My Written Submission On 4th November, 2010 (At the close of prosecution case for prima facie) – KES TANGKAP NO: 2-83-7119-2009: PP v MOHAMAD IZAHAM BIN MOHAMED YATIM
DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR
DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA
KES TANGKAP NO: 2-83-7119-2009
ANTARA
PENDAKWA RAYA
DAN
MOHAMAD IZAHAM BIN MOHAMED YATIM
HUJAHAN BERTULIS PIHAK PEMBELAAN
Dengan izin Tuan Majistret,
1. Ini adalah hujahan bertulis pihak pembelaan di akhir kes pendakwaan.
LATARBELAKANG KES:
2. Tertuduh dihadapkan dengan pertuduhan seperti berikut:
“Bahawa kamu pada 13/07/09 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat ******************************, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah didapati memiliki sebanyak 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK yang di bawah milikan kamu. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 5(2) akta yang sama”.
3. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil 7 orang saksi untuk membuktikan kes pendakwaan iaitu:
3.1 SP-1 iaitu Insp. Mohd Razif b. Mohd Zaid I/16542
3.2 SP-2 iaitu Zanariah binti Ibrahim
3.3 SP-3 iaitu Mohanaraj Naidi Subbiah
3.4 SP-4 iaitu Mohamad Zamri bin Roslan
3.5 SP-5 iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah I/17525
3.6 SP-6 iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus
3.7 SP-7 iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira binti Zakaria
4. Ekshibit-ekshibit yang telah ditanda adalah seperti berikut:-
4.1 P-1 – Borang Serah Menyerah (Borang D6)
4.2 P2(a), (b), (c), (d) – (n) – 7 DVC, 3 VCD, 2 Cd, 1 thumb drive dan hard disc
4.3 P3(a – m) – 13 keping DVD
4.4 P9 – Copy SP2
4.5 P11 – Quotation Baru
4.6 P12 – Surat Lawyer 1 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan
4.7 P13 – Surat Lawyer 3 mohon hak penjagaan anak
4.8 P14 – Surat Lawyer 7
4.9 P15 – Surat Lawyer 7A2 contoh isteri derhaka yang nyata
4.10 P16-(dalam softcopy)Surat lawyer 7A2 dokumen
4.11 P17-(softcopy) surat lawyer 8 dokumen
4.12 P18 – Surat Lawyer 8 mohon tangguh tarikh perbicaraan
4.13 P19 – yearfocal – terdapat nama Saliza binti Ramli
4.14 P20 – S6301428.jpg
4.15 P21-S6301429.jpg
4.16 P22-S6301430.jpg
4.17 P23-S6301431.jpg
4.18 P24-S6301432.jpg
4.19 P25-S6301433.jpg
4.20 P26-S6301434.jpg
4.21 P27-S6301435.jpg
4.22 P28-S6301436.jpg
4.23 P29-S6301437.jpg
4.24 P30-S6301438.jpg
4.25 P31- S6301439.jpg
4.26 P32- S6301440.jpg
4.27 P33- S6301441.jpg
4.28 P34 – Dang Wangi Report D29694/2009
4.29 P35 – Laporan Analisa
4.30 P36 – Copy SP2
4.31 P37-Borang Senarai Geledah
HUJAHAN PIHAK PEMBELAAN
5. Di dalam kes ini pihak Pendakwaan perlu membuktikan setiap intipati (‘ingredients’) pertuduhan berkaitan seksyen 5(1) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh iaitu; (1) bahawa Tertuduh mempunyai milikan ekslusif pada setiap masa yang material iaitu pada 13-7-2009 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di alamat 7-3-5 Jalan 2/38B, Taman SPPK Segambut, dalam Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, 106 klip video lucah yang disimpan di dalam Hard Disc jenis Hitachi Deskstar S/N R325559XK; dan (2) 106 klip video tersebut adalah lucah.
Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 bahawa (di mukasurat 504 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):
“I am of the view that the submission of the learned DPP in respect of the 1st ground comprising the 1st to the 3rd points is without merit. The charge preferred against the accused under s. 5(1) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 (“the Act”) requires proof of two essential ingredients:
(a) the accused was in exclusive possession at the material time, ie, 3p.m. on 18 November 2002 of the 18 obscene film’s in the form of VCD; and
(b) that the 18 film’s are of obscene material.”
Pihak Pembelaan juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 bahawa (di mukasurat 324 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):
“[5] Bagi membuktikan satu kes prima facie dibawah s. 5(1)(a) Akta Penapisan Filem 2002, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah membuktikan bahawa:
(a) Responden mempunyai milikan terhadap VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas;
(b) tiada sebarang keraguan tentang identiti barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah; dan
(c) kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”).”
Pihak Pembelaan juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon [2010] 5 CLJ 77 bahawa (di mukasurat 79 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan):
“The Charge
[8] The charge preferred against the respondent under s. 5(1) of the 2002 Act requires proof of two main ingredients ie, that:
(i) the respondent at the material time was in possession of the 65 obscene films in the form of DVD; and
(ii) that the 65 films (DVDs) are obscene.”
Isu Milikan Eksklusif Pada Setiap Masa Yang Material
6. Di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material telah dibuktikan dengan cara berikut, iaitu:
“Intipati (a)
[6] Dihadapan Majistret, pihak pembelaan berhujah bahawa gerai menjual VCD dan DVD lucah tersebut berada di tempat laluan orang awam dan ada kemungkinan bahawa barang-barang kes berkenaan dimiliki oleh orang lain. Tiada siasatan dibuat oleh pihak pendakwaan terhadap pendaftaran perniagaan gerai tersebut bagi menyiasat siapa pemilik gerai dan pihak pembelaan juga berhujah bahawa tiada seorang pelanggan pun ditangkap semasa serbuan.
[7] Berdasarkan keterangan dari pemerhatian yang dibuat oleh anggota-anggota serbuan selama lebih kurang sepuluh minit, didapati hanya responden sahaja yang berada di gerai tersebut dan beliau sendiri melayan pelanggan. Pemerhatian dibuat dengan jarak lebih kurang 30 meter dari gerai tersebut yang terletak betul-betul di hadapan restoran. Walaupun VCD dan DVD tersebut tidak berada dalam milikan fizikal responden, tetapi jelas dari keterangan saksi-saksi, OKT berada di gerai tersebut sepanjang masa pemerhatian dan beliau jugalah yang melayan pelanggan.
[8] Puan Majistret adalah betul apabila beliau memutuskan bahawa memandangkan gerai menjual VCD dan DVD itu adalah gerai di kaki lima (“gerai haram”), tentulah ia tidak didaftarkan. Sekiranya pihak pendakwaan membuat carian perniagaan sekalipun, usaha mereka akan menjadi sia-sia. Tentang isu ketiadaan seorang pelanggan pun ditangkap ataupun dipanggil untuk siasatan, ia adalah tidak perlu memandangkan tuduhan ke atas responden ialah terhadap kesalahan memiliki VCD dan DVD lucah, dan bukannya kesalahan menjual VCD dan DVD lucah. Oleh itu, pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa responden mempunyai milikan terhadap VCD-VCD dan DVD-DVD lucah berkenaan.”
7. Apa yang boleh difahamkan daripada kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, hanya si tertuduh berada di gerai haram tersebut sepanjang masa dan si tertuduh kelihatan melayan pelanggan dan ketika serbuan dibuat sewaktu si tertuduh berada di gerai haram tersebut, terdapat VCD dan DVD yang dikatakan lucah di gerai haram tersebut. Di peringkat pendakwaan ini, untuk membuktikan intipati ini, pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan dan pemunyaan sebenar premis tersebut dan DVD tersebut, cukup sekadar membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif. Pemilikan eksklusif tidak sama dengan pemilikan sebenar atau pemilikan fizikal.
8. Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material telah dibuktikan dengan cara berikut, iaitu:
“[9] Having read the appeal record and the written submission of the appellant and having heard both parties, I am in agreement with the learned deputy public prosecutor that the element of possession has been proved through the prosecution witnesses SP1, 2 and 3 who were members of the raiding party.
[10] The 65 DVDs alleged to be obscene were found under the counter of the premises and at the material time of the raid, the respondent was alone in the premises manning the counter. He attempted to flee when SP1 identified himself as a police officer.
[11] The facts of this case are similar to Mohamed Ibrahim v. PP [1962] 1 LNS 100 HC wherein the appellant was found to be in possession of 65 copies of the book “Tropic of Cancer”. The impugned books were found under the counter of his shop. The appellant in Mohamed Ibrahim (supra) was employed to manage the sale of books and though an attempt was made to absolve himself of knowledge as he could not read English, nevertheless the court held that the inference was irresistible that the 65 copies found in the shop for the purpose of being sold and that the appellant was the person in charge of selling of the books in the shop was in possession of them and in possession of them for purposes of sale. He also failed in his argument that knowledge was negated by his ignorance of the English language as the court held that he could have obtained the services of an English – speaking clerk in ordering the books.
[12] In this case, there was the uncontroverted evidence of SP1 and SP3 that the 65 DVDs were found under the counter and the respondent was found at the time of raid, behind this counter. Knowledge can also be inferred from the fact that he attempted flight when SP1 identified himself as a public officer. Therefore, viewed in its totality the prosecution had proved the element of possession.
[13] There is no cause for the adverse inference to be invoked as it is trite that the calling of witnesses is at the discretion of the prosecution and the burden is on the prosecution throughout to prove its case. I find no gap here, neither can it be said that there was any suppression of evidence.
[14] Therefore the learned magistrate had erred in holding that the element of possession was not proved and in invoking the adverse presumption.”
9. Apa yang boleh difahamkan dari kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, ketika serbuan dibuat, si tertuduh berada keseorangan dan sedang menjaga kaunter di dalam premis yang diserbu tersebut, dan DVD yang dikatakan lucah tersebut dijumpai di bawah kaunter tersebut. Di peringkat pendakwaan ini, untuk membuktikan intipati ini, pihak pendakwaan tidak perlu membuktikan pemilikan dan pemunyaan sebenar premis tersebut dan DVD tersebut, cukup sekadar membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif. Pemilikan eksklusif tidak sama dengan pemilikan sebenar atau pemilikan fizikal.
10. Menggunapakai ketiga-tiga kes di atas di dalam kes kita pada hari ini, untuk membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material, Tertuduh mestilah berada pada 13-7-2009 jam lebih kurang 6.00 petang di 7-3-5, Jalan 2/38B, Taman Segambut, SPPK, 50200 Kuala Lumpur, yang dikatakan terdapat bahan yang dikatakan lucah di sisi undang-undang tersebut.
11. Di dalam kes kita pada hari ini, jika dilihat pada Borang Senarai Geledah yang mesti diisi di tempat dan masa pemeriksaan, ianya merujuk kepada No. Repot 5070/09 Balai Jalan Patani, tempat/bangunan yang diperiksa ialah 7-3-5, Jalan 2/38B, Taman Segambut, SPPK, 50200 Kuala Lumpur (Premis tersebut), nama penghuni atau sesiapa yang hadir iaitu Ainy Suhailah binti Yunus (Penghuni tersebut), nama pegawai polis yang hadir semasa pemeriksaan iaitu Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal, Insp Siti Mazira bt Zakaria dan D/Kpl Nora (Pegawai Polis tersebut), pada tarikh 13-7-2009 dan masa yang tidak disebut (Tarikh dan Masa tersebut), barang yang dijumpai adalah seperti yang tertera di dalam Borang Senarai Geledah tersebut. Ini adalah terkandung di dalam Borang Geledah yang diberikan kepada penama pada 13.7.2009. Walaubagaimanapun Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010 adalah berbeza kerana ada masa dicatatkan. Pihak Pembelaan telah membangkitkan bantahan berkenaan perbezaan di antara Borang Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009 dan Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010.
12. Bagi membuktikan elemen milikan, pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi-saksi SP1, SP2, SP4 dan SP6.
13. Di dalam kes ini Tertuduh telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap setiap dokumen lain yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1 dan dalam bentuk ‘softcopy’ (Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21”, “P-22, “ P-23”, “P-24” P-25”, “P-26”, “P-27”, “P-28”, “P-29”, “P-30”, “P-31”, “P-32” dan “P-33” mukasurat 16,17 Nota Keterangan) yang tiada kaitan langsung dengan pertuduhan dan tidak termasuk di dalam lingkungan definisi “filem” sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh Seksyen 3 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002.
14. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil semula SP1 untuk membuktikan fakta bahawa komputer yang digunakan oleh SP1 untuk mencetak salinan dokumen-dokumen cetakan komputer adalah di dalam kawalan dan jagaan beliau. Walaubagaimanapun, ianya tetap memudaratkan kes pendakwaan kerana semasa pemeriksaan balas SP1 memberi keterangan bahawa tiada buku log (buku daftar akitiviti seliaan peralatan computer forensic) dan tiada sijil mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 dikemukakan untuk menunjukkan aktiviti-aktiviti yang dilakukan oleh SP1 melalui penggunaan komputer di pejabat beliau. Ini menyebabkan terputusnya rantaian bukti dan rantaian kawalan barang bukti.
15. Pihak Pembelaan bersandarkan kepada kes Pendakwa Raya v. Goh Hoe Cheong [2006] MLJU 0468 kes Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 0474 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana K N Segara J membuat keputusan seperti berikut:
“There was no witness from MAS and/or the authority managing KLIA called by the prosecution to prove the aspect of physical checking-in of the bags of passengers on flight MH020, particularly, the purported check-in of bags P6 and P23 by the 1st and 2nd accused, as well as the bag of Seok Hann(SP10). Therefore, the computer generated documents, namely, the baggage tags P6A, P23A and the respective baggage claim tags P16A and P31A, cannot be admitted in evidence unless S 90A Evidence Act, 1950 is complied with by the prosecution. No certificate was tendered to the Court signed by a person who either before or after the production of the documents by the computer was responsible for the management of the operation of that computer, or for the conduct of the activities for which that computer was used. In the circumstances I hold that P6A, P23A, P16A and P31A are inadmissible in evidence.”
16. Di dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 6 MLJ 678, kes Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 694,695 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan), Vincent Ng J telah memutuskan bahawa sijil diperlukan untuk pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer.
17. Di dalam kes ini pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil SP2 yang mengemukakan satu salinan dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan (Ekshibit “P-9” mukasurat 34 dan 35 Nota Keterangan). Pihak Pembelaan telah membangkitkan bantahan terhadap pengemukaan salinan dokumen tersebut kerana tiada kaitan dengan pertuduhan dan mengikut keterangan SP2 semasa pemeriksaan balas, dokumen asal telah dimusnahkan kerana polisi syarikat. Mustahil jika arahan ketua syarikat tersebut untuk melupuskan semua dokumen dan salinan yang berkaitan tetapi masih terdapat satu salinan yang tersimpan yang boleh digunakan untuk perbicaraan ini. Pihak Timbalan Pendakwaraya hanya bergantung kepada Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 sebagai peruntukan untuk penerimaan keterangan sekunder sebagai bukti tanpa membuktikan elemen-elemen kritikal yang dengan berkaitan pemusnahan dokumen asal dan tidak memanggil ketua SP2 yang mempunyai kuasa mengeluarkan arahan pemusnahan untuk memusnahkan dokumen asal dan tiada keterangan mengenai kaedah yang digunakan untuk memusnahkan dokumen asal tersebut. Saksi-saksi yang berkaitan dengan proses pemusnahan juga tidak dipanggil berserta dengan mesin yang digunakan untuk memusnahkan dokumen tersebut tidak dibawa ke mahkamah. Di samping itu SP2 tidak mempunyai kepakaran tulisan tangan dan tandatangan yang digazzettekan oleh kerajaan dan sudah pastinya bukan seorang pakar tandatangan untuk mengenalpasti tandatangan yang terdapat di atas salinan dokumen tersebut. Sekiranya perbandingan dibuat dengan dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan di Mahkamah melalui SP1 terdapat perbezaan yang ketara di mana dokumen yang ditender di Mahkamah tiada tandatangan mana-mana pihak dan kandungan juga berbeza. SP2 juga mendakwa salinan yang dikemukakan juga merupakan dokumen asal yang dikemukan oleh Tertuduh.
18. Di dalam kes Kum Wah Sdn Bhd v. RHB Bank Bhd [2009] 9 MLJ 490 kes Mahkamah Tinggi (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 498 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan), di mana Azian J memutuskan bahawa keterangan seorang pakar tandatangan yang tidak digazettekan mengikut undang-undang tidak boleh diterima:
“Based on their qualifications and experiences, I am more inclined to accept that PW4 is more qualified to give evidence in respect of whether the signatures on Exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and ‘D6’ are forgery. DW6 may have been the director general of the Malaysian Chemistry Department but he was never gazette as a document examiner in the government service. He said ‘I am not a document examiner. I have never produced a technical report. Yes, a technical report can only be produced by a gazetted document examiner. As such I am of the considered opinion that PW4 is more qualified and experienced to give testimony in respect of signatures on the three documents mentioned.”
19. Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 perlu dibaca bersama dengan Seksyen 45 untuk keterangan pakar diambil untuk pengesahan tandatangan di atas dokumen tersebut.
20. Dengan ini adalah dihujahkan bahawa salinan Ekshibit “P-9” yang ditender melalui SP2 tidak boleh diterima masuk sebagai dokumen ekshibit pendakwaan kerana tidak dibawa masuk melalui pembuatnya.
21. Ini jelas bertentangan dengan Seksyen 90 dibaca bersama Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memperuntukkan bahawa apabila pembuat dokumen tidak dipanggil, satu sijil pengesahan perlu dikeluarkan dan tiada sebarang tindakan diambil oleh pihak pendakwaan untuk mematuhi kehendak-kehendak peruntukan-peruntukan undang-undang di atas.
22. Untuk kes-kes jenayah, undang-undang keterangan terbaik (‘the best evidence rule’) adalah keterangan primer dan tiada Seksyen 65(1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 digunapakai bagi kes-kes jenayah. Oleh sebab itu Tertuduh ingin menyokong hujahan dengan prinsip yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Wong Choon Mei & Anor V. Dr. Kuldeep Singh & Anor [1985] 2 MLJ 373 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 376 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan sekiranya Seksyen 65 (1)(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 hendak digunapakai oleh mana-mana pihak, pihak tersebut telah mengambil semua langkah untuk mencari dokumen asal dan sekiranya dokumen asal telah musnah atau hilang, orang yang bertanggungjawab menjaga dokumen asal tersebut perlu mengesahkan fakta mengenai kemusnahan atau kehilangan dokumen asal tersebut.
Seah SCJ memutuskan seperti berikut:
“In short, before secondary evidence could be received the condition laid down in section 65(1)(c) viz. the original (the 4 X-rays) has been destroyed or lost, must be satisfactorily proved by admissible evidence, like calling the officer in charge of the X-ray Record Office. If the officer was not available then his absence should eb properly accounted for. In my opinion, it is highly undesirable to allow the 1st respondent, who was being sued by the appellant and who might be regarded as an interested party, to give hearsay, evidence that the 4 X-Rays had been lost or misplaced. His testimony might be treated as tainted. A fortitori, it might even be rejected on the ground of hearsay. This strict rule was reiterated by Lord Tenterden in Vincent v Cole 173 ER 1151:
“I have always acted (perhaps more so than other judges) most strictly on the rule; that what is in writing shall only be proved by the writing itself. My experience has taught me the extreme danger of relying on the recollection of witnesses, however, honest, as to the contents of a written instrument; they may be so easily mistaken that I think the purposes of justice require the strict enforcement of the rule”.
23. Ekshibit “P-9” yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan melalui SP2 hanya salinan fotostat, bukan cetakan komputer dan SP2 bukan pembuat dokumen tersebut yang begitu diragui kebolehterimaannya sebagai ekshibit. Walaubagaimanapun salinan Ekshibit “P-9” tersebut diterima sebagai eksibit oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2.
24. Salinan Ekshibit “P-9” yang dikemukakan oleh SP2 tidak boleh diterima sebagai keterangan dokumentar oleh Mahkamah berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang tersebut di atas.
25. SP5 telah mengesahkan bahawa beliau dan anggota polis yang dua lagi memasuki tempat kejadian tanpa satu waran yang sah di sisi undang-undang yang sudah tentu menimbulkan kacau ganggu terhadap penghuni premis tersebut (muka surat 48 Nota Keterangan).
26. Saksi pendakwaan SP5 memberi keterangan bahawa Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada tarikh rampasan barang kes dibuat iaitu pada 13.7.2009(muksurat 48 Nota Keterangan). SP5 menyatakan beliau hanya nampak seorang wanita dan dua orang kanak-kanak. Wanita yang dikatakan oleh SP5 tidak dicamkan di Mahkamah (mukasurat 46 dan 47 Nota Keterangan). SP5 semasa pemeriksaan balas turut menyatakan bahawa cakera keras (‘hard disc’) dipegang oleh Pegawai Penyiasat dari rak buku dan ada banyak buku. SP5 tidak tahu warna rak buku tersebut, di mana kedudukan rak buku, di mana kedudukan ‘hard disc’ pada rak buku tersebut dan bilangan rak pada rak buku tersebut (mukasurat 49 Nota Keterangan). Tiada gambar diambil dan ditunjuk kepada SP5 bagi membuktikan tempat barang rampasan ditemui (dinafikan oleh pembelaan). SP5 juga mengesahkan semasa pemeriksaan utama bahawa cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tidak berada di dalam milikan, jagaan dan kawalan Tertuduh pada masa rampasan dibuat kerana Tertuduh tidak berada di tempat kejadian.
27. Di dalam kes ini Tertuduh tidak pernah melihat cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang didakwa oleh pihak Pendakwaan dari tempat kejadian dari 13.7.2009 hingga ke saat ini.
28. Berasaskan keterangan SP5 dan SP7, pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut adalah berada di dalam milikan, jagaan dan kawalan Tertuduh. Di atas keterangan ini sahaja terdapat keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan dan Tertuduh boleh dilepaskan berasaskan alasan ini.
29. Tiada definisi untuk ‘milikan’ di dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC di dalam kes Pendakwaraya lawan Sim, Odita, Muhammad Architects Sdn Bhd [2008] 3 CLJ 623 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah perlu merujuk kepada definisi untuk milikan di dalam kes-kes yang telah diputuskan. Di dalam kes ini responden telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan milikan secara fizikal perisian yang melanggar hakcipta oleh responden.
Di dalam kes tersebut Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC memutuskan seperti berikut:
“The word “possession’ is not defined in the Copyrights Act 1987 and therefore it is pertinent to refer to judicial decisions involving criminal charges to guide us to define the word “possession’. Thus, it was the contention of the defence that prosecution has to establish physical possession of the alleged infringing programs by the accused. The prosecution failed to prove actual physical possession of the alleged infringing copies of computer programs, as evidence was before the court that the premises of the accused was not for the sole usage of the accused company but also shared among the other companies mentioned above. This by itself, in my view, is sufficient to sustain the order of acquittal.
30. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah lanjut mengenai isu ini di mana daripada Nota Keterangan tersebut, amat jelas saksi awam SP4 mengesahkan tiada surat-surat yang ditunjuk oleh pihak pendakwaan diterima oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Pulau Pinang (Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18, P19 dan muka surat 42, 43, 44 dan 45 Nota Keterangan) untuk membuktikan surat-surat yang dikatakan diekstrak oleh SP1.
31. Fakta ini seterusnya telah disahkan oleh saksi pendakwaan ketujuh iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat bahawa Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18 dan P19 (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010) tiada di dalam rekod Mahkamah Syariah. Oleh yang demikian Ekshibit P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18 dan P19 tidak seharusnya diterima sebagai ekshibit kerana tiada fakta mengesahkan kewujudan ekshibit-ekshibit tersebut.
32. Pihak Pembelaan ingin berhujah bahawa pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” amat jelas telah mencabul hak ‘privacy’ dan ‘privillege’ Tertuduh dan keluarga sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Artikel 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Pengemukaan dokumen cetakan komputer berupa gambar-gambar tersebut yang telah ditanda sebagai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” adalah tanpa sebarang kebenaran daripada pembuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut dan tidak relevan kepada pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh.
33. Pihak Pendakwaan turut memanggil SP6 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai ekshibit “P21” hingga “P33” yang kononnya mengikut pihak Pendakwaan diekstrak dari cakera keras tersebut. Walaubagaimanapun SP6 menggunapakai peruntukan undang-undang Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 kerana beliau mempunyai ‘privilege’ ke atas gambar-gambar berbentuk perlakuan tersebut yang merupakan satu bentuk komunikasi di antara Tertuduh dan SP6. Mahkamah sendiri telah turut memutuskan bahawa ekshibit “P-20” hingga “P-33” adalah dokumen-dokumen yang dilindungi di bawah privilege di bawah Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan oleh yang demikian tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti di Mahkamah (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010). Seksyen 122 Akta Keterangan 1950 memperuntukkan seperti berikut:
S122. “No person who is or has been married shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has been married; nor shall he be permitted to disclose anu such communication unless the person who made it or his representative in interest consents, except in suits between married persons or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.”
34. Pihak Pembelaan bersandarkan satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Mustapha Hussain J di dalam Palldas a/l Arumugam v Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 CLJ 661, 665 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 5 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) menyatakan bahawa perlakuan juga satu bentuk komunikasi di antara isteri dan Tertuduh.
“From the record of appeal, the appellant’s wife Gudi Kaur (PW3) had, in examination-in-chief, given quite a lengthy evidence of all communications between herself and her husband. Though some of the evidence relates between purely to acts, as distinct from words spoken, ie, what she saw appellant was doing, it is so inextricably interwoven with what appellant had said to her, that to separate each act from words spoken by the appellant to her would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Even if extricable and rejecting the words spoken, one would have their prejudicial effect still lingering.
Even though objection was not taken by the defence, this silence cannot convert what the law says is inadmissible evidence to be admissible. One would expect the wife’s evidence to be led in such a way as to confine such evidence to what she saw the appellant doing. The wife should have been stopped the moment she started uttering what her husband said to her. From the record it would seem that nobody ever bothered about this section 122.
35. Di dalam kes Public Prosecutor lawan Abdul Majid [1994] 3 MLJ 457 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 6 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan)James Foong J telah memutuskan bahawa isteri tertuduh boleh dipaksa memberi keterangan kecuali komunikasi yang dibuat oleh tertuduh kepada beliau melainkan jika keizinan tertuduh diperolehi seperti yang diperlukan di bawah S122 Akta itu.
36. Di samping itu Pemohon ingin menyatakan bahawa pengemukaan “P21” hingga “P33” tersebut telah mencabul hak ‘privacy’ Pemohon dan keluarga Pemohon sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Artikel 10 dan 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
37. Tertuduh berhujah bahawa milikan tidak boleh dibuktikan melalui keterangan persekitaran (‘circumstantial evidence’) iaitu dengan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Ekshibit-ekshibit “P-11”, “P-12”, “P-13”, “P-14, “P-15”, “P-16”, “P-17”, “P-18”, “P-19”, “P-20”, “P-21” hingga “P33” yang merupakan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan hanya kerana dokumen-dokumen tersebut didakwa terdapat di dalam cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh).
38. SP5 iaitu pegawai yang terlibat semasa geledah dan SP7 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat sendiri mengesahkan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Oleh yang demikian milikan secara fizikal tidak dibuktikan langsung (rakaman video prosiding perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).
39. Adalah dihujahkan juga bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan premis tempat kejadian kerana tiada gambar-gambar tempat kejadian dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan. Di samping itu, tiada rajah kasar disediakan oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7). Walaupun pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil SP3 untuk memberi keterangan tetapi gagal memberi lokasi tempat kejadian yang tepat dan tempat kejadian tidak dikenalpasti (mukasurat 40 Nota Keterangan). Selain itu premis tempat kejadian adalah rumah sewa yang turut berada di dalam kawalan SP3 yang sudah tentu mempunyai akses kepada premis tersebut. Oleh yang demikian bukan Tertuduh sahaja ada akses kepada premis tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh). Oleh yang demikian tempat kejadian tidak dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan.
SP3 di dalam pemeriksaan balas hanya memberi keterangan seperti berikut:
C : How many unit?
J : I’m not sure.
40. Sekali lagi pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada kes Pendakwa Raya v. Goh Hoe Cheong [2006] MLJU 0468 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 0471 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan)di mana K N Segara J memutuskan bahawa apabila tiada gambar dan pelan kasar tempat tertuduh ditahan di ‘baggage assembly area” maka terdapat keraguan di dalam kes pendakwaan.
41. Di antara ketiga-tiga Pegawai Polis tersebut yang hadir untuk pemeriksaan di Bangunan tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut, Insp. Mohd Shah Rizal bin Sahabudin Shah telah dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai SP5 untuk memberi keterangan mengenai penggeledahan tersebut.
42. SP5 ketika pemeriksaan utama telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 46 – 47 Nota Keterangan) bahawa:
“Pada 13-7-2009, saya terima arahan daripada ketua bahagian saya iaitu ASP Kamarudin untuk beri bantuan kepada pegawai penyiasat dari Pulau Pinang iaitu Insp. Siti Mazira untuk membuat rampasan dan pemeriksaan. Saya dan Insp. Mazira telah sampai di alamat 7-3-5, Jalan 2/38B, Taman Segambut SPPK, Kuala Lumpur. Saya dan Insp. Mazira telah sampai di alamat tersebut dan Insp. Mazira telah ketuk pintu rumah beberapa kali dan keluar seorang wanita. Insp. Mazira telah perkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai kanan polis dengan menunjukkan kad kuasa kepada wanita tersebut. Wanita tersebut dikenali sebagai Aini Suhailah binti Yunus. Kemudian kami masuk ke dalam rumah untuk buat pemeriksaan setelah menerangkan tujuan kehadiran kami bersama saya Insp. Siti Mazira dan seorang anggota perempuan iaitu Kopral Nora. Saya lihat ada 2 orang kanak-kanak. Dan saya lihat sebelah kiri ada 2 bilik satu bilik tidur dan satu bilik bacaan. Pemeriksaan dilakukan dalam bilik bacaan tersebut, saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah merampas satu unit hard disc di rak buku iaitu Hitachi Deskstar. No. Siri R32559XK, satu unit thumbdrive Data Traveller, juga di rak buku, 2 unit CD, 3 unit VCD dan 7 unit DVD dalam bilik tersebut. Dalam bilik tersebut juga saya lihat satu CPU dan monitor yang mana CPU tersebut dalam keadaan tidak bertutup dengan casing dan tiada sambungan wayar ke monitor atau power. Saya anggap ia tidak berfungsi. Lepas membuat pemeriksaan saya lihat Insp. Mazira telah buat rampasan ke atas barang-barang yang saya sebut tadi dan telah disenaraikan dalam senarai bongkah. Senarai bongkah dibuat oleh pegawai penyiasat dan lihat ia ditandatangani pemilik rumah iaitu Aini Suhailah. Satu salinan diberi kepada penama. Kemudian rampasan telah diambil oleh pegawai penyiasat. Saya nampak barang itu dirampas oleh Insp. Mazira sebab saya ada di belakang beliau. Suasana cerah kerana rampasan dibuat waktu siang. Barang kes sentiasa dalam kawalan Insp. Siti Mazira. Saya masih boleh camkan hard disk P2a dan P2b itu berdasarkan nombor siri. (Saksi dirujuk hard disc dan thumbdrive P2a dan P2b – dicamkan SP5). Hanya satu jenis hard disc sahaja yang ditemui. Pemeriksaan dilakukan hanya dalam bilik bacaan sahaja dan tiada apa-apa yang berlaku.”
43. SP5 ketika pemeriksaan balas telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 47 – 49 Nota Keterangan) bahawa, antaranya:
“Saya diminta bantuan daripada Insp. Mazira yang menyiasat bersabit laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/09.”
“Saya hanya dimaklumkan untuk bantuan tentang bersabit kes itu.”
“Saya diminta untuk beri bantuan pemeriksaan dan rampasan oleh Insp. Kamarudin kepada Insp. Siti Mazira bersabit Patani Report.”
“Pada 13-7-2009 masuk jam 6.30 petang.”
“Tak nampak si tertuduh masa itu di kawasan itu.”
“Semasa masuk buat pemeriksaan Insp. Mazira telah perkenalkan diri dengan tunjukkan kad kuasa polis, waran tiada.”
“Masa masuk dalam rumah, nampak satu wanita dan 2 orang kanak-kanak.”
“Saya membantu Insp. Mazira untuk membuat pemeriksaan rumah.”
44. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa melalui Borang Senarai Geledah dan keterangan SP5, dapat disimpulkan bahawa Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tiada di dalam Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut pada jam 6.30 petang.
45. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa tiada keterangan daripada SP5 mengenai masa di dalam Borang Senarai Geledah tidak dimasukkan.
46. Pihak Pembelaan berhujah bahawa masa di dalam kertas pertuduhan dan di dalam keterangan SP5 tidak sama. Tiada penerangan mengenainya daripada SP5. Begitu juga tiada penerangan mengenainya daripada SP7.
47. SP6 telah dipanggil untuk pemeriksaan utama hanya disuruh membaca sehelai kertas yang didakwa sebagai borang geledah oleh pihak pendakwaan. Tiada pengecaman yang dibuat dengan SP6 berkenaan ketiga-tiga anggota polis yang datang ke premis tersebut pada 13.7.2009.
48. SP7 telah dipanggil untuk pemeriksaan utama oleh DPP menyatakan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian.
49. Ada anggota polis lain yang memasuki premis tersebut pada masa material tetapi tidak dipanggil kerana berdasarkan keterangan SP5 semasa pemeriksaan utama:
“Kemudian kami masuk ke dalam rumah untuk buat pemeriksaan setelah menerangkan tujuan kehadiran kami bersama saya Insp. Siti Mazira dan seorang anggota perempuan iaitu Koperal Nora. Pihak Pembelaan memohon Mahkamah menggunapakai Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 di mana saksi ini sekiranya dipanggil akan memudaratkan kes pendakwaan walaupun beliau perlu dipanggil untuk pengesahan perbezaan Borang Geledah yang dikeluarkan pada 13.7.2009 dan Borang Geledah yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah pada 19.10.2010.
Isu Kaedah Analisis Forensik Komputer (SP1)
50. Saksi pakar SP1 dipertikaikan oleh pihak Pembelaan berdasarkan sebab-sebab berikut:
a. Pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh telah dibuat berdasarkan laporan polis SP1 Dang Wangi Report No. 029694/09 (Ekshibit “P-34” mukasurat 18 Nota Keterangan) apabila SP1 membuat pemeriksaan analisa pada 23.7.2009. Walaubagaimanapun di dalam salinan laporan polis tersebut ada jelas tercatit bahawa laporan polis tersebut tidak boleh digunakan untuk tuntutan atau perbicaraan di Mahkamah dan hanya untuk kegunaan dalaman PDRM sahaja. Oleh yang demikian pertuduhan di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah cacat, defektif dan tidak sah di sisi undang-undang kerana berasaskan laporan polis yang tidak boleh digunakan untuk pendakwaan dan perbicaraan di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. Walaubagaimanapun di akhir kes pendakwaan pada 19.10.2010, Mahkamah ada menyatakan bahawa laporan polis SP1 sekarang adalah ‘First Information Report’ (rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).
b. Di dalam kes ini terdapat konflik kepentingan (‘conflict of interest’) dan melanggar etika seorang pakar (‘Breach of Expert Duties’) di pihak SP1 yang bertindak sebagai pakar dan pengadu pada masa yang sama dan telah memprejudiskan secara material pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh dan ini sangat bertentangan dengan kod etika dan amalan saksi pakar yang diterimapakai oleh mahkamah-mahkamah di seluruh dunia. Setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan-perbicaraan yang dijalankan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 29.7.2010, memang ketara bahawa terdapat konflik kepentingan (‘conflict of interest’) dan “Breach of Expert Duties” di mana saksi pendakwaan pertama (SP1) bukan hanya bertindak sebagai pengadu dan pakar tetapi juga sebagai pegawai penyiasat pada masa yang sama kerana semua barang kes diterima melalui beliau dan catatan di atas Ekshibit “P-20” hingga Eksihbit “P-33” ditanda oleh beliau mengikut keterangan SP7(rakaman video perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010). Keterangan SP1 bersifat keterangan dengar cakap (‘hearsay’).
Di dalam kes Alcontara A/L Ambross v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 MLJ 209 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 211 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:
“(5) Although no objection had been raised to the admission of one of the statement made by ASP Abdul Wahab which was clearly based on hearsay and therefore inadmissible, the judge was nevertheless under an automatic duty to stop it from being adduced, for inadmissible evidence does not become admissible by reason of failure to object.”.
c. Adalah menjadi hujah Pihak Pembelaan bahawa saksi pendakwaan SP1 hanya merupakan saksi pakar dan adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas bahawa keterangan seorang saksi pakar hanya bersifat sokongan (‘corroborative’), boleh diambilkira tetapi tidak semestinya perlu diterima dan Mahkamah sendiri yang perlu menentukan isu kebolehterimaan sesuatu bukti.
Pihak Pembelaan ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah kepada kes Public Prosecutor v. Lin Lian Chen [1992] 2 MLJ 561 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 317 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Agung telah mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa bila memanggil keterangan pakar, pihak pendakwaan mesti mendirikan kepakaran saksi tersebut.
d. Selain daripada itu, Pihak Pembelaan turut berhujah bahawa kaedah yang betul perlu digunapakai apabila melibatkan saksi pakar sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Hashim J di dalam kes Wong Chop Saow v. Public Prosecutor [1965] 1 MLJ 247 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) seperti berikut:
“To avoid confusion the expert witness should give his evidence as follows: He should first state his qualifications as an expert. He should then state that he has given evidence as an expert in such cases and that his evidence has been accepted by the courts.”
e. Daripada Nota Keterangan tersebut, tiada keterangan daripada SP1 yang menunjukkan kelayakan beliau dan samada beliau pernah memberi keterangan di mahkamah dan mahkamah menerima keterangan beliau.
f. Setelah meneliti Nota Keterangan tersebut, banyak tokok tambah, percanggahan keterangan yang direkodkan dan juga fakta-fakta penting tidak direkodkan oleh Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur. Di antara percanggahan keterangan tersebut SP1 telah menyatakan bahawa beliau tiada sijil ENCase tetapi mengikut Nota Keterangan tersebut SP1 menyatakan bahawa beliau ada sijil dari satu syarikat dan identiti syarikat tersebut tidak dinyatakan (mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan tersebut). Seperti yang dijelaskan di dalam buku “Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations” 3rd Edition muka surat 81, Bill Nelson, Amelia Phillps, Frank Enfiger, and Christopher Steuart:
EnCase Certified Examiner (EnCE) Certification
Guidance Software, the creator of EnCase, sponsors the EnCE certification program. EnCE certification is open to the public and private sectors and is specific to the use and mastery of EnCase computer forensics analysis. Requirements for taking the EnCE certification exam don’t depend on taking the Guidance Software EnCase training courses. Candidates for this certificate are required to have a licensed copy of EnCase.
Tertuduh ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah yang Mulia ini kepada kes Foo Fio Na v. Hospital Assunta & Anor [1999] 6 MLJ 738 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 758 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) yang merujuk kepada kes Whitehouse v Jordan & Anor [1981] 1 All ER pada mukasurat 276:
“While some degree of consultation between experts and legal advisers is entirely proper, it is necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to be the independent product of the expert, uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation. To the extent that it is not, the evidence is likely to be not only incorrect but self defeating.”
Tertuduh ingin juga merujuk kepada kes R v Harris [2006] 1 Cr App Rep 55 (di mukasurat 65 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan)seperti berikut:
“[271] It may be helpful for judges, practitioners and experts to be reminded of the obligations of an expert witness summarised by Cresswell J in National Justice Cia Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd, The Ikarian Reefer [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 at 81. Cresswell J pointed out amongst other factors the following,which we summarise as follows:
(1) Expert evidence presented to the court should be and seen to be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation.
(2) An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of advocate.
(3) An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions on which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which detract from his concluded opinions.
(4) An expert should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise.
(5) If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers that insufficient data is available then this must be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one.
(6) If after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on material matters, such change of view should be communicated to the other side without delay and when appropriate to the court.”
Tertuduh ingin juga merujuk kepada Australian Medical Association di dalam buku “Expert Evidence” muka surat 326 seperti berikut:
Expert Medical Witness – Policy Statement (March 1998)
2. Conflict of Interest
That the AMA believes that, when requested to provide an expert opinion and faced with conflict of interest, a practitioner should declare this or decline to offer an opinion.
g. Saksi SP1 tidak memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini kelulusan akademik berkaitan dengan kepakaran di dalam bidang komputer dan tidak pernah menduduki peperiksaan (EnCE) yang diiktiraf oleh syarikat EnCase Software bagi melayakkan beliau mengendalikan perisian Encase dengan betul dan tepat berdasarkan piawaian persijilan ISO kawalan mutu forensik komputer antarabangsa. Ini amat memudaratkan kes Pendakwaan kerana kelayakan dan kepakaran SP1 tidak dibuktikan.
SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas memberi keterangan seperti berikut:
C : “Qualified untuk handle Encase?
: Saya berkursus untuk belajar Encase dan jalankan analisa, tak ingat nama company tapi ada sijil”
(mukasurat 22 Nota Keterangan)
Ini disokong dengan satu kes Pendakwaraya lawan Kit Chee Wan [1999] 1 MLJ 16 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 6 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa saksi pakar mesti membuktikan latarbelakang kelayakan akademik dan keupayaan kepakaran beliau.
h. Analisis terhadap barang rampasan yang dijalankan oleh SP1 tidak mengikut piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa. SP1 di dalam keterangannya semasa pemeriksaan balas mengaku bahawa beliau tidak melakukan analisa forensik yang ditetapkan oleh piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa malah SP1 juga mengaku tidak melakukan proses ‘acquisition’, ‘forensic imaging’, dan pengesahan kesahihan kandungan hard disk tersebut (mukasurat 2, 3, 4, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).
Bagi isu ini pihak Pembelaan memohon agar Mahkamah yang Mulia ini menggunapakai peruntukan Seksyen 5 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan dibaca bersama Seksyen 56 dan Seksyen 57 Akta Keterangan 1950 untuk mengambilkira kes-kes yang telah diputuskan mengikut Common Law atau undang-undang yang berkuatkuasa di England mengenai kaedah pembuktian forensik komputer memandangkan tiada kes berkaitan pembuktian cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang diputuskan dengan piawaian forensik antarabangsa di Malaysia pada masa ini.
Piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa untuk penggunaan perisian Encase, peralatan pengimejan forensik ImagerSolo III, dan beberapa perisian yang lain yang diiktiraf oleh piawaian forensik antarabangsa dan persijilan ISO kawalan mutu forensik komputer antarabangsa, kaedah ‘acquisition’ yang betul dan tepat di samping kaedah pengimejan menggunakan format pengimejan forensik komputer yang diterima oleh piawaian forensik antarabangsa tetapi tidak ditunjukkan dan dilakukan oleh SP1. Kaedah pengiraan ‘hash value’ bagi setiap klip video dengan menggunakan proses ‘one-way hash functions’ yang akan menghasilkan ‘digital fingerprint’ (‘hash value’) yang unik bagi setiap maklumat yang diproses dengan algorithma ‘digital signature’ atau ‘DNA signature’ tertentu yang peka terhadap Kesan Avalanche (Avalanche Effect) (di mukasurat 1-2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan). Kaedah ‘forensic imaging’ yang betul dan tepat juga memainkan peranan yang sangat penting untuk mengawal rapi ketepatan dan bahan bukti di dalam bentuk yang asal dan tidak tercemar atau ‘tampered’. Penggunaan dan pemilihan algorithma-algorithma yang betul dan tepat amat bersesuaian untuk tujuan pengesahan, kesahihan, integriti dan kebolehterimaan kandungan cakera keras (‘harddisk’) untuk perbicaraan di mahkamah di mana kaedah pengekstrakan bahan bukti secara imej-imej forensik yang disalin dari cakera keras satu persatu bit (bit per bit) dan kesemua proses tersebut tidak dilakukan oleh SP1 (mukasurat 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).
i. SP1 juga tidak tahu apa itu yang dimaksudkan sebagai ‘hash value‘, ‘hash functions’ dan ‘algorithm‘ yang digunakan untuk tujuan pengesahan, integriti, kebolehterimaan dan kebolehpercayaan data di dalam harddisk tersebut. Malah SP1 juga telah memberi keterangan bahawa dia tidak tahu kegunaan ‘hash functions’, ‘hash value’, ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘forensic tools’ yang sepatutnya digunakan semasa melakukan analisa forensik terhadap ‘harddisk’ seperti yang telah dibangkitkan oleh Tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan balas (mukasurat 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 dan 27 Nota Keterangan).
Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada kes R v. Trapp [2009] S.J. No. 64; 2009 SKPC 109; 2009SK.C. LEXIS 686 (di mukasurat 2-10 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan)di mana pakar telah menunjukkan kepada mahkamah penggunaan ‘hash function’ atau ‘hash algorithm’ dan ‘hash value’ merupakan proses yang sangat kritikal dan penting di samping pengimejan forensik dilakukan sebelumnya. Di dalam kes tersebut, pakar telah menggunakan SHA-1 sebagai ‘hash function’, ‘hash value’ penggiraan ‘hash value’ ditunjukkan dan dibandingkan dengan salinan imej forensik semasa perbicaraan. Berdasarkan keterangan saksi SP1, telah jelas bahawa saksi SP1 tidak melakukan analisa yang betul dan tepat untuk memenuhi piawaian forensik antarabangsa yang ditetapkan berdasarkan Piawaian Daubert, di dalam kes Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993)(mukasurat 13 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan), yang merupakan satu piawaian yang diterimapakai oleh semua badan forensik di seluruh dunia,seperti di bawah:
Daubert Test for Reliability
Witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:
-The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data
-The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods
-The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case
The key for the Court in determining whether an expert may testify before a jury is therefore primarily one of “reliability of method”. The court will not look at the actual opinion held by an expert, but merely examines his or her methodology to determine whether the procedures used or his methodology is not reliable, then his entire opinion is likewise unreliable and should be excluded from the jury.
Daubert Factors
The U.S Supreme Court set out several specific factors that should be used by the courts in evaluating any proposed expert testimony. These factors are not exclusive and some or all may not apply in any given case, but they are always the place to start the reliability analysis. The factors are as follows:
1. Whether the theory or technique has been scientifically tested.
2. Whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review or publication.
3. The (expected) error rate of the technique used.
4. Acceptance of the theory or technique in the relevant scientific community.
SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas menyatakan bahawa beliau tidak membuat pengimejan bahan bukti di dalam bentuk salinan imej-imej forensik bagi keseluruhan kandungan cakera keras (‘harddisk’) (mukasurat 26 Nota Keterangan) seperti yang ditetapkan oleh piawaian forensik komputer antarabangsa (Piawaian Daubert). Oleh yang demikian SP1 tidak mengikut kaedah yang diiktiraf oleh piawaian komputer forensik antarabangsa dan bahan bukti tidak disahkan kesahihan dan integritinya. Tertuduh juga telah menerima 13 keping DVD salinan klip video yang disalin dengan menggunakan format DVD yang bukan mengikuti piawaian format pengimejan forensic antarabangsa yang ditetapkan di mana apabila diperiksa oleh Tertuduh telah mendapati metadata setiap fail klip video tidak sama dengan metadata yang diterangkan oleh SP1 dan bilangan klip video juga berbeza bilangan yang diberi dengan keterangan SP1 semasa perbicaraan. Terdapat juga kandungan yang sama dikira berulang-ulang semasa perbicaraan.
Fakta ini dinyatakan semasa pemeriksaan utama SP1:
“Selepas analisa/kenalpasti video2 lucah yang terkandung tindakan seterusnya adalah masukan video2 ini ke dalam DVD. Tidak ingat berapa keping. Saya masih boleh cam.”
(Rujuk DVD dalam sampul putih-di dalam ada 13 keping tanda X1-X13. Dicamkan SP1. Ditanda sebagai P3a-m) (mukasurat 13 Nota Keterangan).
Di dalam kertas penyelidikan yang dibentangkan oleh Renico Koen dari ICSA, University of Pretoria, South Africa dan Martin S. Oliver, ICSA, University of Pretoria, South Africa yang bertajuk “The Use of File Timestamps in Digital Forensics” menyatakan:
“Event data is generated when a significant digital event occurs. Although the generated event data is of little value when viewed independently, collectively event data can produce information that can help investigators to deduce relationships between events to produce abstract views of the evidence at hand.”
Dan mereka juga telah membuat kesimpulan bahawa:
“A principle was introduced based on the concept of synergy claiming that insignificant pieces of event datum may collectively be of significant forensic importance.”
Diikuti juga di dalam kertas penyelidikan oleh Svein Yngvar Willassen yang bertajuk “Hypothesis Based Investigation of Digital Timestamps” dengan jelas menerangkan di dalam abstract bahawa:
“Timestamps stored on digital media play an important role in digital investigations. Unfortunately, timestamps may be manipulated, and also refer to a clock that can be erroneous, failing or maladjusted. This reduces the evidentiary value of timestamps. This paper takes the approach that historical adjustments to a clock can be hypothesized in a clock hypothesis. Clock hypotheses can then be tested for consistency with stored timestamps. A formalism for the definition and testing of a clock hypothesis is developed, and test methods for clock hypothesis consistency are demonstrated. With the number of timestamps found in typical digital investigations, the methods presented in this paper can justify clock hypotheses without having to rely on timestamps from external sources. This increases the evidentiary value of timestamps, even when the originating clock has been erroneous, failing or maladjusted.”
Di dalam kes Regina v. Shipman (Harold Frederick) (1999, unreported) terdapat persoalan modifikasi dan manipulasi ‘timestamps’ di mana semasa perbicaraan didapati bahawa ‘timestamp’ boleh diubah yang boleh membawa kepada penipuan metadata yang akan memberi impak besar dan nilai signifikan yang tinggi kepada analisis forensik terhadap kebolehterimaan probative evidence, kebolehpercayaan di dalam perbicaraan mahkamah.
j. Persijilan ISO – Analisis SP1 gagal mengikut piawaian kawalan kualiti dan standard forensik komputer antarabangsa bagi ‘error’ dan ralat saintifik yang berkaitan dengan perisian dan peralatan untuk tujuan penganalisa forensik kerana SP1 telah memberi keterangan semasa pemeriksaan balas bahawa makmal beliau tidak dipersijilkan dengan standard ISO 9000 (Quality Management System in Production Environment), ISO 9001 (Quality Management), ISO 9069 (Software Quality Model), ISO 9241 (Ergonomic requirements for office work with visual display), ISO 17025 (General requirements for competence of test and calibration laboratories), ISO 27001 (Information technology-Security Techniques-Information Security Management Systems) dan ISO 15489/1:2001 (mukasurat 26 Nota Keterangan) untuk pengurusan kualiti untuk prosedur, proses, perisian, peralatan forensik computer yang digunakan dan yang berkaitan dengannya. Ini merupakan satu syarat yang sangat kritikal dan penting bagi sesuatu analisis forensik komputer dapat dijalankan dengan betul dan tepat.
Semasa pemeriksaan balas SP1 telah mengesahkan ada ‘error’ semasa ujitayang dibuat dengan menggunakan ‘software Encase’.(Mukasurat 20 Nota Keterangan).
Tertuduh telah mengemukakan bantahan terhadap Laporan Forensik SP1 yang mana Laporan Forensik yang cuba ditender di Mahkamah bertarikh 28.7.2009 yang amat ketara berlainan dengan Laporan Forensik bertarikh 27.7.2009 yang diberikan oleh pihak pendakwaan di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 51A Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Pihak Tertuduh terpaksa membangkitkan bantahan apabila pihak pendakwaan sendiri tidak mematuhi prosedur-prosedur di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 51A dan Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah di mana apabila pihak Pendakwaan gagal memberikan salinan di dalam tempoh waktu yang ditetapkan dan penerimaan Laporan Forensik tersebut sebagai ekshibit adalah bertentangan dengan kes-kes yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah di mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal mematuhi tempoh penyerahan laporan yang ditetapkan di bawah Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, ianya ‘fatal’ kepada kes pendakwaan dan laporan forensik tersebut tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti.
Berkenaan isu ini, pihak Tertuduh ingin merujuk kepada satu kes Ooi Lean Chai v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 1 MLJ 337 (Rep) (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana Mahkamah Agung telah memutuskan bahawa Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah bukan hanya bersifat prosedural tetapi mengandungi peraturan untuk kebolehterimaan laporan pakar sebagai bukti di mana sekiranya ‘proviso’ kepada Seksyen 399 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah tidak dipatuhi, laporan pakar tidak boleh diterima sebagai bukti.
51. SP1 juga gagal memberi sebarang keterangan bagaimana beliau menjaga ‘hard disk’ tersebut selepas menerimanya dari Pegawai Penyiasat dari tarikh 13.7.2009 ke 26.7.2009 dan dari tarikh analisa ke tarikh pertama sebutan kes. Adalah dihujahkan di sini bahawa rantaian kawalan dan rantaian bukti telah terputus (“break in the chain of custody and break in the chain of evidence’). SP1 di dalam pemeriksaan semula hanya memberi keterangan seperti berikut:
“J : Ianya ada dalam kawalan saya. Disimpan dalam makmal forensic disimpan dalam peti khas untuk hard disc yang mana kunci dipegang oleh saya sendiri.”
52. Kes ini perlu dibezakan dengan kes-kes Mahkamah yang telah diputuskan berkenaan ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD) kerana cakera keras mempunyai kapasiti penyimpanan data yang lebih besar dan dibandingkan dengan ‘compact disc‘, malah tiada material yang boleh dimasukkan semula ke dalam ‘compact disc’ melainkan hanya berlaku pada cakera keras – (data yang terdahulu akan terbatal (dengan izin ‘fast overwrite‘)).
53. Apabila cakera keras tersebut dimainkan dengan set komputer yang bukan dirampas dari tempat kejadian, ianya tidak terdiri daripada satu sistem yang lengkap dan sekiranya ianya dimainkan dengan bukan sistem komputer yang asal dan komputer yang lain cakera keras tersebut telah dicemari (‘tampering with evidence‘) dan ini tidak seharusnya dibenarkan berlaku oleh Mahkamah. Dirujuk kepada buku bertajuk “Cyber Forensics – A Field Manual for Collecting, Examining, and Preserving Evidence of Computer Crimes”, 2nd Edition oleh Albert J. Marcella, Jr. dan Doug Menendez ms 288, 289, 276-281 menyatakan keperluan buku log bagi merekod setiap aktiviti siasatan dan analisis forensik wajib dinyatakan semasa perbicaraan di mahkamah.
54. Tertuduh berhujah bahawa milikan tidak boleh dibuktikan melalui keterangan persekitaran (‘circumstantial evidence‘) iaitu dengan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Ekshibit-ekshibit “P11”, “P12”, “P13”, “P14, “P15”, “P16”, “P17”, “P18”, “P19”, “P20”, “P21” hingga “P33” yang merupakan salinan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan hanya kerana dokumen-dokumen tersebut didakwa terdapat di dalam cakera keras (‘hard disc’) tersebut (dinafikan oleh Tertuduh).
Pihak Pembelaan ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh VT Singham J di dalam kes Ah Poon & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 CLJ 521 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 10-11 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana VT Sigham J menyatakan seperti berikut:
“Irrelevant and Prejudicial Facts Or Evidence
[17] As for the police report which contains serious allegation that the accuseds are suspected to be involved in the activity of prostitution, it cannot be denied that this is highly prejudical, inadmissible or is otherwise objectionable and the accuseds have every right to know and understand the contents and they should be given the opportunity of raising any objection to the contents of the police report which is against them. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to show whether the contents of the police report which has been marked as exh. P 3 was read and explained to the accuseds and what was their reponse.
[18] It is paramount importance that all documentary evidence which are tendered as evidence by the prosecution and marked as exhibits in proceedings where the accused has pleaded guilty to a charge if possible should be shown, read and explained to the accuseds and understood by him or her so that in the event the contents of the documents which contains some incriminating facts which implicates the accuseds are disputed or not admitted, the document will have to be rejected without having it marked as an exhibit…..Be that as it may, a document or an exhibit is not to be admitted unless it is relevant to the charge.”
55. SP5 iaitu pegawai yang terlibat semasa geledah dan SP7 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat sendiri mengesahkan Tertuduh tiada di tempat kejadian pada 13.7.2009. Oleh yang demikian milikan secara fizikal tidak dibuktikan langsung (rakaman video prosiding perbicaraan pada 19.10.2010).
56. Keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP1 di dalam mahkamah mestilah bersifat a posteriori evidence dan analisis yang dilakukan mestilah bersifat a posteriori analysis. Semua teori dan teknik yang digunakan untuk tujuan analisis forensik dan perbicaraan di mahkamah juga mestilah suatu yang ‘scientific cognition a priori’ dan ‘a posteriori truths’ bukan bersifat hypothetical atau junk science di mana setiap keterangan wajib mematuhi sepenuhnya Piawaian Daubert (Piawaian Forensik Komputer Antarabangsa). Di dalam kes ini SP1 telah memberi keterangan yang nyata tidak bersifat a priori mahupun a posteriori kerana setiap keterangan SP1 tidak disokong oleh analisis berangka forensik (forensics numerical analysis) berdasarkan Piawaian Daubert dan di dalam Buku Expert Evidence, Fourth Edition di mukasurat 62 hingga 66.
Immanuel Kant di dalam bukunya yang bertajuk, “Critique of Pure Reason” – The Cambridge Edition of The Work of Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Elements, Pt II. Div. I Bk. I. Ch. II. (B128) muka surat 226:
“The empirical derivation, however, to which both of them resorted, cannot be reconciled with reality of the scientific cognition a priori that we posses, that namely of pure mathematics and general natural science, and is therefore refutted by the facta.”
a das Factum
57. Oleh itu, laporan Forensik SP1 (Ekshibit “P35”) tidak komprehensif dan konklusif.
58. Oleh yang demikian, kesimpulan yang tidak dapat dielakkan ialah Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tidak mempunyai pemilikan eksklusif pada setiap masa yang material, bahan yang dikatakan lucah tersebut.
Isu 106 Klip Video Tersebut Mestilah Lucah di Sisi Undang-undang
59. Di dalam kes PP v. Chung Wan Li, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:
“2nd Ground
Under the 2nd ground the prosecution submitted that the learned Magistrate had erred in law and in fact when he came to his finding that the prosecution has failed to prove that all of exh. P1, ie, the remaining 14 VCD (video cakera padat) seized are obscene films and disregarded PW5’s evidence that the result of a screen test conducted on the seized items has shown that all these items are obscene films.
Under the 2nd ground, in my view, it would be unsafe for the court to solely rely on PW5’s evidence that he had conducted a screen test on all the 18 VCD’s and that they were all obscene films because I find that exh. P5 which was prepared by him in respect of the 18 VCDs handed to him lacked evidential value and besides there was a material contradiction as from whom he received the 18 VCDs (discussed earlier).
Therefore, the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCDs is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films becomes critical. Here as per the finding of the learned Magistrate not only were only four VCDs screened but unfortunately the titles of the four VCDs were not even identified. Hence, there is no evidence before the court of which of the four VCDs out of the 18 VCDs exh. P1 (A-R) were of obscene material and neither was there proof whether the remaining 14 VCDs were of obscene material or otherwise.
I agree with the defence that the learned Magistrate should not be faulted just because he had allowed the prosecution’s application to conduct random screening. In my opinion the permission granted by the learned Magistrate is not tantamount to a waiver of the burden emplaced on the prosecution to prove each and every essential ingredient of the charge for purposes of establishing a prima facie case. It is the duty of the prosecution throughout to establish a prima facie case and it is not for the learned Magistrate, as pointed out by the defence, to tell them as to the correct procedure to be adopted.”
60. Di dalam kes PP v. Lee Swee Sing, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:
“Intipati (b)
[9] Berdasarkan keterangan, SP1 ada membuat rampasan terhadap barang-barang kes. Namun begitu, adalah didapati tiada sebarang penandaan dibuat pada mana-mana bahagian pada VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas. Setelah barang-barang kes diserahkan kepada SP3 (C/Insp. Saifulnizam bin Mohamed Jais), SP3 juga tidak membuat apa – apa tanda pada barang-barang kes yang diterima dan menyimpan barang-barang kes tersebut di bilik stor barang kes. Penjaga stor pula tidak dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan di mahkamah. Kemungkinan bahawa barang-barang kes ini telah bercampur-aduk dengan barang kes untuk kes yang lain tidak dapat diketepikan.
[10] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan keputusan Majistret apabila beliau mendapati senarai bongkar (eks. P3) yang merujuk kepada senarai VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas adalah tidak lengkap. Terdapat sepuluh keping VCD dan DVD lucah dalam bahasa Cina tidak dinyatakan tajuk (“title”) dan begitu juga dengan empat keping DVD dalam bahasa Cina yang tidak dinyatakan tajuk. Dalam eksh. P3 cuma dinyatakan seperti berikut: “pelbagai tajuk VCD/DVD lucah dalam bahasa Cina”. Dalam perkara ini, saya bersetuju dengan penghakiman dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501, di mana Hakim Lau Bee Lan memutuskan:
… the principle to be gleaned is the effect of non-compliance of the provision governing a search list merely cast doubt on the bona fides of the parties conducting the search and then becomes incumbent on the trial judge to scrutinize the evidence further whether a prima facie has made out.
In the context of the present case, the identity of the 18 VCDs is central to proving that the accused had possession of them and the absence of the listing of each of the titles of the 18 VCDs greatly weakens the case for the prosecution.
Intipati (c)
[11] Timbalan pendakwa raya terpelajar menghujahkan bahawa kesemua VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas telah dibuktikan mengandungi adegan lucah. Dengan hormat, mahkamah ini tidak bersetuju. Walaupun pihak pendakwaan telah mendapat kebenaran dari mahkamah Majistret untuk menjalankan uji tayang secara rawak terhadap barang-barang kes, namun begitu, adalah menjadi tugas pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan kes mereka sepanjang perbicaraan. Hanya sepuluh keping dari VCD dan DVD lucah yang dirampas dibuat uji tayang di mahkamah Majistret dan sepuluh keping VCD/DVD yang dibuat uji tayang itu juga tidak dinyatakan tajuk-tajuknya. Tidak terdapat mana-mana peruntukan dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang menyatakan bahawa penayangan sejumlah VCD/DVD yang dirampas yang dipercayai mengandungi adegan lucah akan dianggap sebagai telah membuktikan bahawa keseluruhan VCD/DVD tersebut mengandungi adegan lucah. Oleh yang demikian, setiap satu VCD/DVD yang dirampas itu perlu dibuat uji tayang. Keadaan ini adalah berbeza, misalnya, dengan peruntukan yang jelas dibawah s. 37(j) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang menyatakan bahawa adalah mencukupi jika sampel dadah diambil tidak kurang dari 10% bekas (receptacles) yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya (lihat kes-kes Gunalan Ramachandran & Ors v. PP[2004] 4 CLJ 551; Chu Tak Fai v. PP [2006] 4 CLJ 931 dan PP v. Seow Wei Hoong[2008] 4 CLJ 453).
[12] Dalam perkara ini, saya juga bersetuju dengan penghakiman dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Chung Wan Li (supra) apabila hakim dipetik berkata:
Therefore, the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCDs is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films becomes critical. Here as per the finding of the learned magistrate not only were only four VCDs screened but unfortunately the titles of the four VCDs were not even identified. Hence, there is no evidence before the court of which the four VCDs out of the 18 VCDs Exh P1 (A-R) were of obscene material and neither was there proof whether the remaining 14 VCDs were of obscene material or otherwise.
I agree with the defence that the learned magistrate should not be faulted just because he had allowed the prosecution’s application to conduct random screening. In my opinion, the permission granted by the learned magistrate is not tantamount to a waiver of the burden emplaced on the prosecution to prove each and every essential ingredient of the charge for purposes of establishing a prima facie case. It is the duty of the prosecution throughout to establish a prima facie case and it is not for the learned magistrate, as pointed out by the defence, to tell them as to the correct procedure to be adopted.
[13] Keputusan bahawa terdapat keraguan yang munasabah sama ada barang-barang kes yang dirampas pada hari kejadian adalah sama dengan barang-barang kes yang dikemukakan di dalam mahkamah dan sama ada kesemua VCD dan DVD yang dirampas itu mengandungi adegan lucah (“obscene material”) adalah penemuan fakta yang dibuat oleh Puan Majistret berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan beliau di mana beliau mempunyai kelebihan untuk melihat dan mendengar saksi-saksi berkenaan. Penemuan fakta adalah merupakan fungsi eksklusif mahkamah bicara (lihat PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457). Perkara ini telah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap. Dalam kes Herchun Singh & Ors v. PP [1969] 1 LNS 52, Ong Hock Thye, KH berkata:
An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding on fact arrived at by the judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding: see Sheo Swarup v. King- Emperor AIR [1934] PC 227.
[14] Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa tidak terdapat apa-apa alasan untuk memutuskan bahawa Puan Majistret telah “mishandling the fact” dalam kes ini. Keputusan selainnya oleh Puan Majistret akan bertentangan dengan keberatan keterangan (“weight of evidence”) yang ada di hadapan mahkamah.
[15] Kesan terkumpul undang-undang terhadap keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan dalam kes ini telah menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pihak pendakwaan. Terdapat jurang yang tidak dipenuhi oleh pihak pendakwaan terutama yang berhubung dengan identiti ekshibit dan adegan lucah. Perkara ini memudaratkan kes pihak pendakwaan. Dalam kes Mohan Singh Lachman Singh v. PP [2002] 3 CLJ 293, Mahkamah Rayuan membuat pemerhatian:
The burden of proving its case at every stage lies on the prosecution. The only task of the accused is to raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecution’s case. If there are gaps in the case for the prosecution, these cannot be filled by resorting to a purported failure on the part of the defence to put specific questions relevant to its case. Such gaps must be filled by the prosecution itself: Abdullah Zawawi v. PP [1985] CLJ 19 (Rep); [1985] 2 CLJ 2; [1985] 2 MLJ 16. That has always been the law. It is still the law.
[16] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan di atas, mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa rayuan timbalan pendakwa raya tidak mempunyai merit. Dengan itu, rayuan ditolak dan keputusan Puan Majistret yang melepas dan membebaskan responden di akhir kes pendakwaan bagi pertuduhan kedua dikekalkan.”
61. Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Seong Yoon, di dalam membuktikan sama ada bahan tersebut adalah lucah di sisi undang-undang, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa:
“Screen Testing For Obscenity
[15] However, I find that the second vital ingredient in this case, ie, that the 65 DVDs are obscene was not proved.
15.1. There is no evidence at all that the 65 DVDs were subject to a screen test (uji tayang) for the court to make a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene.
15.2. SP1 merely testified that he was satisfied that the 65 DVDs were obscene by looking at the covers of the DVDs.
15.3. SP4, the I.O. of the case, said he had screen tested them at random in his office and found them to be obscene.
15.4. Although at one point of the proceedings the learned APP applied to reserve screen-testing of the DVDs, the learned defence counsel had responded that there was no need for screen-testing (p. 29 of Appeal Record). Unfortunately the court appeared to have agreed with learned defence counsel because nowhere in the notes of evidence does it appear that screen testing was done.
[16] In the case of PP v. Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 HC, the learned High Court judge held that “the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCD’s is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films”. In Chung’s case (supra), the learned High Court judge did not approve of the random testing that was conducted during the trial.
[17] His Lordship Mohd. Zawawi Salleh, JC, concurred with the learned High Court judge in the case of PP v. Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 HC. His Lordship held in Lee Swee Sing’s case that there is no provision in the Film Censorship Act 2002 which allows for random testing. A comparison was drawn with the provision of s. 37(j) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which allowed for a 10% of the sample of the drugs to be tested.
[18] In this case, there was no screen testing at all carried out during the trial. How then can the court arrive at a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene? It is patently clear that the prosecution had failed to prove that the 65 DVDs were obscene and the learned magistrate should have so found.
[19] For the reasons as adumbrated above the acquittal and discharge of the respondent is hereby affirmed as the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case against the respondent as per the charge.
[20] The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”
62. Apa yang boleh difahamkan daripada ketiga-tiga kes di atas, kesemua jumlah bahan yang tercatat di dalam kertas pertuduhan mestilah dibuktikan lucah di sisi undang-undang. Sekiranya satu bahan tidak lucah, maka si tertuduh mestilah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan tersebut kerana tidak terdapat mana-mana peruntukan dalam Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 yang menyatakan bahawa penayangan sejumlah VCD/DVD yang dirampas yang dipercayai mengandungi adegan lucah akan dianggap sebagai telah membuktikan bahawa keseluruhan VCD/DVD tersebut mengandungi adegan lucah.
63. Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil Insp. Mohd Razif b. Mohd Zaid I/16542 sebagai SP1 untuk memberi keterangan bahawa 106 klip video tersebut adalah lucah. SP1 telah memberi keterangan (di mukasurat 4 – 11 Nota Keterangan) bahawa: “Ada 150 video. Dalam senarai, ada 106 yang lucah. Saya ada list saya buat dalam list laporan forensic saya.” SP1 seterusnya telah diberi keterangan bahawa di antara klip video tersebut adalah lucah, tidak lucah, tidak dapat dimainkan, ada gambar lucah, tiada video lucah, tiada bahan lucah, tidak boleh dimainkan, mohon delete temporary file.
64. Oleh itu, melalui keterangan SP1 dan Ekshibit P35 (Laporan Analisa), jumlah klip video yang dikatakan lucah tidak sampai 106. Maka, pihak Pendakwaan tidak berjaya membuktikan intipati ini menurut undang-undang.
65. Bilangan klip video lucah sebanyak 106 klip tersebut sebenarnya tidak dapat dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan kerana terdapat klip video yang berulang-ulang dan mempunyai kandungan yang sama tetapi nama fail yang berbeza (mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan). Terdapat klip-klip video yang tidak dapat dimainkan seperti dancewater.avi, dcmonument.avi dan moonrise.avi, ROSEBLOOM.avi, video001.avi, V10raw.mpg dan V137raw.mpg (mukasurat 5, 6 dan 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip-klip video yang tidak keluar (mukasurat 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada yang tiada kandungan lucah (mukasurat 5,6,7 dan 13 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip yang tidak dapat dibaca seperti V10.raw.mpg (mukasurat 7 Nota Keterangan). Ada klip video yang tidak lucah tetapi ditandakan sebagai bahan lucah seperti Sato1.mpg dan sato2.mpg (mukasurat 6 Nota Keterangan). Di samping itu terdapat 2 klip video yang tidak boleh dikira sebagai lucah apabila melibatkan perlakuan di antara suami dan isteri (beast1.Mpg dan dollah2.mpg – mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan) yang pada asalnya berada di tempat persendirian tetapi telah didedahkan oleh SP7 apabila ekshibit “P2” diambil.
66. Pegawai Penyiasat juga tidak menyediakan senarai klip video lucah tersebut kerana tiada senarai diberikan mengikut Seksyen 51A Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Sekiranya pihak Pendakwaan mendakwa senarai klip video yang dilampirkan bersama Laporan Forensik (ekshibit “P35”) maka senarai tersebut tidak boleh diambilkira kerana Laporan Forensik tersebut telah dicabar kesahihannya dengan jumlah uji tayang yang dibuat di Mahkamah dan penerimaan Laporan Forensik tersebut sebagai ekshibit tidak mengikut lunas undang-undang.
67. Bagi intipati kedua pertuduhan, Pihak Tertuduh berhujah bahawa tiada definisi yang khusus bagi ‘lucah’ di dalam udang-undang.
68. SP7 selaku Pegawai Penyiasat juga gagal memberikan definisi yang tepat mengenai lucah di sisi perundangan. Beliau di dalam pemeriksaan balas turut menyatakan bahawa apa yang berlaku di dalam rumah di antara pasangan tidak boleh diambilkira sebagai lucah dan ini sangat bertentangan dengan apa yang beliau lakukan dengan menghadapkan Tertuduh dengan pertuduhan terhadap klip video beast1.Mpg dan dollah2.mpg (mukasurat 5 Nota Keterangan) di mana kedua-dua klip video tersebut merupakan klip antara Tertuduh dengan bekas isteri yang diambil semasa masih lagi suami isteri. Ini merupakan pencabulan hak asasi manusia dan bertentangan dengan Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
Pihak Pembelaan ingin merujuk kepada kes Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan):
[ Footnote 7 ] The Supreme Court of Ohio considered the issue in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N. E. 2d 387 (1960). Four of the seven judges of that court felt that criminal prosecution for mere private possession of obscene materials was prohibited by the Constitution. However, Ohio law required the concurrence of “all but one of the judges” to declare a state law unconstitutional. The view of the “dissenting” judges was expressed by Judge Herbert:
“I cannot agree that mere private possession of . . . [obscene] literature by an adult should constitute a crime. The right of the individual to read, to believe or disbelieve, and to think without governmental supervision is one of our basic liberties, but to dictate to the mature adult what books he may have in his own private library seems to the writer to be a clear infringement of his constitutional rights as an individual.” 170 Ohio St., at 437, 166 N. E. 2d, at 393.
69. Tiada definisi bagi perkataan ‘lucah’ berdasarkan perundangan yang boleh digunapakai di dalam rumah samada di dalam Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967, Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 dan Kanun Kesiksaan.
70. Mengikut Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Volume 1, 24th Edition di muka surat 1115 dengan jelas menerangkan bahawa:
“The word “obscene” has not been defined in the Code.”
71. Definisi Lucah (‘Obscene’) atau Kelucahan (‘Obscenity’) bergantung kepada keadaan, tempat dan konteks semasa ianya berlaku. Apabila seseorang tanpa seurat benang di tubuh berada di rumahnya tanpa kehadiran orang luar tiada sesiapa boleh mengatakan bahawa beliau berkelakuan lucah. Keadaan yang sama juga jika sesuatu rakaman dibuat di dalam rumah dengan diri sendiri tanpa kehadiran orang lain atau dengan kehadiran pasangan yang sah di sisi undang-undang sahaja berada di rumah di mana di dalam konteks tersebut perlakuan tidak dikira bersifat lucah.
72. Di dalam kes-kes ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD), ‘compact disc’ (CD/VCD/DVD) tersebut diedar, dijual dan disebarkan untuk orang awam yang sudah tentu akan memberi kesan kepada orang awam terutamanya golongan muda yang memilikinya. Ini berbeza dengan kes ini di mana pihak polis telah memasuki premis tanpa waran geledah yang sah di sisi undang-undang dan rampasan harta peribadi dibuat yang jelas bukan untuk tatapan umum.
73. Mengikut Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Volume 1, 24th Edition di mukasurat 1122, faktor yang perlu diambilkira di dalam menentukan sesuatu material itu lucah adalah material berunsur lucah tersebut jatuh ke tangan siapa. Di dalam kes ini Pegawai Penyiasat telah memasuki tempat kejadian dan material tersebut berada di tangan beliau. Hanya beliau membuat kesimpulan bahawa material itu lucah.
74. Oleh yang demikian, kesimpulan yang tidak dapat dielakkan ialah Tertuduh di dalam kes kita pada hari ini tidak mempunyai kandungan lucah di sisi undang-undang pada setiap masa yang material, bahan yang dikatakan lucah tersebut.
75. Pihak Pembelaan menyatakan bahawa memandangkan kedua-dua intipati penting di peringkat pendakwaan ini bagi membuktikan prima facie kes terhadap Tertuduh tidak dapat dibuktikan menurut undang-undang, kesimpulan yang tidak boleh dielakkan ialah Tertuduh dilepaskan dan dibebaskan serta merta tanpa memanggil kes pembelaan.
76. Pihak Pembelaan menyatakan bahawa pihak Pendakwaan masih gagal untuk membuktikan prima facie kes terhadap Tertuduh dengan butir-butirannya seperti di perenggan di bawah.
77. Menurut Nota Keterangan, terdapat ruang (‘gap’) di antara ekshibit-ekshibit di mahkamah yang menyebabkan pihak Pembelaan tidak dapat berhujah sepenuhnya dan ini telah memprejudiskan Tertuduh. Pihak Pembelaan ingin menarik perhatian Mahkamah bahawa di dalam Nota Keterangan bagi perbicaraan dari 7.6.2010 hingga 17.8.2010 tiada keterangan mengenai ekshibit-ekshibit “P4” “P5”, “P6”, ”P7, “P8’ dan “P10”. Oleh yang demikian pihak Pembelaan tidak dapat mengutarakan hujah berkenaan ekshibit “P4”, “P5”, “P6”, “P7”, “P8” dan “P10”. Walaubagaimanapun sekiranya ekshibit “P4”, “P5”, “P6”, “P7, “P8’ dan P10” adalah salinan dokumen-dokumen yang diesktrak oleh SP1, pihak Pembelaan membangkitkan bantahan mengenai penerimaan salinan dokumen-dokumen tersebut kerana pihak Pendakwaan gagal mengikut peruntukan Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950.
78. Kertas pertuduhan adalah bersangkut dengan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009. Ini menggambarkan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani adalah ‘First Information Report’. Dokumen ini tidak dikemukakan di Mahkamah yang Mulia ini menyebabkan pihak Pembelaan tidak mempunyai peluang untuk memeriksa balas pengadu.
79. SP5 telah memberi keterangan bahawa pemeriksaan dan penggeledahan yang dibuat di Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 (mohon rujuk mukasurat 47 Nota Keterangan). Keterangan SP5 ini menunjukkan laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 ialah ‘First Information Report’ (yang tidak pernah dikemukakan di mahkamah) yang membolehkan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan di Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut. Barang-barang yang dirampas adalah untuk laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 bukannya report polis lain. Mana-mana ‘First Information Report’ lain yang menggunakan barang-barang geledah menurut Borang Senarai Geledah pada Tarikh tersebut di Premis tersebut telah mencabuli hak setiap rakyat Malaysia yang telah dijamin dan termaktub di dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia.
80. Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Chong Chieng Jen lawan Mohd Irwan Hafiz bin Md Radzi & Anor [2009] 8 MLJ 364 (yang mengikat Mahkamah ini) (di mukasurat 7 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Pembelaan) di mana komputer riba pemohon telah dirampas apabila satu waran geledah dikeluarkan oleh Majistret apabila pemohon disyaki menyimpan bahan berunsur hasutan. Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan untuk mengetepikan waran geledah dan memerintahkan komputer riba dikembalikan kepada Pemohon. Di dalam kes ini Rhodzariah Bujang JC menyatakan seperti berikut:
“The requirement for ‘information’ and ‘reason to believe’ is mandatory because the execution of the warrant willl definitely result in the invasion of the privacy and property of the owner of the premises so named and may even result in the consfication of his property. A person’s privacy and the right to his property are very basic rights of a man and that to his property is even enshrined under Article 13(1) of the Federal Constitution.”
81. Apalagi di dalam kes ini jika tiada waran geledah diperolehi dari mana-mana Mahkamah dan ini sudah tentu mengganggu hak ‘privacy’ Tertuduh sebagaimana yang termaktub di bawah Artikel 10 dan 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
82. Adalah mustahil sesuatu tempat itu digeledah terlebih dahulu sebelum adanya ‘First Information Report’ atau sesuatu tempat itu digeledah mendahului ‘First Information Report’. Tambahan lagi Laporan Analisa oleh SP1 adalah berkenaan dengan Dang Wang Rpt 29694/09 bersabit Jalan Patani Rpt 5070/2009.
83. Laporan Polis Jalan Patani Report 5070/2009 sebagai ‘First Information Report’ adalah amat penting di dalam kes ini memandangkan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan Premis tersebut pada Tarikh tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan Laporan Polis Jalan Patani tersebut. Kesan dan akibat Laporan Polis Jalan Patani tersebut tidak dikemukakan ialah mahkamah mestilah menggunapakai s. 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 yang menyatakan bahawa sekiranya Laporan Polis Jalan Patani tersebut dikemukakan, ianya tidak berpihak kepada pihak Pendakwaan.
84. SP-5 memberi keterangan bahawa tiada waran untuk melakukan penggeledahan dan pemeriksaan tersebut. Bagi situasi ini, pihak Pendakwaan mestilah mematuhi S.62 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan segala intipati S.62 mestilah dipenuhi terlebih dahulu sebelum membuat pemeriksaan atau penggeledahan tanpa waran. Tiada apa-apa keterangan mengenai situasi ini maka penggeledahan atau pemeriksaan pada Tarikh tersebut di Bangunan tersebut adalah tidak sah di sisi undang-undang.
85. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi pendakwaan pertama (SP1) sebagai saksi pakar. Pengadu asal tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi. Maklumat pertama (“First Information Report’) adalah dari seorang bernama Norina Zainol Abidin yang tidak dipanggil oleh pihak pendakwaan sebagai saksi pertama kerana berdasarkan laporan beliau, polis telah datang ke premis tersebut pada 13.7.2009 tanpa waran geledah dan alasan yang munasabah untuk memasuki premis tersebut. Laman web yang dikatakan lucah http://www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com merupakan laman blog yang kosong oleh itu tidak wujud isu kelucahan atau isu yang melanggar kesopanan awam pada laman blog tersebut. Amat ketara bahawa laporan pertama tersebut tidak benar dan merupakan laporan yang palsu yang sengaja direka-reka oleh Pengadu asal untuk menceroboh hak persendirian Tertuduh. Oleh yang demikian cakera keras (‘hard disc’) yang ditender sebagai ekshibit tidak sepatutnya dirampas pada hakikat sebenarnya kerana tiada peralatan atau peranti atau modem atau talian rangkaian yang dilanggani pada tarikh 13hb. Julai, 2009 yang dijumpai di tempat kejadian mengikut seksyen 248 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998.
Pihak Pembelaan mengemukakan petikan Laporan (“First Information Report”) untuk perhatian dan penelitian Mahkamah yang mulia ini:
“Pada tarikh 13.06.09 jam lebih kurang 11.00 malam, ketika saya berada di pejabat (alamat seperti di atas), saya telah mendapat panggilan telefon daripada kawan saya bernama Surianom Miskam, memaklumkan saya bahawa beliau telah melihat gambar-gambar saya di dalam laman web “Kelab Seks Melayu”. Saya terus melayari laman web tersebut iaitu di www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com “ dan mendapati adalah benar terdapat sebanyak 5 keping gambar saya berpakaian penuh, yang terdapat di laman web tersebut, di mana saya percayai 5 keping gambar tersebut telah diambil dari laman web facebook saya sendiri. Selain daripada 5 keping gambar saya yang berpakaian, terdapat juga 4 keping gambar lain yang di dalam keadaan bogel, di mana gambar-gambar tersebut adalah bukan milik saya. Turut terdapat “comment yang disertakan di bawah gambar-gambar tersebut yang berbunyi”mencari zakar sepanjang 9 inci, Surianom Miskam, 019-5722499 dan 03-8925425 ext. 2203”
Pada tarikh 24.06.09, jam lebih kurang 9 malam, ketika saya berada di pejabat (alamat seperti di atas), sekali lagi saya melayari web, iaitu laman web “Kelab Seks Melayu” di www.kelabseksmelayu. wordpress.com dan mendapati 5 keping gambar saya berpakaian penuh yang saya percayai telah diambil dari laman web facebook saya masih berada di laman web tersebut. Malahan, terdapat informasi tmabahan berhubung diri saya yang berbunyi “Happy Birthday Yang Ke-32 Norina Zainol Abidin(Pegawai Kerajaan Yang Menjadi Ahli Kelab Seks Melayu Seumur Hidup)” di laman web yang sama, di mana informasi tersebut bukanlah dimasukkan oleh saya. Malahan, saya tidak pernah menjadi Ahli Kelab Seks Melayu ataupun mana-mana kelab yang tidak bermoral dan bermaruah. Tujuan laporan ini dibuat untuk menjaga maruah dan kepentingan peribadi saya dan juga status serta kerjaya saya sebagai pegawai Kerajaan. Sekian.
86. Tiada sebarang keterangan daripada SP1 dan SP7 yang menerangkan bagaimana laman web tersebut dikesan daripada ‘internet protocol’ dari ‘service provider’ kepada internet yang terdapat dari premis tempat kejadian. SP5 dan SP7 mengesahkan di dalam keterangan masing-masing bahawa tiada modem atau peranti dijumpai. Apa yang boleh digarapkan daripada keterangan-keterangan ini bahawa tiada bukti kukuh mengaitkan tempat kejadian dengan laporan pengadu “First Information Report”. SP5 memberi keterangan bahawa set komputer tidak disambung ke sumber kuasa dan tidak berfungsi. Beliau menyatakan bahawa komputer di tempat kejadian rosak. Oleh yang demikian bagaimana hard disk boleh dirampas sedangkan untuk akses kepada internet memerlukan peranti modem, talian internet yang pada masa material membawa satu internet protocol (IP) yang unik yang boleh dikesan dan dikaitkan dengan “MAC address” (Networking Card) pada komputer yang disyaki tersebut. Tiada keterangan mengenai analisis forensik rangkaian dan analisis forensik Facebook yang dibuat oleh SP1 untuk membuktikan bahawa Tertuduh boleh dikaitkan dengan laman web yang dinyatakan sebelum ini. Nama Domain (‘domain name’) www.kelabseksmelayu.wordpress.com tidak dibuktikan siapa tuanpunya atau pemiliknya atau siapa yang mendaftar ‘domain name’ tersebut.
87. Di samping itu tiada keterangan daripada SP1 dan SP7 bahawa Tertuduh adalah ‘friend’ yang diterima oleh Pengadu asal untuk akaun ‘Facebook’ Pengadu asal. Oleh itu tiada bukti yang menunjukkan bahawa Tertuduh ada akses kepada maklumat akaun ‘Facebook’ Pengadu asal.
Pihak Pembelaan merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi berkaitan internet dan ‘domain name’ (yang mengikat mahkamah ini) Petroliam Nasional Bhd v. Khoo Nee Kiong [2003] 4 MLJ 216 (mukasurat 230-231 Ikatan Otoriti Pembelaan):
“[35] I also reproduce below the following excerpt from the judgment of Aldous LJ in British Telecommunications plc and another v One In A Million Ltd and others and other actions [1998] 4 All ER 476 at p480-481 which explains in very simple terms what is internet and which also adopts the explanation by the learned trial judge, Jonathan Sumption QC sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court on what is domain name:
At its simplest the internet is a collection of computers which are connected through the telephone network to communicate with each other.
As explained by the judge [1998] FSR 265 at p 267:
The internet is increasingly used by commercial organizations to promote themselves and their products and in some cases to buy and sell. For these purposes they need a domain name identifying the computer which they are using. A domain name comprises groups of alphanumeric characters separated by dots. A first group commonly comprises the name of the enterprise or a brand name or trading name associated with it, followed by a ‘top level’ name identifying the nature and sometimes the location of the organization….
Members of the public would not ordinarily have a domain name. They would subscribe to a service provider and have an e-mail address. That enables a subscriber to send a message to another computer through the service provider, which forwards the message requested to the appropriate computer. The subscriber can also browse around the world wide web and seek web pages associated with a particular domain name. Thus if he transmits a domain name and the web pages sought and provide the information obtained.”
Pihak Pembelaan bersandarkan kepada satu kes Frangione v. Vandadongen [2010] O. J. No. 2337 di mana Mahkamah Agung Ontario memutuskan seperti berikut:
[33] Counsel have referred to several cases in Ontario that have dealt with the relatively new issue of production of the contents of Facebook sites given the proliferation of social networking sites. Our courts have observed and accepted that “Facebook” is a social networking sites used by members to communicate information about one’s personal life to other members of the Facebook community. When a person registers with Facebook, at www.facebook.com website, he creates his own profile and privacy settings. Profile information is displayed to people in the networks specified by the user in his privacy settings e.g a user may choose to make his private profile information available to others within his school, geographic area, employment network, or to “friends” of “friends”. A user can set privacy options that limit access to his profile only to those to whom he grants permission the so called “friends” of the user (Murphy v. Perger, [2007] O.J. No. 5511 (S.C.J.); Leduc, supra[19] Wicev. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co.[2009] O.J. No. 2946 (S.C.J.); Kourtesis v. Joris [2007] O.J. No. 5539 (S.C.J).
88. Kesimpulannya berdasarkan hujahan-hujahan yang dikemukakan di atas, terdapat kecacatan yang material dan amat memudaratkan kes pihak Pendakwaan. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan setiap satu intipati pertuduhan dan seterusnya membuktikan satu kes ‘prima facie’ terhadap Tertuduh. Oleh yang demikian Tertuduh pohon dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa dipanggil membela diri untuk pertuduhan di atas.
……………………………..
Mohamad Izaham bin Mohamed Yatim
Tertuduh
Cases Referred:
*************************************************************************************************
[2009] MLJU 0935
© 2010 LexisNexis Asia (a division of Reed Elsevier (S) Pte Ltd)
Malayan Unreported Judgments
Pendakwa Raya v Kok Seong Yoon
2009 MLJU 0935
RAYUAN JENAYAH NO MT(5) 41-66-2008
HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU)
DECIDED-DATE-1: 4 AUGUST 2009
HUE SIEW KHENG, JC
Mohd Fazaly Ali bin Mohd Ghazaly (TPR, Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Johor) bagip pihak perayu
Azmi Ahmad Bakri (Azmi Asram Shujaa & Co) bagi pihak responden
Hue Siew Kheng, JC:
Background
[1] This is an appeal against the decision of the learned magistrate made on 2 December 2008 wherein the respondent was acquitted and discharged without calling for his defence.
[2] The charge against the respondent was for having in his possession 65 obscene DVDs on 22.4.2006, thereby committing an offence under s.5(1)(a) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 and punishable under s.5(2) of the same Act.
[3] The petition of appeal discloses 7 grounds but can be broadly categorized under 2 main grounds: that the learned magistrate had erred in law and in fact in holding that the prosecution had not proved possession and also the adverse inference pursuant to s.114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 should not have been invoked due to the failure to call 2 other persons who were also arrested together with the respondent on the night of the raid.
Brief facts
[4] On 21.4.2006 at about a quarter to midnight, SP1 one ASP Nik Mathelan bin Nik Mohamed led a raid on the premises of Sky Video Trading at No. 6, Danga Bay, Lot 20704, Batu 4 ½ Jalan Skudai, Johor Bahru. It was a crime prevention operation, targeted at pornography and prostitution.
[5] During the raid, 3 persons were arrested, including the respondent. The other 2 persons arrested were subsequently released as the police were of the view that they were customers at the said premises.
[6] A search of the premises revealed 65 pornographic DVDs which were found beneath the counter rack. The raiding party also found 120 DVDs and 19 VCDs without the “Sijil B”, an offence under s. 18(4) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 for which the respondent was also charged.
[7] The respondent had pleaded guilty to the offence pursuant to the s. 18(4) charge and fined accordingly. However, in respect of the charge under s.5(1) for being found in possession of the 65 DVDs alleged to be obscene, the respondent claimed trial. After full trial was conducted, the learned magistrate had acquitted and discharged him without calling for his defence.
The charge
[8] The charge preferred against the respondent under s.5(1) of the 2002 Act requires proof of 2 main ingredients i.e. that-
(i) the respondent at the material time was in possession of the 65 obscene
films in the form of DVD; and
(ii) that the 65 films (DVDs) are obscene.
[9] Having read the appeal record and the Written Submission of the appellant and having heard both parties, I am in agreement with the learned deputy public prosecutor that the element of possession has been proved through the prosecution witnesses SP1, 2 and 3 who were members of the raiding party.
[10] The 65 DVDs alleged to be obscene were found under the counter of the premises and at the material time of the raid, the respondent was alone in the premises manning the counter. He attempted to flee when SP1 identified himself as a police officer.
[11] The facts of this case are similar to Mohd. Ibrahim v PP [1963] MLJ 289 wherein the appellant was found to be in possession of 65 copies of the book “Tropic of Cancer”. The impugned books were found under the counter of his shop. The appellant in Mohd. Ibrahim (supra) was employed to manage the sale of books and though an attempt was made to absolve himself of knowledge as he could not read English, nevertheless the court held that the inference was irresistible that the 65 copies found in the shop for the purpose of being sold and that the appellant was the person in charge of selling of the books on the shop was in possession of them and in possession of them for purposes of sale. He also failed in his argument that knowledge was negated by his ignorance of the English language as the court held that he could have obtained the services of an English – speaking clerk in ordering the books.
[12] In this case, there was the uncontroverted evidence of SP1 and SP3 that the 65 DVDs were found under the counter and the respondent was found at the time of raid, behind this counter. Knowledge can also be inferred from the fact that he attempted flight when SP1 identified himself as a public officer. Therefore, viewed in its totality the prosecution had proved the element of possession.
[13] There is no cause for the adverse inference to be invoked as it is trite that the calling of witnesses is at the discretion of the prosecution and the burden is on the prosecution throughout to prove its case. I find no gap here, neither can it be said that there was any suppression of evidence.
[14] Therefore the learned magistrate had erred in holding that the element of possession was not proved and in invoking the adverse presumption.
Screen testing for obscenity
[15] However, I find that the second vital ingredient in this case, i.e. that the 65 DVDs are obscene was not proved.
15.1 There is no evidence at all that the 65 DVDs were subject to a screen
test (uji tayang) for the court to make a finding that the 65 DVDs are
obscene.
15.2 SP1 merely testified that he was satisfied that the 65 DVDs were
obscene by looking at the covers of the DVDs.
15.3 SP4, the I.O. of the case, said he had screen tested them at random in
his office and found them to be obscene.
15.4 Although at one point of the proceedings the learned APP applied to
reserve screen-testing of the DVDs, the learned defence counsel had
responded that there was no need for screen-testing (pg. 29 of Appeal
Record). Unfortunately the court appeared to have agreed with learned
defence counsel because nowhere in the Notes of Evidence does it appear
that screen testing was done.
[16] In the case of PP v Chung Wan Li [2005] 8 CLJ 501 , the learned High Court Judge held that “the screening of each and everyone of the 18 VCD’s is necessary to determine whether they were obscene films”. In Chung’s case (supra), the learned High Court Judge did not approve of the random testing that was conducted during the trial.
[17] His Lordship Mohd. Zawawi Salleh, J.C., concurred with the learned High Court judge in the case of PP v Lee Swee Sing [2009] 1 CLJ 320 . His Lordship held in Lee Swee Sing’s case that there is no provision in the Film Censorship Act 2002 which allows for random testing. A comparison was drawn with the provision of s.37(j) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which allowed for a 10% of the sample of the drugs to be tested.
[18] In this case, there was no screen testing at all carried out during the trial. How then can the court arrive at a finding that the 65 DVDs are obscene? It is patently clear that the prosecution had failed to prove that the 65 DVDs were obscene and the learned magistrate should have so found.
For the reasons as adumbrated above the acquittal and discharge of the respondent is hereby affirmed as the prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case against the respondent as per the charge.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
LOAD-DATE: 01/12/2010
***********************************************************************************************
U.S. Supreme Court
STANLEY v. GEORGIA, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
394 U.S. 557
STANLEY v. GEORGIA.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.
No. 293.
Argued January 14-15, 1969.
Decided April 7, 1969.
Under authority of a warrant to search appellant’s home for evidence of his alleged bookmaking activities, officers found some films in his bedroom. The films were projected and deemed to be obscene. Appellant was arrested for their possession. He was thereafter indicted, tried, and convicted for “knowingly hav[ing] possession of . . . obscene matter” in violation of a Georgia law. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding it “not essential to an indictment charging one with possession of obscene matter that it be alleged that such possession was `with intent to sell, expose or circulate the same.'” Appellant contends that the Georgia obscenity statute is unconstitutional insofar as it punishes mere private possession of obscene matter. Georgia, relying on Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , argues the statute’s validity on the ground that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.” Id., at 485. Held: The First Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth prohibits making mere private possession of obscene material a crime. Pp. 560-568.
(a) Neither Roth, supra, nor subsequent decisions of the Court were made in the context of a statute punishing mere private possession of obscene material, but involved governmental power to prohibit or regulate certain public actions respecting obscene matter. Pp. 560-564.
(b) The Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and to be generally free from governmental intrusions into one’s privacy and control of one’s thoughts. Pp. 564-566.
(c) The State may not prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct, Roth, supra, distinguished, or proscribe such possession on the ground that it is a necessary incident to a statutory scheme prohibiting distribution, see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 . Pp. 566-568.
224 Ga. 259, 161 S. E. 2d 309, reversed and remanded. [394 U.S. 557, 558]
Wesley R. Asinof argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
J. Robert Sparks argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Lewis R. Slaton.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
An investigation of appellant’s alleged bookmaking activities led to the issuance of a search warrant for appellant’s home. Under authority of this warrant, federal and state agents secured entrance. They found very little evidence of bookmaking activity, but while looking through a desk drawer in an upstairs bedroom, one of the federal agents, accompanied by a state officer, found three reels of eight-millimeter film. Using a projector and screen found in an upstairs living room, they viewed the films. The state officer concluded that they were obscene and seized them. Since a further examination of the bedroom indicated that appellant occupied it, he was charged with possession of obscene matter and placed under arrest. He was later indicted for “knowingly hav[ing] possession of . . . obscene matter” in violation of Georgia law. 1 Appellant [394 U.S. 557, 559] was tried before a jury and convicted. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S. E. 2d 309 (1968). We noted probable jurisdiction of an appeal brought under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2). 393 U.S. 819 (1968).
Appellant raises several challenges to the validity of his conviction. 2 We find it necessary to consider only one. Appellant argues here, and argued below, that the Georgia obscenity statute, insofar as it punishes mere private possession of obscene matter, violates the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. For reasons set forth below, we agree that the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.
The court below saw no valid constitutional objection to the Georgia statute, even though it extends further than the typical statute forbidding commercial sales of obscene material. It held that “[i]t is not essential to an indictment charging one with possession of obscene matter that it be alleged that such possession was `with intent to sell, expose or circulate the same.'” Stanley v. State, supra, at 261, 161 S. E. 2d, at 311. The State and appellant both agree that the question here before us is whether “a statute imposing criminal sanctions upon the mere [knowing] possession of obscene matter” is constitutional. In this context, Georgia concedes that the present case appears to be one of “first [394 U.S. 557, 560] impression . . . on this exact point,” 3 but contends that since “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), the States are free, subject to the limits of other provisions of the Constitution, see, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 -645 (1968), to deal with it any way deemed necessary, just as they may deal with possession of other things thought to be detrimental to the welfare of their citizens. If the State can protect the body of a citizen, may it not, argues Georgia, protect his mind?
It is true that Roth does declare, seemingly without qualification, that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment. That statement has been repeated in various forms in subsequent cases. See, e. g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 186 -187 (1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 635. However, neither Roth nor any subsequent decision of this Court dealt with the precise problem involved in the present case. Roth was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and advertising, and an obscene book, in violation of a federal obscenity statute. 4 The defendant in a companion case, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), was convicted of “lewdly keeping for sale obscene and indecent books, and [of] writing, composing and publishing an obscene advertisement of them . . . .” Id., at 481. None of the statements cited by the Court in [394 U.S. 557, 561] Roth for the proposition that “this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press” were made in the context of a statute punishing mere private possession of obscene material; the cases cited deal for the most part with use of the mails to distribute objectionable material or with some form of public distribution or dissemination. 5 Moreover, none of this Court’s decisions subsequent to Roth involved prosecution for private possession of obscene materials. Those cases dealt with the power of the State and Federal Governments to prohibit or regulate certain public actions taken or intended to be taken with respect to obscene matter. 6 Indeed, with one [394 U.S. 557, 562] exception, we have been unable to discover any case in which the issue in the present case has been fully considered. 7 [394 U.S. 557, 563]
In this context, we do not believe that this case can be decided simply by citing Roth. Roth and its progeny certainly do mean that the First and Fourteenth Amendments recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity. But the assertion of that interest cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections. Neither Roth nor any other decision of this Court reaches that far. As the Court said in Roth itself, “[c]easeless vigilance is the watchword to prevent . . . erosion [of First Amendment rights] by Congress or by the States. The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests.” 354 U.S., at 488 . Roth and the cases following it discerned such an “important interest” in the regulation of commercial distribution of [394 U.S. 557, 564] obscene material. That holding cannot foreclose an examination of the constitutional implications of a statute forbidding mere private possession of such material.
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. “This freedom [of speech and press] . . . necessarily protects the right to receive . . . .” Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 -308 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, see Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948), is fundamental to our free society. Moreover, in the context of this case – a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person’s own home – that right takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.
“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). [394 U.S. 557, 565]
These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us. He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases – the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his library. Georgia contends that appellant does not have these rights, that there are certain types of materials that the individual may not read or even possess. Georgia justifies this assertion by arguing that the films in the present case are obscene. But we think that mere categorization of these films as “obscene” is insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.
And yet, in the face of these traditional notions of individual liberty, Georgia asserts the right to protect the individual’s mind from the effects of obscenity. We are not certain that this argument amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State has the right to control the moral content of a person’s thoughts. 8 To [394 U.S. 557, 566] some, this may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment. As the Court said in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 -689 (1959), “[t]his argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. . . . And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.” Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Nor is it relevant that obscene materials in general, or the particular films before the Court, are arguably devoid of any ideological content. The line between the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn at all. See Winters v. New York, supra, at 510. Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.
Perhaps recognizing this, Georgia asserts that exposure to obscene materials may lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence. There appears to be little empirical basis for that assertion. 9 But more important, if the State is only concerned about printed or filmed materials inducing antisocial conduct, we believe that in the context of private consumption of ideas and information we should adhere to the view that “[a]mong free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be [394 U.S. 557, 567] applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law . . . .” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L. J. 877, 938 (1963). Given the present state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits.
It is true that in Roth this Court rejected the necessity of proving that exposure to obscene material would create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct or would probably induce its recipients to such conduct. 354 U.S., at 486 -487. But that case dealt with public distribution of obscene materials and such distribution is subject to different objections. For example, there is always the danger that obscene material might fall into the hands of children, see Ginsberg v. New York, supra, or that it might intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general public. 10 See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967). No such dangers are present in this case.
Finally, we are faced with the argument that prohibition of possession of obscene materials is a necessary incident to statutory schemes prohibiting distribution. That argument is based on alleged difficulties of proving an intent to distribute or in producing evidence of actual distribution. We are not convinced that such difficulties [394 U.S. 557, 568] exist, but even if they did we do not think that they would justify infringement of the individual’s right to read or observe what he pleases. Because that right is so fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime. 11 Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by today’s holding. As we have said, the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home. Accordingly, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] “Any person who shall knowingly bring or cause to be brought into this State for sale or exhibition, or who shall knowingly sell or offer to sell, or who shall knowingly lend or give away or offer to lend or give away, or who shall knowingly have possession of, or who shall knowingly exhibit or transmit to another, any obscene matter, or who shall knowingly advertise for sale by any form of notice, printed, written, or verbal, any obscene matter, or who shall knowingly manufacture, draw, duplicate or print any obscene matter with intent to sell, expose or circulate the same, shall, if such person has knowledge or reasonably should know of the obscene nature of such matter, be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than five years: Provided, however, in the event the [394 U.S. 557, 559] jury so recommends, such person may be punished as for a misdemeanor. As used herein, a matter is obscene if, considered as a whole, applying contemporary community standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion.” Ga. Code Ann. 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
[ Footnote 2 ] Appellant does not argue that the films are not obscene. For the purpose of this opinion, we assume that they are obscene under any of the tests advanced by members of this Court. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
[ Footnote 3 ] The issue was before the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), but that case was decided on other grounds. MR. JUSTICE STEWART, although disagreeing with the majority opinion in Mapp, would have reversed the judgment in that case on the ground that the Ohio statute proscribing mere possession of obscene material was “not `consistent with the rights of free thought and expression assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.'” Id., at 672.
[ Footnote 4 ] 18 U.S.C. 1461.
[ Footnote 5 ] Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 -737 (1878) (use of the mails); United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 261 (1890) (use of the mails); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (publication); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 508 (1904) (use of the mails); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913) (use of interstate facilities); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (publication); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 -572 (1942) (utterances); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946) (use of the mails); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (possession with intent to sell); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libel).
[ Footnote 6 ] Many of the cases involved prosecutions for sale or distribution of obscene materials or possession with intent to sell or distribute. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Our most recent decision involved a prosecution for sale of obscene material to children. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968). Other cases involved federal or state statutory procedures for preventing the distribution or mailing of obscene material, or procedures for predistribution approval. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Still another case dealt with an attempt to seize obscene material “kept for the purpose [394 U.S. 557, 562] of being sold, published, exhibited . . . or otherwise distributed or circulated . . . .” Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 719 (1961); see also A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964). Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), was a proceeding in equity against a book. However, possession of a book determined to be obscene in such a proceeding was made criminal only when “for the purpose of sale, loan or distribution.” Id., at 422.
[ Footnote 7 ] The Supreme Court of Ohio considered the issue in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N. E. 2d 387 (1960). Four of the seven judges of that court felt that criminal prosecution for mere private possession of obscene materials was prohibited by the Constitution. However, Ohio law required the concurrence of “all but one of the judges” to declare a state law unconstitutional. The view of the “dissenting” judges was expressed by Judge Herbert:
“I cannot agree that mere private possession of . . . [obscene] literature by an adult should constitute a crime. The right of the individual to read, to believe or disbelieve, and to think without governmental supervision is one of our basic liberties, but to dictate to the mature adult what books he may have in his own private library seems to the writer to be a clear infringement of his constitutional rights as an individual.” 170 Ohio St., at 437, 166 N. E. 2d, at 393.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court of Ohio interpreted the Ohio statute to require proof of “possession and control for the purpose of circulation or exhibition.” State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22, 27-28, 179 N. E. 2d 777, 781 (1962), rev’d on other grounds, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). The interpretation was designed to avoid the constitutional problem posed by the “dissenters” in Mapp. See State v. Ross, 12 Ohio St. 2d 37, 231 N. E. 2d 299 (1967).
Other cases dealing with nonpublic distribution of obscene material or with legitimate uses of obscene material have expressed similar reluctance to make such activity criminal, albeit largely on statutory grounds. In United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1890), the Court held that federal law did not make criminal the mailing of a private sealed obscene letter on the ground that the law’s purpose was to purge the mails of obscene matter “as far as was consistent with the rights reserved to the people, and with a due regard to the security of private correspondence . . . .” 135 U.S., at 261 . The [394 U.S. 557, 563] law was later amended to include letters and was sustained in that form. Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420 (1896). In United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1957), the court denied an attempt by the Government to confiscate certain materials sought to be imported into the United States by the Institute for Sex Research, Inc., at Indiana University. The court found, applying the Roth formulation, that the materials would not appeal to the “prurient interest” of those seeking to import and utilize the materials. Thus, the statute permitting seizure of “obscene” materials was not applicable. The court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional questions presented by the claimant, but did note its belief that “the statement . . . [in Roth] concerning the rejection of obscenity must be interpreted in the light of the widespread distribution of the material in Roth.” 156 F. Supp., at 360, n. 40. See also Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264 (1966), where this Court granted the Solicitor General’s motion to vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss an information charging a violation of a federal obscenity statute in a case where a husband and wife mailed undeveloped films of each other posing in the nude to an out-of-state firm for developing. But see Ackerman v. United States, 293 F.2d 449 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1961).
[ Footnote 8 ] “Communities believe, and act on the belief, that obscenity is immoral, is wrong for the individual, and has no place in a decent society. They believe, too, that adults as well as children are corruptible in morals and character, and that obscenity is a source of corruption that should be eliminated. Obscenity is not suppressed primarily for the protection of others. Much of it is suppressed for the purity of the community and for the salvation and welfare of the `consumer.’ Obscenity, at bottom, is not crime. Obscenity is sin.” Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity. 63 Col. L. Rev. 391, 395 (1963).
[ Footnote 9 ] See, e. g., Cairns, Paul, & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1009 (1962): see also M. Jahoda, The Impact of Literature: A Psychological Discussion of Some Assumptions in the Censorship Debate (1954), summarized in the concurring opinion of Judge Frank in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 814-816 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1956).
[ Footnote 10 ] The Model Penal Code provisions dealing with obscene materials are limited to cases of commercial dissemination. Model Penal Code 251.4 (Prop. Official Draft 1962); see also Model Penal Code 207.10 and comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957); H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 316-328 (1968); Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 Col. L. Rev. 669 (1963).
[ Footnote 11 ] What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia statute’s infringement of fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making mere possession criminal.
Nor do we mean to express any opinion on statutes making criminal possession of other types of printed, filmed, or recorded materials. See, e. g., 18 U.S.C. 793 (d), which makes criminal the otherwise lawful possession of materials which “the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation . . . .” In such cases, compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of the individual to possess those materials.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring.
I agree with the Court that the mere possession of reading matter or movie films, whether labeled obscene or not, cannot be made a crime by a State without violating [394 U.S. 557, 569] the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. My reasons for this belief have been set out in many of my prior opinions, as for example, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (concurring opinion), and Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (dissenting opinion).
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, concurring in the result.
Before the commencement of the trial in this case, the appellant filed a motion to suppress the films as evidence upon the ground that they had been seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The motion was denied, and the films were admitted in evidence at the trial. In affirming the appellant’s conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court specifically determined that the films had been lawfully seized. The appellant correctly contends that this determination was clearly wrong under established principles of constitutional law. But the Court today disregards this preliminary issue in its hurry to move on to newer constitutional frontiers. I cannot so readily overlook the serious inroads upon Fourth Amendment guarantees countenanced in this case by the Georgia courts.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The purpose of these clear and precise words was to guarantee to the people of this Nation that they should forever be secure from the general searches and unrestrained seizures that had been a hated hallmark of colonial rule under the notorious writs of assistance of the British Crown. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 . This most basic of Fourth Amendment guarantees was frustrated [394 U.S. 557, 570] in the present case, I think, in a manner made the more pernicious by its very subtlety. For what happened here was that a search that began as perfectly lawful became the occasion for an unwarranted and unconstitutional seizure of the films.
The state and federal officers gained admission to the appellant’s house under the authority of a search warrant issued by a United States Commissioner. The warrant described “the place to be searched” with particularity. 1 With like particularity, it described the “things to be seized” – equipment, records, and other material used in or derived from an illegal wagering business. 2 And the warrant was issued only after the Commissioner had been apprised of more than adequate probable cause to issue it. 3
There can be no doubt, therefore, that the agents were lawfully present in the appellant’s house, lawfully authorized to search for any and all of the items specified in the warrant, and lawfully empowered to seize any such [394 U.S. 557, 571] items they might find. 4 It follows, therefore, that the agents were acting within the authority of the warrant when they proceeded to the appellant’s upstairs bedroom and pulled open the drawers of his desk. But when they found in one of those drawers not gambling material but moving picture films, the warrant gave them no authority to seize the films.
The controlling constitutional principle was stated in two sentences by this Court more than 40 years ago:
“The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 .
This is not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence 5 in plain view. For the record makes clear that the contents of the films could not be determined by mere inspection. And this is not a case that presents any questions as to the permissible scope of a search made incident to a lawful arrest. For the appellant had not been arrested when the agents found the films. After finding them, the agents spent some 50 minutes exhibiting them by means of the appellant’s projector in another upstairs room. Only then did the agents return downstairs and arrest the appellant.
Even in the much-criticized case of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 , the Court emphasized that “exploratory [394 U.S. 557, 572] searches . . . cannot be undertaken by officers with or without a warrant.” Id., at 62. This record presents a bald violation of that basic constitutional rule. To condone what happened here is to invite a government official to use a seemingly precise and legal warrant only as a ticket to get into a man’s home, and, once inside, to launch forth upon unconfined searches and indiscriminate seizures as if armed with all the unbridled and illegal power of a general warrant.
Because the films were seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, they were inadmissible in evidence at the appellant’s trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 . Accordingly, the judgment of conviction must be reversed.
[ Footnote 1 ] “[T]he premises known as 280 Springside Drive, S. E., two story residence with an annex on the main floor constructed of brick and frame, in Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia, in the Northern District of Georgia . . . .”
[ Footnote 2 ] “[B]ookmaking records, wagering paraphernalia consisting of bet slips, account sheets, recap sheets, collection sheets, adding machines, money used in or derived from the wagering business, records of purchases, records of real estate and bank transactions, the money for which was derived from the wagering business, and any other property used in the wagering business, which are being used and/or have been used in the operation of a bookmaking business or represent the fruits of a bookmaking business being operated in violation of Sections 4411, 4412 and 7203 IRC of 1954.”
[ Footnote 3 ] Before the Commissioner were no less than four lengthy and detailed affidavits, setting out the grounds for the affiants’ reasonable belief that the appellant was engaged in an illegal gambling enterprise, and that the paraphernalia of his trade were concealed in his house.
[ Footnote 4 ] The fact that almost no gambling material was actually found has no bearing, of course, upon the validity of the search. The constitutionality of a search depends in no measure upon what it brings to light. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 .
[ Footnote 5 ] See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 . [394 U.S. 557, 573]
***********************************************************************************************
9 MLJ 490, *; [2009] 9 MLJ 490
© 2009 LexisNexis Asia (a division of Reed Elsevier (S) Pte Ltd)
The Malayan Law Journal
PDF Print Format
Kum Wah Sdn Bhd v RHB Bank Bhd (formerly known as Malayan Banking Corp Bhd) (United Frank Sdn Bhd & Ors, third parties)
[2009] 9 MLJ 490
SUIT NO D2–22–2139 OF 2001
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)
DECIDED-DATE-1: 6 JULY 2009
NOOR AZIAN J
CATCHWORDS:
Banking – Banker and customer – Duty of banker – Forgery – Debits in applications for cashier’s order – Whether applications made by plaintiff – Whether plaintiff discharged onus in proving signatures on applications were not those of its signatories – Whether defendant bank negligent in its duty to customer – Whether third parties liable to defendant if latter held liable to plaintiff
Evidence – Expert evidence – Handwriting expert – Whether gazetted document examiner more qualified to give evidence
HEADNOTES:
The plaintiff was a family company that was involved as wholesaler, dealer and retailer of wine and liquor. The three directors of the plaintiff company were all brothers. The plaintiff opened its current account in the form of an overdraft facility (‘the plaintiff’s account’) with United Malayan Banking Corporate Bhd, which through a series of mergers became to be known as the RHB Bank Bhd, the defendant. The signatories to the plaintiff’s account were the three directors, although the plaintiff asserted that for the banking facility it only used a rubber stamp bearing the plaintiff company’s name. On 19 June 2001, the plaintiff’s account was debited by RM848,806.45, which was made up as follows: RM6,302.15 in favour of EON Finance; RM374,402.15 in favour of Tan Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock; and RM468,502.15 in favour of United Frank Sdn Bhd. Of these, although the first debit of RM6,302.15 was debited from the plaintiff’s account it was never paid out to EON Finance Bhd. The second sum of RM374,402.15 in favour of Tan Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock was allowed to be banked into their joint account ie Tan Keng Pan and/or Ho Thiam Hock. All the three debits were in the form of applications for cashier’s order. The plaintiff argued that its account with the defendant bank was wrongfully debited by the sum of RM848,806.45. It then filed the present suit against the defendant for breach of mandate and/or negligence resulting in the wrongful debit of RM848,806.45 from its account. By this action the plaintiff sought a [*491] declaration that the debit was unlawful and without authority and that therefore the sum of RM848,806.45 ought to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant in turn filed a third party proceedings against United Frank Sdn Bhd, Tan Keng Pan and Ho Thiam Hock and claimed the sums of RM468,500 from United Frank Sdn Bhd and RM374,000 from the other two parties. The defendant claimed that it was entitled to be compensated by the third parties in respect of any damages and loss that it may have to pay in the event that it was held liable for the wrongful debits from the plaintiff’s account. The defendant submitted that it was entitled to claim for damages against the third parties for payments made under a mistake under s 73 of the Contracts Act 1950 and/or alternatively under the principles of monies had and received. There was no representation by the first third party ie United Frank Sdn Bhd but the court was informed that it was wound up. Tan Keng Pan and Ho Thiam Hock confirmed that they did not have any dealings with the directors of the plaintiff company. Ho Thiam Hock, who was in charge of daily operations of Sri Saran Daya Sdn Bhd, a money changer company, submitted that the payment of RM374,000 was for a bona fide valuable consideration ie in giving foreign currencies to an unknown person. Both the plaintiff and the defendant called their own handwriting experts as expert witnesses to verify whether the signatures that appeared on the three cashier’s order applications were those of the signatories to the plaintiff’s account. The issues to be tried were whether the three cashier’s order applications for the amount claimed were made by the plaintiff and whether the third parties were liable to the defendant in the event the latter was held liable to the plaintiff for the amount debited from the plaintiff’s account.
Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim with costs:
(1) The three directors of the plaintiff appeared from their demeanour to
be honest witnesses. As such there was no reason to doubt their
evidence that they had not given the defendant bank the mandate to
issue the three cashier’s orders (see para 20).
(2) The expert witness that the plaintiff called upon to give evidence at
the trial was more qualified to give evidence in respect of whether the
signatures on the three cashier’s order applications were forgeries
because he is a gazetted document examiner. This witness was convincing
in concluding that the signatures on the three cashier’s order
applications were not those of the plaintiff. As such, the plaintiff
had discharged its onus of proof as required under s 101 of the
Evidence Act 1950 in establishing that the three signatures were not
those of its signatories. Further, on the balance of probabilities the
documents did not have the mandate of the plaintiff with reference to
the rubber stamp (see para 20).
[*492]
(3) Although the defendant bank had a duty to call its customers to verify
or check in respect of cashier’s order applications above RM20,000 it
would appear that the defendant had not done so. The fact that the
defendant allowed the cashier’s order for RM374,000 issued in the name
Tan Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock to be banked into a joint account bearing the
names Tan Keng Pan and/or Ho Thiam Hock is another piece of evidence
that would support the defendant’s negligence (see paras 21–23).
(4) Tan Keng Pan and Ho Thiam Hock acted in good faith and there was no
mistake when they were paid for exchange of currencies. It was an
unknown person who had gained by the defendant’s mistake. Thus s 73 of
the 1950 Act would not apply in this case and the third parties were
not liable to the defendant (see paras 33–34).
Plaintif merupakan syarikat keluarga yang terlibat sebagai pemborong, pengedar dan peruncit wain dan arak. Ketiga-tiga pengarah plaintif syarikat merupakan adik-beradik. Plaintif membuka akaun semasanya dalam bentuk kemudahan overdraf (‘akaun plaintif’) dengan United Malayan Banking Corporate Bhd, yang mana berikutan dengan beberapa siri penggabungan, kini dikenali sebagai RHB Bank Bhd, defendan. Penandatangan akaun plaintif adalah ketiga-tiga pengarah tersebut, walaupun plaintif menegaskan bahawa bagi tujuan kemudahan perbankan, plaintif hanya menggunakan cap getah nama syarikat plaintif. Pada 19 Jun 2001, akaun plaintif didebitkan sebanyak RM848,806.45, yang mana pecahannya adalah seperti berikut: RM6,302.15 untuk EON Finance; RM374,402.15 untuk Tan Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock; dan RM468,502.15 untuk United Frank Sdn Bhd. Daripada kesemua ini, walaupun jumlah pertama sebanyak RM6,302.15 telah didebitkan daripada akaun plaintif tetapi jumlah tersebut tidak pernah dibayar kepada EON Finance Bhd. Jumlah kedua RM374,402.15 untuk Tan Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock dibenarkan dimasukkan ke akaun bersama iaitu Tan Keng Pan dan/atau Ho Thiam Hock. Ketiga-tiga debit ini dalam bentuk permohonan untuk perintah juruwang. Plaintif berhujah bahawa akaunnya dengan bank defendan telah salah didebitkan dengan jumlah RM848,806.45. Plaintif kemudiannya memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap defendan atas kemungkiran mandat dan/atau kecuaian kerana debit salah sejumlah RM848,806.45 daripada akaunnya. Menerusi tindakan ini, plaintif memohon pengisytiharan bahawa debit tersebut adalah menyalahi undang-undang dan tanpa kebenaran dan jumlah RM848,806.45 harus dibayar kepada plaintif oleh defendan. Defendan pula memfailkan prosiding pihak ketiga terhadap United Frank Sdn Bhd, Tan Keng Pan dan Ho Thiam Hock dan menuntut sejumlah RM468,500 daripada United Frank Sdn Bhd dan RM374,000 daripada dua pihak yang lain tersebut. Defendan [*493] menyatakan bahawa defendan berhak dipampas oleh pihak-pihak ketiga atas sebarang kerugian dan pampasan yang defendan mungkin kena bayar jika defendan didapati bertanggungan atas salah debit daripada akaun plaintif. Defendan berhujah bahawa defendan berhak untuk menuntut ganti rugi terhadap pihak-pihak ketiga untuk bayaran yang telah dibuat atas kesilapan di bawah s 73 Akta Kontrak 1950 dan/atau secara alternatif di bawah prinsip-prinsip wang yang ada dan telah diterima. Tiada perwakilan bagi pihak ketiga yang pertama iaitu United Frank Sdn Bhd tetapi mahkamah dimaklumkan bahawa United Frank telah digulung. Tan Keng Pan dan Ho Thiam Hock mengesahkan bahawa mereka tiada urusan dengan pemgarah-pengarah plaintif syarikat. Ho Thiam Hock, yang bertanggungjawab atas urusan harian Sri Saran Daya Sdn Bhd, sebuah syarikat penggurup wang, menyatakan bahawa bayaran sebanyak RM374,000 adalah untuk balasan bernilai bona fide iaitu memberikan wang asing kepada orang yang tidak dikenali. Kedua-dua plaintif dan defendan memanggil pakar tulisan masing-masing sebagai saksi pakar untuk mengesahkan sama ada tandatangan-tandatangan yang tertera di atas ketiga-tiga permohonan perintah juruwang merupakan penandatangan akaun plaintif. Isu-isu yang perlu diputuskan ialah sama ada ketiga-tiga permohonan perintah juruwang bagi jumlah yang dituntut dibuat oleh plaintif dan sama ada pihak-pihak ketiga bertanggungan terhadap defendan jika defendan diputuskan bertanggungan terhadap plaintif untuk jumlah yang didebitkan daripada akaun plaintif.
Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif dengan kos:
(1) Melihat kepada tingkah laku ketiga-tiga pengarah plaintif menunjukkan
bahawa mereka saksi yang jujur. Oleh itu, tiada alasan untuk meragui
keterangan mereka bahawa mereka tidak memberikan mandat kepada defendan
bank untuk mengeluarkan tiga perintah juruwang (lihat perenggan 20).
(2) Saksi pakar yang dipanggil plaintif memberi keterangan di perbicaraan
lebih berkelayakan untuk memberikan keterangan sama ada
tandatangan-tandatangan pada ketiga-tiga permohonan perintah juruwang
adalah palsu oleh sebab dia merupakan pemeriksa dokumen yang
diwartakan. Saksi ini amat meyakinkan apabila menyimpulkan bahawa
tandatangan-tandatangan pada ketiga-tiga permohonan perintah juruwang
bukanlah milik plaintif. Oleh itu, plaintif berjaya membuktikan atas
beban pembuktian seperti yang dikehendaki di bawah s 101 Akta
Keterangan 1950 dalam mengesahkan bahawa ketiga-tiga tandatangan
tersebut bukanlah milik penandatangan plaintif. Selanjutnya, atas
imbangan kebarangkalian, [*494] dokumen-dokumen tersebut tidak
mendapat mandat daripada plaintif dengan merujuk kepada cap getah
tersebut (lihat perenggan 20).
(3) Walaupun defendan bank bertanggungjawab menghubungi
pelanggan-pelanggannya untuk mengesah atau memeriksa
permohonan-permohonan perintah juruwang yang berjumlah RM20,000 ke
atas, tetapi defendan tidak berbuat demikian. Fakta bahawa defendan
membenarkan perintah juruwang untuk sejumlah RM374,000 atas nama Tan
Keng Pan @ Thiam Hock dimasukkan ke dalam akaun bersama atas nama Tan
Keng Pan dan/atau Ho Thiam Hock merupakan satu lagi bukti kecuaian
defendan (lihat perenggan 21–23).
(4) Tan Keng Pan dan Ho Thiam Hock betindak secara suci hati dan tiada
kesilapan apabila mereka dibayar untuk penukaran wang asing. Adalah
tidak diketahui siapakah yang mendapat keuntungan atas kesilapan
defendan. Maka s 73 Akta 1950 tidak terpakai atas kes ini dan
pihak-pihak ketiga tidak bertanggungan terhadap defendan (lihat
perenggan 33–34).
Notes
For cases on duty of banker, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2005 Reissue) paras 1818–1824.
For cases on handwriting expert, see 7(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2006 Reissue) paras 1465–1473.
Cases referred to
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Hasbudin Haslin [1998] 2 CLJ Supp 332, CA
Barclay’s Bank Ltd v WJ Simms & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 677, QBD
Legislation referred to
Contracts Act 1950 s 73
Evidence Act 1950 s 101
David Hoh (Kingston Tan and HQ Kwong with him) (Heiley Hassan, Tan & Partners) for the plaintiff.
Kumar Kanagasingam (Suhaiza Zakaria with him) (Lee Hishamuddin Allen & Gledhill) for the defendant.
NS Guok (SK Thong with him) (Thong Seng Kong & Assoc) for the third parties.
Noor Azian J:
[1] On 19 June 2001, the plaintiff’s (Kum Wah Sdn Bhd) account with the defendant, RHB Bank Bhd (formerly known as United Malayan Banking [*495] Corp Bhd) was debited by the sum of RM848,806.45 which the plaintiff alleged was wrongfully done by the defendant.
[2] The plaintiff then filed this suit against the defendant for breach of mandate and/or negligence resulting in the wrongful and unilateral debit from the plaintiff’s account with the defendant of the sum of RM848,806.45.
[3] The plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the debit of the said sum from the plaintiff’s account was unlawful and without authority and that the said sum be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.
[4] The defendant filed third party proceedings against United Frank Sdn Bhd (‘FTP’) and Tan Kang Pan (‘STP’) and Ho Thiam Hock (‘TTP’).
[5] In respect of the third party proceedings, the defendant claimed that it had made payments to FTP, STP and TTP in the following amounts:
| (1) | FTP — | RM468,500; and |
| (2) | STP/TTP — | RM374,000. |
[6] The defendant claims that it is entitled to be compensated by the STP and TTP in respect if any damages and loss that it may have to pay in the event the defendant is held responsible to the plaintiff for the amount the plaintiff claimed was wrongfully paid by the defendant to the STP and TTP under s 73 of the Contracts Act 1950 or amount that was had and received by both the STP and the TTP.
[7] For the trial the plaintiff called five witnesses, they being:
| (1) | PW1 | — Tai Lai Kee. |
| Former bank manager of RHB | ||
| Bank, Pudu branch. | ||
| (2) | PW2 | — Look See Kuan. |
| One of the three directors | ||
| of the plaintiff. | ||
| (3) | PW3 | — Look See Kee. One |
| of the three directors of | ||
| the plaintiff. | ||
| (4) | PW4 | — Bala Shanmugam |
| a/l M Vadivelu. Forensic | ||
| document examiner. | ||
| (5) | PW5 | — Look Kan Chai. |
| One of the three directors | ||
| of the plaintiff. |
[*496]
[8] The defendant called six witnesses:
| (1) | DW1 | — Aziz bin |
| Abdullah. Assistant | ||
| superintendent of police. | ||
| (2) | DW2 | — Goh Sing Min. |
| Defendant’s branch | ||
| manager | ||
| (3) | DW3 | — Leong Fang Lang. |
| Head cashier with the | ||
| defendant. | ||
| (4) | DW4 | — Aw Peng Onn. |
| Defendant’s | ||
| manager. | ||
| (5) | DW5 | — Mohd Azmi Mohd |
| Yusoff. At one time an | ||
| assistant bank manager of | ||
| the defendant. | ||
| (6) | DW6 | — Harcharan Singh |
| Tara. Chemico-Legal and | ||
| Forensic consultant. |
[9] The third parties called one witness:
| (1) | TPW1 | — Ho Thiam Hock in |
| charge of daily operations | ||
| of Sri Saran Daya Sdn Bhd, | ||
| a money changer company. | ||
| Gave foreign currencies to | ||
| unknown person who had | ||
| banked in the RM374,000 | ||
| into the RHB bank account | ||
| No | ||
| 2–14213–9000292–7. |
[10] The brief facts of the case is that the plaintiff was established since 21 June 1978 as a family company involved as wholesaler, dealer and retailer of wine and liquor.
[11] There are three directors of the plaintiff’s company ie PW2, PW3 and PW5 and they are all siblings being 66 years old, 72 years old and 65 years old respectively.
[12] On 19 June 2001 the plaintiff’s account was debited for the following sums:
| (1) | RM6,302.15 | — In favour of EON |
| Finance Bhd; | ||
| (2) | RM374,402.15 | — In favour of Tan |
| Kang Pan @ Ho Thiam Hock; | ||
| and | ||
| (3) | RM468.502.15 | — In favour of |
| United Frank Sdn Bhd. |
[13] Although the RM6,302.15 was debited from the plaintiff’s account with the defendant, the defendant never actually paid out this amount to EON Finance Bhd.
[14] The TTP confirmed that they did not have any dealings with the plaintiff nor with the directors, PW2, PW3 and PW5.
[15] The plaintiff opened its current account in the form of overdraft facility with the defendant (then known as United Malayan Banking Corp [*497] Bhd which through a series of mergers became to be known now as RHB Bank Bhd) since 12 November 1979 ie 22 years prior to the relevant date. Initially, the plaintiff’s account was at the defendant’s Pudu branch (located in Sg Besi) where upon merger with the defendant’s Jalan Pasar branch in May 2001, the plaintiff’s account was transferred to the Jalan Pasar branch.
[16] Originally the plaintiff’s overdraft facility was RM700,000 but in 1979 it was increased to 1.5m vide the defendant’s letter of offer of 26 December 2000 — exh ‘P3’. The overdraft was for a working capital.
[17] The signatories to the plaintiff’s account were three ie PW2, PW3 and PW5 as well as the plaintiff’s rubber stamp. The plaintiff asserted that for the banking facility it only used the rubber stamp as in exh ‘P18(a)’.
[18] After a trial of 29 days, four days before the first trial judge, one day before the second trial judge and 24 days before myself and notes of evidence totaling 269 pp, I allowed the plaintiff’s claim with cost and ordered the defendant to refund the amount debited with interest from the date the amount was debited ie 19 June 2001 until 19 November 2007. The defendant’s claim against the STP and TTP was dismissed with cost.
[19] The issue before the court is a question of fact ie whether the applications for the cashier’s order for the amount claimed were made by the plaintiff. The relevant application forms for this case are marked as exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and ‘D6’.
[20] In considering the plaintiff’s claim for breach of mandate and/or negligence resulting in the wrongful and unilateral debit from the plaintiff’s account with the defendant of the sum of RM848,806.45, the following were considered:
No mandate given by the plaintiff for issuance of exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and
‘D6’
(1) Direct evidence of PW2 and PW3 denying giving mandate
I have no reason to doubt the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW5 who at such
ripe ages of 66 years, 72 years and 65 years are running a family
business. Observing their demeanor they appear simple people and I
agree that they bear out as honest witnesses.
(2) Signature of PW2 and PW3 as found in exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and ‘D6’ are
forgeries
Both parties called their own expert witnesses and it was their
evidence that took up most of the trial time. That was why the trial
took so long.
[*498]
Bala Shanmugam (PW4) was the expert witness for the plaintiff and
Harcharan Singh Tara (DW6) was the expert witness for the defendant.
Based on their qualifications and experiences, I am more inclined to
accept that PW4 is more qualified to give evidence in respect of
whether the signatures on exhs ‘D4’; ‘D5’ and ‘D6’ are forgery. DW6 may
have been the director general of the Malaysian Chemistry Department
but he was never gazetted as a document examiner in the government
service. He said ‘I am not a gazetted document examiner. I have never
produced a technical report. Yes, a technical report can only be
produced by a gazetted document examiner.’. As such I am of the
considered opinion that PW4 is more qualified and experienced to give
testimony in respect of signatures on the three documents mentioned.
From the elaborate evidence adduced through PW4 and the extensive
cross-examination of the same witness by the defendant’s counsel, I am
satisfied on the balanced of probabilities that the two signatures on
all the three exhibits are not those of PW2 and PW3.
I will not elaborate in detail but suffice if I were to say that the
plaintiff’s expert witness (PW4) was able to convince me that the
signatures on the three documents are not that of the plaintiff’s.
The plaintiff had discharged their onus of proof as required by s 101
of the Evidence Act 1950 in establishing that the signatures on the
three documents are not those of the signatories to the plaintiff’s
account with the defendant.
(3) Plaintiff’s forged rubber stamp
I totally agree that there is a difference in the rubber stamp used on
the three documents. PW2 and PW3 had described the discrepancy in the
rubber stamp, they used for banking facility and the one used on the
documents ie ‘No:’ (with colon) as opposed to ‘No.’ (with full
stop).
On the balance of probabilities also, I am satisfied that the documents
did not have the mandate of the plaintiff with reference to the rubber
stamp.
(b) Negligence by the defendant
[21] From the testimonies of the defendant’s witnesses, the defendant had a duty to call its customers to verify/check in respect of applications for cashiers orders exceeding RM20,000. DW2 gave evidence to this effect.
[22] Here again, considering the witnesses, PW2, PW3 and PW5, the simple old brothers who ran the family business I am more inclined to believe [*499] them ie they did not receive any phone calls from anybody from the defendant to check/verify if the plaintiff had applied for the cashier’s order.
[23] Another piece of evidence that would support the sheer negligence of the defendant is that the cashier’s order for RM374,000 issued in the names of STP @ TTP (Tan Kang Pan @ Ho Thiam Hock) was allowed to be banked into their joint account (Tan Kang Pan and/or Ho Thiam Hock). This demonstrates the extreme carelessness on the part of the defendant. Judicial notice can be taken that in banking procedure, @ is an account of one person identified by more than one name whilst joint account is an account of more than one person.
[24] I am therefore of the considered opinion, based on the aforesaid reasons that the application for the cashier’s order were never made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was therefore allowed with cost.
[25] In respect of the third party proceedings, only the STP and the TTP were represented.
[26] The defendant alleged that as a result of payment to the STP and the TTP without mandate of the plaintiff and/or under a mandate, the defendant is entitled to recover damages against the STP and the TTP under s 73 of the Contracts Act 1950 and/or alternatively under the principles of monies had and received.
[27] The defence of the STP and TTP is essentially that the payment of RM374,000 on 19 June 2001 into their joint account held by them was for a bona fide valuable consideration ie in consideration that Sri Saran Daya Sdn Bhd (a company operating a money changer business) changing a sum of USD30,000, Pound Sterling 30,000, Hong Kong Dollar 200,000 to a person not known to both the STP and the TTP.
[28] The agreed issues to be tried between the parties are as follows:
(a) whether the STP and TTP are liable to pay the defendant for the
judgment sum in the event the defendant is held liable to the plaintiff;
(b) if the defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff, whether the defendant
had made a mistake in making the payment to the STP and TTP as pleaded;
and
(c) whether the defendant is entitled to claim for damages against the STP
and TTP for payment under mistake under s 73 of the Contracts Act 1950
and/or alternatively under monies had and received.
[*500]
[29] The relevant evidence adduced in respect of the third party proceedings were:
(a) Three applications for cashier’s order exhs ‘D4’, ‘D5’ and ‘D6’ was for
the following:
(i) RM468,500 — For United Frank Sdn Bhd; ‘D4’.
(ii) RM374,000 — For Tan Kang Pan @ Ho Thiam Hock; ‘D5’.
(iii) RM6,300 — For EON Finance Bhd; ‘D6’.
(b) In respect of the cashier’s order for RM374,000 it was banked in into
the joint account of the STP and TTP in spite of the cashier’s
order bearing their names as alias.
(c) The money was banked in as payment for various foreign currencies
mentioned earlier.
(d) The TTP had given the currency to a person who came to the premises of
the TTP’s company.
[30] I have no doubt about the evidence given by TPW1. However I would like to state again that the defendant’s branch that accepted the cashier’s order for the sum of RM374,000 was definitely careless in allowing a cheque bearing the names of the STP and TTP as alias to be banked in into their joint account.
[31] The STP and TTP into whose account the cashier’s order was banked in gave valuable consideration.
[32] It was in fact the defendant who was negligent in not verifying the three application forms and subsequently allowing the cashier’s order for RM374,000 to be banked in into the joint account of the STP and the TTP. If the bank staff had been vigilant and careful and noticed the discrepancy, it would ring a bell and the cashier’s order would be stopped.
[33] Section 73 of the Contracts Act 1950 is in respect of the liability of a person to whom money is paid, or thing delivered, by mistake or under coercion. In the case as for the STP and TTP there was no mistake, they were paid for exchange of currencies. They acted in good faith. It was unknown person who had gained by the defendant’s mistake. In the case of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Hasbudin Haslin [1998] 2 CLJ Supp 332, the case of Barclay’s Bank Ltd v WJ Simms & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 677 was referred to where Geoff J said:
[*501]
It follows that the payee has given consideration; with the consequence
that although the payment has been caused by the bank’s mistake, the
money is irrecoverable from the payee unless the transaction of payment
is itself set aside.
[34] Based on the aforesaid, I find that the STP and TTP is not liable to the defendant who is found liable for the plaintiff’s losses. Therefore, the defendant’s counterclaim against STP and TTP is dismissed with costs.
[35] With respect to the FTP, the court was informed that it was wound up (exh ‘P25’). Since there was no representation for the FTP and the defendant did not ask for any order, I would strike out the claim against the FTP.
ORDER:
Plaintiff’s claim allowed with costs.
***********************************************************************************************
U.S. Supreme Court
DAUBERT v. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
509 U.S. 579
WILLIAM DAUBERT, ET UX., ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MERRELL
DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-102
Argued March 30, 1993
Decided June 28, 1993
Petitioners, two minor children and their parents, alleged in their suit against respondent that the children’s serious birth defects had been caused by the mothers’ prenatal ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription drug marketed by respondent. The District Court granted respondent summary judgment based on a well-credentialed expert’s affidavit concluding, upon reviewing the extensive published scientific literature on the subject, that maternal use of Bendectin has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects. Although petitioners had responded with the testimony of eight other well-credentialed experts, who based their conclusion that Bendectin can cause birth defects on animal studies, chemical structure analyses, and the unpublished “reanalysis” of previously published human statistical studies, the court determined that this evidence did not meet the applicable “general acceptance” standard for the admission of expert testimony. The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed, citing Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014, for the rule that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific community.
Held:
The Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provide the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. Pp. 4-17.
(a) Frye’s “general acceptance” test was superseded by the Rules’ adoption. The Rules occupy the field, United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 , and, although the common law of evidence may serve as an aid to their application, id., at 51-52, respondent’s assertion that they somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Nothing in the Rules as a [509 U.S. 579, 2] whole or in the text and drafting history of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert testimony, gives any indication that “general acceptance” is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules’ liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to “opinion” testimony. Pp. 4-8.
(b) The Rules – especially Rule 702 – place appropriate limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence by assigning to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. The reliability standard is established by Rule 702’s requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific . . . knowledge,” since the adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in science’s methods and procedures, while the word “knowledge” connotes a body of known facts or of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as true on good grounds. The Rule’s requirement that the testimony “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” goes primarily to relevance by demanding a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility. Pp. 9-12.
(c) Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. Many considerations will bear on the inquiry, including whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. Throughout, the judge should also be mindful of other applicable Rules. Pp. 12-15.
(d) Cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising “general acceptance” standard, is the appropriate means by which evidence based on valid principles may be challenged. That even limited screening by the trial judge, on occasion, will prevent the jury from hearing of authentic scientific breakthroughs is simply a consequence of the fact that the Rules are not designed to seek cosmic understanding but, rather, to resolve legal disputes. Pp. 15-17.
951 F.2d 1128 (CA9 1991), vacated and remanded. [509 U.S. 579, 3]
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II-A, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-B, II-C, III, and IV, in which WHITE, O’CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. ___.
Michael H. Gottesman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Kenneth J. Chesebro, Barry J. Nace, David L. Shapiro, and Mary G. Gillick.
Charles Fried argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Charles R. Nesson, Joel I. Klein, Richard G. Taranto, Hall R. Marston, George E. Berry, Edward H. Stratemeier, and W. Glenn Forrester. *
[ Footnote * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Texas et al. by Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota,, Marc Racicot, Attorney General of Montana, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, and Brian Stuart Koukoutchos; for the American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics et al. by Joan E. Bertin, Marsha S. Berzon, and Albert H. Meyerhoff; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White and Roxanne Barton Conlin; for Ronald Bayer et al by Brain Stuart Koukoutchos, Priscilla Budeiri, Arthur Bryant, and George W. Conk; and for Daryl E. Chubin et al. by Ron Simon and Nicole Schultheis. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Miguel A. Estrada, Michael Jay Singer, and John P. Schnitker; for the American Insurance Association by William J. Kilberg, Paul Blankenstein, Bradford R. Clark, and Craig A. Berrington; for the American Medical Association et al. by Carter G.. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, and Jack R. Bierig; for the American Tort Reform Association by John G. Kester and John W. Vardaman, Jr.; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Timothy B. Dyk, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association by Louis R. Cohen and Daniel Marcus; for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., et al. by Victor E. Schwartz, Robert P. Charrow, and Paul F. Rothstein; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Scott G. Campbell, Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard A. Samp; and for Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. by Martin S. Kaufman. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. by Richard A. Meserve and Bert Black; for the American College of Legal Medicine by Miles J. Zaremski; for the Carnegie Commission on Science,, Technology, and Government by Steven G. Gallagher, Elizabeth H. Esty, and Margaret A. Berger; for the Defense Research Institute, Inc., by Joseph A. Sherman, E. Wayne Taff, and Harvey L. Kaplan; for the New England Journal of Medicine et al. by Michael Malina and Jeffrey I. D. Lewis; for A Group of American Law Professors by Donald N. Bersoff; for Alvan R. Feinstein by Don M. Kennedy, Loretta M. Smith, and Richard A. Oetheimer; and for Kenneth Rothman et al. by Neil B. Cohen. [509 U.S. 579, 1]
OJ JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we are called upon to determine the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial.
I
Petitioners Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller are minor children born with serious birth defects. They and their parents sued respondent in California state court, alleging that the birth defects had been caused by the mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription antinausea drug marketed by respondent. Respondent removed the suits to federal court on diversity grounds.
After extensive discovery, respondent moved for summary judgment, contending that Bendectin does not cause birth defects in humans and that petitioners would be unable to come forward with any admissible evidence that it does. In support of its motion, respondent submitted an affidavit of Steven H. Lamm, physician and epidemiologist, who is a well-credentialed expert on the risks from exposure to various [509 U.S. 579, 2] chemical substances. 1 Doctor Lamm stated that he had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and human birth defects – more than 30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients. No study had found Bendectin to be a human teratogen (i.e., a substance capable of causing malformations in fetuses). On the basis of this review, Doctor Lamm concluded that maternal use of Bendectin during the first trimester of pregnancy has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects.
Petitioners did not (and do not) contest this characterization of the published record regarding Bendectin. Instead, they responded to respondent’s motion with the testimony of eight experts of their own, each of whom also possessed impressive credentials. 2 These experts had concluded that Bendectin can cause birth defects. Their conclusions were based upon “in vitro” (test tube) and “in vivo” (live) animal studies that found a link between Bendectin and malformations; pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of Bendectin that purported to show similarities between the [509 U.S. 579, 3] structure of the drug and that of other substance known to cause birth defects; and the “reanalysis” of previously published epidemiological (human statistical) studies.
The District Court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. The court stated that scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is based is “`sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs.'” 727 F.Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989), quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (CA9 1978). The court concluded that petitioners’ evidence did not meet this standard. Given the vast body of epidemiological data concerning Bendectin, the court held, expert opinion which is not based on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to establish causation. 727 F.Supp., at 575. Thus, the animal cell studies, live animal studies, and chemical structure analyses on which petitioners had relied could not raise, by themselves, a reasonably disputable jury issue regarding causation. Ibid. Petitioners’ epidemiological analyses, based as they were on recalculations of data in previously published studies that had found no causal link between the drug and birth defects, were ruled to be inadmissible because they had not been published or subjected to peer review. Ibid.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 951 F.2d 1128 (1991). Citing Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923), the court stated that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific community. 951 F.2d, at 1129-1130. The court declared that expert opinion based on a methodology that diverges “significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the field . . . cannot be shown to be `generally accepted as a reliable technique.'” Id., at 1130, quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (CA9 1985). [509 U.S. 579, 4]
The court emphasized that other Courts of Appeals considering the risks of Bendectin had refused to admit reanalyses of epidemiological studies that had been neither published nor subjected to peer review. 951 F.2d, at 1130-1131. Those courts had found unpublished reanalyses “particularly problematic in light of the massive weight of the original published studies supporting [respondent’s] position, all of which had undergone full scrutiny from the scientific community.” Id., at 1130. Contending that reanalysis is generally accepted by the scientific community only when it is subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ reanalyses as “unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review process, and generated solely for use in litigation.” Id., at 1131. The court concluded that petitioners’ evidence provided an insufficient foundation to allow admission of expert testimony that Bendectin caused their injuries and, accordingly, that petitioners could not satisfy their burden of proving causation at trial.
We granted certiorari, 506 U.S. 914 (1992), in light of sharp divisions among the courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony. Compare, e.g., United States v. Shorter, 257 U.S. App. D.C. 358, 363-364, 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (applying the “general acceptance” standard), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987), with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (CA3 1990) (rejecting the “general acceptance” standard).
II
A
In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye case, the “general acceptance” test has been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial. See E. Green & C. Nesson, Problems, Cases, and Materials on Evidence 649 (1983). Although under increasing [509 U.S. 579, 5] attack of late, the rule continues to be followed by a majority of courts, including the Ninth Circuit. 3
The Frye test has its origin in a short and citation-free 1923 decision concerning the admissibility of evidence derived from a systolic blood pressure deception test, a crude precursor to the polygraph machine. In what has become a famous (perhaps infamous) passage, the then Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described the device and its operation and declared:
“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone, the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” 54 App. D.C., at 47, 293 F., at 1014 (emphasis added).
Because the deception test had “not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made,” evidence of its results was ruled inadmissible. Ibid.
The merits of the Frye test have been much debated, and scholarship on its proper scope and application is legion. 4 [509 U.S. 579, 6] Petitioners’ primary attack, however, is not on the content, but on the continuing authority, of the rule. They contend that the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 5 We agree.
We interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988). Rule 402 provides the baseline:
“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules [509 U.S. 579, 7] prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”
“Relevant evidence” is defined as that which has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Rule 401. The Rule’s basic standard of relevance thus is a liberal one.
Frye, of course, predated the Rules by half a century. In United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), we considered the pertinence of background common law in interpreting the Rules of Evidence. We noted that the Rules occupy the field, id., at 49, but, quoting Professor Cleary, the Reporter, explained that the common law nevertheless could serve as an aid to their application:
“`In principle, under the Federal Rules, no common law of evidence remains. “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided. . . .” In reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated powers.'” Id., at 51-52.
We found the common law precept at issue in the Abel case entirely consistent with Rule 402’s general requirement of admissibility, and considered it unlikely that the drafters had intended to change the rule. Id., at 50-51. In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), on the other hand, the Court was unable to find a particular common-law doctrine in the Rules, and so held it superseded.
Here there is a specific Rule that speaks to the contested issue. Rule 702, governing expert testimony, provides:
“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, [509 U.S. 579, 8] or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”
Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes “general acceptance” as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a “general acceptance” standard. The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid “general acceptance” requirement would be at odds with the “liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules and their “general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to `opinion’ testimony.” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S., at 169 (citing Rules 701 to 705). See also Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991) (“The Rules were designed to depend primarily upon lawyer-adversaries and sensible triers of fact to evaluate conflicts”). Given the Rules’ permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention “general acceptance,” the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made “general acceptance” the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials. 6
B
That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place [509 U.S. 579, 9] no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. 7 Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules, the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.
The primary locus of this obligation is Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify. “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” an expert “may testify thereto.” (Emphasis added.) The subject of an expert’s testimony must be “scientific . . . knowledge.” 8 The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word “knowledge” [connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.] The term “applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986). Of course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be “known” to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science. See, e.g., Brief for Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. as Amici Curiae 9 (“Indeed, scientists do not assert that they know what is immutably `true’ – they are committed to searching for new, temporary theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena”); Brief for American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8 (“Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about [509 U.S. 579, 10] the universe. Instead, it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement” (emphasis in original). But, in order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be [derived by the scientific method.] Proposed testimony must be supported by [appropriate validation] – i.e., “good grounds,” based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific knowledge” establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 9
Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” This condition goes primarily to relevance. “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, nonhelpful.” 3 Weinstein & Berger 70202., p. 702-18. See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (CA3 1985) (“An additional consideration under Rule 702 – and another aspect of relevancy – is whether expert testimony proffered in the [509 U.S. 579, 11] case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute”). The consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of “fit.” Ibid. “Fit” is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes. See Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 258 (1986). The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific “knowledge” about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night. Rule 702’s “helpfulness” standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.
That these requirements are embodied in Rule 702 is not surprising. Unlike an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. See Rules 702 and 703. Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge – a rule which represents “a `most pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon `the most reliable sources of information,'” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed.Rule Evid. 602, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 755 (citation omitted) – is premised on an assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.
C
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to [509 U.S. 579, 12] Rule 104(a), 10 whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. 11 This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid, and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test. But some general observations are appropriate.
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested. “Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.” Green, 645. See also C. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science 49 (1966) (“[T]he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test”); K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. [509 U.S. 579, 13] 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability”).
Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability, see S. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers 61-76 (1990), and, in some instances, well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published, see Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990). Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of “good science,” in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected. See J. Ziman, Reliable Knowledge: An Exploration of the Grounds for Belief in Science 130-133 (1978); Relman & Angell, How Good Is Peer Review?, 321 New Eng.J.Med. 827 (1989). The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.
Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error, see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-354 (CA7 1989) (surveying studies of the error rate of spectrographic voice identification technique), and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation, see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (CA2 1978) (noting professional organization’s standard governing spectrographic analysis), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
Finally, “general acceptance” can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A “reliability assessment does not require, although [509 U.S. 579, 14] it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community.” United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d, at 1238. See also 3 Weinstein Berger 70203., pp. 702-41 to 702-42. Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and “a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community,” Downing, 753 F.2d, at 1238, may properly be viewed with skepticism.
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. 12 Its overarching subject is the scientific validity – and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability – of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.
Throughout, a judge assessing a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable rules. Rule 703 provides that expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts or data are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.” Rule 706 allows the court at its discretion to procure the assistance of an expert of its own choosing. Finally, Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially [509 U.S. 579, 15] outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . . .” Judge Weinstein has explained: “Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge, in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules, exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.” Weinstein, 138 F.R.D., at 632.
III
We conclude by briefly addressing what appear to be two underlying concerns of the parties and amici in this case. Respondent expresses apprehension that abandonment of “general acceptance” as the exclusive requirement for admission will result in a “free-for-all” in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions. In this regard, respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987). Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56. Cf., e.g., Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (CA6) (holding that scientific evidence that provided foundation for expert testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, was not sufficient to allow a jury to find it more probable than not that defendant caused plaintiff’s injury), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (CA5 [509 U.S. 579, 16] 1989) (reversing judgment entered on jury verdict for plaintiffs because evidence regarding causation was insufficient), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (CA5 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Green, 680-681. These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising “general acceptance” test, are the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 702.
Petitioners and, to a greater extent, their amici exhibit a different concern. They suggest that recognition of a screening role for the judge that allows for the exclusion of “invalid” evidence will sanction a stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy, and will be inimical to the search for truth. See, e.g., Brief for Ronald Bayer et al. as Amici Curiae. It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and scientific analyses. Yet there are important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment – often of great consequence – about a particular set of events in the past. We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding, [509 U.S. 579, 17] but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes. 13
IV
To summarize: “General acceptance” is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence – especially Rule 702 – do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.
The inquiries of the District Court and the Court of Appeals focused almost exclusively on “general acceptance,” as gauged by publication and the decisions of other courts. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] Doctor Lamm received his master’s and doctor of medicine degrees from the University of Southern California. He has served as a consultant in birth-defect epidemiology for the National Center for Health Statistics, and has published numerous articles on the magnitude of risk from exposure to various chemical and biological substances. App. 34-44.
[ Footnote 2 ] For example, Shanna Helen Swan, who received a master’s degree in biostistics from Columbia University and a doctorate in statistics from the University of California at Berkeley, is chief of the section of the California Department of Health and Services that determines causes of birth defects, and has served as a consultant to the World Health Organization, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institutes of Health. Id., at degree 113-114, 131-132. Stuart A. Newman, who received his bachelor’s in chemistry from Columbia University and his master’s and doctorate in chemistry from the University of Chicago, respectively, is a professor at New York Medical College, and has spent over a decade studying the effect of chemicals on limb development. Id., at 54-56. The credentials of the others are similarly impressive. See id., at 61-66, 73-80, 148-153, 187-192, and Attachments 12, 20, 21, 26, 31, and 32 to Petitioners’ Opposition to Summary Judgment, in No. 84-20, 3-G(I) (SD Cal.).
[ Footnote 3 ] For a catalog of the many cases on either side of this controversy, see P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 1-5, pp. 10-14 (1986 and Supp. 1991).
[ Footnote 4 ] See, e.g., Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw.U.L.Rev. 643 (1992) (hereinafter Green); Becker & Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years – the Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory [509 U.S. 579, 6] Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 Geo. WashLRev. 857, 876-885 (1992); Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye is Sixty-Five Years Old; Should He Retire?, 16 West St.U.L.Rev. 357 (1989); Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 Ford.L.Rev. 595 (1988), Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C.L.Rev. 1 (1988); Proposals for a Model Rule on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 26 Jurimetrics J. 235 (1986); Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 1197 (1980); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 7, 119, 125-127 (1987).
Indeed, the debates over Frye are such a well-established part of the academic landscape that a distinct term – “Frye ologist” – has been advanced to describe those who take part. See Behringer, Introduction, Proposals for a Model Rule on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 26 Jurimetrics J., 237, 239 (1986), quoting Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 Jurimetrics J. 254, 264 (1984).
[ Footnote 5 ] Like the question of Frye’s merit, the dispute over its survival has divided courts and commentators. Compare, e.g., United States v. (Frye is superseded by the Rules of Evidence, Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (CA2 1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979) with Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1111, 1115-1116 (CA5 1991) (en banc) (Frye and the Rules coexist), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992), 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence 70203., pp. 702-36 to 702-37 (1988) (hereinafter Weinstein & Berger) (Frye is dead), and M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 703.2 (3d ed. 1991) (Frye lives). See generally P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 1-5, n. 28-29 (citing authorities).
[ Footnote 6 ] Because we hold that Frye has been superseded and base the discussion that follows on the content of the congressionally enacted Federal Rules of Evidence, we do not address petitioners’ argument that application of the Frye rule in this diversity case, as the application of a judge-made rule affecting substantive rights, would violate the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
[ Footnote 7 ] THE CHIEF JUSTICE “do[es] not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility,” post, at 4, but would neither say how it does so nor explain what that role entails. We believe the better course is to note the nature and source of the duty.
[ Footnote 8 ] Rule 702 also applies to “technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Our discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered here.
[ Footnote 9 ] We note that scientists typically distinguish between “validity” (does the principle support what it purports to show?) and “reliability” (does application of the principle produce consistent results?). See Black, 56 Ford.L.Rev. at, 599. Although “the difference between accuracy, validity, and reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no more than a hen’s kick,” Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 256 (1986), our reference here is to evidentiary reliability – that is, trustworthiness. Cf., e.g., Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed.Rule Evid. 602, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 755. (“`[T]he rule requiring that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact’ is a `most pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon `the most reliable sources of information.'” (citation omitted)); Advisory Committee’s Notes on Art. VIII of Rules of Evidence, 29 U.S.C. App., p. 770 (hearsay exceptions will be recognized only “under circumstances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness”). [In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.]
[ Footnote 10 ] Rule 104(a) provides:
“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) [pertaining to conditional admissions]. In making its determination, it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.” These matters should be established by a preponderance of proof. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 -176 (1987).
[ Footnote 11 ] Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on “novel” scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended. Indeed, theories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule Evidence 201.
[ Footnote 12 ] A number of authorities have presented variations on the reliability approach, each with its own slightly different set of factors. See, e.g., Downing, 753 F.2d, at 1238-1239 (on which our discussion draws in part); 3 Weinstein & Berger 70203., pp. 7021 to 7022 (on which the Downing court in turn partially relied); McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L.Rev. 879, 911-912 (1982); and Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 231 (1983) (statement by Margaret Berger). To the extent that they focus on the reliability of evidence as ensured by the scientific validity of its underlying principles, all these versions may well have merit, although we express no opinion regarding any of their particular details.
[ Footnote 13 ] This is not to say that judicial interpretation, as opposed to adjudicative factfinding, does not share basic characteristics of the scientific endeavor: “The work of a judge is in one sense enduring, and in another, ephemeral. . . . In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross and a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound and fine.” B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 178-179 (1921).
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The petition for certiorari in this case presents two questions: first, whether the rule of Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923), remains good law after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence; and second, if Frye remains valid, whether it requires expert scientific testimony to have been subjected to a peer review process in order to be admissible. The Court concludes, correctly in my view, that the Frye rule did not survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and I therefore join Parts I and II-A of its opinion. The second question presented in the petition for certiorari necessarily is mooted by this holding, but the Court nonetheless proceeds to construe Rules 702 and 703 very much in the abstract, and then offers some “general observations.” Ante, at 12.
“General observations” by this Court customarily carry great weight with lower federal courts, but the ones offered here suffer from the flaw common to most such observations – they are not applied to deciding whether particular testimony was or was not admissible, and therefore they tend to be not only general, but vague and abstract. This is particularly unfortunate in a case such as this, where [509 U.S. 579, 2] the ultimate legal question depends on an appreciation of one or more bodies of knowledge not judicially noticeable, and subject to different interpretations in the briefs of the parties and their amici. Twenty-two amicus briefs have been filed in the case, and indeed the Court’s opinion contains no fewer than 37 citations to amicus briefs and other secondary sources.
The various briefs filed in this case are markedly different from typical briefs, in that large parts of them do not deal with decided cases or statutory language – the sort of material we customarily interpret. Instead, they deal with definitions of scientific knowledge, scientific method, scientific validity, and peer review – in short, matters far afield from the expertise of judges. This is not to say that such materials are not useful or even necessary in deciding how Rule 702 should be applied; but it is to say that the unusual subject matter should cause us to proceed with great caution in deciding more than we have to, because our reach can so easily exceed our grasp.
But even if it were desirable to make “general observations” not necessary to decide the questions presented, I cannot subscribe to some of the observations made by the Court. In Part II-B, the Court concludes that reliability and relevancy are the touchstones of the admissibility of expert testimony. Ante, at 10-11. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides, as the Court points out, that “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” But there is no similar reference in the Rule to “reliability.” The Court constructs its argument by parsing the language “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, . . . an expert . . . may testify thereto. . . .” Fed. Rule Evid. 702. It stresses that the subject of the expert’s testimony must be “scientific . . . knowledge,” and points out that “scientific” “implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science” and that the word “knowledge” [509 U.S. 579, 3] “connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Ante, at 9. From this it concludes that “scientific knowledge” must be “derived by the scientific method.” Ante, at 10. Proposed testimony, we are told, must be supported by “appropriate validation.” Ante, at 10. Indeed, in footnote 9, the Court decides that “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.” Ante, at 10, n. 9 (emphasis in original).
Questions arise simply from reading this part of the Court’s opinion, and countless more questions will surely arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its teaching to particular offers of expert testimony. Does all of this dicta apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis of “technical or other specialized knowledge” – the other types of expert knowledge to which Rule 702 applies – or are the “general observations” limited only to “scientific knowledge”? What is the difference between scientific knowledge and technical knowledge; does Rule 702 actually contemplate that the phrase “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” be broken down into numerous subspecies of expertise, or did its authors simply pick general descriptive language covering the sort of expert testimony which courts have customarily received? The Court speaks of its confidence that federal judges can make a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid, and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Ante, at 12. The Court then states that a “key question” to be answered in deciding whether something is “scientific knowledge” “will be whether it can be (and has been) tested.” Ante, at 12. Following this sentence are three quotations from treatises, which not only speak of empirical testing, but one of which states that the “`criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability'” Ante at 12-13. [509 U.S. 579, 4]
I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its “falsifiability,” and I suspect some of them will be, too.
I [do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility] in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role. I think the Court would be far better advised in this case to decide only the questions presented, and to leave the further development of this important area of the law to future cases. [509 U.S. 579, 1]
Leave a reply to chairmat Cancel reply
MOHAMAD IZAHAM MOHAMED YATIM
The Mathematical Theory of Nothing
Anti Cyber Forensics
- 10 Amazing WordPress Design Resources
- Making 43% of the Web More Dynamic with the WordPress Interactivity API
- WordPress Website Speed Build: The Masters Golf Tournament
- Registering Custom Post Types in the WordPress Admin: Our CloudFest Hackathon Report
- Site-Building Made Simple: Introducing the Public Pattern Library
- 10 WordPress Influencers to Follow in 2024
- Streamlining Your Content Creation: Adding Images From Your Phone With Ease
- A Visit to Where the Cloud Touches the Ground
- 5 Hidden Features of WordPress.com
- Hot Off the Press: New WordPress.com Themes for March 2024
Anti Cyber Forensics - The Art of Counter-Cyber Forensics 
This really essentially a lovely stuff. An doc something like this provides precisely how deep the concept is actually realized by publisher.
Maintain up the great work mate. This website article shows how well you comprehend and know this subject.
The layout of the weblog is absolutely messed up when I look at it in Opera. Plz fix it.
Appreciate the interesting facts on your blog post. We can certainly value good advice. It assists to debate and present knowledge and commentary.
Amazing things here. I’m very satisfied to look your post. Thanks so much and I am taking a look forward to contact you. Will you kindly drop me a mail?
It is really a great and useful piece of information. I’m satisfied that you shared this helpful information with us. Please stay us informed like this. Thank you for sharing.
It’s truly a nice and useful piece of information. I am glad that you simply shared this useful information with us. Please keep us up to date like this. Thank you for sharing.
It is in point of fact a great and helpful piece of information. I am satisfied that you simply shared this helpful info with us. Please stay us up to date like this. Thank you for sharing.
It is in point of fact a nice and helpful piece of info. I am satisfied that you shared this helpful info with us. Please keep us informed like this. Thank you for sharing.
It is in reality a great and useful piece of info. I’m glad that you simply shared this useful information with us. Please stay us informed like this. Thanks for sharing.
It’s in reality a great and useful piece of info. I’m glad that you shared this helpful info with us. Please keep us informed like this. Thanks for sharing.
It is in point of fact a great and helpful piece of info. I’m satisfied that you simply shared this helpful info with us. Please stay us informed like this. Thanks for sharing.
namensko varcevanje [url=http://www.upravljanjepremozenja.info]upravljanje premozenja[/url]
It’s in point of fact a great and helpful piece of information. I am happy that you shared this helpful info with us. Please keep us informed like this. Thanks for sharing.
Fantastic goods from you, man. I have understand your stuff previous to and you are just too fantastic. I really like what you’ve acquired here, certainly like what you’re stating and the way in which you say it. You make it enjoyable and you still take care of to keep it wise. I cant wait to read much more from you. This is really a great web site.
Appreciate it for this post, I am a big big fan of this web site would like to proceed updated.
I am impressed with this web site , really I am a fan .
Deference to post author, some excellent information .
Well I really liked studying it. This tip procured by you is very effective for correct planning.
I gotta favorite this web site it seems very beneficial invaluable
An attention-grabbing dialogue is worth comment. I feel that it’s best to write more on this matter, it won’t be a taboo subject but generally persons are not enough to talk on such topics. To the next. Cheers
Rattling clear site, regards for this post.
Its excellent as your other articles : D, appreciate it for putting up.
I blog quite often and I truly appreciate your information. This great article has really peaked my interest. I will bookmark your site and keep checking for new details about once a week. I opted in for your RSS feed as well.
There are some fascinating points in time on this article however I don’t know if I see all of them center to heart. There’s some validity however I’ll take hold opinion till I look into it further. Good article , thanks and we would like more! Added to FeedBurner as well
I’d forever want to be update on new articles on this web site , saved to fav! .
Some really rattling work on behalf of the owner of this site, perfectly great subject matter.
I gotta favorite this site it seems very useful very useful
An impressive share! I have just forwarded this onto a colleague who has been doing a little homework on this. And he in fact ordered me breakfast simply because I stumbled upon it for him… lol. So allow me to reword this…. Thanks for the meal!! But yeah, thanx for spending the time to discuss this topic here on your blog.
Woh I your content , saved to bookmarks ! .
I likewise think hence , perfectly indited post! .
This website is known as a walk-by way of for the entire data you wanted about this and didn’t know who to ask. Glimpse here, and also you’ll undoubtedly uncover it.
I am not very superb with English but I get hold this really easygoing to translate.
Loving the information on this internet site , you have done outstanding job on the blog posts.
This internet site is my inspiration , very wonderful design and style and perfect content .
Its superb as your other content : D, regards for posting .
I am impressed with this web site , very I am a big fan .
I’ve been exploring for a bit for any high-quality articles or blog posts on this kind of area . Exploring in Yahoo I ultimately stumbled upon this web site. Reading this information So i am satisfied to convey that I’ve an incredibly just right uncanny feeling I came upon just what I needed. I so much no doubt will make sure to don’t put out of your mind this website and provides it a look on a relentless basis.
Some really nice and useful info on this website , too I conceive the design and style contains wonderful features.
I like this web site very much, Its a very nice spot to read and receive information.
Woh I enjoy your posts , saved to fav! .
Excellent post. I was checking constantly this blog and I’m impressed! Very useful information particularly the last part 🙂 I care for such info much. I was looking for this certain info for a long time. Thank you and best of luck.
As I website possessor I think the articles here is rattling good , appreciate it for your efforts.
Some truly nice and utilitarian info on this site, also I think the design holds superb features.
Loving the info on this internet site , you have done great job on the blog posts.
Some times its a pain in the ass to read what blog owners wrote but this site is real user pleasant! .
Its fantastic as your other blog posts : D, thanks for putting up.
I got what you intend, saved to favorites , very nice web site .
Real wonderful visual appeal on this website , I’d rate it 10 10.
Some really prime posts on this site, saved to favorites .
Pretty nice post. I just stumbled upon your blog and wished to say that I’ve truly enjoyed browsing your blog posts. After all I will be subscribing to your rss feed and I hope you write again very soon!
Loving the info on this web site , you have done great job on the posts .
I like this post, enjoyed this one appreciate it for putting up.
Hi! Quick question that’s completely off topic. Do you know how to make your site mobile friendly? My blog looks weird when browsing from my iphone. I’m trying to find a template or plugin that might be able to resolve this issue. If you have any suggestions, please share. Many thanks!
so much excellent info on here, : D.
There are some fascinating deadlines on this article but I don’t know if I see all of them center to heart. There is some validity but I will take hold opinion until I look into it further. Good article , thanks and we would like extra! Added to FeedBurner as properly
You have remarked very interesting points ! ps nice website .
Yeah bookmaking this wasn’t a risky determination great post! .
This is getting a bit more subjective, but I much prefer the Zune Marketplace. The interface is colorful, has more flair, and some cool features like ‘Mixview’ that let you quickly see related albums, songs, or other users related to what you’re listening to. Clicking on one of those will center on that item, and another set of “neighbors” will come into view, allowing you to navigate around exploring by similar artists, songs, or users. Speaking of users, the Zune “Social” is also great fun, letting you find others with shared tastes and becoming friends with them. You then can listen to a playlist created based on an amalgamation of what all your friends are listening to, which is also enjoyable. Those concerned with privacy will be relieved to know you can prevent the public from seeing your personal listening habits if you so choose.
Hello. Cool article. There’s a problem with the web site in firefox, and you might want to test this… The browser is the market leader and a large element of people will leave out your fantastic writing due to this problem.
Lovely just what I was searching for.Thanks to the author for taking his time on this one.
Just a smiling visitant here to share the love (:, btw outstanding design .
Yay google is my king assisted me to find this great website ! .
I was looking through some of your blog posts on this internet site and I believe this internet site is really informative ! Continue putting up.
Enjoyed examining this, very good stuff, thankyou .
Would love to constantly get updated great web blog ! .
I am glad to be one of the visitors on this outstanding internet site (:, regards for putting up.
Really informative and great structure of content material , now that’s user pleasant (:.
I really like your writing style, excellent info , regards for putting up : D.
I really like foregathering utile information , this post has got me even more info! .
Great post, you have pointed out some great points , I besides believe this s a very wonderful website.
Great information thanks alot ill be back for more info on Used Cars
I’ve been browsing online more than three hours today, yet I never found any interesting article like yours. It is pretty worth enough for me. Personally, if all site owners and bloggers made good content as you did, the net will be much more useful than ever before.
I like this web site very much, Its a really nice place to read and obtain information.
I got what you intend, saved to fav, very nice website .
I saw a lot of website but I conceive this one has something extra in it in it
Please let me know if you’re looking for a writer for your weblog. You have some really good posts and I believe I would be a good asset. If you ever want to take some of the load off, I’d absolutely love to write some material for your blog in exchange for a link back to mine. Please blast me an email if interested. Regards!
Looking forward to reading more. Great blog article. Much obliged.
Please let me know if you’re looking for a writer for your weblog. You have some really great posts and I feel I would be a good asset. If you ever want to take some of the load off, I’d absolutely love to write some material for your blog in exchange for a link back to mine. Please shoot me an email if interested. Many thanks!
*An interesting discussion is worth comment. I think that you should write more on this topic, it might not be a taboo subject but generally people are not enough to speak on such topics. To the next. Cheers
nice post…looking forward to more articles.
Great, thanks for sharing this blog article.Really thank you! Really Great.
Appreciate you sharing, great post.Much thanks again. Fantastic.
Thanks for the article.Really looking forward to read more. Want more.
Your point of view is very interesting, but I can’t agree…
Major thanks for the article.Really thank you! Cool.
Thanks for the blog.Really looking forward to read more. Really Cool.
Zune and iPod: Most people compare the Zune to the Touch, but after seeing how slim and surprisingly small and light it is, I consider it to be a rather unique hybrid that combines qualities of both the Touch and the Nano. It’s very colorful and lovely OLED screen is slightly smaller than the touch screen, but the player itself feels quite a bit smaller and lighter. It weighs about 2/3 as much, and is noticeably smaller in width and height, while being just a hair thicker.
Sweet blog! I found it while browsing on Yahoo News. Do you have any suggestions on how to get listed in Yahoo News? I’ve been trying for a while but I never seem to get there! Cheers
Enjoyed every bit of your blog article.Much thanks again. Really Great.
Enjoyed every bit of your article.Really looking forward to read more. Really Great.
This is one awesome blog post.Much thanks again. Much obliged.
Looking forward to reading more. Great post.Much thanks again.
I truly appreciate this blog.
Say, you got a nice blog article.Really looking forward to read more. Want more.
My partner and I absolutely love your blog and find many of your post’s to be precisely what I’m looking for. Does one offer guest writers to write content for yourself? I wouldn’t mind composing a post or elaborating on a number of the subjects you write about here. Again, awesome site!
Hey there! I’m at work browsing your blog from my new iphone! Just wanted to say I love reading through your blog and look forward to all your posts! Keep up the superb work!
Muchos Gracias for your blog.Really thank you! Fantastic.
Hey, thanks for the post.Really thank you! Fantastic.
Do you have a spam issue on this website; I also am a blogger, and I was wanting to know your situation; many of us have developed some nice practices and we are looking to trade techniques with others, please shoot me an email if interested.
Awesome article.Really looking forward to read more. Want more.
Thanks for the article post.Much thanks again. Great.
I recently came accross your site and have been reading along. I thought I would leave my very first remark. Nice blog. I will keep visiting this site very often:D
Thank you ever so for you blog post. Want more.
nice..bookmarking this article.
A round of applause for your article.Much thanks again. Really Cool.
Right now it looks like Expression Engine is the best blogging platform available right now. (from what I’ve read) Is that what you are using on your blog?
I really liked your article post.Really looking forward to read more. Really Cool.
Thanks again for the article post. Cool.
wow, awesome post. Awesome.
Great, thanks for sharing this article.Thanks Again. Great.
Im grateful for the article.Much thanks again. Fantastic.
Quite a few thanks you drastically for this very good and truly insightful write-up. Anybody could get incredibly excellent facts from this submit.exceptional perform continue to maintain it up. I am planning to bookmark this internet site for came back in forthcoming.
Hello would you mind letting me know which web host you’re using? I’ve loaded your blog in 3 completely different internet browsers and I must say this blog loads a lot quicker then most. Can you recommend a good internet hosting provider at a honest price? Many thanks, I appreciate it!
I think this is a real great article post.Really thank you! Fantastic.
Hi there would you mind letting me know which webhost you’re working with? I’ve loaded your blog in 3 completely different web browsers and I must say this blog loads a lot quicker then most. Can you recommend a good internet hosting provider at a fair price? Thank you, I appreciate it!
An interesting discussion is worth comment. I think that you should write more on this topic, it might not be a taboo subject but generally people are not enough to speak on such topics. To the next. Cheers
I really liked your blog.Much thanks again. Great.
Great, thanks for sharing this article post. Will read on…
Really appreciate you sharing this blog.Really looking forward to read more. Fantastic.
Thank you for your blog post. Really Cool.
Enjoyed every bit of your blog article.Really thank you! Awesome.
I value the article. Much obliged.
Do you mind if I quote a few of your posts as long as I provide credit and sources back to your website? My website is in the exact same niche as yours and my users would genuinely benefit from some of the information you provide here. Please let me know if this okay with you. Regards!
Say, you got a nice article post.Really thank you! Fantastic.
Really informative article.Much thanks again. Awesome.
http://blog.fikristationery.com/?p=81
Very good blog.Much thanks again. Will read on…
I value the blog article.Thanks Again. Will read on…
Good day! Do you know if they make any plugins to safeguard against hackers? I’m kinda paranoid about losing everything I’ve worked hard on. Any tips?
I was curious if you ever thought of changing the page layout of your site? Its very well written; I love what youve got to say. But maybe you could a little more in the way of content so people could connect with it better. Youve got an awful lot of text for only having 1 or two images. Maybe you could space it out better?
Really enjoyed this blog.Much thanks again. Want more.
Thanks for sharing, this is a fantastic blog article.Thanks Again. Fantastic.
I truly appreciate this article post. Cool.
I really like and appreciate your blog post.Really thank you! Really Cool.
A round of applause for your blog.Really looking forward to read more. Fantastic.
I appreciate you sharing this article.Thanks Again. Awesome.
I loved your blog.Really thank you! Awesome.
I seen this blog when I was doing a Google search. Thanks for the good read, I look forward to reading more in the future.
I found this blog on Yahoo. Thanks for taking the time to write this. Good stuff here!
Sometimes I think I read too many blogs. This was a great read.
I just added this blog to my Fav’s. Very well written blog piece!
Great article post. Much obliged.
I guess I’m with you on this one! Nice read!
I really like what you had to say. I’ve been thinking about starting a blog like this, but I just don’t know if I’d have the tenacity and the momentum to keep going day after day. I guess I should go for it if I really want it! haha. Good on you for YOUR blog!
Here we go again… I’m spending an extremely long time reading these blogs. Oh Well! It was worth it.
Thanks again for the article post.Really looking forward to read more. Want more.
Some really interesting yet unrelated comments on this post!
I found this blog on Yahoo. Thanks for taking the time to write this. Good stuff here!
Good stuff here! Well written and nicely explained.
Thank you for the good writeup. It if truth be told was a enjoyment account it. Look complicated to far delivered agreeable from you! However, how can we be in contact?
Looking forward to reading more. Great post.Thanks Again. Really Great.
Greetings from Ohio! I’m bored at work so I decided to browse your website on my iphone during lunch break. I love the knowledge you provide here and can’t wait to take a look when I get home. I’m amazed at how quick your blog loaded on my mobile .. I’m not even using WIFI, just 3G .. Anyways, wonderful site!
I got what you mean , appreciate it for posting .Woh I am lucky to find this website through google.
I am impressed with this site, very I am a big fan .
As soon as I detected this internet site I went on reddit to share some of the love with them.
I want foregathering useful info, this post has got me even more info! .
Simply wanna remark on few general things, The website style and design is perfect, the articles is really wonderful : D.
Woh I like your posts , saved to bookmarks ! .
Regards for this howling post, I am glad I detected this site on yahoo.
Regards for all your efforts that you have put in this. very interesting info .
You have brought up a very excellent details , thanks for the post.
Some genuinely nice stuff on this site, I love it.
Perfect piece of work you have done, this internet site is really cool with wonderful info .
Some truly nice and utilitarian info on this website , likewise I conceive the style holds wonderful features.
You have brought up a very fantastic points , thanks for the post.
I like this web blog its a master peace ! Glad I discovered this on google .
I’d constantly want to be update on new blog posts on this site, saved to my bookmarks ! .
I always was interested in this subject and stock still am, thankyou for posting .
Appreciate it for all your efforts that you have put in this. very interesting information.
Some times its a pain in the ass to read what blog owners wrote but this site is really user friendly ! .
I also conceive thence , perfectly indited post! .
You have noted very interesting points ! ps decent internet site .
I really like your writing style, good information, thankyou for posting : D.
Some truly fantastic work on behalf of the owner of this website , absolutely great subject material .
I really treasure your piece of work, Great post.
You have brought up a very great details , regards for the post.
Really nice pattern and superb content material , absolutely nothing else we require : D.
I view something genuinely special in this website .
I am trying not to chime in to much, but I’m really loving this site, and hope this, as well as the excellent reviews some other people have written, will help you decide if it’s the right choice for you.
I am glad to be a visitant of this stark website ! , thankyou for this rare info ! .
I think other website owners should take this internet site as an example , very clean and excellent user friendly design .
You have remarked very interesting points ! ps nice internet site .
Real clear web site , appreciate it for this post.
I always was concerned in this subject and stock still am, appreciate it for posting .
Wohh just what I was searching for, thankyou for putting up.
I like this site because so much useful material on here : D.
Real nice pattern and good articles , nothing at all else we need : D.
Loving the information on this internet site , you have done outstanding job on the posts .
I got what you mean , regards for putting up.Woh I am thankful to find this website through google.
Thankyou for this howling post, I am glad I discovered this internet site on yahoo.
Nice post. I was checking continuously this blog and I am impressed! Very helpful information specifically the last part 🙂 I care for such info much. I was seeking this certain information for a very long time. Thank you and best of luck.
I really like your writing style, superb information, thanks for posting : D.
Fantastic goods from you, man. I’ve understand your stuff previous to and you’re just too excellent. I really like what you have acquired here, certainly like what you are saying and the way in which you say it. You make it enjoyable and you still take care of to keep it smart. I can not wait to read much more from you. This is actually a terrific web site.
Very interesting details you have observed , thankyou for posting .
Some genuinely superb content on this web site , thankyou for contribution.
Definitely believe that which you stated. Your favorite reason seemed to be on the internet the easiest thing to be aware of. I say to you, I definitely get irked while people think about worries that they plainly do not know about. You managed to hit the nail upon the top and defined out the whole thing without having side effect , people can take a signal. Will likely be back to get more. Thanks
I got what you mean , saved to my bookmarks , very nice internet site .
Thank you for sharing with us, I believe this website really stands out : D.
I visited a lot of website but I conceive this one has something extra in it in it
As soon as I noticed this website I went on reddit to share some of the love with them.
Utterly written content material , appreciate it for information .
I think this site has very wonderful composed content posts .
We’re a group of volunteers and opening a new scheme in our community. Your web site offered us with valuable info to work on. You’ve done a formidable job and our whole community will be thankful to you.
Outstanding post, you have pointed out some good points , I as well conceive this s a very excellent website.
Thank you for sharing with us, I conceive this website really stands out : D.
My coder is trying to convince me to move to .net from PHP. I have always disliked the idea because of the expenses. But he’s tryiong none the less. I’ve been using WordPress on various websites for about a year and am concerned about switching to another platform. I have heard good things about blogengine.net. Is there a way I can import all my wordpress content into it? Any help would be greatly appreciated!
Some genuinely tremendous work on behalf of the owner of this internet site , absolutely outstanding content .
I like this web blog very much so much great info .
so much fantastic information on here, : D.
Thank you ever so for you post. Awesome.
so much wonderful information on here, : D.
Deference to post author, some good entropy.
Regards for all your efforts that you have put in this. very interesting information.
Some genuinely great info , Gladiola I noticed this.
I think this site has got some real good information for everyone : D.
Just what I was searching for, thankyou for posting .
Loving the information on this web site , you have done outstanding job on the articles .
Wohh exactly what I was searching for, thankyou for posting .
Just wanna input on few general things, The website design is perfect, the articles is real superb : D.
I rattling delighted to find this internet site on bing, just what I was looking for : D besides saved to fav.
I also think therefore , perfectly pent post! .
I like the efforts you have put in this, regards for all the great articles .
You have mentioned very interesting details ! ps decent web site .
This web site is my breathing in, very fantastic design and perfect content material .
I believe this internet site has very great indited articles articles .
Very interesting points you have mentioned , regards for posting .
hello there and thank you for your information ¡V I have certainly picked up anything new from right here. I did however expertise some technical points using this website, as I experienced to reload the website a lot of times previous to I could get it to load correctly. I had been wondering if your web host is OK? Not that I am complaining, but sluggish loading instances times will sometimes affect your placement in google and can damage your high-quality score if ads and marketing with Adwords. Anyway I am adding this RSS to my e-mail and could look out for a lot more of your respective interesting content. Ensure that you update this again soon..
I am pleased that I noticed this website , exactly the right information that I was looking for! .
You have brought up a very good points , thankyou for the post.
Some truly interesting details you have written. Aided me a lot, just what I was looking for : D.
Merely a smiling visitant here to share the love (:, btw outstanding layout.
hey there and thank you for your information ¡V I¡¦ve certainly picked up something new from right here. I did however expertise some technical points using this website, as I experienced to reload the web site lots of times previous to I could get it to load correctly. I had been wondering if your web host is OK? Not that I’m complaining, but sluggish loading instances times will very frequently affect your placement in google and can damage your high-quality score if advertising and marketing with Adwords. Anyway I am adding this RSS to my e-mail and can look out for a lot more of your respective fascinating content. Ensure that you update this again soon..
superb post. Ne’er knew this, thanks for letting me know.
Definitely believe that which you said. Your favorite reason appeared to be on the web the easiest thing to be aware of. I say to you, I definitely get irked while people consider worries that they plainly do not know about. You managed to hit the nail upon the top as well as defined out the whole thing without having side effect , people can take a signal. Will probably be back to get more. Thanks
Some genuinely interesting details you have written. Assisted me a lot, just what I was searching for : D.
Great post, I think people should acquire a lot from this website its rattling user friendly .
I like this site because so much utile stuff on here : D.
Wonderful goods from you, man. I’ve understand your stuff previous to and you are just too great. I actually like what you have acquired here, really like what you are saying and the way in which you say it. You make it enjoyable and you still care for to keep it sensible. I can not wait to read much more from you. This is actually a great web site.
Only wanna comment on few general things, The website design is perfect, the subject material is really superb : D.
I dugg some of you post as I cogitated they were handy extremely helpful
I like this blog so much, saved to bookmarks .
I truly appreciate your work , Great post.
We’re a group of volunteers and starting a new scheme in our community. Your site offered us with valuable info to work on. You have done an impressive job and our entire community will be grateful to you.
I am impressed with this web site , very I am a big fan .
You have remarked very interesting details ! ps nice web site .
Just what I was looking for, regards for posting .
I like the valuable information you provide in your articles. I will bookmark your weblog and check again here frequently. I’m quite sure I¡¦ll learn a lot of new stuff right here! Best of luck for the next!
I like this website its a master peace ! Glad I observed this on google .
Thankyou for all your efforts that you have put in this. very interesting info .
I like this web site very much, Its a rattling nice situation to read and receive information.
I’d constantly want to be update on new posts on this site, saved to my bookmarks ! .
I admire your work , appreciate it for all the informative content .
Real clear internet site , thanks for this post.
Yeah bookmaking this wasn’t a bad determination outstanding post! .
hello there and thank you for your info ¡V I¡¦ve certainly picked up anything new from right here. I did however expertise several technical issues using this website, as I experienced to reload the web site lots of times previous to I could get it to load properly. I had been wondering if your web host is OK? Not that I’m complaining, but slow loading instances times will sometimes affect your placement in google and can damage your quality score if advertising and marketing with Adwords. Well I¡¦m adding this RSS to my email and can look out for much more of your respective exciting content. Make sure you update this again soon..
I love looking through and I conceive this website got some really useful stuff on it! .
As I website owner I believe the articles here is very good , thanks for your efforts.
I like your writing style really loving this internet site .
I don’t usually comment but I gotta tell regards for the post on this great one : D.
Thanks for sharing, this is a fantastic post.Much thanks again. Really Cool.
Dead composed content , thankyou for information .
I like this website because so much utile material on here : D.
Great goods from you, man. I have understand your stuff previous to and you are just extremely great. I really like what you have acquired here, certainly like what you’re stating and the way in which you say it. You make it enjoyable and you still take care of to keep it smart. I can not wait to read much more from you. This is really a tremendous site.
I like this web site its a master peace ! Glad I observed this on google .
Great post. I was checking constantly this blog and I’m impressed! Extremely useful info particularly the last part 🙂 I care for such info much. I was looking for this particular info for a long time. Thank you and best of luck.
Yeah bookmaking this wasn’t a high risk determination outstanding post! .
Enjoyed looking through this, very good stuff, thanks .
Some really nice stuff on this web site , I like it.
Thanks for this wonderful post, I am glad I found this site on yahoo.
Deference to author , some excellent information .
Muchos Gracias for your blog.Much thanks again. Cool.
Exactly what I was looking for, regards for putting up.
Thankyou for helping out, superb information.
You have observed very interesting details ! ps nice web site .
I really like your writing style, wonderful information, regards for putting up : D.
I like looking through and I conceive this website got some truly useful stuff on it! .
A round of applause for your blog.Much thanks again. Want more.
Im obliged for the article post.Really thank you! Really Cool.
Thanks for sharing, this is a fantastic post. Fantastic.
I cannot thank you enough for the article post.Much thanks again. Keep writing.
Thank you for your blog post.Really looking forward to read more. Cool.
I cannot thank you enough for the article.Really looking forward to read more.
Really appreciate you sharing this article post.Really thank you! Will read on…
I am so grateful for your blog article.Really looking forward to read more.
Very neat article.Really thank you! Keep writing.
Thank you for your blog article.Much thanks again.
Very neat blog post.Really thank you! Awesome.
Thank you for your blog article.Thanks Again. Fantastic.
Thanks so much for the blog.Much thanks again. Fantastic.
Im thankful for the blog post.Much thanks again. Will read on…
wow, awesome article post.Really thank you!
Im thankful for the post.Thanks Again. Fantastic.
wow, awesome article. Really Cool.
Awesome article post. Great.
Say, you got a nice article post.Really thank you! Great.
I really liked your article. Really Great.
Im thankful for the blog post.Much thanks again. Really Cool.
Really informative article. Will read on…
I truly appreciate this post.Really thank you! Great.
Im thankful for the post.Thanks Again. Want more.
Major thanks for the blog article.Much thanks again. Cool.
This is one awesome article post.
Very informative post.Much thanks again.
nice post
Thanks-a-mundo for the article.Really thank you! Much obliged.
Looking forward to reading more. Great blog post.Really thank you! Great.
Really appreciate you sharing this blog article.Really thank you! Cool.
I loved your post.Really looking forward to read more. Great.
Muchos Gracias for your blog post.Really thank you! Much obliged.
Awesome article.Really looking forward to read more. Keep writing.
Hi, I do think your web site may be having browser compatibility issues. Whenever I look at your website in Safari, it looks fine however, when opening in IE, it has some overlapping issues. I simply wanted to provide you with a quick heads up! Apart from that, excellent site!
A big thank you for your article. Want more.
Thank you for your article.Much thanks again. Great.
Very good post.Really thank you! Cool.
I cannot thank you enough for the blog post.Much thanks again. Awesome.
Very good blog post.Really looking forward to read more. Awesome.
Really appreciate you sharing this post.Thanks Again. Much obliged.
Thank you ever so for you blog. Really Great.
Thanks for sharing, this is a fantastic post. Fantastic.
Thanks a lot for the blog post. Cool.
Thanks for sharing, this is a fantastic blog post.Much thanks again. Awesome.
Im grateful for the blog post.Much thanks again. Really Cool.
Great, thanks for sharing this article post.Much thanks again. Great.
Really informative blog.Much thanks again. Awesome.
Thanks a lot for the post.Much thanks again. Much obliged.
Very neat article.Really looking forward to read more. Really Great.
Thank you for your article post.Really thank you! Really Cool.
Thank you for your blog.Really thank you! Want more.
Really enjoyed this article.Really thank you! Much obliged.
Awesome blog article. Really Cool.
I cannot thank you enough for the article.Really thank you! Really Great.
Thanks-a-mundo for the post.Thanks Again. Want more.
You made some decent points there. I looked on the internet for the issue and found most individuals will go along with with your website.
Very good blog.Much thanks again. Much obliged.
I’d have to check with you here. Which is not something I usually do! I enjoy reading a post that will make people think. Also, thanks for allowing me to comment!
Looking forward to reading more. Great blog.Really thank you! Awesome.
Fantastic post.Much thanks again. Really Cool.
Thanks so much for the blog post. Fantastic.
Thank you for your post. Really Great.
A big thank you for your blog article.Really looking forward to read more. Fantastic.
Muchos Gracias for your blog.Thanks Again. Fantastic.
Major thanks for the blog.Much thanks again.
Appreciate you sharing, great post. Keep writing.
I am glad for writing to make you understand what a awesome encounter our girl developed using your blog. She discovered too many details, including how it is like to have a wonderful helping mood to get a number of people smoothly grasp a number of grueling things. You really exceeded our own expectations. Thanks for distributing these great, healthy, informative and even unique guidance on this topic to Kate.
Hey, thanks for the post.Much thanks again. Really Great.
There are some interesting points in time in this article but I don’t know if I see all of them center to heart. There is some validity but I will take hold opinion until I look into it further. Good article , thanks and we want more! Added to FeedBurner as well
I’d have to check with you here. Which is not something I usually do! I enjoy reading a post that will make people think. Also, thanks for allowing me to comment!
Major thankies for the post.Really looking forward to read more. Really Great.
Thanks for sharing, this is a fantastic blog article.Really thank you! Keep writing.
Thanks for the blog post.Really thank you! Awesome.
wow, awesome article. Awesome.
Thank you ever so for you blog.Thanks Again. Fantastic.
I cannot thank you enough for the article.Really looking forward to read more. Will read on…
Thanks-a-mundo for the blog.Much thanks again. Really Cool.
Great, thanks for sharing this article.Much thanks again.
Great, thanks for sharing this article. Great.
Thanks so much for the post.Really thank you!
wow, awesome article.Really thank you! Will read on…
A big thank you for your blog article. Want more.
Thanks-a-mundo for the blog article.Much thanks again. Fantastic.
Thanks-a-mundo for the blog.Really looking forward to read more. Will read on…
Very good post.Much thanks again. Really Cool.
Hey, thanks for the article post.Really looking forward to read more. Really Great.
I cannot thank you enough for the blog.Really looking forward to read more.
wow, awesome article post.Really thank you! Much obliged.
I loved your post. Really Great.
Wow, great blog. Great.
Great blog. Awesome.
Very good article post.Really looking forward to read more. Will read on…
Appreciate you sharing, great post.Thanks Again. Great.
Very good blog article.Really thank you! Really Great.
A round of applause for your blog article.Really looking forward to read more.
I really enjoy the blog post.Much thanks again. Awesome.
Thanks again for the article post.Thanks Again. Will read on…
Major thanks for the blog. Want more.
Im grateful for the blog post.Really looking forward to read more. Keep writing.
Im thankful for the post.Really looking forward to read more. Much obliged.
wow, awesome article post.Really looking forward to read more. Much obliged.
Enjoyed every bit of your article. Much obliged.
Appreciate you sharing, great post.Much thanks again. Fantastic.
Thank you for your post.Thanks Again. Really Cool.
I really liked your article post.Really thank you! Want more.
I value the blog article.Really thank you! Much obliged.
Im grateful for the article.Really looking forward to read more. Awesome.
Im obliged for the post.Much thanks again. Great.
Very informative post.Really looking forward to read more. Keep writing.
Hey, thanks for the article.Thanks Again. Cool.
I loved your article post. Will read on…
Very informative post.Much thanks again. Really Cool.
I really like and appreciate your blog post.Really thank you! Really Cool.
Really appreciate you sharing this post.Really looking forward to read more.
What youre saying is completely true. I know that everybody must say the same thing, but I just think that you put it in a way that everyone can understand. I also love the images you put in here.
Wow, that’s what I was exploring for, what a material!
existing here at this webpage, thanks admin of this web site.
I am extremely impressed with your writing skills as well as with the layout
on your weblog. Is this a paid theme or did you modify it yourself?
Either way keep up the excellent quality writing, it’s rare to see a great blog like this one
these days.
mG95vu Looking forward to reading more. Great blog post. Really Great.
M1IMXi Really enjoyed this article post.Much thanks again. Awesome.