi membuktikan satu kes prima facie dibawah s. 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah membuktikan bahawa:

(a) Responden mempunyai milikan terhadap VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas;

(b) tiada sebarang keraguan tentang identiti barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah; dan

(c) kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”).

Pihak Pembelaan juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon [2010] 5 CLJ 77 bahawa (di mukasurat 79 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

“The Charge

[8] The charge preferred against the respondent under s. 5(1) of the 2002 Act requires proof of two main ingredients ie, that:

(i)   the respondent at the material time was in possession of the 65 obscene films in the form of DVD; and

(ii) that the 65 films (DVDs) are obscene.

Isu Milikan Eksklusif Pada Setiap Masa Yang Material

18.       Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 bahawa (di mukasurat 504 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

“I am of the view that the submission of the learned DPP in respect of the 1st ground comprising the 1st to the 3rd points is without merit. The charge preferred against the accused under s. 5(1) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 (“the Act”) requires proof of two essential ingredients:

(a) the accused was in exclusive possession at the material time, ie, 3p.m. on 18 November 2002 of the 18 obscene film’s in the form of VCD; and

(b) that the 18 film’s are of obscene material.

Pihak Pembelaan juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 bahawa (di mukasurat 324 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

“[5] Bagi membuktikan satu kes prima facie dibawah s. 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah membuktikan bahawa:

(a) Responden mempunyai milikan terhadap VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas;

(b) tiada sebarang keraguan tentang identiti barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah; dan

(c) kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”).

Pihak Pembelaan juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon [2010] 5 CLJ 77 bahawa (di mukasurat 79 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):

“The Charge

[8] The charge preferred against the respondent under s. 5(1) of the 2002 Act requires proof of two main ingredients ie, that:

(i)   the respondent at the material time was in possession of the 65 obscene films in the form of DVD; and

(ii) that the 65 films (DVDs) are obscene.

19.       Apa yang boleh difahamkan daripada kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, hanya si tertuduh berada di gerai haram tersebut sepanjang masa dan si tertuduh kelihatan melayan pelanggan dan ketika serbuan dibuat sewaktu si tertuduh berada di gerai haram tersebut, terdapat VCD dan DVD yang dikatakan lucah di gerai haram tersebut. Di peringkat pendakwaan ini, untuk membuktikan intipati ini, pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan dan pemunyaan sebenar premis tersebut dan DVD tersebut, cukup sekadar membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif. Pemilikan eksklusif tidak sama dengan pemilikan sebenar atau pemilikan fizikal.

.

20.       Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material telah dibuktikan dengan cara berikut, iaitu:

“[9] Having read the appeal record and the written submission of the appellant and having heard both parties, I am in agreement with the learned deputy public prosecutor that the element of possession has been proved through the prosecution witnesses SP1, 2 and 3 who were members of the raiding party.

[10] The 65 DVDs alleged to be obscene were found under the counter of the premises and at the material time of the raid, the respondent was alone in the premises manning the counter. He attempted to flee when SP1 identified himself as a police officer.

[11] The facts of this case are similar to Mohamed Ibrahim v. PP [1962] 1 LNS 100 HC wherein the appellant was found to be in possession of 65 copies of the book “Tropic of Cancer”. The impugned books were found under the counter of his shop. The appellant in Mohamed Ibrahim (supra) was employed to manage the sale of books and though an attempt was made to absolve himself of knowledge as he could not read English, nevertheless the court held that the inference was irresistible that the 65 copies found in the shop for the purpose of being sold and that the appellant was the person in charge of selling of the books in the shop was in possession of them and in possession of them for purposes of sale. He also failed in his argument that knowledge was negated by his ignorance of the English language as the court held that he could have obtained the services of an English – speaking clerk in ordering the books.

[12] In this case, there was the uncontroverted evidence of SP1 and SP3 that the 65 DVDs were found under the counter and the respondent was found at the time of raid, behind this counter. Knowledge can also be inferred from the fact that he attempted flight when SP1 identified himself as a public officer. Therefore, viewed in its totality the prosecution had proved the element of possession.

[13] There is no cause for the adverse inference to be invoked as it is trite that the calling of witnesses is at the discretion of the prosecution and the burden is on the prosecution throughout to prove its case. I find no gap here, neither can it be said that there was any suppression of evidence.

[14] Therefore the learned magistrate had erred in holding that the element of possession was not proved and in invoking the adverse presumption.”

21.       Apa yang boleh difahamkan dari kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, ketika serbuan dibuat, si tertuduh berada keseorangan dan sedang menjaga kaunter di dalam premis yang diserbu tersebut, dan DVD yang dikatakan lucah tersebut dijumpai di bawah kaunter tersebut. Di peringkat pendakwaan ini, untuk membuktikan intipati ini, pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan dan pemunyaan sebenar premis tersebut dan DVD tersebut, cukup sekadar membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif. Pemilikan eksklusif tidak sama dengan pemilikan sebenar atau pemilikan fizikal.

22.       Pihak Pembelaan telah Berjaya mewujudkan satu keraguan yang munasabah daripada keterangan saksi-saksi pihak pendakwaan sendiri iaitu Saksi Pendakwaan 5 dan Saksi Pendakwaan 7 (Pegawai Penyiasat) kerana mengikut kedua-dua saksi, Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009.

23.       SP5 iaitu pegawai yang terlibat semasa geledah dan SP7 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat sendiri mengesahkan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Oleh yang demikian milikan secara fizikal tidak dibuktikan langsung (rakaman video prosiding perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).

24.       Adalah dihujahkan juga bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan premis tempat kejadian kerana tiada gambar-gambar tempat kejadian dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan. Di samping itu, tiada rajah kasar disediakan oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7). Walaupun pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil SP3 untuk memberi keterangan tetapi gagal memberi lokasi tempat kejadian yang tepat dan tempat kejadian tidak dikenalpasti (mukasurat 40 Nota Keterangan). Selain itu premis tempat kejadian adalah rumah sewa yang turut berada di dalam kawalan SP3 yang sudah tentu mempunyai akses kepada premis tersebut. Oleh yang demikian bukan Tertuduh sahaja ada akses kepada premis tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh). Oleh yang demikian tempat kejadian tidak dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan.

SP3 di dalam pemeriksaan balas hanya memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

C         :           How many unit?

J          :           I’m not sure.

25.       Sekali lagi pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada kes Pendakwa Raya v. Goh Hoe Cheong [2006] MLJU 0468 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 0471 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana K N Segara J memutuskan bahawa apabila tiada gambar dan pelan kasar tempat tertuduh ditahan di ‘baggage assembly area” maka terdapat keraguan di dalam kes pendakwaan.

26.       Di dalam kes kita pada hari ini, jika dilihat pada Borang Senarai Geledah  yang mesti diisi di tempat dan masa pemeriksaan, ianya merujuk kepada No. Repot 5070/09 Balai Jalan Patani, tempat/bangunan yang diperiksa ialah 7-3-5, Jalan 2/38B, Taman Segambut, SPPK, 50200 Kuala Lumpur (Premis tersebut), nama penghuni atau sesiapa yang hadir iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus (Penghuni tersebut), nama pegawai polis yang hadir semasa pemeriksaan iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal, Insp Siti Mazira bt Zakaria dan D/Kpl Nora (Pegawai Polis tersebut), pada tarikh 13-7-2009 dan masa yang tidak disebut (Tarikh dan Masa tersebut), barang yang dijumpai adalah seperti yang tertera di dalam Borang Senarai Geledah tersebut. Ini adalah terkandung di dalam Borang Geledah yang diberikan kepada penama pada 13.7.2009. Walaubagaimanapun Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010 adalah berbeza kerana ada masa dicatatkan. Pihak Pembelaan telah membangkitkan bantahan berkenaan perbezaan di antara Borang Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009 dan Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010.

27.       Di antara ketiga-tiga Pegawai Polis tersebut yang hadir untuk pemeriksaan di Bangunan tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut, Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah telah dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai SP5 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai penggeledahan tersebut.

28.       SP5 ketika pemeriksaan utama telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 46 – 47 Nota Keterangan) bahawa:

“Pada 13-7-2009, saya terima arahan daripada ketua bahagian saya iaitu ASP Kamarudin untuk beri bantuan kepada pegawai penyiasat dari Pulau Pinang iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira untuk membuat rampasan dan pemeriksaan. Saya dan Insp. Mazira telah sampai di alamat 7-3-5, Jalan 2/38B, Taman Segambut SPPK, Kuala Lumpur. Saya dan Insp. Mazira telah sampai di alamat tersebut dan Insp. Mazira telah ketuk pintu rumah beberapa kali dan keluar seorang wanita. Insp. Mazira telah perkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai kanan polis dengan menunjukkan kad kuasa kepada wanita tersebut. Wanita tersebut dikenali sebagai Aini Suhailah binti Yunus. Kemudian kami masuk ke dalam rumah untuk buat pemeriksaan setelah menerangkan tujuan kehadiran kami bersama saya Insp. Siti Mazira dan seorang anggota perempuan iaitu Kopral Nora. Saya lihat ada 2 orang kanak-kanak. Dan saya lihat sebelah kiri ada 2 bilik satu bilik tidur dan satu bilik bacaan. Pemeriksaan dilakukan dalam bilik bacaan tersebut, saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah merampas satu unit hard disc di rak buku iaitu Hitachi Deskstar. No. Siri R32559XK, satu unit thumbdrive Data Traveller, juga di rak buku, 2 unit CD, 3 unit VCD dan 7 unit DVD dalam bilik tersebut. Dalam bilik tersebut juga saya lihat satu CPU dan monitor yang mana CPU tersebut dalam keadaan tidak bertutup dengan casing dan tiada sambungan wayar ke monitor atau power. Saya anggap ia tidak berfungsi. Lepas membuat pemeriksaan saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah buat rampasan ke atas barang-barang yang saya sebut tadi dan telah disenaraikan dalam senarai bongkah. Senarai bongkah dibuat oleh pegawai penyiasat dan lihat ia ditandatangani pemilik rumah iaitu Aini Suhailah. Satu salinan diberi kepada penama. Kemudian rampasan telah diambil oleh pegawai penyiasat. Saya nampak barang itu dirampas oleh Insp. Mazira sebab saya ada di belakang beliau. Suasana cerah kerana rampasan dibuat waktu siang. Barang kes sentiasa dalam kawalan Insp. Siti Mazira. Saya masih boleh camkan hard disk P2a dan P2b itu berdasarkan nombor siri. (Saksi dirujuk hard disc dan thumbdrive P2a dan P2b – dicamkan SP5). Hanya satu jenis hard disc sahaja yang ditemui. Pemeriksaan dilakukan hanya dalam bilik bacaan sahaja dan tiada apa-apa yang berlaku.”

29.       SP5 ketika pemeriksaan balas telah memberi keterangan (di  mukasurat 47 – 49 Nota Keterangan) bahawa, antaranya:

“Saya diminta bantuan daripada Insp. Mazira yang menyiasat bersabit laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/09.”

“Saya hanya dimaklumkan untuk bantuan tentang bersabit kes itu.”

“Saya diminta untuk beri bantuan pemeriksaan dan rampasan oleh Insp. Kamarudin kepada Insp. Siti Mazira bersabit Patani Report.”

“Pada 13-7-2009 masuk jam 6.30 petang.”

“Tak nampak si tertuduh masa itu di kawasan itu.”

“Semasa masuk buat pemeriksaan Insp. Mazira telah perkenalkan diri dengan tunjukkan kad kuasa polis, waran tiada.”

“Masa masuk dalam rumah, nampak satu wanita dan 2 orang kanak-kanak.”

“Saya membantu Insp. Mazira untuk membuat pemeriksaan rumah.”

30.       Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa melalui Borang Senarai Geledah dan keterangan SP5, dapat disimpulkan bahawa Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tiada di dalam Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut pada jam 6.30 petang.

31.       Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa merujuk kepada dokumen di perenggan 6.14 tiada catatan mengenai masa di dalam Borang Senarai Geledah tidak dimasukkan. Ini berlainan dengan Ekshibit “P-37” dan ini menunjukkan bahawa Borang Geledah telah diubahsuai.

32.       Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa masa di dalam kertas pertuduhan dan di dalam keterangan SP5 tidak sama. Tiada penerangan mengenainya daripada SP5. Begitu juga tiada penerangan mengenainya daripada SP7.

33.       SP6 telah dipanggil untuk pemeriksaan utama hanya disuruh membaca sehelai kertas yang didakwa sebagai borang geledah oleh pihak pendakwaan. Tiada pengecaman yang dibuat dengan SP6 berkenaan ketiga-tiga anggota polis yang datang ke premis tersebut pada 13.7.2009.

34.       Borang Senarai Geledah yang disediakan oleh SP7 telah gagal mematuhi kehendak peruntukan Seksyen 36(1) dan (2) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 kerana tiada senarai lengkap klip video yang dirampas.

Akta Penapisan Filem

Notis penyitaan

36. (1) Jika apa-apa penyitaan dibuat di bawah Bahagian ini, Pegawai Penguat Kuasa atau pegawai polis yang membuat penyitaan itu hendaklah menyediakan suatu senarai tiap-tiap filem, bahan publisiti filem, buku, dokumen atau benda lain yang disita dan tempat filem, bahan publisiti filem, buku, dokumen atau benda lain itu telah dijumpai dan hendaklah menandatangani senarai itu.

(2) Senarai yang disediakan mengikut subseksyen (1) hendaklah diserahkan dengan serta-merta kepada penghuni tempat atau premis di mana filem, bahan publisiti filem, buku, dokumen atau benda lain yang disita itu dijumpai.

Pihak Pembelaan ingin merujuk kepada kes Kalidasan A/L Manikam lawan Pendakwaraya Rayuan Jenayah No. 41-44A-2009 (yang Mengikat Mahkamah ini) (Mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) di mana Yang Arif Hakim Yaacob bin Haji Md. Sam telah memutuskan bahawa timbul keraguan apakah sebenarnya judul-judul filem yang perayu dipertuduhkan sebagai memilikinya apabila identiti VCD dan DVD yang dirampas gagal dibuktikan tanpa keraguan oleh pihak pendakwaan.

35.       SP7 telah dipanggil untuk pemeriksaan utama oleh Timbalan Pendakwaraya menyatakan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian.

36.       Ada anggota polis lain yang memasuki premis tersebut pada masa material tetapi tidak dipanggil kerana berdasarkan keterangan SP5 semasa pemeriksaan utama:

“Kemudian kami masuk ke dalam rumah untuk buat pemeriksaan setelah menerangkan tujuan kehadiran kami bersama saya Insp. Siti Mazira dan seorang anggota perempuan iaitu Koperal Nora. Pihak Pembelaan memohon Mahkamah menggunapakai Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 di mana saksi ini sekiranya dipanggil akan memudaratkan kes pendakwaan walaupun beliau perlu dipanggil untuk pengesahan perbezaan Borang Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009 dan Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010.

37.       Bagi membuktikan elemen milikan, pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi-saksi SP1, SP2, SP4 dan SP6.

38.       Di dalam kes ini Tertuduh masih lagi membangkitkan bantahan terhadap setiap dokumen lain yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1 dan dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’ (Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21”, “P-22, “ P-23”, “P-24” P-25”, “P-26”, “P-27”, “P-28”, “P-29”, “P-30”, “P-31”, “P-32” dan “P-33” mukasurat 16,17 Nota Keterangan) yang tiada kaitan langsung dengan pertuduhan dan tidak termasuk di dalam lingkungan definisi “filem” sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002.

39.       Di dalam kes ini juga pihak Pembelaan telah berjaya mengemukakan dokumen untuk membuktikan bahawa ekshibit “P-9” yang ditender melalui  SP2 tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan (Ekshibit “P-9mukasurat 34 dan 35 Nota Keterangan). Pihak Pembelaan telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap pengemukaan salinan dokumen tersebut kerana tiada kaitan dengan pertuduhan dan mengikut keterangan SP2 semasa pemeriksaan balas, dokumen asal telah dimusnahkan kerana polisi syarikat.

40.    Tiada definisi untuk ‘milikan’ di dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC di dalam kes Pendakwaraya lawan Sim, Odita, Muhammad Architects Sdn Bhd [2008] 3 CLJ 623 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah perlu merujuk kepada definisi untuk milikan di dalam kes-kes yang telah diputuskan. Di dalam kes ini responden telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan milikan secara fizikal perisian yang melanggar hakcipta oleh responden.

Di dalam kes tersebut Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC memutuskan seperti berikut:

The word “possession’ is not defined in the Copyrights Act 1987 and therefore it is pertinent to refer to judicial decisions involving criminal charges to guide us to define the word “possession’. Thus, it was the contention of the defence that prosecution has to establish physical possession of the alleged infringing programs by the accused. The prosecution failed to prove actual physical possession of the alleged infringing copies of computer programs, as evidence was before the court that the premises of the accused was not for the sole usage of the accused company but also shared among the other companies mentioned above. This by itself, in my view, is sufficient to sustain the order of acquittal.

41.       Pihak Pembelaan berhujah lanjut mengenai isu ini di mana daripada Nota Keterangan tersebut, amat jelas saksi awam SP4 mengesahkan tiada surat-surat yang ditunjuk oleh pihak pendakwaan diterima oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Pulau Pinang (Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18, P19 dan muka surat 42, 43, 44 dan 45 Nota Keterangan) untuk membuktikan surat-surat yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1.

42.       Fakta ini seterusnya telah disahkan oleh saksi pendakwaan ketujuh iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat bahawa Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18 dan P19 (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010) tiada di dalam rekod Mahkamah Syariah. Oleh yang demikian Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18 dan P19 tidak seharusnya diterima sebagai ekshibit kerana tiada fakta mengesahkan kewujudan ekshibit-ekshibit tersebut.

43.       Tertuduh semasa memberi keterangan semasa pemeriksaan utama kes pembelaan telah mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen daripada Mahkamah Syari’ah untuk menunjukkan percanggahan yang wujud bagi ekshibit “P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14”, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18” dan “P-19” tetapi Mahkamah tidak menanda setiap satu dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Tertuduh sebagai ekshibit sebagaimana mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 173(j)(iii) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

44.       Pihak Pembelaan ingin berhujah bahawa pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” amat jelas telah mencabul hak (dengan izin) ‘privacy’ dan (dengan izin) ‘privillege’ Tertuduh dan keluarga sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Artikel 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” adalah tanpa sebarang kebenaran daripada pembuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut dan tidak relevan kepada pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh.

45.       Pihak Pendakwaan turut memanggil SP6 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” yang kononnya mengikut pihak Pendakwaan diekstrak dari cakera keras tersebut. Walaubagaimanapun SP6 menggunapakai peruntukan undang-undang Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 kerana beliau mempunyai ‘privilege’ ke atas gambar-gambar berbentuk perlakuan tersebut yang merupakan satu bentuk komunikasi di antara Tertuduh dan SP6. Mahkamah sendiri telah turut memutuskan bahawa ekshibit “P-20” hingga “P-33” adalah dokumen-dokumen yang dilindungi di bawah privilege di bawah Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan oleh yang demikian tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti di Mahkamah (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010). Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

S122. No person who is or has been married shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has been married; nor shall he be permitted to disclose anu such communication unless the person who made it or his representative in interest consents, except in suits between married persons or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.”

46.       Pihak Pembelaan bersandarkan satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Mustapha Hussain J di dalam Palldas a/l Arumugam v Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 CLJ 661, 665 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) menyatakan bahawa perlakuan juga satu bentuk komunikasi di antara isteri dan Tertuduh.

“From the record of appeal, the appellant’s wife Gudi Kaur (PW3) had, in examination-in-chief, given quite a lengthy evidence of all communications between herself and her husband. Though some of the evidence relates between purely to acts, as distinct from words spoken, ie, what she saw appellant was doing, it is so inextricably interwoven with what appellant had said to her, that to separate each act from words spoken by the appellant to her would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Even if extricable and rejecting the words spoken, one would have their prejudicial effect still lingering.

Even though objection was not taken by the defence, this silence cannot convert what the law says is inadmissible evidence to be admissible. One would expect the wife’s evidence to be led in such a way as to confine such evidence to what she saw the appellant doing. The wife should have been stopped the moment she started uttering what her husband said to her. From the record it would seem that nobody ever bothered about this section 122.

47.       Di dalam kes Public Prosecutor lawan Abdul Majid [1994] 3 MLJ 457 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 6 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) James Foong J telah memutuskan bahawa isteri tertuduh boleh dipaksa memberi keterangan kecuali komunikasi yang dibuat oleh tertuduh kepada beliau melainkan jika keizinan tertuduh diperolehi seperti yang diperlukan di bawah S122 Akta itu.

48.       Di samping itu Pemohon ingin menyatakan bahawa pengemukaan “P21” hingga “P33” tersebut telah mencabul hak ‘privacy’ Pemohon dan keluarga Pemohon sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Artikel 10 dan 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

49.       Tertuduh berhujah bahawa milikan tidak boleh dibuktikan melalui keterangan persekitaran (‘circumstantial evidence’) iaitu dengan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, “P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21” hingga “P33” yang merupakan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan hanya kerana dokumen-dokumen tersebut didakwa terdapat di dalam cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh).

50.       Di antara ketiga-tiga Pegawai Polis tersebut yang hadir untuk pemeriksaan di Bangunan tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut, Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah telah dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai SP5 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai penggeledahan tersebut.

51.       SP5 ketika pemeriksaan utama telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 46 – 47 Nota Keterangan) bahawa:

“Pada 13-7-2009, saya terima arahan daripada ketua bahagian saya iaitu ASP Kamarudin untuk beri bantuan kepada pegawai penyiasat dari Pulau Pinang iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira untuk membuat rampasan dan pemeriksaan. Saya dan Insp. Mazira telah sampai di alamat 7-3-5, Jalan 2/38B, Taman Segambut SPPK, Kuala Lumpur. Saya dan Insp. Mazira telah sampai di alamat tersebut dan Insp. Mazira telah ketuk pintu rumah beberapa kali dan keluar seorang wanita. Insp. Mazira telah perkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai kanan polis dengan menunjukkan kad kuasa kepada wanita tersebut. Wanita tersebut dikenali sebagai Aini Suhailah binti Yunus. Kemudian kami masuk ke dalam rumah untuk buat pemeriksaan setelah menerangkan tujuan kehadiran kami bersama saya Insp. Siti Mazira dan seorang anggota perempuan iaitu Kopral Nora. Saya lihat ada 2 orang kanak-kanak. Dan saya lihat sebelah kiri ada 2 bilik satu bilik tidur dan satu bilik bacaan. Pemeriksaan dilakukan dalam bilik bacaan tersebut, saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah merampas satu unit hard disc di rak buku iaitu Hitachi Deskstar. No. Siri R32559XK, satu unit thumbdrive Data Traveller, juga di rak buku, 2 unit CD, 3 unit VCD dan 7 unit DVD dalam bilik tersebut. Dalam bilik tersebut juga saya lihat satu CPU dan monitor yang mana CPU tersebut dalam keadaan tidak bertutup dengan casing dan tiada sambungan wayar ke monitor atau power. Saya anggap ia tidak berfungsi. Lepas membuat pemeriksaan saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah buat rampasan ke atas barang-barang yang saya sebut tadi dan telah disenaraikan dalam senarai bongkah. Senarai bongkah dibuat oleh pegawai penyiasat dan lihat ia ditandatangani pemilik rumah iaitu Aini Suhailah. Satu salinan diberi kepada penama. Kemudian rampasan telah diambil oleh pegawai penyiasat. Saya nampak barang itu dirampas oleh Insp. Mazira sebab saya ada di belakang beliau. Suasana cerah kerana rampasan dibuat waktu siang. Barang kes sentiasa dalam kawalan Insp. Siti Mazira. Saya masih boleh camkan hard disk P2a dan P2b itu berdasarkan nombor siri. (Saksi dirujuk hard disc dan thumbdrive P2a dan P2b – dicamkan SP5). Hanya satu jenis hard disc sahaja yang ditemui. Pemeriksaan dilakukan hanya dalam bilik bacaan sahaja dan tiada apa-apa yang berlaku.”

Isu Kaedah Analisis Forensik Komputer (SP1)

52.       Saksi pakar SP1 dipertikaikan oleh pihak Pembelaan berdasarkan sebab-sebab berikut:

a.               Pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh telah dibuat berdasarkan laporan polis SP1 Dang Wangi Report No. 029694/09 (Ekshibit “P-34mukasurat 18 Nota Keterangan) apabila SP1 membuat pemeriksaan analisa pada 23.7.2009. Walaubagaimanapun di dalam salinan laporan polis tersebut ada jelas tercatit bahawa laporan polis tersebut tidak boleh digunakan untuk tuntutan atau perbicaraan di Mahkamah dan hanya untuk kegunaan dalaman PDRM sahaja.  Oleh yang demikian pertuduhan di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah cacat, defektif dan tidak sah di sisi undang-undang kerana berasaskan laporan polis yang tidak boleh digunakan untuk pendakwaan dan perbicaraan di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. Walaubagaimanapun di akhir kes pendakwaan pada 19.10.2010, Mahkamah ada menyatakan bahawa laporan polis SP1 sekarang adalah ‘First Information Report’ (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).

b.         Di dalam kes ini terdapat konflik kepentingan (‘conflict of interest’) dan melanggar etika seorang pakar (‘Breach of Expert Duties’) di pihak SP1 yang bertindak sebagai pakar dan pengadu pada masa yang sama dan telah memprejudiskan secara material pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh dan ini sangat bertentangan dengan kod etika dan amalan saksi pakar yang diterimapakai oleh mahkamah-mahkamah di seluruh dunia. Setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan-perbicaraan yang dijalankan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 29.7.2010, memang ketara bahawa terdapat konflik kepentingan (‘conflict of interest’) dan “Breach of Expert Duties” di mana saksi pendakwaan pertama (SP1) bukan hanya bertindak sebagai pengadu dan pakar tetapi juga sebagai pegawai penyiasat pada masa yang sama kerana semua barang kes diterima melalui beliau dan catatan di atas Ekshibit “P-20” hingga Eksihbit “P-33” ditanda oleh beliau mengikut keterangan SP7(rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010). Keterangan SP1 bersifat keterangan dengar cakap (‘hearsay’) dan tidak dapat diterima pakai.

Di dalam kes Alcontara A/L Ambross v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 MLJ 209 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 211 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“(5)   Although no objection had been raised to the admission of one of the statement made by ASP Abdul Wahab which was clearly based on hearsay and therefore inadmissible, the judge was nevertheless under an automatic duty to stop it from being adduced, for inadmissible evidence does not become admissible by reason of failure to object.”.

c.               Adalah menjadi hujah Pihak Pembelaan bahawa saksi pendakwaan SP1 hanya merupakan saksi pakar dan adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas bahawa keterangan seorang saksi pakar hanya bersifat sokongan (‘corroborative’), boleh diambilkira tetapi tidak semestinya perlu diterima dan Mahkamah sendiri yang perlu menentukan isu kebolehterimaan sesuatu bukti.

Pihak Pembelaan ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah kepada kes Public Prosecutor v. Lin Lian Chen [1992] 2 MLJ 561 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 317 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Agung telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bila memanggil keterangan pakar, pihak pendakwaan mesti mendirikan kepakaran saksi tersebut.

d.         Selain daripada itu, Pihak Pembelaan turut berhujah bahawa kaedah yang betul perlu digunapakai apabila melibatkan saksi pakar sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Hashim J di dalam kes Wong Chop Saow v. Public Prosecutor [1965] 1 MLJ 247 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) seperti berikut:

“To avoid confusion the expert witness should give his evidence as follows: He should first state his qualifications as an expert. He should then state that he has given evidence as an expert in such cases and that his evidence has been accepted by the courts.”

e.         Daripada Nota Keterangan tersebut, tiada keterangan daripada SP1 yang menunjukkan kelayakan beliau dan samada beliau pernah memberi keterangan di mahkamah dan mahkamah menerima keterangan beliau.

f.          Setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan tersebut, banyak tokok tambah, percanggahan keterangan yang direkodkan dan juga fakta-fakta penting tidak direkodkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur. Di antara percanggahan keterangan tersebut SP1 telah menyatakan bahawa beliau tiada sijil ENCase tetapi mengikut Nota Keterangan tersebut SP1 menyatakan bahawa beliau ada sijil dari satu syarikat dan identiti syarikat tersebut tidak dinyatakan (mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan tersebut). Seperti yang dijelaskan di dalam buku “Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations3rd Edition muka surat 81, Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillps, Frank Enfiger, and Christopher Steuart:

EnCase Certified Examiner (EnCE) Certification

Guidance Software, the creator of EnCase, sponsors the EnCE certification program. EnCE certification is open to the public and private sectors and is specific to the use and mastery of EnCase computer forensics analysis. Requirements for taking the EnCE certification exam don’t depend on taking the Guidance Software EnCase training courses. Candidates for this certificate are required to have a licensed copy of EnCase.

Tertuduh ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia ini kepada kes Foo Fio Na v. Hospital Assunta & Anor [1999] 6 MLJ 738 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 758 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) yang merujuk kepada kes Whitehouse v Jordan & Anor [1981] 1 All ER pada mukasurat 276:

“While some degree of consultation between experts and legal advisers is entirely proper, it is necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to be the independent product of the expert, uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation. To the extent that it is not, the evidence is likely to be not only incorrect but self defeating.”

Tertuduh ingin juga merujuk kepada kes R v Harris [2006] 1 Cr App Rep 55 (di mukasurat 65 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan)seperti berikut:

“[271] It may be helpful for judges, practitioners and experts to be reminded of the obligations of an expert witness summarised by Cresswell J in National Justice Cia Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd, The Ikarian Reefer [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 at 81. Cresswell J pointed out amongst other factors the following,which we summarise as follows:

(1) Expert evidence presented to the court should be and seen to be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation.

(2) An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of advocate.

(3) An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions on which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which detract from his concluded opinions.

(4) An expert should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise.

(5) If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers that insufficient data is available then this must be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one.

(6) If after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on material matters, such change of view should be communicated to the other side without delay and when appropriate to the court.”

g.      Saksi SP1 tidak memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini kelulusan akademik berkaitan dengan kepakaran di dalam bidang komputer dan tidak pernah menduduki peperiksaan (EnCE) yang diiktiraf oleh syarikat EnCase Software bagi melayakkan beliau mengendalikan perisian Encase dengan betul dan tepat berdasarkan piawaian persijilan ISO kawalan mutu forensik komputer antarabangsa. Ini amat memudaratkan kes Pendakwaan kerana kelayakan dan kepakaran SP1 tidak dibuktikan.

h.      Mengikut keterangan Tertuduh semasa dipanggil membela diri, ianya di luar kemampuan SP1 untuk mempunyai satu lesen Encase di atas nama sendiri dan apabila SP1 gagal mengemukakan sebarang sijil kelayakan pengendalian Encase, adalah diragui analisis yang dijalankan oleh SP1 menggunakan perisian Encase yang tulen.

SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

C         :           “Qualified untuk handle Encase?

:           Saya berkursus untuk belajar Encase dan jalankan analisa, tak ingat nama company tapi ada sijil”

(mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan)

Ini disokong dengan satu kes Pendakwaraya lawan Kit Chee Wan [1999] 1 MLJ 16 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 6 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa saksi pakar mesti membuktikan latarbelakang kelayakan akademik dan keupayaan kepakaran beliau.

h.         Analisis terhadap barang rampasan yang dijalankan oleh SP1 tidak mengikut piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa. SP1 di dalam keterangannya semasa pemeriksaan balas mengaku bahawa beliau tidak melakukan analisa forensik yang ditetapkan oleh piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa malah SP1 juga mengaku tidak melakukan proses ‘acquisition’, ‘forensic imaging’, dan pengesahan kesahihan kandungan hard disk tersebut (mukasurat 2, 3, 4, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).

Bagi isu ini pihak Pembelaan memohon agar Mahkamah yang Mulia ini menggunapakai peruntukan Seksyen 5 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan dibaca bersama Seksyen 56 dan Seksyen 57 Akta Keterangan 1950 untuk mengambilkira kes-kes yang telah diputuskan mengikut Common Law  atau undang-undang yang berkuatkuasa di England mengenai kaedah pembuktian forensik komputer memandangkan terdapat ‘lacunae’ di dalam undang-undang Malaysia dan tiada kes berkaitan pembuktian cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang diputuskan dengan piawaian forensik antarabangsa di Malaysia pada masa ini.

Piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa untuk penggunaan perisian Encase, peralatan pengimejan forensik ImagerSolo III, dan beberapa perisian yang lain yang diiktiraf oleh piawaian forensik antarabangsa dan persijilan ISO kawalan mutu forensik komputer antarabangsa, kaedah ‘acquisition’ yang betul dan tepat di samping kaedah pengimejan menggunakan format pengimejan forensik komputer yang diterima oleh piawaian forensik antarabangsa tetapi tidak ditunjukkan dan dilakukan oleh SP1. Kaedah pengiraan ‘hash value’ bagi setiap klip video dengan menggunakan proses ‘one-way hash functions’ yang akan menghasilkan ‘digital fingerprint’ (‘hash value’) yang unik bagi setiap maklumat yang diproses dengan algorithma ‘digital signature’ atau ‘DNA signature’ tertentu yang peka terhadap Kesan Avalanche (Avalanche Effect) (di mukasurat 1-2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan). Kaedah ‘forensic imaging’ yang betul dan tepat juga memainkan peranan yang sangat penting untuk mengawal rapi ketepatan dan bahan bukti di dalam bentuk yang asal dan tidak tercemar atau ‘tampered’. Penggunaan dan pemilihan algorithma-algorithma yang betul dan tepat amat bersesuaian untuk tujuan pengesahan, kesahihan, integriti dan kebolehterimaan kandungan cakera keras (‘harddisk’) untuk perbicaraan di mahkamah di mana kaedah pengekstrakan bahan bukti secara imej-imej forensik yang disalin dari cakera keras satu persatu bit (bit per bit) dan kesemua proses tersebut tidak dilakukan oleh SP1 (mukasurat 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).

i.          SP1 juga tidak tahu apa itu yang dimaksudkan sebagai ‘hash value‘, ‘hash functions’ dan ‘algorithm‘ yang digunakan untuk tujuan pengesahan, integriti, kebolehterimaan dan kebolehpercayaan data di dalam harddisk tersebut. Malah SP1 juga telah memberi keterangan bahawa dia tidak tahu kegunaan ‘hash functions’, ‘hash value’, ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘forensic tools’ yang sepatutnya digunakan semasa melakukan analisa forensik terhadap ‘harddisk’ seperti yang telah dibangkitkan oleh Tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan balas (mukasurat 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).

Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada kes R v. Trapp [2009] S.J. No. 64; 2009 SKPC 109; 2009SK.C. LEXIS 686 (di mukasurat 2-10 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana pakar telah menunjukkan kepada mahkamah penggunaan ‘hash function’ atau ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘hash value’ merupakan proses yang sangat kritikal dan penting di samping pengimejan forensik dilakukan sebelumnya. Di dalam kes tersebut, pakar telah menggunakan SHA-1 sebagai ‘hash function’, ‘hash value’ pengiraan ‘hash value’ ditunjukkan dan dibandingkan dengan salinan imej forensik semasa perbicaraan. Berdasarkan keterangan saksi SP1, telah jelas bahawa saksi SP1 tidak melakukan analisa yang betul dan tepat untuk memenuhi piawaian forensik antarabangsa yang ditetapkan berdasarkan Piawaian Daubert, di dalam kes Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993)(mukasurat 13 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan), yang merupakan satu piawaian yang diterimapakai oleh semua badan forensik di seluruh dunia, seperti di bawah:

Daubert Test for Reliability

Witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:

-The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data

-The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods

-The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case

The key for the Court in determining whether an expert may testify before a jury is therefore primarily one of “reliability of method”. The court will not look at the actual opinion held by an expert, but merely examines his or her methodology to determine whether the procedures used or his methodology is not reliable, then his entire opinion is likewise unreliable and should be excluded from the jury.

Daubert Factors

The U.S Supreme Court set out several specific factors that should be used by the courts in evaluating any proposed expert testimony. These factors are not exclusive and some or all may not apply in any given case, but they are always the place to start the reliability analysis. The factors are as follows:

1. Whether the theory or technique has been scientifically tested.

2. Whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review or publication.

3. The (expected) error rate of the technique used.

4. Acceptance of the theory or technique in the relevant scientific community.

SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas menyatakan bahawa beliau tidak membuat pengimejan bahan bukti di dalam bentuk salinan imej-imej forensik bagi keseluruhan kandungan cakera keras (‘harddisk’) (mukasurat 26 Nota Keterangan) seperti yang ditetapkan oleh piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa (Piawaian Daubert). Fakta ini telah ditegaskan oleh Tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan utama bagi kes pembelaan. Oleh yang demikian SP1 tidak mengikut kaedah yang diiktiraf oleh piawaian komputer forensik antarabangsa dan bahan bukti tidak disahkan kesahihan dan integritinya. Tertuduh juga telah menerima 13 keping DVD salinan klip video yang disalin dengan menggunakan format DVD yang bukan mengikuti piawaian format pengimejan forensik antarabangsa yang ditetapkan di mana apabila diperiksa oleh Tertuduh telah mendapati metadata setiap fail klip video tidak sama dengan metadata yang diterangkan oleh SP1 dan bilangan klip video juga berbeza bilangan yang diberi dengan keterangan SP1 semasa perbicaraan. Terdapat juga kandungan yang sama dikira berulang-ulang semasa perbicaraan.

Fakta ini dinyatakan semasa pemeriksaan utama SP1:

“Selepas analisa/kenalpasti video2 lucah yang terkandung tindakan seterusnya adalah masukan video2 ini ke dalam DVD. Tidak ingat berapa keping. Saya masih boleh cam.”

(Rujuk DVD dalam sampul putih-di dalam ada 13 keping tanda X1-X13. Dicamkan SP1. Ditanda sebagai P3a-m) (mukasurat 13 Nota Keterangan).

Di dalam kertas penyelidikan yang dibentangkan oleh Renico Koen dari ICSA, University of Pretoria, South Africa dan Martin S. Oliver, ICSA, University of Pretoria, South Africa yang bertajuk “The Use of File Timestamps in Digital Forensics” menyatakan:

“Event data is generated when a significant digital event occurs. Although the generated event data is of little value when viewed independently, collectively event data can produce information that can help investigators to deduce relationships between events to produce abstract views of the evidence at hand.”

Dan mereka juga telah membuat kesimpulan bahawa:

“A principle was introduced based on the concept of synergy claiming that insignificant pieces of event datum may collectively be of significant forensic importance.”

Diikuti juga di dalam kertas penyelidikan oleh Svein Yngvar Willassen yang bertajuk “Hypothesis Based Investigation of Digital Timestamps” dengan jelas menerangkan di dalam abstract bahawa:

Timestamps stored on digital media play an important role in digital investigations. Unfortunately, timestamps may be manipulated, and also refer to a clock that can be erroneous, failing or maladjusted. This reduces the evidentiary value of timestamps. This paper takes the approach that historical adjustments to a clock can be hypothesized in a clock hypothesis. Clock hypotheses can then be tested for consistency with stored timestamps. A formalism for the definition and testing of a clock hypothesis is developed, and test methods for clock hypothesis consistency are demonstrated. With the number of timestamps found in typical digital investigations, the methods presented in this paper can justify clock hypotheses without having to rely on timestamps from external sources. This increases the evidentiary value of timestamps, even when the originating clock has been erroneous, failing or maladjusted.”

Di dalam kes Regina v. Shipman (Harold Frederick) (1999, unreported) terdapat persoalan modifikasi dan manipulasi ‘timestamps’ di mana semasa perbicaraan didapati bahawa ‘timestamp’ boleh diubah yang boleh membawa kepada penipuan metadata yang akan memberi impak besar dan nilai signifikan yang tinggi kepada analisis forensik terhadap kebolehterimaan probative evidence, kebolehpercayaan di dalam perbicaraan mahkamah.

j.          Persijilan ISO – Analisis SP1 gagal mengikut piawaian kawalan kualiti dan standard forensik komputer antarabangsa bagi ‘error’ dan ralat saintifik yang berkaitan dengan perisian dan peralatan untuk tujuan penganalisa forensik kerana SP1 telah memberi keterangan semasa pemeriksaan balas bahawa makmal beliau tidak dipersijilkan dengan standard ISO 9000 (Quality Management System in Production Environment), ISO 9001 (Quality Management), ISO 9069 (Software Quality Model), ISO 9241 (Ergonomic requirements for office work with visual display), ISO 17025 (General requirements for competence of test and calibration laboratories), ISO 27001 (Information technology-Security Techniques-Information Security Management Systems) dan ISO 15489/1:2001 (mukasurat 26 Nota Keterangan) untuk pengurusan kualiti untuk prosedur, proses, perisian, peralatan forensik computer yang digunakan dan yang berkaitan dengannya. Ini merupakan satu syarat yang sangat kritikal dan penting bagi sesuatu analisis forensik komputer dapat dijalankan dengan betul dan tepat.

Semasa pemeriksaan balas SP1 telah mengesahkan ada ‘error’ semasa ujitayang dibuat dengan menggunakan ‘software Encase’. (Mukasurat 20 Nota Keterangan).

Pihak Pembelaan ingin bersandarkan kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan New Zealand, di dalam kes Holt lawan Auckland City Council [1980] 2 NZLR 124; 1980 NZLR LEXIS 568, (mukasurat  Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa sesiapa yang menggunakan peralatan perlu memastikan ketepatan data yang dihasilkan:

“The presumption serves the important purpose of saving the time and expense of proving the obvious. At the same time, until it can be considered that the functioning and trustworthiness of a newly developed device is a matter of common knowledge, those who rely on the equipment must carry the responsibility of establishing its accuracy.”

k.         Pihak Pembelaan mempertikaikan tentang catatn masa yang berlawanan daripada hukum alam kerana masa yang direkodkan di dalam senarai klip video yang disediakan oleh SP1 adalah terkebelakang. Tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan utama kes pembelaan telah menunjukkan bahawa setiap catatan masa pada Laporan Forensik bertarikh 27.7.2009 tidak seiring dengan hukum alam dan jelas menunjukkan berlaku perubahan atau fabrikasi pada cakera keras tersebut.

Pihak Pembelaan ingin merujuk kepada kes Director of Public Prosecutions lawan Mc Keown dan Director of Public Prosecutions lawan Jones [1997] All ER 737 [1997] 1 WLR 295, [1997] RTR 162, 161 JP 356, [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 155, [1997] Crim LR 522 (mukasurat  Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) yang membuat pemerhatian tentang masa seperti berikut:

“I have considered the matter on the assumption that the error in the clock display showed that the computer was not operating properly. I should say, however, that I am not satisfied that this conclusion should have been drawn. Computer clocks, like any others, have to be set to the correct time and the most obvious explanation for the 15-minute discrepancy was that someone had made a mistake when he last set the clock.”

Pihak Pembelaan juga turut merujuk kepada kes Castle v Cross
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION [1985] 1 All ER 87, [1984] 1 WLR 1372, [1984] Crim LR 682, [1985] RTR 62
(mukasurat  Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) di  mana Queen’s Bench Division membuat kesimpulan mengenai penggunaan peralatan komputer bergantung kepada kawalan seseorang adalah seperti berikut:

“Of course, where a computer is used in respect of its memory function, it is possible to envisage where it might fall foul of the rule against hearsay.”

“[Counsel for the appellant] submitted that there was a difference in kind between the measuring device (even a sophisticated one) and this computer. He also suggested that there was a difference in kind between a mathematician who used a slide rule and one who used a calculating computer. We do not agree. This computer was rightly described as a tool. It did not contribute its own knowledge. It merely did a sophisticated calculation which could have been done manually by the chemist and was in fact done by the chemists using the computer programmed by Mr. Kellie whom the Crown called as a witness. The fact that the efficiency of a device is dependent on more than one person does not make any difference in kind. Virtually every device will involve the persons who made it, the persons who calibrated, programmed or set it up (for example with a clock the person who set it to the right time in the first place) and the person who uses or observes the device. In each particular case how many of these people it is appropriate to call must depend on the facts of, and the issues raised and concessions made in that case.”

l.          Tertuduh telah mengemukakan bantahan terhadap Laporan Forensik SP1 yang mana Laporan Forensik yang cuba ditender di Mahkamah bertarikh 28.7.2009 yang amat ketara berlainan dengan Laporan Forensik bertarikh 27.7.2009 yang diberikan oleh pihak pendakwaan di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 51A Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Pihak Tertuduh terpaksa membangkitkan bantahan apabila pihak pendakwaan sendiri tidak mematuhi prosedur-prosedur di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 51A dan Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah di mana apabila pihak Pendakwaan gagal memberikan salinan di dalam tempoh waktu yang ditetapkan dan penerimaan Laporan Forensik tersebut sebagai ekshibit adalah bertentangan dengan kes-kes yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah di mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal mematuhi tempoh penyerahan laporan yang ditetapkan di bawah Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, ianya ‘fatal’ kepada kes pendakwaan dan laporan forensik tersebut tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti.

Tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan utama kes pembelaan telah menunjukkan bahawa setiap catatan masa pada Laporan Forensik bertarikh 27.7.2009 (“ID-D1”) tidak seiring dengan hukum alam dan jelas menunjukkan berlaku perubahan atau fabrikasi.

Berkenaan isu ini, pihak Tertuduh ingin merujuk kepada satu kes Ooi Lean Chai v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 1 MLJ 337 (Rep) (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Agung telah memutuskan bahawa Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah bukan hanya bersifat prosedural tetapi mengandungi peraturan untuk kebolehterimaan laporan pakar sebagai bukti di mana sekiranya ‘proviso’ kepada Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah tidak dipatuhi, laporan pakar tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti.

53.       SP1 juga gagal memberi sebarang keterangan bagaimana beliau menjaga ‘hard disk’ tersebut selepas menerimanya dari Pegawai Penyiasat dari tarikh 13.7.2009 ke 26.7.2009 dan dari tarikh analisa ke tarikh pertama sebutan kes. Adalah dihujahkan di sini bahawa rantaian kawalan dan rantaian bukti telah terputus (“break in the chain of custody and break in the chain of evidence’). SP1 di dalam pemeriksaan semula hanya memberi keterangan seperti berikut:

“J : Ianya ada dalam kawalan saya. Disimpan dalam makmal forensic disimpan dalam peti khas untuk hard disc yang mana kunci dipegang oleh saya sendiri.”

54.       Tertuduh semasa dipanggil membela diri mempertikaikan cara penyimpanan barang kes oleh SP1 kerana tiada ‘casing’ khusus untuk mengelakkan berlakunya ‘anti static’ dan fabrikasi semasa pemindahan dari tempat kejadian ke makmal tempat analisa SP1.

Kes ini perlu dibezakan dengan kes-kes Mahkamah yang telah diputuskan berkenaan ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD) kerana cakera keras mempunyai kapasiti penyimpanan data yang lebih besar dan dibandingkan dengan ‘compact disc‘, malah tiada material yang boleh dimasukkan semula ke dalam ‘compact disc’ melainkan hanya berlaku pada cakera keras – (data yang terdahulu akan terbatal (dengan izin ‘fast overwrite‘)).

55.       Apabila cakera keras tersebut dimainkan dengan set komputer yang bukan dirampas dari tempat kejadian, ianya tidak terdiri daripada satu sistem yang lengkap dan sekiranya ianya dimainkan dengan bukan sistem komputer yang asal dan komputer yang lain cakera keras tersebut telah dicemari (‘tampering with evidence‘) dan ini tidak seharusnya dibenarkan berlaku oleh Mahkamah. Dirujuk kepada buku bertajuk “Cyber Forensics – A Field Manual for Collecting, Examining, and Preserving Evidence of Computer Crimes”, 2nd Edition oleh Albert J. Marcella, Jr. dan Doug Menendez ms 288, 289, 276-281 menyatakan keperluan buku log bagi merekod setiap aktiviti siasatan dan analisis forensik wajib dinyatakan semasa perbicaraan di mahkamah.

56.       Tertuduh berhujah bahawa milikan tidak boleh dibuktikan melalui keterangan persekitaran (‘circumstantial evidence‘) iaitu dengan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Ekshibit-ekshibit “P11”, “P12”, “P13”, “P14, “P15”, “P16”, “P17”, “P18”, “P19”, “P20”, “P21” hingga “P33” yang merupakan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan hanya kerana dokumen-dokumen tersebut didakwa terdapat di dalam cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh).

Pihak Pembelaan ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh VT Singham J di dalam kes Ah Poon & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 CLJ 521 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 10-11 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana VT Sigham J menyatakan seperti berikut:

“Irrelevant and Prejudicial Facts Or Evidence

[17] As for the police report which contains serious allegation that the accuseds are suspected to be involved in the activity of prostitution, it cannot be denied that this is highly prejudical, inadmissible or is otherwise objectionable and the accuseds have every right to know and understand the contents and they should be given the opportunity of raising any objection to the contents of the police report which is against them. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to show whether the contents of the police report which has been marked as exh. P 3 was read and explained to the accuseds and what was their reponse.

[18] It is paramount importance that all documentary evidence which are tendered as evidence by the prosecution and marked as exhibits in proceedings where the accused has pleaded guilty to a charge if possible should be shown, read and explained to the accuseds and understood by him or her so that in the event the contents of the documents which contains some incriminating facts which implicates the accuseds are disputed or not admitted, the document will have to be rejected without having it marked as an exhibit…..Be that as it may, a document or an exhibit is not to be admitted unless it is relevant to the charge.”

57.       Oleh itu, laporan Forensik SP1 (Ekshibit “P35”) tidak komprehensif dan konklusif.

58.       Oleh yang demikian, kesimpulan yang tidak dapat dielakkan ialah Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tidak mempunyai pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material, bahan yang dikatakan lucah tersebut.

Isu 106 Klip Video Tersebut Mestilah Lucah di Sisi Undang-undang

59.       Di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“2nd Ground

Under the 2nd ground the prosecution submitted that the learned Magistrate had erred in law and in fact when he came to his finding that the prosecution has failed to prove that all of exh. P1, ie, the remaining 14 VCD (video cakera padat) seized are obscene films and disregarded PW5’s evidence that the result of a screen test conducted on the seized items has shown that all these items are obscene films.

Under the 2nd ground, in my view, it would be unsafe for the court to solely rely on PW5’s evidence that he had conducted a screen test on all the 18 VCD’s and that they were all obscene films because I find that exh. P5 which was prepared by him in respect of the 18 VCDs handed to him lacked evidential value and besides there was a material contradiction as from whom he received the 18 VCDs (discussed earlier).

Therefore, the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCDs is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films becomes critical. Here as per the finding of the learned Magistrate not only were only four VCDs screened but unfortunately the titles of the four VCDs were not even identified. Hence, there is no evidence before the court of which of the four VCDs out of the 18 VCDs exh. P1 (A-R) were of obscene material and neither was there proof whether the remaining 14 VCDs were of obscene material or otherwise.

I agree with the defence that the learned Magistrate should not be faulted just because he had allowed the prosecution’s application to conduct random screening. In my opinion the permission granted by the learned Magistrate is not tantamount to a waiver of the burden emplaced on the prosecution to prove each and every essential ingredient of the charge for purposes of establishing a prima facie case. It is the duty of the prosecution throughout to establish a prima facie case and it is not for the learned Magistrate, as pointed out by the defence, to tell them as to the correct procedure to be adopted.”

60.       Di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“Intipati (b)

[9] Berdasarkan keterangan, SP1 ada membuat rampasan terhadap barang-barang kes. Namun begitu, adalah didapati tiada sebarang penandaan dibuat pada mana-mana bahagian pada VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas. Setelah barang-barang kes diserahkan kepada SP3 (C/Insp. Saifulnizam bin Mohamed Jais), SP3 juga tidak membuat apa – apa tanda pada barang-barang kes yang diterima dan menyimpan barang-barang kes tersebut di bilik stor barang kes. Penjaga stor pula tidak dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan di mahkamah. Kemungkinan bahawa barang-barang kes ini telah bercampur-aduk dengan barang kes untuk kes yang lain tidak dapat diketepikan.

[10] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan keputusan Majistret apabila beliau mendapati senarai bongkar (eks. P3) yang merujuk kepada senarai VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas adalah tidak lengkap. Terdapat sepuluh keping VCD dan DVD lucah dalam bahasa Cina tidak dinyatakan tajuk (“title”) dan begitu juga dengan empat keping DVD dalam bahasa Cina yang tidak dinyatakan tajuk. Dalam eksh. P3 cuma dinyatakan seperti berikut: “pelbagai tajuk VCD/DVD lucah dalam bahasa Cina”. Dalam perkara ini, saya bersetuju dengan penghakiman dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501, di mana Hakim Lau Bee Lan memutuskan:

… the principle to be gleaned is the effect of non-compliance of the provision governing a search list merely cast doubt on the bona fides of the parties conducting the search and then becomes incumbent on the trial judge to scrutinize the evidence further whether a prima facie has made out.

In the context of the present case, the identity of the 18 VCDs is central to proving that the accused had possession of them and the absence of the listing of each of the titles of the 18 VCDs greatly weakens the case for the prosecution.

Intipati (c)

[11] Timbalan pendakwa raya terpelajar menghujahkan bahawa kesemua VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas telah dibuktikan mengandungi adegan lucah. Dengan hormat, mahkamah ini tidak bersetuju. Walaupun pihak pendakwaan telah mendapat kebenaran dari mahkamah Majistret untuk menjalankan uji tayang secara rawak terhadap barang-barang kes, namun begitu, adalah menjadi tugas pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan kes mereka sepanjang perbicaraan. Hanya sepuluh keping dari VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas dibuat uji tayang di mahkamah Majistret dan sepuluh keping VCD/DVD yang dibuat uji tayang itu juga tidak dinyatakan tajuk-tajuknya. Tidak terdapat mana-mana peruntukan dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang menyatakan bahawa penayangan sejumlah VCD/DVD yang dirampas yang dipercayai mengandungi adegan lucah akan dianggap sebagai telah membuktikan bahawa keseluruhan VCD/DVD tersebut mengandungi adegan lucah. Oleh yang demikian, setiap satu VCD/DVD yang dirampas itu perlu dibuat uji tayang. Keadaan ini adalah berbeza, misalnya, dengan peruntukan yang jelas dibawah s. 37(j) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang menyatakan bahawa adalah mencukupi jika sampel dadah diambil tidak kurang dari 10% bekas (receptacles) yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya (lihat kes-kes Gunalan Ramachandran & Ors v. PP[2004] 4 CLJ 551; Chu Tak Fai v. PP [2006] 4 CLJ 931 dan PP v. Seow Wei Hoong[2008] 4 CLJ 453).

[12] Dalam perkara ini, saya juga bersetuju dengan penghakiman dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Chung Wan Li (supra) apabila hakim dipetik berkata:

Therefore, the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCDs is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films becomes critical. Here as per the finding of the learned magistrate not only were only four VCDs screened but unfortunately the titles of the four VCDs were not even identified. Hence, there is no evidence before the court of which the four VCDs out of the 18 VCDs Exh P1 (A-R) were of obscene material and neither was there proof whether the remaining 14 VCDs were of obscene material or otherwise.

I agree with the defence that the learned magistrate should not be faulted just because he had allowed the prosecution’s application to conduct random screening. In my opinion, the permission granted by the learned magistrate is not tantamount to a waiver of the burden emplaced on the prosecution to prove each and every essential ingredient of the charge for purposes of establishing a prima facie case. It is the duty of the prosecution throughout to establish a prima facie case and it is not for the learned magistrate, as pointed out by the defence, to tell them as to the correct procedure to be adopted.

[13] Keputusan bahawa terdapat keraguan yang munasabah sama ada barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian adalah sama dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah dan sama ada kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas itu mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”) adalah penemuan fakta yang dibuat oleh Puan Majistret berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan beliau di mana beliau mempunyai kelebihan untuk melihat dan mendengar saksi-saksi berkenaan. Penemuan fakta adalah merupakan fungsi eksklusif mahkamah bicara (lihat PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457). Perkara ini telah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap. Dalam kes Herchun Singh & Ors v. PP [1969] 1 LNS 52, Ong Hock Thye, KH berkata:

An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding on fact arrived at by the judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding: see Sheo Swarup v. King- Emperor AIR [1934] PC 227.

[14] Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa tidak terdapat apa-apa alasan untuk memutuskan bahawa Puan Majistret telah “mishandling the fact” dalam kes ini. Keputusan selainnya oleh Puan Majistret akan bertentangan dengan keberatan keterangan (“weight of evidence”) yang ada di hadapan mahkamah.

[15] Kesan terkumpul undang-undang terhadap keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan dalam kes ini telah menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pihak pendakwaan. Terdapat jurang yang tidak dipenuhi oleh pihak pendakwaan terutama yang berhubung dengan identiti ekshibit dan adegan lucah. Perkara ini memudaratkan kes pihak pendakwaan. Dalam kes Mohan Singh Lachman Singh v. PP [2002] 3 CLJ 293, Mahkamah Rayuan membuat pemerhatian:

The burden of proving its case at every stage lies on the prosecution. The only task of the accused is to raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecution’s case. If there are gaps in the case for the prosecution, these cannot be filled by resorting to a purported failure on the part of the defence to put specific questions relevant to its case. Such gaps must be filled by the prosecution itself: Abdullah Zawawi v. PP [1985] CLJ 19 (Rep); [1985] 2 CLJ 2; [1985] 2 MLJ 16. That has always been the law. It is still the law.

[16] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan di atas, mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa rayuan timbalan pendakwa raya tidak mempunyai merit. Dengan itu, rayuan ditolak dan keputusan Puan Majistret yang melepas dan membebaskan responden di akhir kes pendakwaan bagi pertuduhan kedua dikekalkan.”

61.       Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah di sisi undang-undang, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:

“Screen Testing For Obscenity

[15] However, I find that the second vital ingredient in this case, ie, that the 65 DVDs are obscene was not proved.

15.1. There is no evidence at all that the 65 DVDs were subject to a screen test (uji tayang) for the court to make a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene.

15.2. SP1 merely testified that he was satisfied that the 65 DVDs were obscene by looking at the covers of the DVDs.

15.3. SP4, the I.O. of the case, said he had screen tested them at random in his office and found them to be obscene.

15.4. Although at one point of the proceedings the learned APP applied to reserve screen-testing of the DVDs, the learned defence counsel had responded that there was no need for screen-testing (p. 29 of Appeal Record). Unfortunately the court appeared to have agreed with learned defence counsel because nowhere in the notes of evidence does it appear that screen testing was done.

[16] In the case of PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 HC, the learned High Court judge held that “the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCD’s is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films”. In Chung’s case (supra), the learned High Court judge did not approve of the random testing that was conducted during the trial.

[17] His Lordship Mohd. Zawawi Salleh, JC, concurred with the learned High Court judge in the case of PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 HC. His Lordship held in Lee Swee Sing’s case that there is no provision in the Film Censorship Act 2002 which allows for random testing. A comparison was drawn with the provision of s. 37(j) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which allowed for a 10% of the sample of the drugs to be tested.

[18] In this case, there was no screen testing at all carried out during the trial. How then can the court arrive at a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene? It is patently clear that the prosecution had failed to prove that the 65 DVDs were obscene and the learned magistrate should have so found.

[19] For the reasons as adumbrated above the acquittal and discharge of the respondent is hereby affirmed as the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case against the respondent as per the charge.

[20] The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

62.       Apa yang boleh difahamkan daripada ketiga-tiga kes di atas, kesemua jumlah bahan yang tercatat di dalam kertas pertuduhan mestilah dibuktikan lucah di sisi undang-undang. Sekiranya satu bahan tidak lucah, maka si tertuduh mestilah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan tersebut kerana tidak terdapat mana-mana peruntukan dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang menyatakan bahawa penayangan sejumlah VCD/DVD yang dirampas yang dipercayai mengandungi adegan lucah akan dianggap sebagai telah membuktikan bahawa keseluruhan VCD/DVD tersebut mengandungi adegan lucah.

63.       Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil SP1 untuk memberi keterangan bahawa 106 klip video tersebut adalah lucah. SP1 telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 4 – 11 Nota Keterangan) bahawa: “Ada 150 video. Dalam senarai, ada 106 yang lucah. Saya ada list saya buat dalam list laporan forensic saya.” SP1 seterusnya telah diberi keterangan bahawa di antara klip video tersebut adalah lucah, tidak lucah, tidak dapat dimainkan, ada gambar lucah, tiada video lucah, tiada bahan lucah, tidak boleh dimainkan, mohon delete temporary file.

64.       Oleh itu, melalui keterangan SP1 dan Ekshibit P35 (Laporan Analisa), jumlah klip video yang dikatakan lucah tidak sampai 106. Maka, pihak Pendakwaan tidak berjaya membuktikan intipati ini menurut undang-undang.

65.       Bilangan klip video lucah sebanyak 106 klip tersebut sebenarnya tidak dapat dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan kerana terdapat klip video yang berulang-ulang dan mempunyai kandungan yang sama tetapi nama fail yang berbeza (mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan). Terdapat klip-klip video yang tidak dapat dimainkan seperti dancewater.avi, dcmonument.avi dan moonrise.avi, ROSEBLOOM.avi, video001.avi, V10raw.mpg dan V137raw.mpg (mukasurat 5, 6 dan 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip-klip video yang tidak keluar (mukasurat 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada yang tiada kandungan lucah (mukasurat 5,6,7 dan 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip yang tidak dapat dibaca seperti V10.raw.mpg (mukasurat 7 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip video yang tidak lucah tetapi ditandakan sebagai bahan lucah seperti Sato1.mpg dan sato2.mpg (mukasurat 6 Nota Keterangan). Di samping itu terdapat 2 klip video yang tidak boleh dikira sebagai lucah apabila melibatkan perlakuan di antara suami dan isteri (beast1.Mpg dan dollah2.mpg – mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan) yang pada asalnya berada di tempat persendirian tetapi telah didedahkan oleh SP7 apabila ekshibit “P2” diambil.

66.       Tertuduh di dalam pemeriksaan utama Kes Pembelaan telah member keterangan bahawa DVD (ekshibit “P3a-P3m”) telah dibawa oleh Tertuduh ke Balai Polis Kepong dan seorang anggota polis bernama Kopral Azmi  telah mengira klip video yang berada di dalam ekshibit P3 hanya berjumlah 82 klip video sahaja.

67.       Pegawai Penyiasat juga tidak menyediakan senarai klip video lucah tersebut kerana tiada senarai diberikan mengikut Seksyen 51A Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Sekiranya pihak Pendakwaan mendakwa senarai klip video yang dilampirkan bersama Laporan Forensik (ekshibit “P35”) maka senarai tersebut tidak boleh diambilkira kerana Laporan Forensik tersebut telah dicabar kesahihannya dengan jumlah uji tayang yang dibuat di Mahkamah dan penerimaan Laporan Forensik tersebut sebagai ekshibit tidak mengikut lunas undang-undang.

68.       Tiada senarai klip video yang disediakan oleh Saksi Pendakwaan ke-7 (SP7) selaku Pegawai Penyiasat dan setiap satu daripada 106 klip video yang berlainan tajuk dan menjadi asas pertuduhan tidak ditanda sebagai ekshibit. Ini dapat dibuktikan dengan tiada keterangan direkodkan di dalam Nota-nota Keterangan sehingga 6.1.2011.

69.       Bagi intipati kedua pertuduhan, Pihak Tertuduh berhujah bahawa tiada definisi yang khusus bagi ‘lucah’ di dalam undang-undang.

70.       SP7 selaku Pegawai Penyiasat juga gagal memberikan definisi yang tepat mengenai lucah di sisi perundangan. Beliau di dalam pemeriksaan balas turut menyatakan bahawa apa yang berlaku di dalam rumah di antara pasangan tidak boleh diambilkira sebagai lucah dan ini sangat bertentangan dengan apa yang beliau lakukan dengan menghadapkan Tertuduh dengan pertuduhan terhadap klip video beast1.Mpg dan dollah2.mpg (mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan) di mana kedua-dua klip video tersebut merupakan klip antara Tertuduh dengan bekas isteri yang diambil semasa masih lagi suami isteri. Ini merupakan pencabulan hak asasi manusia dan bertentangan dengan Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Pihak Pembelaan ingin merujuk kepada kes Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan):

[ Footnote 7 ] The Supreme Court of Ohio considered the issue in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N. E. 2d 387 (1960). Four of the seven judges of that court felt that criminal prosecution for mere private possession of obscene materials was prohibited by the Constitution. However, Ohio law required the concurrence of “all but one of the judges” to declare a state law unconstitutional. The view of the “dissenting” judges was expressed by Judge Herbert:

“I cannot agree that mere private possession of . . . [obscene] literature by an adult should constitute a crime. The right of the individual to read, to believe or disbelieve, and to think without governmental supervision is one of our basic liberties, but to dictate to the mature adult what books he may have in his own private library seems to the writer to be a clear infringement of his constitutional rights as an individual.” 170 Ohio St., at 437, 166 N. E. 2d, at 393.

71.       Tiada definisi bagi perkataan ‘lucah’ berdasarkan perundangan yang boleh digunapakai di dalam rumah samada di dalam Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967, Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan Kanun Kesiksaan.

72.       Mengikut Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Volume 1, 24th Edition di muka surat 1115 dengan jelas menerangkan bahawa:

“The word “obscene” has not been defined in the Code.”

73.       Definisi Lucah (‘Obscene’) atau Kelucahan (‘Obscenity’) bergantung kepada keadaan, tempat dan konteks semasa ianya berlaku. Apabila seseorang tanpa seurat benang di tubuh berada di rumahnya tanpa kehadiran orang luar tiada sesiapa boleh mengatakan bahawa beliau berkelakuan lucah. Keadaan yang sama juga jika sesuatu rakaman dibuat di dalam rumah dengan diri sendiri tanpa kehadiran orang lain atau dengan kehadiran pasangan yang sah di sisi undang-undang sahaja berada di rumah di mana di dalam konteks tersebut perlakuan tidak dikira bersifat lucah. Kesopanan awam hanya meliputi luar premis persendirian dan lucah tidak didefinisikan secara khusus di dalam perundangan.

Akta Penapisan Filem

Filem lucah

5. (1) Tiada seorang pun boleh—

(a) ada atau menyebabkan dirinya ada dalam milikan, jagaan, kawalan atau pemunyaannya; atau

(b) menyebarkan, menayangkan, mengedarkan, mempamerkan, membuat, mengeluarkan, menjual atau menyewakan, apa-apa filem atau bahan publisiti filem yang lucah atau yang selainnya bertentangan dengan kesopanan awam.

(2) Mana-mana orang yang melanggar subseksyen (1) melakukan suatu kesalahan dan apabila disabitkan boleh didenda tidak kurang daripada sepuluh ribu ringgit dan tidak lebih daripada lima puluh ribu ringgit atau dipenjarakan

74.       Di dalam kes-kes ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD), ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD) tersebut diedar, dijual  dan disebarkan untuk orang awam yang sudah tentu akan memberi kesan kepada orang awam terutamanya golongan muda yang memilikinya. Ini berbeza dengan kes ini di mana pihak polis telah memasuki premis tanpa waran geledah yang sah di sisi undang-undang dan rampasan harta peribadi dibuat yang jelas bukan untuk tatapan umum.

75.       Mengikut Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Volume 1, 24th Edition di mukasurat 1122, faktor yang perlu diambilkira di dalam menentukan sesuatu material itu lucah adalah material berunsur lucah tersebut jatuh ke tangan siapa. Di dalam kes ini Pegawai Penyiasat telah memasuki tempat kejadian dan material tersebut berada di tangan beliau. Hanya beliau membuat kesimpulan bahawa material itu lucah.

76.       Oleh yang demikian, kesimpulan yang tidak dapat dielakkan ialah Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tidak mempunyai kandungan lucah di sisi undang-undang pada setiap masa yang material, bahan yang dikatakan lucah tersebut.

77.       Pihak Pembelaan menyatakan bahawa memandangkan kedua-dua intipati penting di peringkat pendakwaan ini bagi membuktikan kes melampaui keraguna yang munasabah terhadap Tertuduh tidak dapat dibuktikan menurut undang-undang, kesimpulan yang tidak boleh dielakkan ialah Tertuduh dilepaskan dan dibebaskan serta merta daripada pertuduhan tersebut.

78.       Pihak Pembelaan menyatakan bahawa pihak Pendakwaan masih gagal untuk membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan yang munasabah terhadap Tertuduh dengan butir-butirannya seperti di perenggan di bawah.

79.       Menurut Nota Keterangan, terdapat ruang (‘gap’) di antara ekshibit-ekshibit di mahkamah yang menyebabkan pihak Pembelaan tidak dapat berhujah sepenuhnya dan ini telah memprejudiskan Tertuduh. Pihak Pembelaan ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah bahawa di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 17.8.2010 tiada keterangan mengenai ekshibit-ekshibit “P4” “P5”, “P6”, ”P7, “P8’ dan “P10”. Oleh yang demikian pihak Pembelaan tidak dapat mengutarakan hujah berkenaan ekshibit “P4”, “P5”, “P6”, “P7”, “P8” dan “P10”. Walaubagaimanapun sekiranya ekshibit “P4”, “P5”, “P6”, “P7, “P8’ dan P10” adalah salinan dokumen-dokumen yang diesktrak oleh SP1, pihak Pembelaan membangkitkan bantahan mengenai penerimaan salinan dokumen-dokumen tersebut kerana pihak Pendakwaan gagal mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950.

80.       Kertas pertuduhan adalah bersangkut dengan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009. Ini menggambarkan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani adalah ‘First Information Report’. Dokumen ini telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah Majistret tetapi tidak ditanda sebagai ekshibit kerana Mahkamah Majistret telah menolak permohonan Tertuduh untuk memanggil Pengadu asala sebagai saksi kedua pembelaan yang menyebabkan pihak Pembelaan tiada peluang untuk membuktikan fakta-fakta berkenaan aduan pengadu.

81.       SP5 telah memberi keterangan bahawa pemeriksaan dan penggeledahan yang dibuat di Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 (mukasurat 47 Nota Keterangan). Keterangan SP5 ini menunjukkan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 ialah ‘First Information Report’ yang membolehkan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan di Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut. Barang-barang yang dirampas adalah untuk laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 bukannya report polis lain. Mana-mana ‘First Information Report’ lain yang menggunakan barang-barang geledah menurut Borang Senarai Geledah pada Tarikh tersebut di Premis tersebut telah mencabuli hak setiap rakyat Malaysia yang telah dijamin dan termaktub di dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia.

82.       Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Chong Chieng Jen lawan Mohd Irwan Hafiz bin Md Radzi & Anor  [2009] 8 MLJ 364 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana komputer riba pemohon telah dirampas apabila satu waran geledah dikeluarkan oleh Majistret apabila pemohon disyaki menyimpan bahan berunsur hasutan. Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk mengetepikan waran geledah dan memerintahkan komputer riba dikembalikan kepada Pemohon. Di dalam kes ini Rhodzariah Bujang JC menyatakan seperti berikut:

The requirement for ‘information’ and ‘reason to believe’ is mandatory because the execution of the warrant willl definitely result in the invasion of the privacy and property of the owner of the premises so named and may even result in the consfication of his property. A person’s privacy and the right to his property are very basic rights of a man and that to his property is even enshrined under Article 13(1) of the Federal Constitution.”

83.       Apalagi di dalam kes ini jika tiada waran geledah diperolehi dari mana-mana Mahkamah dan ini sudah tentu mengganggu hak ‘privacy’ Tertuduh sebagaimana yang termaktub di bawah Artikel 10 dan 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

84.       Adalah mustahil sesuatu tempat itu digeledah terlebih dahulu sebelum adanya ‘First Information Report’ atau sesuatu tempat itu digeledah mendahului ‘First Information Report’. Tambahan lagi Laporan Analisa oleh SP1 adalah berkenaan dengan Dang Wang Rpt 29694/09 bersabit Jalan Patani Rpt 5070/2009.

85.       Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 sebagai ‘First Information Report’ adalah amat penting di dalam kes ini memandangkan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani tersebut. Tertuduh semasa memberi keterangan di dalam pemeriksaan utama telah memohon agar Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report No. 5070/09 tersebut ditanda sebagai “ID” tetapi disebabkan Pengadu Norina Zainol Abidin tidak dapat dipanggil kerana ditolak oleh Mahkamah, salinan laporan polis tersebut ditender mengikut Seksyen 173(j)(iii) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

86.       SP-5 memberi keterangan bahawa tiada waran untuk melakukan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan tersebut. Bagi situasi ini, pihak Pendakwaan mestilah mematuhi S.62 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan segala intipati S.62 mestilah dipenuhi terlebih dahulu sebelum membuat pemeriksaan atau penggeledahan tanpa waran. Tiada apa-apa keterangan mengenai situasi ini maka penggeledahan atau pemeriksaan pada Tarikh tersebut di Bangunan tersebut adalah tidak sah di sisi undang-undang.

87.       Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi pendakwaan pertama (SP1) sebagai saksi pakar. Pengadu asal tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi. Maklumat pertama (“First Information Report’) adalah dari seorang bernama Norina Zainol Abidin yang tidak dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai saksi pertama kerana berdasarkan laporan beliau, polis telah datang ke premis tersebut pada 13.7.2009 tanpa waran geledah dan alasan yang munasabah untuk memasuki premis tersebut. Laman web yang dikatakan lucah http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com merupakan laman blog yang kosong  oleh itu tidak wujud isu kelucahan atau isu yang melanggar kesopanan awam pada laman blog tersebut. Amat ketara bahawa laporan pertama tersebut tidak benar dan merupakan laporan yang palsu yang sengaja direka-reka oleh Pengadu asal untuk menceroboh hak persendirian Tertuduh. Oleh yang demikian cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang ditender sebagai ekshibit tidak sepatutnya dirampas pada hakikat sebenarnya kerana tiada peralatan atau peranti atau modem atau talian rangkaian yang dilanggani pada tarikh 13hb. Julai, 2009 yang dijumpai di tempat kejadian mengikut seksyen 248 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998.

88.       Tiada sebarang keterangan daripada SP1 dan SP7 yang menerangkan bagaimana laman web tersebut dikesan daripada ‘internet protocol’ dari ‘service provider’ kepada internet yang terdapat dari premis tempat kejadian. SP5 dan SP7 mengesahkan di dalam keterangan masing-masing bahawa tiada modem atau peranti dijumpai. Apa yang boleh digarapkan daripada keterangan-keterangan ini bahawa tiada bukti kukuh mengaitkan tempat kejadian dengan laporan pengadu “First Information Report”. SP5 memberi keterangan bahawa set komputer tidak disambung ke sumber kuasa dan tidak berfungsi. Beliau menyatakan bahawa komputer di tempat kejadian rosak. Oleh yang demikian bagaimana cakera keras (‘hard disk’) boleh dirampas sedangkan untuk akses kepada internet memerlukan peranti modem, talian internet yang pada masa material membawa satu internet protocol (IP) yang unik yang boleh dikesan dan dikaitkan dengan “MAC address” (Networking Card) pada komputer yang disyaki tersebut. Tiada keterangan mengenai analisis forensik rangkaian dan analisis forensik Facebook yang dibuat oleh SP1 untuk membuktikan bahawa Tertuduh boleh dikaitkan dengan laman web yang dinyatakan sebelum ini. Nama Domain (‘domain name’) http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com tidak dibuktikan siapa tuanpunya atau pemiliknya atau siapa yang mendaftar ‘domain name’ tersebut.

89.       Di samping itu tiada keterangan daripada SP1 dan SP7 bahawa Tertuduh adalah ‘friend’ yang diterima oleh Pengadu asal untuk akaun ‘Facebook’ Pengadu asal. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang menunjukkan bahawa Tertuduh ada akses kepada maklumat akaun ‘Facebook’ Pengadu asal.

Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi berkaitan internet dan ‘domain name’ (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) Petroliam Nasional Bhd v. Khoo Nee Kiong [2003] 4 MLJ 216 (mukasurat 230-231 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan):

[35] I also reproduce below the following excerpt from the judgment of Aldous LJ in British Telecommunications plc and another v One In A Million Ltd and others and other actions [1998] 4 All ER 476 at p480-481 which explains in very simple terms what is internet and which also adopts the explanation by the learned trial judge, Jonathan Sumption QC sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court on what is domain name:

At its simplest the internet is a collection of computers which are connected through the telephone network to communicate with each other.

As explained by the judge [1998] FSR 265 at p 267:

The internet is increasingly used by commercial organizations to promote themselves and their products and in some cases to buy and sell. For these purposes they need a domain name identifying the computer which they are using. A domain name comprises groups of alphanumeric characters separated by dots. A first group commonly comprises the name of the enterprise or a brand name or trading name associated with it, followed by a ‘top level’ name identifying the nature and sometimes the location of the organization….

Members of the public would not ordinarily have a domain name. They would subscribe to a service provider and have an e-mail address. That enables a subscriber to send a message to another computer through the service provider, which forwards the message requested to the appropriate computer. The subscriber can also browse around the world wide web and seek web pages associated with a particular domain name. Thus if he transmits a domain name and the web pages sought and provide the information obtained.”

Pihak Pembelaan bersandarkan kepada satu kes Frangione v. Vandadongen [2010] O. J. No. 2337 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Agung Ontario memutuskan seperti berikut:

[33] Counsel have referred to several cases in Ontario that have dealt with the relatively new issue of production of the contents of Facebook sites given the proliferation of social networking sites. Our courts have observed and accepted that “Facebook” is a social networking sites used by members to communicate information about one’s personal life to other members of the Facebook community. When a person registers with Facebook, at http://www.facebook.com website, he creates his own profile and privacy settings. Profile information is displayed to people in the networks specified by the user in his privacy settings e.g a user may choose to make his private profile information available to others within his school, geographic area, employment network, or to “friends” of “friends”. A user can set privacy options that limit access to his profile only to those to whom he grants permission the so called “friends” of the user (Murphy v. Perger, [2007] O.J. No. 5511 (S.C.J.); Leduc, supra[19] Wicev. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co.[2009] O.J. No. 2946 (S.C.J.); Kourtesis v. Joris [2007] O.J. No. 5539 (S.C.J).

90.       Adalah amat jelas bahawa penyitaan barang kes pada 13.7.2009 dibuat tanpa sebab yang munasabah dan berlawanan dengan kehendak Seksyen 42 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan juga prinsip yang telah diputuskan di dalam kes Chong Chieng Jen lawan Mohd Irwan Hafiz bin Md Radzi & Anor  [2009] 8 MLJ 364 dan Tertuduh berhak kepada gantirugi kerana penyitaan tanpa sebab yang munasabah.

91.       Pada 17.1.2011 Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 1 telah membuat perintah untuk Kes Tangkap tersebut ditetapkan untuk sebutan di hadapan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 untuk Tertuduh melantik peguambela dan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 7.2.2011 tanpa member peluang dan masa untuk mencukupi untuk Tertuduh melantik peguambela yang nyata tidak mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 255 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

Tertuduh ingin bersandarkan kepada kes Mahkamah Agung (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Liaw Kwai Wah & Anor v. PP [1987] 2 MLJ 69 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Agung menyatakan bahawa hak Tertuduh untuk diwakili seorang peguambela adalah termaktub di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Di dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Awaluddin bin Suratman & Ors lawan Pendakwaraya [1992] 1 MLJ 416 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) Mohtar Abdullah J membuat pemerhatian seperti berikut:

“Although the court should be strict in dealing with application for the postponement, the court owes a duty to an accused person to ensure that he has the benefit of counsel who would be properly able to act on his behalf. Since counsel had just been retained for the first accused, a short adjournment would further the interest of justice as counsel needed the notes of evindece to be properly prepared to safeguard the accused’s interest”.

92.       Pihak Pembelaan turut berhujah bahawa prosiding ‘hostile witness’ yang dilakukan terhadap Saksi Pendakwaan ke-enam (SP6) spade 19.10.2010 semasa kes pendakwaan telah tidak mengikut prosedur ‘hostile witness’ yang sewajarnya mengikut kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan kerana, inter alia, SP6 tidak ditunjukkan dengan bahagian pernyataan yang berlawanan dan tidak diberi peluang untuk memberi penjelasan  bagi kenyataan yang berlawanan.

Salleh Abas FJ di dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Krishnan v. PP [1981] 2 MLJ 121, 123 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) telah mengesahkan prosedur ‘hostile witness’ di dalam kes Muthusamy v. PP [1948] MLJ 57 (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan)adalah prosedur yang diterima dan digunapakai secara konsisten oleh mahkamah-mahkamah di Malaysia:

“This procedure has been accepted and consistently followed by courts in this country and we see no reason to depart from it.”

Taylor J in Muthusamy v. PP:

“The proper way to apply the section is this. On the request of either side, the court reads the former statement. If there is no serious discrepancy the court so rules and no time is wasted. The first necessity is to read it with confident expextation that it will be different form the evidence but looking judicially to see whether the difference really so serious as to suggest that the witness is unreliable.

Differences may be divided into four classes:

(a)       Minor differences, not amounting to discrepancies;

(b)       Apparent discrepancies;

(c)        Serious discrepancies;

(d)       Material contradictions.

Minor differences are attributable mainly to differences in interpretation and the way in which the statement was taken and sometimes to differences in recollection. A perfectly truthful witness may mention a detail on one occasion and not remember it on another. A mere omission is hardly ever a discrepancy. The police statement is usually much briefer than the evidence. Both the statement and the evidence are usually narratives reduced from question and answer. The witness is not responsible for the actual expressions used in either, and all the less wehre he does not speak English.

If the police statement gives an outline of substantially the same story, there being no apparent irreconcilable conflict between the two on any point material to the issue, the Magistrate should say at once “The difference is not such as to affect his credit” and hand the statement back.

If, however, the difference is so material as probably to amount to a discrepancy affecting the credit of the witness, the court may permit the witness to eb asked whether he made the alleged statement. If he denies having made it, then either the matter must be dropped or the document must eb formally proved, by calling the writer or, if he is not available, by proving in some other way that the witness did make the statement.

If the witness admits making the former statement, or is proved to have made it, then the two conflicting versions must be carefully explained to him, preferably by the Court, and he must have a fair and full opportunity to explain the difference. If he can, then his credit is saved, though there may still be doubt as to the accuracy of his memory. This procedure is cumbersome and slow and therefore should not be used unless the apparent discrepancy is material to the issue.”

93.       Mahkamah Majistret sewajarnya mengendalikan penilaian maksimum ke atas keterangan semua saksi dan kegagalan untuk mengendalikan penilaian maksimum ke atas keterangan saksi-saksi mengakibatkan salah laksana keadilan.

Di dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Lee Kwan Woh v Public Prosecutor [2009] 5 MLJ 301, (mukasurat Ikatan Otoriti Tambahan Pembelaan) Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“[27] It is plain from what we have said when discussing the evidence that a reasonable tribunal properly directing itself on the applicable law and judicially appreciating the evidence would have acquitted the appellant at the close of prosecution case. The failure of the learned judge to undertake a maximum or positive evaluation of the evidence of PW3, PW4 and PW8 has in the present case resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice.”

94.       Kesimpulannya berdasarkan hujahan-hujahan yang dikemukakan di atas, terdapat kecacatan yang material dan amat memudaratkan kes pihak Pendakwaan. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan setiap satu intipati pertuduhan dan pihak Pembelaan telah berjaya membuktikan terdapat keraguan yang munasabah di dalam kes pendakwaan. Oleh yang demikian Tertuduh pohon dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan di atas.

……………………………..

Mohamad Izaham bin Mohamed Yatim

Tertuduh

Categories: Abuse of Process of Court, Art of Counter-CyberForensics, Blog, Breach of Expert Duties, Breach of Natural Justice, Breach of Prosecution's Duties, Case Law Studies, Chain of Custody, Chain of Evidence, Conspiracy Theory, Control, Credibility of Expert Witness, Criminal & Civil Liability of Expert Witness, Criminal Behavioral Studies, Criminal Justice, Criminal Procedures Code (Act 593) - Malayan Law, Criminology, Custody, Cyber Forensics & Investigations, Damages, Definition of Possession in Law, Domain Names, E-mail, Electronic Evidence, Evidence Act 1950 (Malayan Law), Expert At Crime Scene, Expert Evidence, Expert Witness, Federal Constitutions, First Information Report (FIR), Freedom and Privacy, Freedom of Thought, Fundamental Human Rights, Gazetted Expert Witness, Human Rights, Marriage & Privacy, Illegally Obtained Evidence, Information, Intellectual Properties & Copyrights, Invasion of Privacy, Knowledge, Law of Tort, Limitation of Immunity of Judge in Lower Court, Limitations to The Immunity Rule, Malicious Prosecution, Manner in which lack of competency may rise, Marriage Rights, Natural Justice, Networking and Internet, Penal Codes, Power and Privacy, Private Property, Private Spaces, Prosecution, Retrospective of Privacy, S 120 Parties to Civil Suits and Wives and Husbands, S44 Fraud or Collusion in Obtaining Judgement or Incompetency of Court May Be Rise, Scientific Evidence and Law, Secret of The Bodies, Territories of Selfness, Trial Within Trial, True Definition of Natural Justice, Websites, Without Search Warrant

First in the History of Malaysian Judiciary: Malicious Prosecution by Malaysian Deputy Public Prosecution and Misconduct (Tort) of a Malicious Magistrate Been Proved During Court Proceedings (The SuperSly of Malaysian Deputy Public Prosecutor and The First Magistrate To Be Called The Greatest Liar of All Time) – My Written Submission Against the Malicious Magistrate

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR

DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO:  41-147-2010

 

(Dalam perkara Mahkamah Majistret di Kuala Lumpur

Permohonan Jenayah No: 89-206-2010 pada 21.9.2010)

 

ANTARA

MOHAMAD IZAHAM BIN MOHAMED YATIM                            …PERAYU

DAN

PENDAKWA RAYA                                                                        …RESPONDEN

[berkenaan perkara Mahkamah Majistret di Kuala Lumpur

Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009]

HUJAHAN BERTULIS PIHAK PERAYU

Dengan izin Yang Arif Hakim,

1.                  Ini adalah hujahan bertulis pihak Perayu untuk rayuan terhadap keputusan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur yang menolak permohonan Perayu pada 21.9.2010 agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009.

LATARBELAKANG KES:

2.                  Perayu dihadapkan dengan pertuduhan seperti berikut:

Bahawa kamu pada 13/07/09 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat 7-3-5 Jalan 2/38B, Taman SPPK Segambut, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah didapati memiliki sebanyak 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK yang di bawah milikan kamu. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 5(2) akta yang sama”.

3.                  Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil 7 orang saksi untuk membuktikan kes pendakwaan iaitu:

3.1             SP-1 iaitu Insp. Mohd Razif b. Mohd Zaid I/16542

3.2             SP-2 iaitu Zanariah binti Ibrahim

3.3             SP-3 iaitu Mohanaraj Naidi Subbiah

3.4             SP-4 iaitu Mohamad Zamri bin Roslan

3.5             SP-5 iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah I/17525

3.6             SP-6 iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus

3.7             SP-7 iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira binti Zakaria

4.                  Ekshibit-ekshibit yang telah ditanda adalah seperti berikut:-

4.1             P-1 – Borang Serah Menyerah (Borang D6)

4.2             P2(a), (b), (c), (d) – (n) – 7 DVC, 3 VCD, 2 Cd, 1 thumb drive dan hard disc

4.3             P3(a – m) – 13 keping DVD

4.4             P9 – Copy SP2

4.5             P11 – Quotation Baru

4.6             P12 – Surat Lawyer 1 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

4.7             P13 – Surat Lawyer 3 mohon hak penjagaan anak

4.8             P14 – Surat Lawyer 7

4.9             P15 – Surat Lawyer 7A2 contoh isteri derhaka yang nyata

4.10         P16-(dalam softcopy)Surat lawyer 7A2 dokumen

4.11         P17-(softcopy) surat lawyer 8 dokumen

4.12         P18 – Surat Lawyer 8 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan

4.13         P19 – yearfocal – terdapat nama Saliza binti Ramli

4.14         P20 – S6301428.jpg

4.15         P21-S6301429.jpg

4.16         P22-S6301430.jpg

4.17         P23-S6301431.jpg

4.18         P24-S6301432.jpg

4.19         P25-S6301433.jpg

4.20         P26-S6301434.jpg

4.21         P27-S6301435.jpg

4.22         P28-S6301436.jpg

4.23         P29-S6301437.jpg

4.24         P30-S6301438.jpg

4.25         P31- S6301439.jpg

4.26         P32- S6301440.jpg

4.27         P33- S6301441.jpg

4.28         P34 – Dang Wangi Report D29694/2009

4.29         P35 – Laporan Analisa

4.30         P36 – Copy SP2

4.31         P37-Borang Senarai Geledah

5.         Pihak Pembelaan telah memohon untuk memanggil 3 orang saksi untuk membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah dan telah dibenarkan pada 24.11.2010. Perayu telah memberi keterangan secara bersumpah pada 13.12.2010. Pada 6.1.2011, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menolak permohonan Perayu untuk memanggil 2 orang saksi lagi dan menetapkan tarikh untuk Hujahan pada 18.1.2011.

6.         Pihak Perayu juga pada tarikh Sambung Bicara 13.12.2010 semasa kes Pembelaan telah mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen untuk menunjukkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap ekshibit-ekshibit “P-12” hingga “P-19”  kerana pembuat tidak dipanggil dan terdapat keterangan bercanggah di antara satu sama lain tetapi Mahkamah enggan menerima dan menanda dokumen-dokumen tersebut sebagai keterangan pihak pembelaan.

7.         Bagi permohonan Perayu agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009, afidavit-afidavit berikut telah difailkan dan Perayu memohon kepada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini agar afidavit-afidavit tersebut dirujuk bagi pendengaran rayuan ini:

6.1       Afidavit Sokongan Perayu yang diikrarkan pada 14.9.2010(kemudian daripada ini dirujuk sebagai “Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut”); dan

6.2       Afidavit Jawapan Nurwahida Binti Mat Khairuddin yang diikrarkan pada 21.9.2010(kemudian daripada ini dirujuk sebagai “Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut”).

8.         Perayu ingin menyatakan pada peringkat rayuan ini bahawa pada hari pendengaran permohonan agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009 pada 21.9.2010, Majistret telah menetapkan hujahan lisan pada jam 2.30 petang tetapi apabila prosiding dimulakan pada jam 2.30 petang pada hari yang sama, Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur terus membuat keputusan menolak permohonan Perayu agar beliau menarik diri daripada mendengar  Kes Tangkap tersebut.

9.         Oleh yang demikian Perayu tidak berpeluang untuk membangkitkan bantahan terhadap Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut. Bantahan yang ingin dibangkitkan oleh Perayu terhadap Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut adalah deponen yang mengikrarkan afidavit adalah bukan Timbalan Pendakwaraya yang mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009.

10.       Di samping itu Perayu tidak berpeluang untuk membuat hujahan mengenai alasan-alasan yang telah dibangkitkan dan mengutarakan kes-kes yang menjadi asas bagi permohonan Perayu.

HUJAHAN PIHAK PERAYU

11.       Pihak Perayu dengan sesungguhnya ingin menyatakan di sini bahawa hanya pada 29.11.2010 Alasan Penghakiman bagi keputusan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menolak permohonan Perayu agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 menarik diri daripada mendengar perbicaraan kes ini pada 21.9.2010 diperolehi dan  oleh yang demikian Perayu berhujah bahawa Perayu telah diprejudiskan oleh kelewatan tersebut sehingga Mahkamah yang Mulia ini terpaksa menangguhkan rayuan ini ke tarikh pendengaran pada 12.1.2011.

12.       Perayu ingin merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Tinggi Voon Chin Fatt v. Public Prosecutor ACRJ(KL) Criminal Appeal No 3 1949 (di Tab A mukasurat 4Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Spenser Wilkinson J memutuskan bahawa kelewatan menyediakan Alasan Penghakiman yang menyebabkan pendengaran rayuan ditangguhkan adalah tidak boleh diterima:

“The delay in bringing the appellant to trial was regrettable. But the delay since the trial in the hearing of this appeal, which was due solely to the inability of the appellant to obtain the grounds of judgment of the learned District Judge was, in my opinion inexcusable.”

In view of the confusion between admissible and inadmissible evidence; of the fatc that admissible evidence does not appear to have been as unassailable as the learned District Judge appeared to have thought; and of the possibility of prejudice to the appellant through the long delay in writing the grounds of decision, it is impossible for this conviction to stand.”

13.       Walaubagaimanapun pihak Perayu turut berhujah mengenai alasan-alasan pihak Perayu di dalam permohonan agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar perbicaraan Kes Tangkap No: 2-83-7119-2009 seperti di perenggan 3 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut.

14.       Alasan di perenggan 3.4 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut telah didengar dan keputusan telah dibuat pada 11.10.2010 oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dan tidak lagi relevan kepada rayuan ini. Rayuan telah dibuat terhadap keputusan tersebut di Mahkamah Rayuan.

15.       Bagi alasan di perenggan 3.5 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut, Nota-nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan kes tangkap tersebut pada tarikh-tarikh 7.6.2010, 8.6.2010, 29.7.2010, 30.7.2010, 4.8.2010, 17.8.2010, 6.9.2010,20.9.2010, 21.9.2010 dan 30.9.2010 telah dibekalkan pada 5.10.2010 dan video rakaman perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010 yang dibekalkan TIDAK sepenuhnya dan terdapat percanggahan di dalam Nota-nota Keterangan tersebut sebagaimana yang telah dibangkitkan pada pendengaran permohonan di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini sebelum ini pada 11.10.2010.

16.       Terlebih dahulu Perayu ingin menyatakan bahawa Perayu membangkitkan bantahan terhadap Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut kerana deponen yang mengikrarkan afidavit adalah bukan Timbalan Pendakwaraya yang mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap No:2-83-7119-2009.

17.       Mengikut perenggan pertama Afidavit Jawapan  Tersebut, deponen adalah Pembantu Undang-Undang yang lebih rendah grednya daripada Timbalan Pendakwaraya dan tidak mengendalikan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap tersebut kerana mengikut Nota-nota Keterangan, Timbalan Pendakwaraya adalah Nurul Ashiqin dan Siti Hajar.

18.       Oleh yang demikian Perayu berhujah bahawa Afidavit Jawapan Tersebut tidak boleh digunapakai untuk pendengaran permohonan agar Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur menarik diri daripada mendengar perbicaraan Kes Tangkap No: 2-83-7119-2009 kerana  deponen tiada pengetahuan tentang prosiding perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut.

19.       Pihak Perayu ingin merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Agung (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) Wee Choo Keong v MBf Holdings Berhad & Anor And Another Appeal [1995] 3 MLJ 549 (Tab B di mukasurat 26 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah dan Sarawak) memutuskan bahawa afidavit tidak boleh digunakan apabila tidak dapat membuktikan fakta-fakta yang diikrarkan di dalam afidavit tersebut:

“It is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only that Wee at the material time on 10 February 1993 at about 4.25pm was in his office, but also that the alleged acts and/or omissions by Ivan Wong were done on the instructions of Wee and were sufficient to constitute evasion of service of the court order on the part of Wee. After careful deliberation of submissions by counsel for both sides and detailed examination and analysis of all relevant evidence adduced in the form of affidavits and exhibits, I was of the view that the evidence, taken in totality, was insufficient to prove or fell short of proving to the criminal standard, ie beyond reasonable doubt the charge of contempt by evasion of service of the court order dated 9 February 1993 as alleged.”

20.       Pihak Perayu juga turut merujuk kepada kes Zamrud Properties Sdn Bhd v Pang Mooi Gaid & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 180 (Tab C di mukasurat 12 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) Faiza Thamby Chik J telah memutuskan bahawa afidavit yang diikrarkan oleh deponen yang tiada pengetahuan tentang fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit berkenaan maka afidavit berkenaan tidak boleh digunapakai:

The deponent in encl 2 has clearly stated that he was informed by his counsel of the happenings at the full trial in the sessions court. The deponent clearly has no personal knowledge of the happenings or the course of the trial at the sessions court and therefore is unable on his own to prove the facts as alleged in his affidavit. This is clearly hearsay evidence.”

21.       Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang apabila dinyatakan di perenggan 1 bahawa alasan Perayu di perenggan 3.1 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut adalah satu alasan yang tidak munasabah.

22.       Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa pertuduhan di bawah Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 berada di bawah bidangkuasa Mahkamah Majistret. Walaubagaimanapun tiada sebarang kes berkenaan ‘hard disk’ yang telah diputuskan oleh mana-mana mahkamah di Malaysia disandarkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

23.       Oleh yang demikian, pihak Perayu ingin sesungguhnya menegaskan alasan di perenggan 3.1 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut amat perlu diambilkira kerana pertuduhan yang dihadapkan terhadap Perayu mengenai cakera keras (‘hard disk’) memang merupakan kes pertama seumpamanya di Malaysia.

24.       Perayu berhujah dengan lebih lanjut bahawa apabila pertuduhan terhadap Perayu merupakan kes pertama seumpamanya di Malaysia dan tiada kes-kes yang pernah diputuskan oleh mana-mana Mahkamah di Malaysia maka adalah lebih wajar Majistret yang lebih kanan dan berpengalaman mendengar kes ini kerana melibatkan isu-isu teknikal dan undang-undang yang lebih kompleks dan mencabar.

25.       Setakat ini kes yang telah diputuskan di mahkamah Negara-negara Komanwel yang melibatkan pertuduhan mengenai cakera keras (‘hard disk’) adalah kes R v. Trapp [2009] S.J. No. 64; 2009 SKPC 109; 2009SK.C. LEXIS 686 (Tab D di mukasurat 1-13  Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana pakar telah menunjukkan kepada mahkamah penggunaan ‘hash function’ atau ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘hash value’ merupakan proses yang sangat kritikal dan penting di samping pengimejan forensik cakera keras dilakukan sebelumnya. Di dalam kes tersebut, pakar forensik komputer telah menggunakan SHA-1 sebagai ‘hash function’, ‘hash value’ pengiraan ‘hash value’ ditunjukkan dan dibandingkan dengan salinan imej forensik bagi cakera keras semasa perbicaraan.

26.       Oleh itu jelas terdapat ‘lacunae’di dalam undang-undang di Malaysia berkenaan pembuktian kes melibatkan cakera keras dan Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 seharusnya menggunapakai peruntukan Seksyen 5 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah di mana undang-undang di England digunapakai untuk prosedur pembuktian kes melibatkan cakera keras.

27.       Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 di dalam Alasan Penghakimannya di perenggan 2 ada menyatakan bahawa kes telah selesai di peringkat pendakwaan dan sudah ditetapkan untuk keputusan. Keputusan telah diberikan pada 4.12.2010 di mana terdapat kes prima facie dan Perayu dipanggil membela diri walaupun hujahan pihak Pendakwaan bersandarkan kepada keterangan Saksi Pendakwaan keenam yang diisytihar sebagai (dengan izin) ‘hostile witness’ oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 dan otoriti-otoriti yang dikemukakan di dalam hujahan bertulis pihak Pendakwaan tidak lengkap dan konklusif mengenai terdapat satu kes prima facie yang memprejudiskan Perayu.

28.       Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia ini bahawa Perayu telah memohon Alasan Penghakiman bahawa terdapat satu kes prima facie terhadap Perayu agar Perayu dapat menyediakan kes pembelaan dan juga memanggil saksi-saksi bagi pembelaan. Walaubagaimanapun sehingga ke hari ini Alasan Penghakiman tersebut tidak diperolehi.

29.       Pada 13.12.2010 apabila Perayu membuat permohonan agar kes ditangguhkan dengan mengemukakan otoriti bahawa rayuan ini perlu didengar terlebih dahulu, permohonan telah ditolak tanpa mengambilkira kes yang telah diputuskan dan dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah Majistret yang mengikat Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

30.       Perayu telah mengemukakan kes Mahkamah Rayuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) kes Rowstead Systems Sdn Bhd v. Bumicrystal Technology (M) Sdn Bhd [2005] 2 CLJ 471 (Tab E di mukasurat 471 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa penangguhan prosiding perlu dibenarkan apabila terdapat rayuan berkenaan keputusan Hakim yang menolak permohonan daripada menarik diri daripada mendengar kes tersebut.

Di muka surat 471, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“As mentioned above, this case comes under the category of non-automatic disqualification. Hence the need to prove whether the element of bias exists. It has to be objectively decided, based on all the facts and circumstances of the case. But more important question to be asked is whether it is proper for such decision to be made by presiding judge against whom bias has been alleged? In other words, when a party alleges that a presiding judge is biased, and if the presiding judge himself decides he is not, would such decision not infringe the rule of natural justice in that “one should not be a judge in one’s own cause”. This, we think, is the crux of the instant case, even more so when the learned JC would have to decide the degree of bias that would be sufficient to affect his impartiality. In our judgment, this situation would come within the meaning of special circumstances.

We have taken into consideration the fact that in the event that a stay a proceedings was not granted and the learned JC be allowed to proceed with the hearing of this case, it would result in a waste of time and effort by all persons involved since if the Court of Appeal allows the appeal the whole proceedings conducted by the learned JC would have to be completely expunged. In the circumstances it would be more expedient to allow a stay of the proceedings until the hearing of the appeal has been completed.”

31.       Pada 24.12.2010 apabila kes ditetapkan untuk sambung bicara bagi kes Pembelaan dan sepina kepada saksi turut dicatitkan tarikh yang sama, waran tangkap dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah kerana dikatakan tarikh sambung bicara sebenarnya pada 23.12.2010.

32.       Pada 6.1.2011 tarikh yang ditetapkan untuk Sebutan waran tangkap, waran tangkap telah dibatalkan dan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah menolak permohonan pihak Pembelaan untuk memanggil 2 orang saksi pembelaan dan menetapkan kes untuk hujahan bertulis pada 18.1.2011.

33.       Selanjutnya, Perayu berhujah bahawa Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang apabila mendapati bahawa tiada sebab-sebab yang kukuh yang dapat membuktikan bahawa akan ada ketidakadilan ataupun keputusan yang berat sebelah dibuat oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 seperti di perenggan 3 Alasan penghakiman bertarikh 11.11.2010.

34.       Bagi membalas alasan ini Perayu dengan sesungguhnya memohon agar Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dapat melihat sendiri rakaman video sepanjang perbicaraan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 6.11.2011 supaya Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dapat menilai sendiri samada Perayu telah dibenarkan mengemukakan soalan-soalan dengan sepenuhnya semasa pemeriksaan balas.

35.       Bagi menjawab alasan di perenggan 3 Alasan Penghakiman tersebut, Perayu bersandarkan alasan di perenggan 3.2 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut, di mana pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa cara Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 mendengar dan menjalankan perbicaraan Kes Tangkap tersebut tidak mengikut kaedah dan prosedur di bawah undang-undang. Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 seharusnya membuat arahan yang jelas.

36.       Pada 29.7.2010 sehingga 19.10.2010 Perayu tidak dapat mengutarakan soalan-soalan dengan sepenuhnya terhadap semua saksi-saksi pendakwaan semasa pemeriksaan balas kerana dihalang oleh Mahkamah.

37.       Selanjutnya, bagi alasan di perenggan 3.3 Afidavit Sokongan Tersebut,

pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa hak Perayu telah dinafikan untuk melantik peguambela dan mendapat satu perbicaraan yang adil dan telus menurut Artikel 5 Perlembagaan Persekutuan (Tab F di mukasurat 1 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu).

38.       Artikel 5 Perlembagaan Persekutuan memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

5. Liberty of the person.

(1) No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.

(2) Where complaint is made to a High Court or any judge thereof that a person is being unlawfully detained the court shall inquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order him to be produced before the court and release him.

(3) Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult by a legal practitioner of his choice.

39.       Tiada direkodkan di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi sambung perbicaraan pada 29.7.2010 mengenai permohonan penangguhan untuk melantik peguambela.

40.       Oleh itu hak Perayu untuk mendapat satu perbicaraan yang adil mengikut prinsip , dengan izin, ‘natural justice’ yang merangkumi ‘right to a fair hearing’ telah dikompromi.

41.       Bagi menyokong alasan ini pihak Perayu bersandarkan kepada satu kes

Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) di dalam kes Jaginder Singh & Ors v. Attorney-General [1983] 1 MLJ 71 (Tab G di mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Raja Azlan Shah AG LP, Abdul Hamid FJ dan AbdoolCader J membenarkan rayuan perayu di dalam kes tersebut dan memutuskan seperti berikut:

What also vitiated the committal for contempt of court in this case was the learned judge’s failure to make plain to the appellants the specific nature of the charges and the opportunity to give them a fair hearing.”

42.       Pihak Perayu juga turut merujuk kepada kes Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] AC 322, PC, (Tab H di mukasurat 14 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) Lord Denning telah memutuskan bahawa:

“… The rule against bias is one thing. The right to be heard is another. Those two rules are the essential characteristics of what is called natural justice. They are the twin pillars supporting it. The Romans put them in the two maxims: Nemo judex in causa sua, and Audi alteram partem. They have recently been put in the two words, Impartiality and Fairness. But they are separate concepts and are governed by separate considerations. In the present case inspector Kanda complained of a breach of the second. He said that his constitutional right had been infringed. He had been dismissed without being given a reasonable hearing”.

43.       Adalah dihujahkan oleh Perayu bahawa hak untuk mendapat perbicaraan yang adil bukan setakat Mahkamah menyediakan pen dan notepad untuk catat nota prosiding (mukasurat 12 Nota Keterangan) tetapi hak untuk mendapat satu perbicaraan yang adil merupakan salah satu prinsip asas (dengan izin) ‘natural justice’.

44.       Menurut Nota Keterangan, terdapat ruang (‘gap’) di antara ekshibit-ekshibit yang dikemukakan di mahkamah yang menyebabkan pihak Perayu tidak dapat berhujah sepenuhnya dan ini telah memprejudiskan Tertuduh. Pihak Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia bahawa di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 17.8.2010 tiada keterangan mengenai ekshibit-ekshibit “P4” “P5”, “P6”, ”P7, “P8’ dan “P10”. Di sini pihak Perayu telah menunjukkan bahawa Nota-nota Keterangan yang dibekalkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur adalah tidak sempurna dan ini boleh memprejudiskan Kes Tangkap tersebut.

45.       Tiada senarai klip video yang disediakan oleh Saksi Pendakwaan ke-7 (SP7) selaku Pegawai Penyiasat dan setiap satu daripada 106 klip video yang menjadi asas pertuduhan tidak ditanda sebagai ekshibit. Ini dapat dibuktikan dengan tiada keterangan direkodkan di dalam Nota-nota Keterangan sehingga 6.1.2011.

46.       Selain daripada itu, setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan tersebut, banyak tokok tambah, percanggahan keterangan yang direkodkan dan juga fakta-fakta penting tidak direkodkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur. Di antara percanggahan keterangan tersebut SP1 telah menyatakan bahawa beliau tiada sijil ENCase tetapi mengikut Nota Keterangan tersebut SP1 menyatakan bahawa beliau ada sijil dari satu syarikat dan identiti syarikat tersebut tidak dinyatakan (mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan tersebut).

47.       Pihak Perayu juga berhujah bahawa terdapat tokok tambah di dalam Nota Keterangan pada 20.9.2010 apabila Kes Tangkap tersebut ditetapkan untuk Sebutan waran tangkap kerana Perayu tiada memaklumkan kepada Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur bahawa Perayu dilepaskan pada waktu pagi 6.9.2010 tetapi ianya direkodkan di dalam Nota Keterangan (mukasurat 58 Nota Keterangan). Ini amat memprejudiskan Perayu kerana lain alasan diberikan lain yang direkodkan oleh Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.

48.       Perayu juga turut menyatakan bahawa Perayu tidak berpeluang untuk mengemukakan laporan polis Pengadu asal semasa pemeriksaan balas saksi pendakwaan kelima dan semasa Perayu memberi keterangan (rakaman video perbicaraan pada tarikh 13.12.2010) kerana Mahkamah sendiri tidak membenarkannya walaupun laporan polis Pengadu asal amat material di dalam Kes Tangkap tersebut (mukasurat 47 dan 48 Nota Keterangan).

49.       Tambahan lagi di dalam Kes Tangkap tersebut, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur telah menerima sebagai bukti setiap dokumen lain yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1 dan dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’ (Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21”, “P-22, “ P-23”, “P-24” P-25”, “P-26”, “P-27”, “P-28”, “P-29”, “P-30”, “P-31”, “P-32” dan “P-33” mukasurat 16,17 Nota Keterangan) yang tiada kaitan langsung dengan pertuduhan dan tidak termasuk di dalam lingkungan definisi “filem” sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002. Walaubagaimanapun bantahan telah dibangkitkan oleh Perayu.

50.       Pihak Perayu juga ingin menyatakan bahawa pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” adalah tanpa sebarang kebenaran daripada pembuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut, memprejudiskan Perayu dan tidak relevan kepada pertuduhan terhadap Perayu.

51.       Pihak Pendakwaan turut memanggil SP6 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” yang kononnya mengikut pihak Pendakwaan diekstrak dari cakera keras tersebut. Walaubagaimanapun SP6 menggunapakai peruntukan undang-undang Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 kerana beliau mempunyai ‘privilege’ ke atas gambar-gambar berbentuk perlakuan tersebut yang merupakan satu bentuk komunikasi di antara Perayu dan SP6. Mahkamah sendiri telah turut memutuskan bahawa ekshibit “P-20” hingga “P-33” adalah dokumen-dokumen yang dilindungi di bawah privilege di bawah Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan juga telah membuat keputusan bahawa SP6 adalah (dengan izin) ‘hostile witness’.

52.       Pihak Perayu ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh VT Singham J di dalam kes Ah Poon & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 CLJ 521 (Tab I di mukasurat 10 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana VT Sigham J menyatakan seperti berikut:

“Irrelevant and Prejudicial Facts Or Evidence

[17] As for the police report which contains serious allegation that the accuseds are suspected to be involved in the activity of prostitution, it cannot be denied that this is highly prejudicial, inadmissible or is otherwise objectionable and the accuseds have every right to know and understand the contents and they should be given the opportunity of raising any objection to the contents of the police report which is against them. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to show whether the contents of the police report which has been marked as exh. P 3 was read and explained to the accuseds and what was their response.

[18] It is paramount importance that all documentary evidence which are tendered as evidence by the prosecution and marked as exhibits in proceedings where the accused has pleaded guilty to a charge if possible should be shown, read and explained to the accuseds and understood by him or her so that in the event the contents of the documents which contains some incriminating facts which implicates the accuseds are disputed or not admitted, the document will have to be rejected without having it marked as an exhibit…..Be that as it may, a document or an exhibit is not to be admitted unless it is relevant to the charge.”

53.       Adalah dihujahkan bahawa Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur seharusnya memastikan Mahkamah berlaku adil kepada Perayu tambahan pula Perayu tidak diwakili peguam dan perlu mengemukakan soalan-soalan semasa pemeriksaan balas setiap saksi pendakwaan sendiri.

54.       Perayu ingin merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Rayuan Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Bhd v Yong Liuk Thin & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 213 (Tab J di mukasurat 17 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“To disqualify a judge, there must be circumstances or facts which have
been shown to exist which would lead a reasonable and fair-minded
onlooker or which would have given reasonable ground for him to suspect that the case would not be decided according to the evidence.”

55.       Perayu berhujah bahawa Perayu telah berjaya menunjukkan fakta-fakta dari Nota Keterangan dan rakaman video perbicaraan Kes Tangkap tersebut yang boleh menjurus kepada keadaan yang munasabah bahawa Kes Tangkap tersebut diputuskan berdasarkan bukti-bukti yang tidak kukuh.

56.       SP5 iaitu pegawai yang terlibat semasa geledah dan SP7 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat sendiri mengesahkan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Oleh yang demikian milikan secara fizikal tidak dibuktikan langsung (rakaman video prosiding perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).

57.       Pihak Perayu seterusnya berhujah bahawa prinsip undang-undang yang digunapakai oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 adalah bukan prinsip undang-undang yang terpakai untuk penentuan samada permohonan untuk seseorang Hakim menarik diri daripada mendengar kes di hadapan beliau.

58.       Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2 merujuk kepada kes Mohamed Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v Inspector General of Police [2001] 2 MLJ 481 (Tab K di mukasurat 21 dan 22 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Augustine Paul J memutuskan seperti berikut:

“Any attempt made to hold a judgment against the decider whether directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly or even dressed and fashioned as a perception will strike at the very core of the administration of justice and lead to the destruction of the independence of the judiciary. A criticism can be said to be fair, even when wrong, if it is based on a legal analysis of the issues decided in a case. A criticism cannot be fair when it is built upon facts which are not truly stated and also when it is based mostly on surmises or unauthorized versions furnished by interested parties. On
the facts, the application made to recuse the judge was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court. Just as it is
improper for a judge to hear a case when there may be a reasonable perception of bias if he hears the case, it is equally wrong for him to disqualify himself from hearing a case when there are no grounds to do so”

59.       Oleh yang demikian otoriti yang digunapakai untuk Alasan Penghakiman

bertarikh 11.11.2010 adalah tidak relevan.

60.       Adalah dihujahkan bahawa prinsip undang-undang yang terpakai bagi menentukan isu seseorang Hakim perlu menarik diri daripada mendengar kes di hadapan beliau adalah undang-undang yang mantap seperti mana prinsip undang-undang yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) di dalam kes Mohamed Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 1 MLJ 321 (Tab L di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:

“The test to be applied in the present case was the ‘real danger of bias’
test. Hence, the question here was whether having regard to the facts
and circumstances, was there a real danger of bias on the part of the
learned trial judge when he heard the habeas corpus application“

Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes tersebut merujuk kepada undang-undang yang diputuskan di England berkaitan ‘bias’ seperti di dalam kes R v Gough [1993] AC 646 seperti berikut:

“[7] In England, the courts applied the ‘real danger’ of bias test in a criminal case. In R v Gough [1993] AC 646, the House of Lords rejected the reasonable suspicion test. Lord Goff, after examining the authorities in detail, reformulated the real danger test as follows (at p 670):

[Having] ascertained the relevant circumstances, the court should ask
itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a
real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the
tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or
have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party
to the issue under consideration
(Emphasis added.)

[8] His Lordship also made it clear that this was the test to apply in all cases of apparent bias, whether concerned with justices or other members of inferior tribunals, or with jurors (like Webb) or with arbitrators.”

61.       Perayu berhujah bahawa berdasarkan kes Mahkamah Persekutuan tersebut, (dengan izin) ‘the real danger of bias’ boleh dibuktikan daripada Nota Keterangan dan rakaman video perbicaraan Kes Tangkap tersebut seperti mana hujahan-hujahan lanjut di perenggan-perenggan 26 hinga 49 di atas.

62.       Di dalam kes Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577 (Tab M di mukasurat 8 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) Lord Denning memutuskan bahawa Mahkamah perlu mengelak unsur-unsur ‘bias’ seperti berikut:

“A man may be disqualified from sitting in a judicial capacity on one of two grounds. First, a “direct pecuniary interest” in the subject-matter. Second, “bias” in favour of one side or against the other.

So far as “percuniary interest” is concerned, I agree with the Divisional Court that there is no evidence that Mr John Lannon had any direct pecuniary interest in the suit.

So far as bias is concerned, it was acknowledged that there was no actual bias on the part of Mr Lannon, and no want of good faith. But it was said that there was, albeit unconscious, a real likelihood of bias. This is a matter on which the law is not altogether clear: but 1 start with the oft-repeated saying of Lord Hewart CJ in R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256: “It is not merely of some importance, but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”

In R v Barnsley Licensing Justices, ex parte Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers’ Association [1960] 2 QB 167, Devlin] appears to have limited that principle considerably, but I would stand by it. It brings home this point: in considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. Tt does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand: Nevertheless there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not enough. There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The court will not inquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: “The judge was biased.”

63.       Pihak Perayu turut berhujah bahawa adalah menjadi tanggungjawab Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur pada setiap masa untuk bersifat adil, ‘impartial’ dan membantu Perayu di dalam perbicaraan Kes Tangkap tersebut yang tidak diwakili peguambela sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

64.       Perayu ingin mengemukakan pandangan berkenaan ‘impartiality of judges’ di mana NH Chan di dalam bukunya “How To Judge The Judges” di mukasurat 17 (Tab N mukasurat 17 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) merujuk kepada David Pannick, di dalam buku Judges, pada mukasurat 39-40, yang mencatatkan seperti berikut:

“Few judges could hope to emulate the impartiality of Chief Justice Mansfield: he presided, fairly, at the trial of Lord George Gordon in 1781 for alleged treason despite the fact that his own house had been burnt down in the riots provoked by Gordon. The trial resulted in Gordon’s acquittal (see Lord Campbell, The Lives of the Chief Justices of England, 3rd edn, 1874, Vol 3, pp 128-129). But all judges would now decline to sit in judgment on a case where their personal feelings or interests made it impossible for them to act in an impartial manner.

For an account of what caused the Gordon Riots, see Lord Denning What Next in the Law, pp 23, 24:

The greatest tragedy that befell Lord Mansfield was in the Gordon Riots of 1780.

One of the subjects on which he had always shown his enlightened views was that of religious toleration…. But he was in advance of his time. On one occasion the City of London elected a man as sheriff. They knew he was a dissenter and would not serve. They imposed a fine on him for not serving. Lord Mansfield held that the fine was invalid. It was a piece of persecution. He said:

“Temporal punishment ought not to be inflicted for mere opinions with respect to particular modes of worship.”

The City was so upset that many regarded Lord Mansfield as “little better than an infidel”.

On another occasion a Roman Catholic priest had said mass contrary to the law of the land. He was tried before Lord Mansfield and a jury. He was undoubtedly guilty as the law then stood. But Lord Mansfield summed up for an acquittal. His final words to the jury were:

“Take notice, if you bring him in guilty the punishment is very severe; a dreadful punishment indeed! Nothing less than perpetual imprisonment!”

The jury found a verdict of “Not Guilty”: but many zealous Protestants were candalized. Rumours were spread abroad that the Lord Chief Justice was not only a Jacobite but a Papist, and some even asserted that he was a Jesuit in disguise.

Lord George Gordon then led the cry of “No Popery” and stirred up the people to violence. The great object of vengeance was Lord Mansfield. The mob marched on his house in Bloomsbury Square. The magistrates wished him to call in the soldiers to defend him. But he refused. The multitude came on, carrying torches and combustibles. They began to batter his front door. He then escaped with his wife through the back door. They burnt his house and all that was in it. His precious library went up in flames.

At p 25:

The insurrection was quelled. Lord George Gordon was tried for high treason. Lord Mansfield presided at the trial with a jury. Nowadays we should have considered it undesirable, lest he be thought to be prejudiced against Gordon. But Lord Mansfield tried the case with perfect propriety. Erskine defended Gordon. The defence was that Gordon himself had no hand in the violence. It was the “lawless herd, with fury blind” who did it. The jury acquitted Gordon. It was the best thing that could happen.

According to Lord Bingham (see The Sultan Azlan Shah Law Lectures, Lord Bingham: The Law as the Handmaid of Commerce, p 367):

… although Mansfield has left a generally golden reputation behind him, he was in his day the subject of sustained personal vilification perhaps never suffered by any other judge in any place at any time. I refer to the anonymous Letters ofjunius, some of which were addressed to him personally and attacked in the strongest terms his partial and pro-government approach in particular to libel trials. During the Gordon riots of June 1780 his carriage windows were smashed by the mob, he was hustled as he left the House of Lords, his house in Bloomsbury Square was burned and his library destroyed. In comparison with penalties such as these the strictures of the press to which the modern judge is exposed may seem a somewhat moderate affliction.

He served as Chief Justice for 32 years.”

65. Daripada keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan sebagaimana yang direkodkan di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi Kes Tangkap tersebut, amat jelas terdapat unsur-unsur pendakwaan bersifat mala fide (“Malicious Prosecution”) di dalam Kes Tangkap tersebut dan faktor ini perlu diambilkira oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini.

66. Kesimpulannya berdasarkan hujahan-hujahan yang dikemukakan di atas, Perayu memohon agar rayuan ini dibenarkan kerana pihak Perayu telah berjaya menunjukkan terdapat ‘real danger of bias’ di pihak Majistret di dalam mendengar dan membuat keputusan bagi Kes Tangkap tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, Perayu dengan sesungguhnya memohon agar satu perintah penggantungan prosiding dibuat berdasarkan kes Rowstead Systems Sdn Bhd v. Bumicrystal Technology (M) Sdn Bhd [2005] 2 CLJ 465 yang mengikat Mahkamah ini di mana sekiranya satu pengantungan prosiding tidak dibenarkan akan membuang masa dan merugikan usaha setiap pihak sekiranya rayuan ini dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah ini. Oleh itu, Perayu memohon agar perintah dibuat agar kes terhadap Perayu didengar oleh Majistret lain demi keadilan bagi Perayu di dalam kes ini.

……………………………..

Mohamad Izaham bin Mohamed Yatim

Perayu

12hb Januari 2011



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Computer Simulations – Expert Evidence: LAWRENCE v KEMPSEY SHIRE COUNCIL 3429 of 1986 SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES EQUITY DIVISION

One must be very careful with computer predictions. Usually they are the result of someone making assumptions and assessments of various vital factors and feeding these factors into the comPuter. Unless those assumptions and assessments are proved by evidence (or are conceded to be valid) the mere fact that a computer produced a prediction is of no evidentiary value whatever. It is clear [*72] law that an expert witness’ evidence on matters of fact is in the same position as the factual evidence of any other witness; English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd 1973 1 Ch 415, 421; Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 16 ACSR 227, 231. That problem cannot be overcome merely by feeding unproved factual material into a computer and treating as evidence what the machine produces.

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Copyright (c) 1996 INFO-ONE INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD.
NEW SOUTH WALES UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
LAWRENCE v KEMPSEY SHIRE COUNCIL
3429 of 1986
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
1995 NSW LEXIS 11428; BC9504607
20-24 March 1995 (Wauchope), 28-29 March 1995 (Sydney), heard;
12 May 1995, delivered

CATCHWORDS: [*1] ENERGY and RESOURCES 27 – Riparian rights Right to have water flow
undiminished in quality – Provision of “harmless” effluent affects quality.
EVIDENCE 138 – Computer results – Hydrologist’s computer model of flood
patterns – Inadmissible unless underlying assumptions properly proved.
FENCES and BOUNDARIES 3 – Water boundary – Torrens land – Non-tidal stream
made tidal by council works – Ad medium filum rule applied.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 40 – Torts – Nuisance caused by sewerage works – Statutory
defences considered – Local Government Act. 1993 s733.
NUISANCE 3 17 – Water – Low floods causing sewerage effluent to pond on
plaintiff’s land – Injunction refused – Damages awarded.
WATER 18 – Damage – Council’s sewerage works – Causing effluent to pond on
plaintiff’s land.

JUDGES: YOUNG J

HIS HONOUR: The plaintiff sues for an injunction and for damages in respect of an alleged nuisance in allowing sewerage effluent to enter Christmas Creek near Kempsey and to flow out of the creek and to pond on and deleteriously affect his grazing land. He also sues for infringement of his riparian rights. The proceedings were heard by me at Wauchope commencing on 20 March, 1995 and I sat  [*2] for a week in that town, though I had a view at Kempsey on the Tuesday of that week. The balance of the case was heard in Sydney. Mr Nigel Cotman appeared for the plaintiff, Mr Michael Murphy appeared for the defendant council.

The plaintiff is the proprietor of four blocks of land abutting Christmas Creek. He says that since the defendant or its predecessor did work on its West Kempsey sewerage treatment plant in 1976, his land has deteriorated in the manner I will consider shortly. Because these proceedings were only commenced in 1986, the Limitation Act operates so as to prevent any recovery for damages caused before 8 September, 1980. It is clear that at least since 1980, the plaintiff has been the proprietor of the relevant land. The West Kempsey sewerage plant is at the Northern extremity of the former Kempsey Municipal area. The sewerage is collected at the plant and passes through two ponds before leaving the plant and finding its way into Christmas Creek. Prior to 1976, the effluent passed over land then belonging to a Mr Griffin and passed into the creek near the boundary of Griffin’s land and the Kempsey Saleyards. I will call this point of entry into the creek Point [*3] X. A drain was constructed to pass the effluent to the creek by a more direct route. This drain joined the creek at a point further to the West of Point X, at a point I will call Point Y.

In 1976, a channel was constructed along a road reserve further to the West again. Since 1976, the effluent has passed along this channel and entered the creek at a point I will call Point Z, which point is not far distant from the plaintiff’s Western boundary.

The plaintiff’s property is vacant agistment lands on the Northern side of the creek, that is, across the creek from Griffin’s land.

The plaintiff says that his land is in a particularly good position because it provides agistment for stock even in times of drought. Furthermore, because it is within walking distance of the Kempsey Saleyards, the plaintiff was able to buy cattle at the saleyards when prices were depressed, keep the cattle on his property without incurring transport costs and then resell at a profit a short time later. The plaintiff is very familiar with the area having lived there most of his life. He can remember the creek in 1940 when he was a boy of fourteen. He says that at that time the creek was about 15 metres [*4] wide and relatively shallow. The measurement that the plaintiff gave was “up to the kneepad of the horse” which he eventually translated as being 3’6″ to 5′ 6″ ie between one and one point seven metres. There were however a series of five deep waterholes in the stretch of the creek fronting the plaintiff’s property which were extremely valuable in time of drought. The plaintiff thought that the first council sewerage works which affected the creek were effected in the early 1940s. The defendant’s evidence was that these took place about 1937.

The next major work was done in 1976. This was the work to which I have already adverted. In about 1985, the defendant council, in conjunction with the Glenrock-Tennessee Drainage Union deepened the creek. The purpose was to extend the distance for which the creek was tidal so that tidal forces would force water from the Macleay River to flush the creek fronting the plaintiff’s land.

The council did further work in the area in 1993. This worked changed the method of effluent dispersal from discharging the effluent into the creek to what is called land irrigation. That is the effluent, after various biological matter has been destroyed by [*5] sunlight in a holding pond for three weeks, is sprayed out over the surface of land now owned by the council, until it eventually flows in or over that land before entering Christmas Creek. There were other works done on Christmas Creek from time to time between 1937 and 1995 which had some influence on the land, but the periods I have noted map out the main divides.

Both parties called expert witnesses. The agricultural expert for the plaintiff was Miss Julia A Vincent, whilst Mr JWS Mackenzie gave agricultural expert evidence for the defendant.

I will analyse the evidence more closely in due course. However, one can readily see the ambit of the dispute when one realises that most of Miss Vincent’s findings are contradicted by Mr Mackenzie. Miss Vincent supported the plaintiff’s assertions that the plaintiff’s land had a carrying capacity of 200 head of cattle. Mr Mackenzie stated that the carrying capacity of the plaintiff’s land was only ever 35 head. He says that the land was always poor with relatively high acidity and that the tests show that the effluent affected land and adjacent land are at present not significantly different. Mr Mackenzie says that the extra nutrients [*6] in the creek are not a result of any one factor. He further says that the growth of water hyacinth and smartweed is not attributable to the effluent. Mr Mackenzie says that he has actually seen the plaintiff’s cattle drinking from the creek, a matter which Miss Vincent denies. In short, Mr Mackenzie’s evidence, if accepted, would prove that there was no effect to the plaintiff’s land from the effluent. Again, Mr Noble, the plaintiff’s valuer says that similar land to that of the plaintiff’s land had a value of $ 1750 per hectare in 1992. Mr Cotsell, the defendant’s valuer thought the figure was $ 1800 per hectare. Mr Noble considered that the plaintiff’s land has been detrimentally affected so that 40 hectares of flat land is now only worth $ 750 per hectare whilst the remaining 74.4 hectares has fallen to $ 1500 per hectare. Thus, he says, the plaintiff’s land is worth $ 60,000 less than had it not been affected by the effluent. Mr Cotsell, on the other hand, did not consider the plaintiff’s land to be detrimentally affected at all and said it was still worth $ 1,800 per hectare.

Both parties filed points of issues which were substantially identical, the plaintiff’s document  [*7] merely being more detailed than the defendant’s. However, as often happens, during the course of the trial, some issues were not pressed and the results of others became obvious.

Thus the real questions are: A. What, if any, riparian rights does the plaintiff possess? B. What is the boundary of the plaintiff’s land in the vicinity of the river? C. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover in nuisance? D. Did the effluent that flowed off the defendant’s land flow onto the plaintiff’s land? E. If D is answered, “Yes”, did the effluent have a deleterious effect on that land? F. What, if any, damage was caused by the effluent? G. Was that effect reasonably foreseeable? H. Did the defendant Council act properly under its statutory powers? I. Is the Council protected under s733 of the Local Government Act, 1993 or the corresponding section of the repealed Act? J. Is the Council protected by the relevant work being done within a Drainage Union? K. Is there any estoppel operating against the defendant to prevent it from asserting that the work was done under the aegis of the Drainage Union? L. What remedy should be given if the plaintiff succeeds? M. What is the proper quantification of the  [*8] plaintiff’s damages? I will deal with these issues in turn. I then will deal with a question of admissibility of evidence on which I reserved, namely: N. Are a scientist’s predictions of water flow based on a computer model admissible?.

In view of the agreement of the parties that time should be given them after delivery of these reasons to consider the form of order and cost, it is not necessary to consider at this stage what orders should be made as to costs. A. There is no doubt that the plaintiff has riparian rights. Riparian rights refer to the rights possessed by the proprietor of the banks (ripa) of a stream. The congerie of rights classically defined by English law by this term has been modified by statute in NSW, see Van Son v Forestry Commission of NSW, Cohen, J (unreported) 3.2.1995. In that case, his Honour confirmed that the effect of legislation has been to remove a good deal of peoples’ riparian rights. However, he said that the riparian right to take and use water “without sensible alteration in its character or quality” remain. (at 31).

The words, “without sensible alteration in its character or quality”, derive from the speech of Lord Macnaghten in Young v [*9] Bankier Distillery Co 1893 AC 691, 698. They were also used by Latham, CJ in H Jones and Co Pty Ltd v Kingborough Corp (1950) 82 CLR 282, 299. See also Embrey v Owen (1851) 6 Ex 353; 155 ER 579.

There was some debate before me as to what was meant by water of good quality. Mr Murphy submitted that it meant water that might be drunk. He put that even if one had a disinclination to drink the water because it contained effluent, if, on proper chemical analysis the water was safe to drink, then, the water was of good quality within the meaning of the rule.

In Young’s case, which was a dispute between a mine owner upstream and a distiller downstream, the mine owner argued that the distiller was still receiving pure water and that the water was not sensibly altered by reason only of its becoming harder. Indeed, the trial court had held that it had not otherwise been affected by the mine owner’s activities. this argument was roundly rejected by the House of Lords. If the water was affected in a way which made it unfit for any of the purposes for which a downstream owner was entitled to use it, it was [*10] sensibly affected (see especially at 696). Even a change in temperature in the water may well be a sensible alteration, see at 700. In Brocket v Luton Corp 1948 WN (Eng) 352, Vaisey, J said, (according to Coulson and Forbes on Waters and Land Drainage 6th ed (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1952, at 218) “I cannot believe that a riparian owner would be obliged to submit to the conversion of clear water into water dyed, for example, bright crimson with cochineal, which I believe to be a perfectly harmless ingredient.” In Embrey’s case, the Court of Exchequer seemed even to be troubled by adjectives such as “sensible” or “appreciable” and seemed to say that except in cases where the damage by the alteration was so small that it was covered by the maxim, “de minimis non curat lex”, the plaintiff could recover.

It is quite clear on the evidence that the water has a different composition as a result of the effluent flowing from the defendant’s land. Not only is it harder, but it also contains extra ingredients. It may or may not be water which those who are not squeamish may drink without ill effect, but that is not the test. The test is whether as a matter of fact and degree the water [*11] now is sensibly different to before the time when the defendant did its work. The scientific evidence is all one way that the water is sensibly different. The plaintiff suffered damage through this alteration. He was receiving water which was enriched with nutrients which promoted the growth of water hyacinth and smartweed. As I will demonstrate later in these reasons, he suffered escape of such water onto adjacent land whose pasture was affected.

The plaintiff also complained about the increased flow of water. For the reasons Cohen J set out in Van Son’s case, this sort of problem can no longer be considered as damage to riparian rights.

B. There was debate before me as to the boundaries of the plaintiff’s land, whether they were the bank of the creek or the centre line of the creek.

In Micklethwait v Newlay Bridge Co (1886) 33 Ch D 133, 145, Cotton, LJ said, “… the rule of construction is now well settled, that where there is a conveyance of land, even though it is described by reference to a plan, and by colour, and by quantity, if it be said to be bounded on one side by a river or public thoroughfare, then on the true construction of the  [*12] instrument, half the bed of the river or half of the road passes…”. This principle of construction is usually known as the Ad Medium Filum Rule. The plaintiff’s certificates of title describe his land by plan only. The lands abutting on the creek are comprised in two certificates of title. Certificate of Title Volume 2043 Folio 206 has a plan where the boundary is shown as a dotted line which is placed within Christmas Creek, but not in the centre of the creek. Certificate of Title Volume 2993 Folio 99 has a similar dotted line, but this time drawn just outside the bed of the creek. In view of the decision of the High Court in Lanyon Pty Ltd v Canberra Washed Sand Pty Ltd (1966) 115 CLR 342 the plans on the certificates of title in this fashion are insufficient of themselves to rebut the presumption. There being no other evidence the presumption should be held to apply.

There is the complicating factor in the present case that, although as at the date of grant the creek was non- tidal, as a result of works done by the defendant or the Drainage Union, it has become subject to tidal influence since about 1985. The ordinary presumption with respect to  [*13] tidal waters is that the proprietor holds up to the mean high water mark and the Crown holds below that line, AG v Chambers (1854) 4 De GM and G 206; 43 ER 486. However, one must look at the situation at the time of the grant. At that time the stream was non-tidal and the Ad Medium Filum Rule applied. It cannot be thought that anyone intended that the boundaries of land adjacent to the creek were to be affected by making it tidal, nor that the Crown would suddenly appear as the proprietor of the land below mean high water mark. This result is analogous to the result where there is accretion caused principally by reason of artificial works, see AG v Leighton 1955 NZLR 729. Thus the boundaries remained as before, subject, of course to a change if by gradual accretion, the creek changes course. Thus, the boundary of the plaintiff’s land where it adjoins the creek must be determined as the centre line of the creek.

C. As to nuisance, there is clearly no doubt that the plaintiff is a land owner. In the context of this case, nuisance will be committed if the defendant is permitting a deleterious substance to flow off its land onto the plaintiff’s land,  [*14] causing damage to that land.

In Van Son’s case, Cohen, J said at 30, “Private nuisance occurs when there is unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. That interference may result from physical damage to the land or it may consist of an interference with the comfort or amenities enjoyed on that land, such as by offensive smells or excessive noise. There may of course be circumstances where both physical damage and loss of enjoyment of amenities occur as a result of the same source of nuisance.”

The plaintiff gave evidence as to having been affected by four problems. The plaintiff says that from 1976, his land has been seriously and deleteriously affected by the defendant’s activities. The plaintiff says that the defendant has committed the tort of nuisance. The gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint is that the work done in 1976 had the effect of forcing nutrient enriched fluid into Christmas Creek which detrimentally affected him. In particular, the plaintiff says the following has occurred: (a) Bogging of cattle became severe at least up until the plaintiff connected some troughs to the town water supply in 1986; (b) Water hyacinth exploded from covering 50 [*15] per cent of the plaintiff’s creek frontage to 100 percent; (c) The amount of feed that the land produced fell off dramatically; (d) Smartweed began to replace native pasture up to the high water flood level. The plaintiff says that, in 1973, he was able to support approximately 200 head of cattle on his property. He says that, in 1973, it was extremely rare for him to see a beast experiencing difficulty in becoming bogged whilst drinking at the creek. Since at least 1980, this phenomenon has not been uncommon.

The plaintiff supported his case with his own evidence, that of some neighbours and family plus some expert evidence. The plaintiff’s principal expert was Miss Julia A Vincent, a consultant agriculturalist.

The defendant presented evidence from its own officers, from neighbouring occupiers and from experts including Mr Webb an expert hydrologist and Mr Mackenzie an expert agriculturalist. The plaintiff’s description of what has occurred on and around his property is consistent with small scale inundations being a matter of concern for a long period of time. Those inundations were most destructive after 1976 first because blockages of the creek occurred along the whole [*16] of the creek-frontage causing effluent to overflow and secondly the effluent was no longer “treated” by ponding on the Griffin land before discharge into the creek. The plaintiff said at T 39: “Q. The question was, when you complained to council in 1973, you told us you believed that the water hyacinth was somehow causing floods to your land? A. Yes. Q. How do you believe the water hyacinth was causing floods to your land? A. Because it was blocking the creek in the lower points. The creek was overflowing onto my land. Q. Where do you say those blockages were? A. Along my frontage to the creek. Q. So you had a flood on your land, but no flood below the Saleyards Bridge, is that what you’re saying? A. Correct.

Q. So it was a purely local flood? A. If you put that way, yes. ………… Q. It wasn’t Saleyards Bridge which was banking the water back? A. No. Q. It was water hyacinth in the creek above Saleyards Bridge? A. Yes. Q. Forming some sort of clumps in the creek? A. Yes. Q. And the water obstructed by those clumps would build up? A. Yes. Q. And flow across your land? A. Yes. Q. And down, back into the creek on the other side of the clumps? A. Not necessarily. Q. Where did [*17] the water go? A. Out onto my land. Q. Where did it come back into the creek? A. It didn’t go down. It stopped on my land and went on to the neighbour’s land where it was lower. The downstream of Saleyards Bridge, the land is higher again. Q. So the water came across the clump of water hyacinth into the creek? A. Yes. Q. In your creek front and flowed out across your land? A. Yes. Q. And the creek below that clump of water hyacinth was full of water too? A. Had water in it. Q. And that water was just as high as the water behind the clump of water hyacinth? A. I don’t know. Q. So you don’t know? You didn’t look at it? A. Yes, I looked at it. Q. What did you see? A. There seemed to be water in it. Q. And the height of the water below the water hyacinths clump, did that seem to be the same height? A. It seemed to be lower. Q. So there was nothing to stop the water coming out onto your land and back into the creek? A. Yes. Q. If the water was lower in the creek, what was stopping it going back? , A. Higher ground in the creek bank. Q. And there was some water going onto your land that got trapped by high ground? A. Yes.” It is common ground that the lip or cusp of the plaintiff’s land [*18] is low in relation to the top of the creek banks. It falls away into large shallow ponded areas that retain water. Those areas are clearly lower than the surrounding land, upstream or downstream. The cusp restricts ponded water from finding its way back into the creek.

Mr Brady who owns the property on the same side of the creek as the plaintiff downstream from the plaintiff’s property gave evidence supporting the plaintiff. He said he had fenced the creek to prevent his cattle from drinking the water or from becoming bogged. He had had the experience of having to rescue a bogged calf. Mr Prior who had long experience in the area, deposed to noticing a distinct deterioration in the plaintiff’s land since 1980. Mr Crossingham who owns property upstream gave similar evidence.

On the other hand Mr A Griffin gave evidence that water hyacinth was always a problem in Christmas Creek and that the effects of flooding have been no greater after 1976 than before. He says too that his cattle drink the water from the creek without any ill effect.

However, Mr G Griffin who owned land on the Southern side of the creek and who gave evidence for the defendant agreed with a lot of the topographical [*19] evidence given by the plaintiff’s witnesses. At T 282 he was asked: “Q. In the areas where the water hyacinth grew in your observation, it was growing most prolifically and quickly where it had access to the effluent? A. That’s right. Q. And was banking up into a solid mat from bank to bank in the creek? A. Yes. Q. So that it didn’t move for the wind or the water – it just sat there? A. That’s right. Q. Any additional hyacinth then got packed into the mat of hyacinth? A. That’s right. Q. So that in the end the creek was effectively choked by the hyacinth mat? A. That’s right. Q. And you would expect, as a farmer, I take it, to have water banked up behind such a mat of hyacinth? A. Yes. Q. Wouldn’t you? A. That’s right. Q. Because this made a wall of hyacinth root all across the creek bed? A. That’s right.” Mr Cotman points out that this process is the destructive one described by Miss Vincent. It is the process that is irrelevant to the type of large scale flooding described in the reports of Dr Webb the defendant’s hydrologist. Major floods come and go without depositing soluble matter on the soil because, by definition, that material is in solution and stays in solution. It is  [*20] the constant small inundations that deliver the nutrients to the plaintiff’s land.

Miss Vincent gave evidence to support this view. She said in her report of 17 December, 1993: “Flood waters containing pollutants, would normally be carried from the land by surface drainage, or by percolation through the soil, into the sub surface water table, then by natural lateral movement, drain out of the soil into the nearest water course, in this instance Christmas Creek. Some absorption of water soluble pollutants by the soil humus will occur during this process, but, for as long as the pollutants remain in solution, the majority will pass from the land with the water.

If however the water is ponded on the land for significant periods of time by a high level of waters in the drainage watercourse, ie, Christmas Creek, the process of evaporation becomes the dominant force acting on accumulated water. This process concentrates the pollutants. This concentrated solution percolates slowly down through the profile, being adsorbed onto the soil particles by the interactions of soil organisms, the pollutants and organic matter to form polluted humus which then adheres to the soil peds.

Once [*21] the soil solution is saturated with the pollutants, the remaining pollutants are deposited on the surface, as evaporation crystallises them from the super-saturated solution.

They will therefore remain on or in the soil until they are removed by dissolution following adequate rainfall or flooding. or are broken down again by soil organisms or removed from the humus by the roots of plants.

This being the case, the pollutants would be held in the soil for long periods of time. The process described above, vis ponding after rainfall and/or flooding, evaporation, concentration of the solution remaining on the land, percolation into the soil, incorporation into the humus, would have the effect of delivering directly to the soil, and the pastures, any pollutants contained in the water on the land.

PASTURE GROWTH Such a delivery, would cause the pastures growing on the land to be directly effected by the pollutants, the root systems effected by those pollutants as they are deposited within the top soil, directly in contact with the primary feeding roots.”

When she was in the witness box, Miss Vincent was asked (T 248): “Q. … in your hypothesis about the delivery of pollutants [*22] to the soil on Mr Lawrence’s property, is flowing water per se a problem where that goes onto a property, flows across and goes away? A. No. Q. If you were told the water flowed across Mr Lawrence’s property and flowed across someone else’s property and went away, would you expect that to be a problem to either of the properties? A. No. Q. If you were told that there was substantial and lengthy ponding of these waters after a flood has receded and then a process of, principally, evaporation to get rid of that water, would that then be a problem under your hypothesis? A. Yes, if it contained elements which were detrimental to the soil.” Miss Vincent also said at the same page: “Q. Were you relying on Mr Lawrence when you say that the property flooded more often? A. Yes, except I do have records – historical records of flooding over the years that he is referring to and the fact that he – him saying that the property flooded more frequently coincides with my history records from the Meteorological Bureau. Q. And these Meteorological Bureau records, what point do those records measure at? A. These are only records of rainfall, not measurements of height of water. Q. If I am understanding [*23] you – and correct me if I’m not – you are saying that the meteorological records indicate during the period you quote there was heavy rain more often? A. Yes. Q. And that the more frequent floods that Mr Lawrence was suffering were because of more frequent rains? A. Yes, the water remaining on the property longer because of the slow drainage rate.”

This evidence is in contrast with the evidence called by the defendant that the plaintiff’s land is in no worse condition than neighbouring land save that the plaintiff had not taken proper care of his land. It should be noted that even if conventional floods are considered, Dr Webb concedes that at the tail end of floods, as the creek drops and the effluent returns within its channel, the effluent plume will reach the opposite lands. That is the second form of inundation that might explain the readings for nutrients and other minerals detected in Miss Vincent’s samples.

I accept the plaintiff’s evidence and those neighbours who gave evidence on his behalf. Further, for the reasons set out in Section E of these reasons, I accept the expert evidence called by the plaintiff. Thus I accept the plaintiff’s basic proposition that he has [*24] suffered an actionable nuisance at the hands of the defendant.

D. There seems no doubt at all in my mind from the evidence that I have already quoted, that the effluent flowed into the creek and onto the plaintiff’s land abutting the creek.

E. The plaintiff says that his land was damaged because of its lessened carrying capacity, and by its becoming boggy.

As to carrying capacity, Mr Cotman submits that the carrying capacity of the land was reduced, as it necessarily must be, as pasture grasses were replaced by weeds.

Miss Vincent evaluated the prior carrying capacity of the land as follows (at T 240-241): “Q. What do you think it could have carried previously? A. Year round under good conditions? Q. No, year round under ordinary conditions? A. How many hectares is it… 114.4. Approximately 70 head. Q. You have told us, Miss Vincent, that 40 hectares of the 114 has been affected? A. Yes. Q. And that leaves 74 hectares not affected? A. Right. Q. Just on that proportion, if it could carry 70 cattle in ordinary conditions, it could carry a lot more than 12 on the high parts of the land alone, couldn’t it? A. Well, when I looked at the animals on his property and I looked [*25] at the boundaries of the property and I looked at the growth of the pastures which were all over it, as well as the high areas, my assessment was 12 at the time. Q. So the high areas had been eaten down? A. Yes, had been eaten down. Q. So your assessment of 12 is on the basis of the property when you looked at it had been eaten out? A. Yes. Oh, not only – no, no. Q. What else did you assess it on? A. The percentage of weed infestation, the lack of relevant pasture species in that area which has been affected. Q. Miss Vincent, my point is this, 74 hectares not affected, 40 hectares affected, that would not reduce the carrying capacity from 70 to 12 even if you destroyed and fenced off the 40 hectares? A. I see what you mean. Maybe I was estimating that on the 40 hectares, not on the whole 114. Q. So in addition to the 12 cattle the property can now carry, it can carry however many it used to carry on the high land? A. If that high land is not degraded as well, having been over-grazed over several decades. Q. Has Mr Lawrence’s high land been degraded over several decades by over-grazing? You have seen it? A. To a degree I would think so, yes.” At T 248 she continued: “Q. What would [*26] you treat as the year round carrying capacity of the high ground on Mr Lawrence’s property in a normal season? A. I would think most likely one animal per two hectares. Q. Are you assuming in that answer some access to water down in the creek? A. Yes. Q. Across the creek flat land? A. Yes. Q. If you assume access to the creek was impeded by for example a barrier of smart weed or whatever, does the high land have any inherent carrying capacity? A. None at all. Q. Indeed, does any of the property have an inherent carrying capacity? A. No. …….. Q. Going to other properties that you have seen in the district which have this configuration of creek flats and some high ground? A. Right. Q. What would you expect to be the year round carrying capacity of such a property in this district? A. I would think one for two hectares. ……… Q. I think you said a property in the district of that configuration would carry one beast per two hectares? A. Yes. Q. If you assume that the low land pasture is damaged in the way that you observed on Mr Lawrence’s property in 1992 – A. Yes. Q. – what would your estimate of the reduction in carrying capacity be in such a property? A. Over the whole  [*27] property? Q. Yes? A. It would be one per three hectares on the remaining area which was still good, as long as there was adequate water supply. Q. You said to his Honour a moment ago that the flats in a damaged condition would come back to one beast per three hectares on the high ground? A. Yes. Q. Why did you add the qualifier ‘on the high ground’? What is the impact on the low ground? A. The reason being that higher ground usually is not as fertile a place – creek or river flats usually – usually have a higher fertility than higher ground. Q. What would be the carrying capacity then per hectare of the lower ground? A. In its undamaged state? Q. First of all in its undamaged state and then in its damaged state? A. Okay. Normal creek flats – improved or unimproved? Q. Unimproved? A. Okay, roughly one animal per two hectares. Q. And in the damaged condition? A. None or almost none. As it is now it really – all of the damaged area has almost no species which are suitable as animal feed. Almost all of it is useless as animal feed.” The defendant’s experts deny that there is any lessening of the carrying capacity of the plaintiff’s land.

The answer to the question as to whether the [*28] effluent detrimentally affected the plaintiff’s land can only be answered after assessing the validity and credibility of the evidence. As I have already said, the evidence of Mr Lawrence on the one hand and Mr Davidson on the other hand amongst the lay witnesses and that of Miss Vincent for the plaintiff and Mr Mackenzie for the defendant were diametrically opposed. I had a view of the locus on the second day of hearing. It was agreed that I should be able to use what I saw on the view as evidence and not merely use it to understand the other evidence. I recorded my impression of what I saw on the view as significant in order to permit counsel to correct any misimpression I may have formed. The notes on the view were shown to counsel for comment, and, after alteration as a result of comment were admitted as Exhibit CX 103.

I realise that I need to be particularly careful about what I saw on the view because the state of the land can vary dramatically depending on the amount of rain it has recently received. I saw the land about three weeks after a minor flood and it may well be that its state in drought conditions is significantly different.

A series of neighbouring land holders [*29] gave evidence. Some said that they had no problem with their land. Some sided with the plaintiff and some with the defendant. Some merely gave evidence as to the going rates for agistment. I have already reviewed some of this evidence. This evidence generally to my mind reinforces the plaintiff’s assertions.

The plaintiff was cross-examined for over a day. He was very careful in making sure he understood the question before he answered. He listened attentively to the questions. He persistently requested Mr Murphy who was cross-examining for further details or definitions. However he did this to such a degree that suspicions arose during the first afternoon as to his bona fides. Was he just an ultra cautious witness or was he using the device of asking for more detail to evade questions? suspect the latter to be the case. This suspicion was reinforced when on one occasion I became a little exasperated and told Mr Lawrence just to answer the question about how high the tidemark was on the creek bank. He gave the extraordinary answer that it was about three metres above the usual water level. This was extraordinary as the only scientific evidence showed that the tidal effect was probably [*30] no more than 0.5 of a metre at the relevant spot. The plaintiff also gave some rather peculiar evidence at the end of the first afternoon. He admitted that, in normal times, when the creek was 15 metres wide, the volume of effluent as compared to the volume of natural ground and rain water was minor. He tried unsuccessfully to seek to evade the significance of this admission by diverting his hearers to considered abnormal times.

There was further bizarre evidence of the plaintiff that the creek rose abnormally depending on the toilet habits of the people of Kempsey. He said that he thought that because so many people arose, showered, went to the toilet and washed their dishes about the same time in the morning, there was a rising of the water level in the creek a corresponding time later (T 59). In view of the fact that there was a 20 day holding pond interposed between the water users and the creek, this was most unlikely. I thought that some of the bizarre evidence came about because Mr Lawrence hated the council officers (the feeling was probably mutual) and thought that he was being clever by giving these bizarre answers to Mr Murphy to whom the plaintiff seemed to take an [*31] instant dislike. I thought that some of the answers and the repeated requests for definition were designed to put the “city slicker” briefed by the hated council off his line rather than to mislead me.

Perhaps the most bizarre piece of evidence came at the very end of the plaintiff’s cross-examination where he did not dispute that he had told a public official that he could not read or write, that he had Alzheimer’s disease and asked whether he could have a document made out in a pseudonym and sign it as a marksman.

I formed the view that I could not completely accept the plaintiff in every detail. Indeed I am fairly sure that he exaggerated the impact on his land of what the council did. He also exaggerated the carrying capacity of his land. I make further reference to these exaggerations in sections F and M of these reasons.

Further I consider that the plaintiff was a witness who genuinely talked himself into believing in his case and he was not going to let anyone else dissuade him from that belief, even by scientific expertise. However, despite these misgivings I generally accept the plaintiff’s evidence as to the state of his land. Although the plaintiff’s evidence  [*32] is important, his case depends more on the acceptability of the expert evidence than on his own testimony.

I have already referred to Miss Julia Vincent who gave expert evidence for the plaintiff.

Miss Vincent gave her principal qualification as a Bachelor of Applied Science (Systems Agriculture) from Hawkesbury Agricultural College. This qualification was really a very basic one. Miss Vincent’s summary assessment of the plaintiff’s property in her report of 11 March 1993 is: “The all year carrying capacity of this property in its current condition would be around twelve (12) head. Carrying capacity of this property, now compared with other Macleay Valley properties in similar positions, is poor. Soil tests show marked increases of soil nutrients despite no fertilizers being applied. Many of these elements appear to be at toxic levels. The effects of this toxicity on the pastures has severely reduced the carrying capacity. Christmas Creek has a serious weed infestation which causes prolonged inundation, by flood waters carrying effluent from the sewerage treatment works.” She took soil samples and had them analysed. Her view was that there were very marked differences between [*33] the results of the tests taken above Point Z which she said “are normal on unimproved soil in this area and the abnormally high results obtained from the samples taken from below the discharge point where no fertilizer has been applied.”

The samples were collected by Mr Lawrence in Miss Vincent’s presence. He later pointed out the positions from which he had taken the samples to Mr Mackenzie who took further samples from these positions. Mr Mackenzie sent the samples to a different laboratory to that used by Miss Vincent. Unfortunately these laboratories appear to use different measurement scales so it was difficult to correlate their findings.

Mr Mackenzie failed to find any evidence of nutrient accumulation, toxicity or other damage that he could attribute to effluent.

Miss Vincent was cross-examined for some time. As I have said, she was obviously not the most highly qualified expert in this field. Further, primarily because the plaintiff was not a man with a great amount of spare money to spend on litigation, Miss Vincent allowed Mr Lawrence himself to collect some evidence and often just acted on his say so. However, Mr Lawrence gave evidence and attested to what he  [*34] had done and the cross-examination did not affect his evidence. Miss Vincent gave me the impression in the witness box that she was very competent in the field. She answered questions without hesitation and was not affected by cross-examination. Indeed there was, when one analyses it, very little challenge in cross-examination to what she said.

Miss Vincent depended considerably on Mr Lawrence for her “history”. As Mr Lawrence is a little unreliable so must some of Miss Vincent’s evidence be discounted. However, generally speaking, I thought that she was an impressive witness whose views should be accepted.

On the defendant’s side, Mr Davidson, the defendant’s Shire Engineer, now holding the office of Director of Operations gave evidence. Strangely, I was not told what, if any, qualifications, Mr Davidson possessed. He had, however, been the Shire Engineer for the defendant or one of its predecessors since 1972 and the evidence showed he had had some training for this position.

Mr Davidson’s basic position was that everything was all right and that the council had acted in a proper manner and in accordance with the state of knowledge at the time. He was cross-examined on  [*35] the correspondence with the State Pollution Control Commission (the SPCC). This correspondence showed that there had been complaints about the effluent in the creek both from the plaintiff and other landowners since at least 1980.

In its letter to the defendant of 4 February, 1981, the SPCC had indicated that its tests showed that some sections of Christmas Creek were anaerobic and that the creek was not considered to be in a good condition and contained some vigorous clumps of water hyacinth. The Minister wrote to the plaintiff in the same month noting that regular sampling of the effluent in the creek had not been carried out and that monitoring work required of the defendant had not been carried out. Furthermore the council was having difficulty achieving the effluent quality required. However, by 1984, the SPCC seemed to have conceded that because of cost and other factors, discharge into Christmas Creek should be licensed.

Judell, Platt, Thomas and Associates Pty Ltd to which I will refer simply as Judell Platt reported to the defendant in February, 1985, “The elevation of the pH in the creek effluent discharge point is attributed to the alkalinity of entering effluent.  [*36]

It has been reported that cows will not drink enough water if it contains high concentrations of iron and the content of 4.0 to 8.6 mg/l of iron in the creek may have an effect on stock watering.

The elevation of iron concentration in the water at Kemp Street is attributed to the suspended material containing precipitated iron.”

Kemp Street is to the East of the plaintiff’s property. Kemp Street runs into Saleyards Road at a low bridge over the creek. Judell Platt’s report showed that the iron at Kemp Street was 8.6 as opposed to 4.0 upstream of the effluent discharge, non-filtrable residue 370 as opposed to 80, total alkalinity 84 as opposed to 59 and total hardness 87 as opposed to 48. Mr Davidson in cross-examination agreed that the SPCC required that before the defendant irrigated land on which a beast was to graze with effluent it had to be held in a holding pond for 20 days. Mr Davidson, however, considered that so long as the effluent just passed into a waterway it could hardly get onto grazing land except by pump irrigation so that the condition did not apply.

It T 321, Mr Cotman asked Mr Davidson: “Q. So I take it you would have discouraged pump irrigation from [*37] Christmas Creek below the discharge point because that would contravene SPCC requirement, is that right? A. No….Because pumping out of Christmas Creek in the vicinity or anywhere on the other side of the railway bridge is fine. It is tidal. ……….. Q. And at times of low water flow and irrigation might be sought, the flow was substantially from flows of effluent, wasn’t it? A. Yes. Q. And to irrigate onto pasture for cattle consumption would, as you understood it, have contravened SPCC requirements? A. I’m not sure about that. … Q. But as you understood the situation in 1981 the SPCC was saying to you in relation to the effluent you were discharging, this effluent should not be used for irrigation of pastures used for cattle grazing? A. That’s correct.” Mr Davidson then agreed that if people pumped from the creek for cattle grazing purposes that would be a breach of SPCC requirements, but said that that was a matter for the SPCC.

Mr Davidson seemed to be completely unaware until June 1985 that the introduction of nutrients including nitrogen and phosphorus would be a problem. He admitted, however, that in 1981 the SPCC had called attention to the undesirability of waste [*38] discharge into small rivers and streams. He says his concern was with algae and aquatic weeds.

The SPCC’s letter to the council of 26 June, 1985 included an expression of concern as to the nutrients that were passing into the creek and the Macleay River and indicating that steps would have to be taken to improve the water quality. It pointed out that the nutrients were causing the growth of large tracts of water weeds including some noxious varieties. SPCC advised against the use of the creek for domestic water or recreational use, but thought that there was no need to restrict other beneficial uses of the water.

There is no doubt that Mr Davidson appreciated right from the commencement of the diversion of the entry point of the effluent to Point Z that the creek would contain considerably more liquid upstream of Point Y than previously. However he appeared not to have foreseen any problem with the extra water. Earlier cross-examination went to the point that in 1980, Mr Davidson had said that, “Council should continue to control aquatic weeds on Christmas Creek and reduce the nuisance as much as possible by confining the flow to the bed of the creek.”

Mr Davidson at that [*39] time, and may still, held the view that so long as the polluted water stayed in the creek, the only problem was with aquatic weeds. He further felt that the way to control those weeds was with chemical treatment. He did not seem to appreciate that poisoned weed might well sink and block and poison the creek. Mr Lawrence opposed chemical treatment, and this led Mr Davidson to think even less of Mr Lawrence.

At T 312 the following cross-examination took place: “Q. You then went on to say ‘Council should continue to control aquatic weeds on Christmas Creek and reduce the nuisance as much as possible by confining the flow to the beds of the creek’? A. Yes. Q. What did you understand by that turn of phrase ‘Confining the flow to the bed of the creek’? A. By eliminating some of the blockages in the general area. Q. The creek might flow more freely? A. Well, by removing the blockage the level of the creek would be lower and its width would be confined. Q. It would not tend to flow over its banks and onto the adjoining land, is that right? A. Well, my essential aim was to reduce the level of the water to thereby narrow the width of the channel that was occupied by water. That meant a relatively [*40] small cut in any obstruction. Q. But your purpose was to attempt to confine the flow to the bed of the creek, wasn’t it? A. It was my perceived view that if we could narrow the width of the water from about 15 metres, any reduction would make management of the weed much easier. Q. But here on 29 you are talking simply about the control of aquatic weed, aren’t you? A. Yes. Q. Not about cutting creeks. It’s the control of aquatic weed? A. Yes. Q. You understood that uncontrolled aquatic weed was causing the creek not to be confined to the bed of the creek? A. No. My concern there was that we had a management problem that involved a length of creek about 15 metres wide that could be reduced markedly by some adjustment to the bed of the creek. ……… Q. Now you suggest that the council should continue to control aquatic weed on Christmas Creek and reduce the nuisance as much as possible? A. Yes. Q. By confining the flow in the bed of the creek? A. Yes. Q. You understood there was a nuisance being created by the flow not being confined to the bed of the creek, didn’t you? A. No. The nuisance was the propagation of water hyacinth.” Mr Cotman put that Mr Davidson’s answers are a little [*41] disingenuous in relation to his understanding of the effect on creek blockage on the creek water escaping the banks of the creek. His note, on which he was being cross examined, speaks in clear terms as to the appreciation of the risk of unconfined flow of the creek, ie an escape of water that would necessarily flow to the low land adjoining the creek on, inter alia, Mr Lawrence’s land. Drains and the like would be ineffectual because, by definition, the creek waters were higher than the land that would require draining. Drains would bring the inundation, not remove it.

Mr Davidson was not the most impressive of witnesses. He tended not to address the questions put to him, but to make speeches. I think this was more because, as a person in authority, he was more used to telling people things rather than having to listen to questions and answer them. Thus, I do not consider he was prevaricating at all. Indeed, I got the impression that he was a man who knew that his practical way of doing things was correct and was not at all concerned with extraneous matters such as pollution or the plaintiff’s rights. He had to do a job to disperse part of the sewerage effluent of the Town of  [*42] Kempsey as cheaply as possible and he did not allow other matters to cloud the issue. The defendant also called on hydrologist Dr Stephen Webb. I have already briefly referred to some of his evidence. I deal with the inadmissibility of his evidence from computer flood modelling in Section M of these reasons. His remaining evidence was of a technical nature and was more relevant to high flood conditions than to the low flooding problem that is to the core of this case.

Dr Webb commented adversely on the evidence given by Mr King, a Civil Engineer, called for the plaintiff. I do not consider that discussion or resolution of their differences would assist in the determination of the real issues in this case. Indeed Mr King’s evidence was mainly relevant only to the side issue as to whether the council’s method of performing its functions was the only way of performing them.

Mr Mackenzie finally appeared on the last day of the hearing. He said that he had been involved in giving evidence before some administrative tribunal in Canberra and was not able to be in court when he had been scheduled to give evidence in this case. Three factors tell against Mr Mackenzie’s evidence being [*43] accepted. First, it was clear to me from the view that the plaintiff’s property near the creek was far more deleteriously affected by bogging, smartweed and rushes than surrounding properties. Secondly, the scientific analysis of the water samples from Judell Platt show that the substances which were pouring into the creek, are substances which the SPCC branded as being harmful to domestic and recreational users of the creek and to cattle that might graze upon it. Thirdly, the warnings of the SPCC would seem to have been otiose if nothing harmful was happening.

As I have already said, Miss Vincent’s evidence clearly shows a considerable detriment to the plaintiff’s land by the inundation. Mr Mackenzie would have me believe that conditions on the plaintiff’s land near the creek are just the same as on similar land in the vicinity, so that the effluent has nil effect.

I find it impossible to accept the defendant’s basic premise that there is no difference to the plaintiff’s land from neighbouring land other than that caused by bad husbandry. The plaintiff’s land is good drought fodder land which has to the naked eye been affected by the smartweed and the growing of rushes etc  [*44] in the area where ponding has taken place after minor flooding.

A lot of time was spent in this case over the water hyacinth growth. This was not a problem at the time of the view, because there had been some major flooding and the water hyacinth had been washed away. The increased growth of water hyacinth did not directly cause the plaintiff damage. However, the presence of water hyacinth blockages from time to time exacerbated the problems with minor flooding to the plaintiff’s land. I do not accept the defendant’s view that the water hyacinth merely floats on top of the water relatively harmlessly and does not contribute to flooding at all. That might be true of a major flood, but, as has already been seen, it was the effect of a series of minor floods leaving ponded effluent on the plaintiff’s land which was the most significant problem.

On the other side of the case I must say that my view is that the plaintiff has overstated the position when he says that the native grasses have been destroyed. There was some confusion between the various experts as to what was an Australian Native Grass as opposed to grasses that at some stage in our history had been imported from the [*45] Northern hemisphere. It does not seem to me that this matters very much. I am convinced that some of the species of grass that were on the property when the plaintiff acquired it still remain on the property. I am also convinced that a significant amount of good fodder grass has been destroyed by the effect of effluent polluted water overflowing onto the grasslands.

Mr Murphy submitted that